菩薩藏佛教學會
20
背景
翻譯
下載 ▾

X50n0822_成唯識論證義(第1卷-第3卷)|X50n0822_成唯識論證義(第1卷-第3卷)(續2)

"接下來破斥所產生的粗糙顏色。分為四個部分。首先破斥結果的顏色不超過原因的量。論證如下:你所執著的結果不應該是眼等色根所能感知的,這是論點(宗)。原因是:因為它不超過原因的量。譬如極微(Paramāṇu,最小的物質單位)。這便違背了你自己的主張。又犯了自語相違的過失。如果說結果的顏色與原因的量結合,並非粗糙但看起來像粗糙,一定是根境(Indriya-viṣaya,感官及其對像)的話,那麼結果既然與原因相同,原本就是極微,原因應該像結果一樣,極微也應該是粗糙的。立論破斥如下:你所執著的結果顏色沒有粗糙的性質結合,這是論點(宗)。原因是:因為它與原因的量相同。譬如極微。或者極微也應該與粗糙的性質結合。原因是:因為位置沒有區別。就像粗糙的結果顏色一樣。",

"如果說結果的顏色遍佈在自身的原因之中,因此也不是色根所能感知的。",

"第二,從結果像原因的角度來破斥。首先陳述並轉變對方的觀點。自身的原因就是極微。如果說結果的顏色遍佈在自身的原因之中,原因的本體不是單一的,可以稱之為粗糙,那麼原因的本體既然很多,結果也應該很多,就像很多極微,位置各不相同一樣。論證如下:你所執著的結果顏色本體應該不是單一的,這是論點(宗)。原因是:因為位置各不相同。就像所在的原因一樣。結果既然各自不同地存在於原因之中,仍然不能成為粗糙的顏色。因此,結果的顏色也不是眼根所能感知的。",

"如果說結果由多個部分結合而成為粗糙,那麼你所執著的前後就互相矛盾了。",

"第三,從原因像結果的角度來破斥。首先陳述並轉變對方的觀點。如果說粗糙的顏色不是由極微構成,而是由結果的多個部分結合而成為粗糙的,那麼結合多個極微,也應該不細微,完全可以成為五根(Pañcendriya,五種感官)現量(Pratyakṣa,直接感知)的境界,何必用多個結果結合成粗糙的呢?既然粗糙的結果顏色是由多個部分組成的,那就是假法(Kalpana,虛構的事物)。而你卻認為是有實體的,這就違背了你自己的教義。",

"又,結果與原因都具有質礙(Sapatighata,阻礙),這只是隨意的虛妄計度。",

"第四,從原因和結果同處一地的角度來破斥。結果與原因應該不在同一處,這是論點(宗)。原因是:因為都具有質礙。譬如兩個極微。如果說結果和原因互相涉入,就像沙子吸收水,藥物進入熔化的銅一樣,誰會承認有吸收水的沙子,進入藥物的銅呢?即使承認吸收進入,各個分支分離,也不能說是一個整體。沙子、銅、水、藥物,本體各自轉變,也不能說是恒常。你為何執著它是恒常且是唯一的呢?《廣百論》(Vipulapratishtha,廣百論)中說:『其次,爲了破斥……』"

], “english_translations”: [ “English version”, “Siddhanta (宗, Thesis). Hetu (因, Reason) says: ‘Because it can produce a result.’ For example, that which it produces.”,

"Furthermore, the produced result does not exceed the measure (size, scope, etc.) of the cause, just as there is no difference in color and location between a coarse result and its cause.",

"Next, refuting the produced coarse color. Divided into four parts. First, refuting that the color of the result does not exceed the measure of the cause. The argument is as follows: What you hold as the result should not be perceptible by the color sense organs such as the eye, this is the thesis (宗). The reason is: because it does not exceed the measure of the cause. For example, a Paramāṇu (極微, the smallest unit of matter). This contradicts your own assertion. It also commits the fault of self-contradiction. If you say that the color of the result combines with the measure of the cause, is not coarse but appears coarse, and must be a sense object (Indriya-viṣaya, 根境, sense organ and its object), then since the result is the same as the cause, it is originally a Paramāṇu, the cause should be like the result, and the Paramāṇu should also be coarse. Establishing an argument to refute: What you hold as the color of the result does not have a combination of coarse properties, this is the thesis (宗). The reason is: because it is the same measure as the cause. For example, a Paramāṇu. Or the Paramāṇu should also have a combination of coarse properties. The reason is: because there is no difference in location. Like the coarse color of the result.",

"If you say that the color of the result pervades within its own cause, therefore it is also not perceptible by the color sense organ.",

"Second, refuting from the perspective of the result being like the cause. First, stating and transforming the opponent's view. The self-cause is the Paramāṇu. If you say that the color of the result pervades within its own cause, and the substance of the cause is not singular, it can be called coarse, then since the substance of the cause is many, the result should also be many, just like many Paramāṇus, each in a different location. The argument is as follows: What you hold as the substance of the color of the result should not be singular, this is the thesis (宗). The reason is: because the locations are different. Like the cause in each location. Since the results each exist differently within the cause, it still cannot become a coarse color. Therefore, the color of the result is also not perceptible by the eye sense organ.",

"If you say that the result becomes coarse because multiple parts combine, then what you hold is contradictory before and after.",

"Third, refuting from the perspective of the cause being like the result. First, stating and transforming the opponent's view. If you say that the coarse color is not composed of Paramāṇus, but becomes coarse because multiple parts of the result combine, then combining multiple Paramāṇus should also not be subtle, and can completely become the object of direct perception (Pratyakṣa, 現量) of the five sense organs (Pañcendriya, 五根), why use multiple results to combine into something coarse? Since the coarse color of the result is composed of multiple parts, then it is a constructed phenomenon (Kalpana, 假法, fabricated thing). But you consider it to be a real entity, which contradicts your own doctrine.",

"Furthermore, both the result and the cause have obstruction (Sapatighata, 質礙), this is merely arbitrary and false speculation.",

"Fourth, refuting from the perspective of the cause and result being in the same place. The result and the cause should not be in the same place, this is the thesis (宗). The reason is: because they both have obstruction. For example, two Paramāṇus. If you say that the result and cause interpenetrate each other, like sand absorbing water, or medicine entering molten copper, who would admit that there is sand that absorbs water, or copper that enters medicine? Even if absorption and entry are admitted, the various branches separate, and it cannot be said to be a single entity. Sand, copper, water, and medicine, their substances each transform, and it cannot be said to be constant. Why do you hold that it is constant and unique? The Vipulapratishtha (廣百論) says: 'Next, in order to refute...'"

] }


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

極微因果同處。及顯因體定是無常。故說頌曰。若因為果壞。是因即非常。或許果與因二體不同處。諸質礙物。余礙逼時。若不移處。必當變壞如是極微。果所侵逼。或相受入。異體同居。如以細流。溉粗砂聚。或復入中。令其轉變。如妙藥汁。注赤镕銅。若許如前。則有諸分。既相受入。諸分支離。如相離物。不共生果。是則應無一切粗物。又若同彼有諸細分。即應如彼體是無常。若許如后。自說極微體有變壞。何待徴難。若並不許。應許極微互相障隔。因果別處。以有礙物。處必不同。如非因果諸有礙物。又粗色果下。重縱奪破。若謂因相雖多。果體是一者。則得一分時。應得一切分。何以故。彼此是一故。一即一切故。若不許一得一切。便違果體是一之理。若許一得一切。又違彼此各別之事。故彼所執。妄計而已。進退。即上許與不許。

  然諸外道品類雖多所執有法不過四種。

  此下。總破四執。前以九十五種。束為十三宗。今又束為四種。華嚴疏云。若計一者。則謂因中有果。若計異者。則謂因中無果。三則亦有亦無。四則非有非無。余諸異計皆不出此。廣百論云。一切世間句義名言所表。心慧所知。情執不同。略有四種。謂有。非有。俱許。俱非。隨次應知配四邪執。謂一。非一。雙許。雙非。

  一執有法無有等性(至)色等應無青黃等異。

  此即因中有果計。有法。即所造之法。有性。即能造之性。彼執下。破。勿一切法即有性者。事理不可執一取故。理雖一而事則殊故。量云。有法與有等性其體定

```json
{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "極微(paramāṇu,最小的物質單位)的因果關係存在於同一處。並且,顯現的因的本體必定是無常的。所以經文偈頌說:『如果因為結果而壞滅,那麼這個因就是無常的。』或者認為果和因是兩個不同的本體,諸如具有質礙的物體,當受到其他質礙物的逼迫時,如果不移動位置,必定會變壞。就像極微一樣,受到果的侵逼,或者相互容納,不同的本體同居一處,就像用細小的水流灌溉粗糙的沙堆。或者進入其中,使其轉變,就像用妙藥的汁液注入赤紅的熔銅。如果允許像前面所說的那樣,那麼就會有諸多分。既然相互容納,諸多分就分離了,就像分離的物體,不共同產生結果。那麼就應該沒有一切粗大的物體。又如果和它們一樣具有諸多分,就應該像它們一樣本體是無常的。如果允許像後面所說的那樣,自己已經說了極微的本體有變壞,還等待什麼征難呢?如果都不允許,就應該允許極微互相障礙隔離,因果處於不同的地方。因為有障礙的物體,所處的位置必定不同,就像非因果的諸有礙物。又粗大的色果向下,受到重壓、縱向拉伸和破壞。如果認為因的相雖然多,果的本體是一個,那麼得到一個分的時候,就應該得到一切分。為什麼呢?因為彼此是一體的緣故,一就是一切的緣故。如果不允許得到一個就得到一切,就違背了果的本體是一的道理。如果允許得到一個就得到一切,又違背了彼此各別的事實。所以他們的執著,只是虛妄的計度而已。進退,就是上面所說的允許與不允許。",
    
    "然而各種外道(tīrthika,佛教以外的修行者)的品類雖然很多,但他們所執著的有法(bhāva,存在)不過四種。",
    
    "下面總破斥四種執著。之前以九十五種,歸納為十三宗,現在又歸納為四種。《華嚴疏》說:『如果計度為一,那麼就認為因中存在果。如果計度為異,那麼就認為因中沒有果。第三種是既有也有沒有,第四種是非有非沒有。其餘各種不同的計度都不能超出這四種。』《廣百論》說:『一切世間的語句、意義、名稱、言語所表達的,心智所瞭解的,情感執著的不同,大致有四種,即有、非有、俱許、俱非。應當知道依次對應四種邪執,即一、非一、雙許、雙非。』",
    
    "第一種執著有法沒有等性(samatā,平等性),以至於色等應該沒有青黃等不同的性質。",
    
    "這就是因中存在果的計度。有法,就是所造作的法。有性,就是能造作的性質。下面破斥他們的觀點。不要認為一切法就是有性,因為事理不可執著於一。理雖然是一,但事則不同。論證說:有法與有等性,它們的本體必定是..."
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "The cause and effect of the paramāṇu (smallest unit of matter) exist in the same place. Moreover, the manifested entity of the cause is definitely impermanent. Therefore, the verse says: 'If the cause is destroyed because of the effect, then this cause is impermanent.' Or, it is thought that the effect and the cause are two different entities, such as objects with obstruction. When pressed by other obstructive objects, if they do not move, they will definitely deteriorate. Just like the paramāṇu, being encroached upon by the effect, or mutually accommodating, different entities coexisting in one place, like irrigating a rough pile of sand with a small stream of water. Or entering into it, causing it to transform, like pouring the juice of a wonderful medicine into molten red copper. If it is allowed as mentioned earlier, then there will be many parts. Since they accommodate each other, the parts are separated, just like separated objects, not jointly producing results. Then there should be no coarse objects at all. Furthermore, if they have many parts like them, then their entities should be impermanent like them. If it is allowed as mentioned later, one has already said that the entity of the paramāṇu has deterioration, what further questioning is needed? If none of these are allowed, then it should be allowed that the paramāṇus obstruct and isolate each other, and the cause and effect are in different places. Because objects with obstruction must be in different places, just like non-causal obstructive objects. Also, the coarse color effect goes downwards, subjected to heavy pressure, longitudinal stretching, and destruction. If it is thought that although the aspects of the cause are many, the entity of the effect is one, then when one part is obtained, all parts should be obtained. Why? Because they are one with each other, one is all. If it is not allowed that obtaining one means obtaining all, then it violates the principle that the entity of the effect is one. If it is allowed that obtaining one means obtaining all, then it violates the fact that they are separate from each other. Therefore, their attachment is merely a false calculation. Advance and retreat refer to the above-mentioned allowance and disallowance.",
    
    "However, although there are many categories of tīrthikas (non-Buddhist practitioners), the bhāvas (existences) they adhere to are only four types.",
    
    "Below, the four attachments are refuted in general. Previously, ninety-five types were summarized into thirteen schools, and now they are summarized into four types. The Huayan Commentary says: 'If one calculates as one, then it is thought that the effect exists in the cause. If one calculates as different, then it is thought that the effect does not exist in the cause. The third is both existent and non-existent, and the fourth is neither existent nor non-existent. All other different calculations cannot exceed these four.' The Extensive Treatise on the Hundred Verses says: 'All worldly phrases, meanings, names, and expressions, understood by the mind and wisdom, and the differences in emotional attachments, are roughly of four types, namely existence, non-existence, both allowed, and both disallowed. It should be known that they correspond to the four wrong attachments in order, namely one, not one, both allowed, and both disallowed.'",
    
    "The first attachment is that bhāva does not have samatā (equality), so that colors etc. should not have different qualities such as blue and yellow.",
    
    "This is the calculation that the effect exists in the cause. Bhāva is the dharma that is created. Samatā is the nature that can create. Below, their views are refuted. Do not think that all dharmas are samatā, because things and principles cannot be attached to as one. Although the principle is one, the things are different. The argument says: bhāva and samatā, their entities must be..."
  ]
}

一。是有法。體無差別是宗。因云。一切法即有性故。喻如有性。既違自教。亦違世間。又違現量。青黃色等。現量境故。廣百論云。數論外道執有等性與諸法一。即當有句。此執非真。所以者何。若青等色與色性一。應如色性其體皆同。又樂等聲與聲性一。應如聲性其體皆同。香味觸等。類亦應爾。眼等諸根與根性一。應如根性其體皆同。應一一根取一切境。應一一境對一切根。又一切法與有性一。應如有性其體皆同。又樂苦癡。及與思我。與有性一。應如有性其體皆同。是則汝宗所立差別皆不成就。故彼所執決定非真。

  二執有法與有等性(至)應如聲等非眼等境。

  此即因中無果計。先敘執。彼執下。破。勿一切法非有性故者。事理不可分為二故。量云。若有法與有等性。其體定異。是有法。體不可得是宗。因云。一切法非有性故。如已滅無。既違自教。又違世間。廣百論云。勝論外道說有等性與法非一。當非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若青等色與色性異。應如聲等非眼所行。聲等亦然。聲等性應如色等。非耳等境。又一切法非有性者。應如兔角。其體本無。是則應同空無我論。或同餘道邪見師宗。豈不有性非即諸法。法雖非有而有有耶。所依法無。能依豈有。又有性上無別有性。應不名有。所餘諸法雖有有性。非有性故。其體應無。是則一切所立句義皆不得成。便同撥無邪見外道。故彼所執決定非真。

  三執有法與有等性(至)而執為實理定不成。

  此即亦有亦無計。先敘執。彼執下。破。廣百論云。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "一、第一種觀點認為,『有法』(dharmin,具有自性的事物)的本體與『有性』(astitva,存在性)沒有差別,這是他們的宗義。他們提出的理由是:『一切法』(sarva-dharma,一切事物)都具有『有性』。但這種比喻就像說『如有性』一樣,既違背了他們自己的教義,也違背了世間的常識,還違背了現量(pratyaksa,直接感知)。因為青色、黃色等都是現量所能感知的對象。正如《廣百論》所說:數論外道認為『有等性』(sāmānya,共性)與諸法是同一的,這相當於肯定了『有』的說法。但這種觀點並非真實。為什麼呢?如果青色等顏色與『色性』(rūpa-sāmānya,顏色的共性)是同一的,那麼它們的本體應該像『色性』一樣完全相同。又如果快樂等聲音與『聲性』(śabda-sāmānya,聲音的共性)是同一的,那麼它們的本體應該像『聲性』一樣完全相同。香味觸等也應如此。眼等諸根與『根性』(indriya-sāmānya,根的共性)是同一的,那麼它們的本體應該像『根性』一樣完全相同。這樣一來,就應該每一個根都能感知到一切境,每一個境都能被一切根所感知。又如果一切法與『有性』是同一的,那麼它們的本體應該像『有性』一樣完全相同。又如果快樂、痛苦、愚癡以及思想、自我與『有性』是同一的,那麼它們的本體應該像『有性』一樣完全相同。這樣一來,你們宗派所建立的差別就都不能成立了。所以他們的觀點必定不是真實的。",
    "二、第二種觀點認為,『有法』與『有等性』……(省略中間部分)……應該像聲音等一樣不是眼睛所能感知的對象。",
    "這相當於因中無果的推論。先敘述他們的觀點。『彼執下』開始破斥。『勿一切法非有性故者』,意思是事物的本體和它的理不可分為二。論證如下:如果『有法』與『有等性』,它們的本體必定是不同的,這是『有法』。『有法』的本體不可得,這是他們的宗義。他們提出的理由是:『一切法』不具有『有性』,就像已經滅亡的事物一樣。這既違背了他們自己的教義,也違背了世間的常識。《廣百論》說:勝論外道認為『有等性』與法不是同一的,這相當於否定了『有』的說法。但這種觀點也不是真實的。為什麼呢?如果青色等顏色與『色性』是不同的,那麼它們應該像聲音等一樣不是眼睛所能感知的對象。聲音等也應如此,聲音等的聲音的共性應該像顏色等一樣,不是耳朵等所能感知的對象。又如果一切法不具有『有性』,那麼就應該像兔角一樣,其本體根本不存在。這樣一來,就應該等同於空無我論,或者等同於其他外道的邪見。難道不是『有性』並非就是諸法,法雖然不是『有』,但卻具有『有』嗎?所依賴的法不存在,能依賴的『有』又怎麼可能存在呢?又在『有性』之上沒有其他的『有性』,因此不應該被稱為『有』。其餘的諸法雖然具有『有性』,但因為不是『有性』,它們的本體應該不存在。這樣一來,一切所建立的句義都不能成立,就等同於撥無因果的邪見外道。所以他們的觀點必定不是真實的。",
    "三、第三種觀點認為,『有法』與『有等性』……(省略中間部分)……而執著為真實,這個道理必定不能成立。",
    "這相當於亦有亦無的推論。先敘述他們的觀點。『彼執下』開始破斥。《廣百論》說:"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "I. The first view is that the essence of 'dharmin' (a thing possessing inherent nature) is no different from 'astitva' (existence), which is their tenet. Their reason is: 'All dharmas' (sarva-dharma, all things) possess 'astitva'. But this analogy is like saying 'as existence', which contradicts their own teachings, common sense, and direct perception (pratyaksa). Because blue, yellow, etc., are objects that can be perceived by direct perception. As the *Shatashastra* says: The Samkhya heretics believe that 'sāmānya' (generality) is identical to all dharmas, which is equivalent to affirming 'existence'. But this view is not true. Why? If blue and other colors are identical to 'rūpa-sāmānya' (the generality of color), then their essence should be completely the same as 'rūpa-sāmānya'. Also, if pleasure and other sounds are identical to 'śabda-sāmānya' (the generality of sound), then their essence should be completely the same as 'śabda-sāmānya'. The same should be true for smell, taste, touch, etc. If the eye and other senses are identical to 'indriya-sāmānya' (the generality of the senses), then their essence should be completely the same as 'indriya-sāmānya'. In this case, each sense should be able to perceive all objects, and each object should be able to perceived by all senses. Also, if all dharmas are identical to 'astitva', then their essence should be completely the same as 'astitva'. Also, if pleasure, pain, ignorance, as well as thought and self, are identical to 'astitva', then their essence should be completely the same as 'astitva'. In this case, all the distinctions established by your sect would not be able to stand. Therefore, their view must not be true.",
    "II. The second view is that 'dharmin' is different from 'sāmānya' ... (omitted middle part) ... should be like sounds and other things that cannot be perceived by the eye.",
    "This is equivalent to the inference of no effect in the cause. First, state their view. '彼執下' (pǐ zhí xià) begins the refutation. '勿一切法非有性故者' (wù yī qiē fǎ fēi yǒu xìng gù zhě) means that the essence of things and its principle cannot be divided into two. The argument is as follows: If 'dharmin' and 'sāmānya', their essence must be different, this is 'dharmin'. The essence of 'dharmin' cannot be obtained, this is their tenet. Their reason is: 'All dharmas' do not have 'astitva', just like things that have already perished. This contradicts their own teachings and common sense. The *Shatashastra* says: The Vaisheshika heretics believe that 'sāmānya' is not identical to dharma, which is equivalent to denying 'existence'. But this view is also not true. Why? If blue and other colors are different from 'rūpa-sāmānya', then they should be like sounds and other things that cannot be perceived by the eye. The same should be true for sounds and other things, the generality of sounds should be like colors and other things that cannot be perceived by the ear and other senses. Also, if all dharmas do not have 'astitva', then they should be like rabbit horns, whose essence does not exist at all. In this case, it should be equivalent to the theory of emptiness and no-self, or equivalent to the heretical views of other heretics. Isn't it that 'astitva' is not exactly all dharmas, although dharma is not 'existence', but it has 'existence'? The dharma on which it depends does not exist, how can the 'existence' on which it depends exist? Also, there is no other 'existence' above 'existence', so it should not be called 'existence'. Although the remaining dharmas have 'existence', but because they are not 'existence', their essence should not exist. In this case, all the established sentences and meanings cannot be established, which is equivalent to the nihilistic heretics who deny cause and effect. Therefore, their view must not be true.",
    "III. The third view is that 'dharmin' and 'sāmānya' ... (omitted middle part) ... and clinging to it as real, this principle must not be established.",
    "This is equivalent to the inference of both existence and non-existence. First, state their view. '彼執下' (pǐ zhí xià) begins the refutation. The *Shatashastra* says:"
  ]
}

無慚外道執有等性與彼諸法亦一亦異。當於亦有亦非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若有等性與色等一。同數論過。與色等異。同勝論失。一異二種。性相相違。而言體同。理不成立。一應非一。即異故如異。異應非異。即一故如一。一異既不成。有非有焉立。一異相異。而言體同。則一切法皆應無異。異相既無。一相何有。一異二相。相待立故。若謂一法待對不同名一異者。即應一異二並非真。或隨一假。一法二相。立相乖違。俱言是真。必不應理。故彼所執。決定非真。

  四執有法與有等性(至)諸有智者勿謬許之。

  此即非有非無計。先敘執。彼執下。破。非一異執同異一者。言此執與前亦異亦一之執同也。以非一即異。非異即一故。廣百論云。邪命外道執有等性與彼諸法非一非異。當於非有非非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若有等性。與法非一。同勝論過。與法非異。同數論失。又一異相。世共知有。汝獨撥無。違世間失。又汝所說非一異言。為但是遮。為偏有表。若偏有表。應不雙非(如立非一以顯一。立一以顯非一。謂之表。今既雙非。復何所表)。若但是遮。應無所執(如立非一以遮一。立非異以遮異。既為遮過而設。不得更有所執)。有遮有表。理互相違(遮則非表。表則非遮)無表無遮。言成戲論(既非遮表徒成謔談)。汝執諸法性相非空。而說雙非。但為避過。此雙非語。亦不應論。違汝所宗法性相故。若諸法性一一俱非。此俱非言。亦不應說。舉言必有俱非性故。是則汝曹應常結舌。發言便壞自論所宗。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "外道(Tirthika)心懷慚愧,執著于『等性』(Sameness,指一種普遍存在的、不變的實體)以及『彼諸法』(所有現象)之間『亦一亦異』(既相同又不同)的關係。對於『亦有亦非有』(既存在又不存在)的說法,這也是不真實的。為什麼呢?如果『等性』與『色』(Rupa,物質)等現象相同,就會犯了數論派(Samkhya)的『同數論過』(認為所有個體都是同一本質的複製品)的錯誤;如果『等性』與『色』等現象相異,就會犯了勝論派(Vaisheshika)的錯誤。『一』(Oneness,同一)和『異』(Difference,差異)這兩種性質,在本質上是相互矛盾的,卻說它們在本體上是相同的,這在邏輯上是無法成立的。『一』應該不是『一』,因為它與『異』相同,就像『異』一樣;『異』應該不是『異』,因為它與『一』相同,就像『一』一樣。既然『一』和『異』都不能成立,那麼『有』和『非有』又怎麼能成立呢?『一』和『異』的性質是不同的,卻說它們在本體上是相同的,那麼一切法都應該沒有差異了。既然差異的性質不存在,那麼『一』的性質又怎麼存在呢?『一』和『異』這兩種性質,是相互依存而存在的。如果說一個法根據不同的參照對像而被稱為『一』或『異』,那麼『一』和『異』都不是真實的,或者其中一個是虛假的。一個法具有兩種相互矛盾的性質,這在邏輯上是說不通的。如果說兩者都是真實的,那更是沒有道理的。所以,他們的執著肯定是錯誤的。",
    
    "四種執著『有法』(existent phenomena)與『有等性』(the sameness of existence)的觀點……所有有智慧的人都不要錯誤地接受它。",
    
    "這就是『非有非無計』(neither existent nor nonexistent)。首先敘述他們的執著,然後在下面進行駁斥。『非一異執』(neither one nor different)與『同異一者』(the same as the one that is both identical and different)的執著相同。因為『非一』就是『異』,『非異』就是『一』。廣百論(Vimsatika)中說:『邪命外道(Ajivikas)執著于『等性』與『彼諸法』之間『非一非異』的關係。對於『非有非非有』的說法,這也是不真實的。為什麼呢?如果『等性』與法『非一』,就會犯了勝論派的錯誤;如果『等性』與法『非異』,就會犯了數論派的錯誤。而且,『一』和『異』的性質,世人都知道是存在的,只有你們否認它,這是違背世間的錯誤。而且,你們所說的『非一異』,是僅僅表示否定,還是偏向于肯定?如果偏向于肯定,就不應該雙重否定(例如,建立『非一』是爲了顯示『一』,建立『一』是爲了顯示『非一』,這叫做肯定。現在既然雙重否定,又想顯示什麼呢?)。如果僅僅表示否定,就應該沒有任何執著(例如,建立『非一』是爲了否定『一』,建立『非異』是爲了否定『異』,既然是爲了否定錯誤而設立的,就不能再有任何執著)。肯定和否定,在邏輯上是相互矛盾的(否定就不是肯定,肯定就不是否定)。沒有肯定也沒有否定,就成了戲論(既然既不肯定也不否定,就只是開玩笑)。你們執著于諸法的性質不是空性,卻又說雙重否定,只是爲了避免過失。這種雙重否定的說法,也是不應該討論的,因為它違背了你們所宗的法性。如果諸法的性質一一都是否定,那麼這種雙重否定的說法,也是不應該說的,因為說出來就必然有雙重否定的性質。那麼你們就應該永遠閉嘴,一說話就會破壞自己所宗的理論。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Outwardly shameless Tirthikas (non-Buddhist schools) cling to the 'Sameness' (a universal, unchanging entity) and 'those phenomena' (all phenomena) as 'neither one nor different' (both identical and different). Regarding the statement 'neither existent nor nonexistent,' this is also untrue. Why? If 'Sameness' is the same as phenomena like 'Rupa' (form, matter), it would commit the error of the Samkhya school's 'numerical identity fallacy' (believing all individuals are replicas of the same essence); if 'Sameness' is different from phenomena like 'Rupa,' it would commit the error of the Vaisheshika school. The qualities of 'Oneness' (identity) and 'Difference' (distinctness) are inherently contradictory, yet to say they are the same in essence is logically untenable. 'One' should not be 'one' because it is the same as 'different,' just like 'different'; 'different' should not be 'different' because it is the same as 'one,' just like 'one.' Since 'one' and 'different' cannot be established, how can 'existence' and 'non-existence' be established? The qualities of 'one' and 'different' are distinct, yet to say they are the same in essence implies that all dharmas (phenomena) should have no difference. Since the quality of difference does not exist, how can the quality of 'one' exist? The two qualities of 'one' and 'different' exist interdependently. If one says that a dharma is called 'one' or 'different' based on different references, then 'one' and 'different' are both untrue, or one of them is false. It is logically inconsistent for a dharma to have two contradictory qualities. To say that both are true is even more unreasonable. Therefore, their clinging is definitely wrong.",
    
    "The four views clinging to 'existent phenomena' and 'the sameness of existence'... all wise people should not mistakenly accept it.",
    
    "This is the 'neither existent nor nonexistent' view. First, describe their clinging, and then refute it below. The 'neither one nor different' clinging is the same as 'the one that is both identical and different.' Because 'not one' is 'different,' and 'not different' is 'one.' The Vimsatika states: 'Ajivikas (a heterodox sect) cling to the relationship between 'Sameness' and 'those phenomena' as 'neither one nor different.' Regarding the statement 'neither existent nor nonexistent,' this is also untrue. Why? If 'Sameness' is 'not one' with dharma, it would commit the error of the Vaisheshika school; if 'Sameness' is 'not different' from dharma, it would commit the error of the Samkhya school. Moreover, the qualities of 'one' and 'different' are known to exist by the world, but you alone deny it, which is an error against the world. Furthermore, is your statement 'neither one nor different' merely expressing negation, or does it lean towards affirmation? If it leans towards affirmation, it should not be doubly negative (for example, establishing 'not one' is to reveal 'one,' establishing 'one' is to reveal 'not one,' which is called affirmation. Now that it is doubly negative, what do you want to reveal?). If it merely expresses negation, then there should be no clinging (for example, establishing 'not one' is to negate 'one,' establishing 'not different' is to negate 'different,' since it is established to negate errors, there should be no further clinging). Affirmation and negation are logically contradictory (negation is not affirmation, affirmation is not negation). Without affirmation and without negation, it becomes mere play (since it neither affirms nor negates, it is just joking). You cling to the nature of dharmas as not being emptiness, yet you say double negation, just to avoid faults. This double negation should not be discussed either, because it violates the nature of dharma that you uphold. If the nature of dharmas is negated one by one, then this double negation should not be said either, because saying it necessarily has the quality of double negation. Then you should always shut your mouths, and speaking will destroy the theory you uphold.'"
  ]
}

默亦不成。以俱非故。語默俱失。一何苦哉。誰有智人。而不悲愍。故彼所執。決定非真。如是世間四種外道。邪論惡見。擾壞其心。虛妄推尋諸法性相。皆不中理。競執紛紜。于諸法中。起四種謗。謂有。非有。雙許。雙非。增益。損減。相違。戲論。是故世間所執非實。破外道法執竟。

  余乘所執離識實有(至)及諸無為理非有故。

  次破余乘。分二。一問答標數。二正釋所執。今初。余乘于大乘百法中。止許七十五法。謂色法十一。不相應行法十四。無為法有三。心所法四十六。心法唯一。共七十五。故下破詞。于不相應及無為法。唯舉彼所執之數破之。余則不舉。色十一者。有對十。無對一。有對十者。五根。五塵。彼計極微所成。經部師計能成極微是實。所成根等是假。以實從假。眼緣粗色。不緣極微。薩婆多計能所皆實。無對一者。謂法處無表色。不相應十四者。一得。二非得。三同分。四命根。五心無定。六滅盡定。七無想報。八生。九住。十異。十一無常。十二名身。十三句身。十四文身。薩婆多計不與色心相應。皆是實有。無為三者。一虛空。二擇滅。三非擇滅。薩婆多計離色心等實有自體。心所法四十六者。大地有十。大善地十。大煩惱地六。大不善地二。小煩惱地十。不定地八。為四十六。大地十者。一受。二想。三思。四觸。五欲。六慧。七念。八作意。九勝解。十三摩地。大善地十者。一信。二不放逸。三輕安。四行舍。五慚。六愧。七無貪。八無嗔。九不害。十勤。大煩惱地六者。一癡。二放逸

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "沉默也不能成立,因為沉默和言語都是虛假的。言語和沉默都失去了意義,這是多麼痛苦啊!誰是有智慧的人,而不為此悲憫呢?所以他們所堅持的,絕對不是真理。像這樣,世間四種外道,以邪惡的理論和錯誤的見解,擾亂人們的心,虛妄地推求諸法的體性和現象,都不合乎道理。他們競相執著,紛爭不已,對於諸法,生起四種誹謗:認為『有』、『非有』、『既有又非有』、『既非有也非非有』,這是增益和損減;互相違背,如同兒戲。所以世間所執著的都不是真實的。破斥外道的法執完畢。",
    
    "其他宗派所執著的離開識而存在的實法(乃至)以及各種無為法,在道理上是不存在的。",
    
    "接下來破斥其他宗派的觀點。分為兩部分:一是問答並標明數量,二是正式解釋所執著的觀點。現在開始第一部分。其他宗派對於大乘百法中,只承認七十五法,即色法十一、不相應行法十四、無為法有三、心所法四十六、心法唯一,總共七十五。所以下面的破斥之詞,只針對不相應行法和無為法,只列舉他們所執著的數量來破斥,其餘的則不列舉。色法十一,包括有對色十種,無對色一種。有對色十種,即五根(眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根),五塵(色塵、聲塵、香塵、味塵、觸塵)。他們認為五根五塵是由極微組成的。經部師認為能組成極微的是真實的,所組成的根等是虛假的。因為真實來自虛假,所以眼根緣于粗色,不緣于極微。薩婆多部認為能組成和所組成的都是真實的。無對色一種,指法處所攝的無表色。不相應行法十四種,一是得,二是非得,三是同分,四是命根,五是心無定,六是滅盡定,七是無想報,八是生,九是住,十是異,十一是無常,十二是名身,十三是句身,十四是文身。薩婆多部認為這些不與色心相應,都是真實存在的。無為法三種,一是虛空,二是擇滅,三是非擇滅。薩婆多部認為這些離開色心等,有真實的自體。心所法四十六種,大地法有十種,大善地法有十種,大煩惱地法有六種,大不善地法有二種,小煩惱地法有十種,不定地法有八種,總共四十六種。大地法十種,一是受,二是想,三是思,四是觸,五是欲,六是慧,七是念,八是作意,九是勝解,十是三摩地。大善地法十種,一是信,二是不放逸,三是輕安,四是行舍,五是慚,六是愧,七是無貪,八是無嗔,九是不害,十是勤。大煩惱地法六種,一是癡,二是放逸。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Silence is also untenable, because both silence and speech are false. Speech and silence both lose their meaning; how painful this is! Who is wise and does not feel compassion for this? Therefore, what they insist on is definitely not the truth. Thus, the four types of external paths in the world, with their evil theories and wrong views, disturb people's minds, vainly seeking the nature and characteristics of all dharmas, none of which is reasonable. They compete in clinging, arguing endlessly, and regarding all dharmas, they give rise to four kinds of slander: thinking 'it exists,' 'it does not exist,' 'it both exists and does not exist,' 'it neither exists nor does it not exist,' which are addition and subtraction; they contradict each other, like children playing. Therefore, what the world clings to is not real. The refutation of the external paths' clinging to dharmas is complete.",
    
    "The real dharmas that other schools cling to as existing apart from consciousness (and even) all unconditioned dharmas, are not existent in principle.",
    
    "Next, refute the views of other schools. It is divided into two parts: first, question and answer and mark the number; second, formally explain the views they cling to. Now begin the first part. Other schools, among the hundred dharmas of Mahayana, only acknowledge seventy-five dharmas, namely eleven forms, fourteen non-associated formations, three unconditioned dharmas, forty-six mental factors, and one mind, totaling seventy-five. Therefore, the words of refutation below only target non-associated formations and unconditioned dharmas, only listing the number they cling to in order to refute them, and the rest are not listed. The eleven forms include ten with opposition and one without opposition. The ten with opposition are the five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and the five objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch). They believe that the five roots and five objects are composed of extremely small particles. The Sautrantika school believes that what can compose extremely small particles is real, and what is composed, such as the roots, is false. Because the real comes from the false, the eye root is related to coarse form, not to extremely small particles. The Sarvastivada school believes that both what can compose and what is composed are real. The one without opposition refers to the unmanifested form included in the dharma realm. The fourteen non-associated formations are: one is attainment, two is non-attainment, three is commonality, four is life force, five is mental instability, six is cessation attainment, seven is mindless retribution, eight is birth, nine is duration, ten is difference, eleven is impermanence, twelve is name body, thirteen is sentence body, fourteen is word body. The Sarvastivada school believes that these are not associated with form and mind, and are all real. The three unconditioned dharmas are: one is space, two is selective cessation, and three is non-selective cessation. The Sarvastivada school believes that these have real self-nature apart from form and mind. The forty-six mental factors include ten universal mental factors, ten wholesome mental factors, six root afflictions, two unwholesome mental factors, ten minor afflictions, and eight variable mental factors, totaling forty-six. The ten universal mental factors are: one is feeling, two is perception, three is volition, four is contact, five is desire, six is wisdom, seven is mindfulness, eight is attention, nine is resolution, and ten is samadhi. The ten wholesome mental factors are: one is faith, two is non-negligence, three is tranquility, four is equanimity, five is shame, six is embarrassment, seven is non-greed, eight is non-hatred, nine is non-harming, and ten is diligence. The six root afflictions are: one is ignorance, and two is negligence."
  ]
}

。三懈怠四不信。五惛沉。六掉舉。大不善地二者。一無慚。二無愧。小煩惱地十者。一忿。二覆。三慳。四嫉。五惱。六害。七恨。八諂。九誑。十憍。不定地八者。一貪。二嗔。三慢。四疑。五睡眠。六惡作。七尋。八伺。或問小乘執法。理在不疑。既悟我空。何有執我。答。此說宗徒。非預聖者。至如我等宗大乘教。豈能皆悟法空理耶。

  且所執色總有二種(至)二者無對非極微成。

  二正破所執。依數分三。一色法分二。一正舉。二正釋三。一正舉分二。一標數。對者礙也。二色相對。互相窒礙。如木與石。互相系時。體不相過。互對礙住。名有對義。集論云。謂有見者。皆是有對。又三因故。說名有對。謂種類故。積集故。不修治故。種類者。謂諸法互為能礙。互為所礙。積集者。謂極微已上。不修治者。謂非三摩地自在轉色。又損處依處。是有對義。無對反此。有對色者。即五根五塵十種色。無對色者。法處攝色。據大乘教。亦有五種。一極略色。二極迥色。三受所引色。四遍計所執色。五定果色。一極略色者。以極微為體。但是析彼五根五塵四大定果色至極微位。即此極微。便是極略色體。二極迥色者。即空間六般光影明暗等粗色。令析此六般粗色至極微位。取此細色為極迥色體。又若上下空界所見青。黃。赤。白。光。影。明。暗。即總名空一顯色。及門牕孔隙中所現者。即總名迥色。三受所引色者。受者是領納義。所引色者。即思種現上有防發功能。名所引色。意云。由於師教處領受。為能引發起思種現上

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "三、懈怠;四、不信;五、惛沉;六、掉舉。大不善地法有二種:一、無慚;二、無愧。小煩惱地法有十種:一、忿;二、覆;三、慳;四、嫉;五、惱;六、害;七、恨;八、諂;九、誑;十、憍。不定地法有八種:一、貪;二、嗔;三、慢;四、疑;五、睡眠;六、惡作;七、尋;八、伺。或者有人問:小乘修行人執著於法,這個道理毋庸置疑。既然已經領悟到『我空』的道理,怎麼還會執著于『我』呢?回答:這裡說的是宗派的徒眾,並非已經證悟的聖者。至於我們宗派修習大乘教義的人,難道都能領悟法空的道理嗎?",
    
    "而且所執著的色法總共有兩種(到)第二種是無對,不是由極微組成的。",
    
    "第二部分,正式破斥所執著。根據數量分為三部分。一、色法分為二部分。一、正式提出;二、正式解釋。三、正式提出分為二部分。一、標明數量。「對」的意思是阻礙。二、色法相對,互相阻礙。比如木頭和石頭,互相接觸時,物體不能穿過彼此,互相阻礙停留,這叫做「有對」的含義。《集論》中說:『凡是有可見之物的,都是有對的。』又因為三種原因,稱作「有對」。即種類原因、積集原因、不修治原因。種類原因,是指諸法互相成為能阻礙者,互相成為所阻礙者。積集原因,是指極微以上的事物。不修治原因,是指非三摩地自在轉變的色法。此外,損害處和依靠處,也是「有對」的含義。「無對」則與此相反。「有對」的色法,即五根、五塵這十種色法。「無對」的色法,是法處所攝的色法。根據大乘教義,也有五種:一、極略色;二、極迥色;三、受所引色;四、遍計所執色;五、定果色。一、極略色,以極微為本體。但是分析五根、五塵、四大、定果色到極微的階段,這個極微,就是極略色的本體。二、極迥色,即空間中六種光影明暗等粗色。將這六種粗色分析到極微的階段,取這個細色作為極迥色的本體。又如果上下空界所見的青、黃、赤、白、光、影、明、暗,就總稱為空一顯色。以及門窗孔隙中所顯現的,就總稱為迥色。三、受所引色,受是指領納的含義。所引色,是指思種現行上有防止和引發的功能,叫做所引色。意思是說,由於從師長處領受教導,才能引發思種現行。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Three, sloth; four, disbelief; five, dullness; six, restlessness. There are two types of greatly unwholesome mental factors: one, shamelessness; two, lack of embarrassment. There are ten types of minor afflictive mental factors: one, anger; two, concealment; three, stinginess; four, jealousy; five, annoyance; six, harmfulness; seven, resentment; eight, flattery; nine, deceit; ten, arrogance. There are eight types of indeterminate mental factors: one, greed; two, hatred; three, pride; four, doubt; five, sleep; six, regret; seven, investigation; eight, analysis. Someone might ask: 'The followers of the Hinayana school are attached to the Dharma, this is undoubtedly true. Since they have realized the emptiness of self (Atma-sunyata), how can they still be attached to the self?' The answer is: 'This refers to the followers of the school, not the enlightened sages. As for those of us who practice the Mahayana teachings, can all of us realize the principle of the emptiness of phenomena (Dharma-sunyata)?'",
    
    "Moreover, there are two types of form (rupa) that are clung to: (to) The second is non-obstructive and not composed of ultimate particles (paramanu).",
    
    "The second part is the formal refutation of what is clung to. Based on number, it is divided into three parts. One, form is divided into two parts. One, formal presentation; two, formal explanation. Three, formal presentation is divided into two parts. One, marking the number. 'Obstructive' means hindrance. Two, forms are relative, mutually obstructing each other. For example, wood and stone, when they come into contact with each other, the bodies cannot pass through each other, mutually hindering and stopping, this is called the meaning of 'obstructive'. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says: 'Whatever is visible is obstructive.' Furthermore, it is called 'obstructive' because of three reasons: the reason of type, the reason of accumulation, and the reason of non-cultivation. The reason of type refers to the fact that all dharmas mutually become obstructers and are mutually obstructed. The reason of accumulation refers to things above the ultimate particle. The reason of non-cultivation refers to form that is not freely transformed by *samadhi*. In addition, the place of harm and the place of reliance are also the meaning of 'obstructive'. 'Non-obstructive' is the opposite of this. 'Obstructive' forms are the ten types of forms: the five roots and the five objects. 'Non-obstructive' forms are the forms included in the *dharmadhatu*. According to the Mahayana teachings, there are also five types: one, extremely subtle form (atyanta-paritta-rupa); two, extremely remote form (atyanta-vivikta-rupa); three, form produced by sensation (vedana-nirharya-rupa); four, conceptually constructed form (parikalpita-rupa); five, form resulting from meditative concentration (samadhi-gochara-rupa). One, extremely subtle form, has the ultimate particle as its substance. However, analyzing the five roots, five objects, the four great elements, and the form resulting from meditative concentration to the stage of the ultimate particle, this ultimate particle is the substance of the extremely subtle form. Two, extremely remote form, is the six types of coarse forms in space, such as light, shadow, brightness, and darkness. Analyzing these six types of coarse forms to the stage of the ultimate particle, taking this subtle form as the substance of the extremely remote form. Furthermore, if the blue, yellow, red, white, light, shadow, brightness, and darkness seen in the upper and lower space are collectively called the manifest form of space. And what appears in the gaps of doors and windows is collectively called remote form. Three, form produced by sensation, sensation means the meaning of reception. Form produced, refers to the function of preventing and producing on the manifestation of the seed of thought, called form produced. It means that due to receiving teachings from the teacher, the manifestation of the seed of thought can be triggered."
  ]
}

防發功能。名所引色。即此防發功能。不能表示他故亦名無表色。即以無表色為體。四遍計色者。即妄心遍計。執色為實。從所得色以得其名。五定果色者。定中現境。即如有人作水觀。外人不見人惟見水之類。已上五般法處色。總分三門。一影像門。二無表門。三定果門。一影像門者。影者流類義。像者相似義。即所變相分。是本質之流類。又與本質相似。故名影像。即極略極迥二色。此但是觀心析塵色至色邊際。假立極微。唯有觀心影像。都無實體。散位獨頭意識緣五根五塵水月映象時。當情變起遍計影像相分。此是假非實。故與極略等同立一影像門。問。且如水中月。鏡中像。眼識亦緣。如何言假。唯意識緣。答。水月映象。唯是法境。但以水鏡為緣。其意識便妄計有月有像。並非眼識之境。亦是遍計色收。又遍計是妄心。極略等是觀心。同是假影像故。所以總立。第二無表門。一律儀有表色者。即師前受戒時是。由此表色故。方熏得善思種子。有防發功能。立無表色。二不律儀有表色者。即正下刀殺生造業時是。由此有表色。方熏得不善思種子。有防發功能。立無表色。若處中有表色者。即正禮佛行道及毆擊罵詈時是。由此無表色。方熏得善惡思種。亦有防發功能。立無表色。余詳本條。

  彼有對色定非實有能成極微非實有故。

  二正釋分二。一破有對色。但破能成。則所成不立。此總句。廣如下破。

  謂諸極微若有質礙(至)如何可整合瓶衣等。

  先約質礙破。量云。極微是有法。是假非實宗。因云。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "『防發功能。名所引色』(具有防止惡業生起的功能,由名稱所引導的色法)。即此『防發功能』,不能表示其他,故也名為『無表色』(無法通過行為或語言表達的色法)。即以『無表色』為本體。『四遍計色』(第四種是遍計所執的色法),即妄心遍計執著,認為色法是真實的,從所得到的色法而得到其名稱。『五定果色』(第五種是禪定所產生的色法),即禪定中顯現的境界,比如有人修水觀,外人看不見人,只看見水之類的現象。以上五種法處所攝的色法,總分為三門:一、影像門;二、無表門;三、定果門。一、影像門,『影』是流類之義,『像』是相似之義,即所變現的相分,是本質的流類,又與本質相似,故名影像。即極略色和極迥色兩種。這只是觀心分析塵色至色法邊際,假立極微,唯有觀心的影像,都無實體。散位獨頭意識緣五根五塵、水月映象時,當情變起遍計影像相分。此是假非實,故與極略等同,立為一影像門。問:比如水中月、鏡中像,眼識也能緣,為何說是假的,唯有意識緣?答:水月映象,唯是法境,但以水鏡為緣,其意識便妄計有月有像,並非眼識之境,也是遍計色所攝。又遍計是妄心,極略等是觀心,同是假影像故,所以總立。第二、無表門。一、律儀有表色者,即在師父面前受戒時是。由此有表色,方能熏習得善思種子,有防發功能,立為無表色。二、不律儀有表色者,即正在下刀殺生造業時是。由此有表色,方能熏習得不善思種子,有防發功能,立為無表色。若處中有表色者,即正在禮佛行道及毆擊罵詈時是。由此無表色,方能熏習得善惡思種,也有防發功能,立為無表色。其餘詳細內容見本條。\\n\\n\t彼有對色定非實有,能成極微非實有故。",
    "\t二正釋分二。一破有對色。但破能成。則所成不立。此總句。廣如下破。",
    "\t謂諸極微若有質礙(至)如何可整合瓶衣等。",
    "\t先約質礙破。量云。極微是有法。是假非實宗。因云。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "'Defensive function. Name-induced form' (possessing the function of preventing the arising of evil karma, guided by name). This 'defensive function,' unable to express anything else, is also called 'non-revealing form' (form that cannot be expressed through actions or language). It takes 'non-revealing form' as its substance. 'Four conceptually constructed forms' (the fourth type is form grasped by conceptual construction), that is, the deluded mind conceptually grasps, believing that form is real, and obtains its name from the form obtained. 'Five meditative result forms' (the fifth type is form produced by meditation), that is, the realm manifested in meditation, such as someone practicing water contemplation, where outsiders do not see the person but only see water. The above five types of forms included in the sphere of dharmas are generally divided into three categories: 1. Image category; 2. Non-revealing category; 3. Meditative result category. 1. Image category: 'Image' means flowing category, 'likeness' means similarity, that is, the manifested aspect-division, which is the flowing category of the essence and is also similar to the essence, hence the name image. Namely, extremely subtle form and extremely distant form. This is only the mind contemplating and analyzing dust-form to the edge of form, falsely establishing ultimate particles, only having the image of the contemplating mind, without any substance. When the scattered solitary consciousness cognizes the five roots, five objects, water-moon reflection, and mirror image, the conceptually constructed image aspect-division arises according to the situation. This is false and not real, so it is the same as extremely subtle form, establishing one image category. Question: For example, the moon in water and the image in a mirror, the eye-consciousness can also cognize, why is it said to be false, and only the consciousness cognizes? Answer: The moon in water and the image in a mirror are only the realm of dharmas, but taking water and mirror as conditions, the consciousness falsely believes that there is a moon and an image, which is not the realm of eye-consciousness, and is also included in conceptually constructed form. Moreover, conceptual construction is the deluded mind, and extremely subtle form is the contemplating mind, both being false images, so they are established together. 2. Non-revealing category: 1. Form of precepts that is revealing, that is, when receiving precepts in front of the teacher. Because of this revealing form, one can cultivate the seeds of wholesome thought, having a defensive function, establishing non-revealing form. 2. Form of non-precepts that is revealing, that is, when killing and creating karma with a knife. Because of this revealing form, one can cultivate the seeds of unwholesome thought, having a defensive function, establishing non-revealing form. If there is revealing form in the intermediate state, that is, when bowing to the Buddha, practicing the Way, and beating and scolding. Because of this non-revealing form, one can cultivate the seeds of wholesome and unwholesome thoughts, also having a defensive function, establishing non-revealing form. See the original article for more details.",
    "That opposing form is definitely not real, because the ultimate particles that constitute it are not real.",
    "2. Correct explanation is divided into two. 1. Refuting opposing form. Only refuting the constituent, then the constituted is not established. This is the general statement. The detailed refutation is below.",
    "That all ultimate particles, if they have resistance (to)... how can they be assembled into bottles, clothes, etc.?",
    "First, refute based on resistance. The inference is: Ultimate particles are the subject. They are false and not real is the thesis. The reason is:"
  ]
}

有質礙故。喻如瓶等。又諸極微如何可整合瓶衣等是宗。因云。無質礙故。喻如非色。

  又諸極微若有方分(至)故有對色實有不成。

  后約方分破。方謂方隅。分謂分位。謂此極微。若有方分。便可分析。既可分析。便非實有。若無方分。則此極微不屬色法。云何和合以成粗色。而能承光發影耶。廣百論頌云。微若有東方。必有東方分。極微若有分。如何是極微。論曰。是諸極微。既有質礙。日輪才舉。舒光觸時。東西兩邊。光影各現。逐日光移。隨光影轉。承光發影。處既不同。故知極微定有方分。既有方分。便失極微。如是極微即可分折。應如粗物非實非常。違汝論宗極微無方分。常住實有。造世間萬物。又佛性論破云。為當一塵中有六方不。若有六方。即成六分。若無六方。非謂為色。既有六分。即可分折。若有方無分。是則六塵共入一塵。無量諸塵並應如是。則無成大義。又如一塵。日光照時。為照一邊。為東西俱達。若唯照一邊。則有六分。若東西俱達。色則非有。故知方分不實。悉並是空。皆可與此互相發也。觸壁等。足上承光發影之義。和合物。即壁等。日光在東。決不在西。物影在西。決不在東。既柱壁等即諸極微。故此極微定有方分。又諸極微。隨處必有方隅差別。若不爾者。便無共相和集之義。若言眾微更相涉入。無方分者。則應塵塵涉入無礙。是名如來殊勝妙色。不成世間質礙粗相。故知極微定有方分。汝執有對即色極微。若無方分。則山川壁石皆可直入。更無障隔。若爾。即是果位聖人所證之色。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "因為有質礙的緣故,可以比喻為瓶子等物體。另外,你們所說的極微(最小的物質單位)如何能夠聚集形成瓶子、衣服等物體呢?這是我的論點。你們的理由是:因為沒有質礙的緣故。這可以比喻為非色法(沒有顏色的事物)。",
    
    "另外,你們所說的極微如果存在方位(方:方位,分:部分),(那麼它就不是最小的單位了,因為可以繼續分割)因此說有對礙的色法是真實存在的,這是不成立的。",
    
    "下面從方位和部分來破斥。方,指的是方位;分,指的是部分。意思是說,如果這個極微存在方位和部分,那麼它就可以被分析。既然可以被分析,那就不是真實存在的。如果不存在方位和部分,那麼這個極微就不屬於色法(有形物質),又怎麼能夠和合在一起形成粗大的色法,並且能夠承受光線、產生陰影呢?《廣百論》的頌文說:『極微如果存在東方,必定存在東方的部分。極微如果存在部分,怎麼能說是極微呢?』論中說:這些極微既然有質礙,太陽剛剛升起,光線照射過來的時候,東西兩邊,光和影各自顯現。隨著太陽光移動,光和影也跟著轉動。承受光線、產生陰影的位置既然不同,所以就知道極微一定存在方位和部分。既然存在方位和部分,就失去了極微的性質。這樣的極微就可以被分割,應該像粗大的物體一樣,不是真實存在,也不是常住不變的。這違反了你們論宗所說的極微沒有方位和部分,常住不變,真實存在,創造世間萬物的說法。另外,《佛性論》破斥說:『難道一個微塵中存在六個方位嗎?如果存在六個方位,那就變成了六個部分。如果不存在六個方位,就不能稱之為色法。』既然存在六個部分,就可以被分割。如果存在方位而沒有部分,那麼六塵(色、聲、香、味、觸、法)就應該共同進入一個微塵,無數的微塵都應該這樣,那就沒有形成大的物體的道理了。又比如一個微塵,當陽光照射的時候,是隻照到一邊,還是東西兩邊都照到?如果只照到一邊,那麼它就存在六個部分。如果東西兩邊都照到,那麼色法就不是真實存在的。所以知道方位和部分不是真實存在的,全部都是空性的。都可以互相引發。』觸壁等,是腳上承受光線、產生陰影的意思。和合物,指的是墻壁等。陽光在東邊,一定不在西邊;物體的影子在西邊,一定不在東邊。既然柱子、墻壁等就是由極微組成的,所以這些極微一定存在方位和部分。另外,這些極微,無論在哪裡,必定存在方位的差別。如果不這樣,就沒有共同和合的道理。如果說眾多極微互相涉入,沒有方位,那麼就應該微塵和微塵之間互相涉入,沒有阻礙。這叫做如來殊勝妙色(佛的清凈色身),不能形成世間有質礙的粗大現象。所以知道極微一定存在方位和部分。你們所執著的有對礙的色法極微,如果沒有方位和部分,那麼山川、墻壁、石頭都可以直接穿過,不再有阻礙。如果這樣,那就是果位聖人所證得的色法(清凈色身)。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Because of having substantial obstruction, it can be compared to objects like bottles. Furthermore, how can the 'paramount atoms' (smallest units of matter) you speak of gather to form bottles, clothes, and other objects? This is my argument. Your reason is: because they have no substantial obstruction. This can be compared to non-color phenomena (things without color).",
    
    "Furthermore, if the 'paramount atoms' you speak of have directions (方: direction, 分: part), (then it is not the smallest unit, because it can be further divided) therefore, saying that obstructive form is truly existent is untenable.",
    
    "The following refutation is based on directions and parts. 'Direction' refers to orientation; 'part' refers to division. The meaning is that if this 'paramount atom' has directions and parts, then it can be analyzed. Since it can be analyzed, it is not truly existent. If it does not have directions and parts, then this 'paramount atom' does not belong to the category of form (tangible matter), so how can it combine to form coarse form, and be able to receive light and cast shadows? The verse in the *Hundred Verses Treatise* says: 'If a paramount atom has an eastern side, it must have an eastern part. If a paramount atom has parts, how can it be a paramount atom?' The treatise says: Since these paramount atoms have substantial obstruction, when the sun rises and its light shines, light and shadow appear on the east and west sides respectively. As the sunlight moves, the light and shadow also move accordingly. Since the locations of receiving light and casting shadows are different, it is known that paramount atoms must have directions and parts. Since they have directions and parts, they lose the nature of paramount atoms. Such paramount atoms can be divided and broken down, and should be like coarse objects, not truly existent and not permanent. This contradicts your doctrine that paramount atoms have no directions and parts, are permanent, truly existent, and create all things in the world. Furthermore, the *Treatise on Buddha-Nature* refutes: 'Does one dust particle have six directions? If it has six directions, then it becomes six parts. If it does not have six directions, it cannot be called form.' Since it has six parts, it can be divided. If there are directions but no parts, then the six sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma) should all enter into one dust particle, and countless dust particles should all be like this, then there is no principle of forming large objects. Also, for example, when sunlight shines on one dust particle, does it only illuminate one side, or does it illuminate both the east and west sides? If it only illuminates one side, then it has six parts. If it illuminates both the east and west sides, then form is not truly existent. Therefore, it is known that directions and parts are not truly existent, and are all empty. They can all mutually cause each other.' Touching the wall, etc., refers to the meaning of the foot receiving light and casting a shadow. Combined objects refer to walls, etc. If the sunlight is in the east, it is definitely not in the west; if the shadow of an object is in the west, it is definitely not in the east. Since pillars, walls, etc., are composed of paramount atoms, these paramount atoms must have directions and parts. Furthermore, these paramount atoms, wherever they are, must have differences in direction. If not, there is no principle of common combination. If it is said that many atoms interpenetrate each other without directions, then atoms should interpenetrate each other without obstruction. This is called the sublime and wonderful form of the Tathagata (Buddha's pure form body), and cannot form the coarse phenomenon of substantial obstruction in the world. Therefore, it is known that paramount atoms must have directions and parts. If the obstructive form atoms that you cling to have no directions and parts, then mountains, walls, and stones can be directly penetrated without obstruction. If so, that is the form (pure form body) realized by sages in the fruition position."
  ]
}

決非世間障礙有對凡色可比。是故極微必有方分。展轉救釋。竟成就一有方分義。故有對色皆可分析。而執為實有者其義不成。

  五識豈無所依緣色(至)自識所變為所緣緣。

  此顯正義。外人問言。五識所依所緣。必有實色。若有對非實。則五識遂無所緣緣耶。論主答云。眼等雖有所依所緣之色。而是識所變現。非是心外別有極微以成根境。但八識生時。內因緣種子力等第八識變似五根五塵。眼等五識。依彼所變根。緣彼本質塵境。雖親不得。要托彼生。實于本識色塵之上。變作五塵相現。即以彼五根為所依。以彼及彼二種五塵為所緣緣。五識若不託第八所變。便無所緣。緣所緣緣中。有親疏故。然眼等下。先明依。色等五塵。世間共見。現量所得。眼等五根。非現量得。除第八識緣。及如來等緣。是現量得。世不共信。余散心中。無現量得。此但能有發識之用。比知是有。此但有功能。非是心外別有大種所造之色。此功能言。即是發生五識作用。觀用知體。如觀生芽。比知種體是有。問。云何而知色是內識所變。曰。外有對色。以理推徴。既不成就。當知定是內識所變。問。既眼等是識所變。何故眼等名根又名所依。曰。以能引發眼等識故。名眼等根。即以此根為俱有依。生眼等識。故又名所依也。此眼等識下。后明緣。此眼等識。外所緣緣。理既非有。應許自識所變為所緣緣。言應許者。是大乘自許。以小乘但許離眼識本質色。不許不離眼識相分色故。大乘以自許言簡。則免隨他一分不極成過。

  謂能引生似自識

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "決不能說世間的障礙(有對——指有相互作用、相互阻礙的性質)能與凡夫所見的色法相比。因此,最小的微塵必定有其方位和部分。經過層層剖析,最終可以證明,凡是有方位部分的色法都是可以被分析的。所以,認為色法是真實存在的觀點是站不住腳的。",
    
    "五識難道沒有所依賴的根和所緣的境嗎?(最終結論是)五識所緣的境是自身意識所變現的,是五識的所緣緣。",
    
    "這是爲了闡明正確的道理。外道之人發問:『五識所依賴的根和所緣的境,必定是真實存在的色法。如果(有對——指有相互作用、相互阻礙的性質)的色法不是真實的,那麼五識豈不是就沒有所緣緣了嗎?』論主回答說:『眼等五根雖然有所依賴的根和所緣的境,但這些都是意識所變現出來的,並非心外別有極微(最小的物質單位)構成根和境。只是在第八識生起時,由於內在的因緣種子力量等,第八識變現出類似於五根和五塵的形象。眼等五識,依賴於第八識所變現的五根,緣取第八識所變現的五塵本質。雖然五識不能直接緣取五塵本質,必須依託于第八識的變現才能產生。實際上,五識是在第八識的色塵之上,變現出五塵的相狀。五識就以這五根為所依,以這五根和五塵兩種為所緣緣。』五識如果不依託于第八識所變現的根和塵,就沒有所緣。在所緣緣中,有親近和疏遠的區別。接下來,先說明五識的所依。色等五塵,是世間人普遍見到的,是現量(直接感知)所獲得的。而眼等五根,不是現量所能獲得的,除非是第八識的緣,以及如來等聖者的緣,才能現量獲得。世間人普遍不相信這一點。在散亂的心境中,無法現量獲得五根。五根只能有引發五識的作用,通過比量(推理)可以知道它的存在。五根只有功能,並非心外別有四大種(地、水、火、風)所造的色法。這裡所說的『功能』,就是指發生五識的作用。通過觀察作用來了解本體,就像觀察新生的嫩芽,從而推知種子的存在。有人問:『如何知道色法是內在意識所變現的呢?』回答說:『外在的(有對——指有相互作用、相互阻礙的性質)色法,經過理性的推論,無法成立,所以應當知道,色法一定是內在意識所變現的。』有人問:『既然眼等五根是意識所變現的,為什麼眼等五根又被稱為根,又被稱為所依呢?』回答說:『因為它們能夠引發眼等五識,所以被稱為眼等根。並且以這眼等根為俱有依(共同存在的依靠),產生眼等五識,所以又被稱為所依。』接下來,說明五識的所緣。眼等五識的外在所緣緣,從理上來說是不存在的,所以應該承認是自身意識所變現的,作為五識的所緣緣。這裡說『應該承認』,是大乘佛教自己承認的。因為小乘佛教只承認離開眼識的本質色,不承認不離開眼識的相分色。大乘佛教用『自許』二字來概括,就可以避免隨順他人宗義而導致的不徹底的過失。",
    
    "(五識的所緣緣)指的是能夠引生類似於自身意識的(相分)。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "It is by no means the case that worldly obstacles (having resistance - referring to the nature of interaction and mutual obstruction) can be compared to the visible forms perceived by ordinary people. Therefore, the smallest particle must have its direction and parts. Through layer-by-layer analysis, it can be ultimately proven that all visible forms with direction and parts can be analyzed. Therefore, the view that visible forms are truly existent is untenable.",
    
    "Do the five consciousnesses not have a basis of support and an object of perception? (The final conclusion is) The object of perception of the five consciousnesses is a transformation of their own consciousness, which is the object-condition of the five consciousnesses.",
    
    "This is to clarify the correct principle. An outsider asks: 'The basis of support and the object of perception of the five consciousnesses must be truly existent visible forms. If visible forms (having resistance - referring to the nature of interaction and mutual obstruction) are not real, then wouldn't the five consciousnesses have no object-condition?' The master replies: 'Although the eyes and other five sense organs have a basis of support and an object of perception, these are all transformations of consciousness. There are no external particles (smallest units of matter) that constitute the sense organs and objects. Only when the eighth consciousness arises, due to the power of internal causes and conditions, such as the seeds, the eighth consciousness transforms into images similar to the five sense organs and the five sense objects. The five consciousnesses, such as the eye consciousness, rely on the five sense organs transformed by the eighth consciousness and perceive the essence of the five sense objects transformed by the eighth consciousness. Although the five consciousnesses cannot directly perceive the essence of the five sense objects, they must rely on the transformation of the eighth consciousness to arise. In reality, the five consciousnesses transform the appearance of the five sense objects on the visible forms of the eighth consciousness. The five consciousnesses take these five sense organs as their basis of support and these five sense organs and five sense objects as their object-condition.' If the five consciousnesses do not rely on the sense organs and objects transformed by the eighth consciousness, they will have no object of perception. Among the object-conditions, there are distinctions of closeness and distance. Next, the basis of support of the five consciousnesses will be explained first. The five sense objects, such as visible forms, are commonly seen by people in the world and are obtained through direct perception. However, the five sense organs, such as the eyes, cannot be obtained through direct perception, unless it is the condition of the eighth consciousness or the condition of enlightened beings such as the Tathagatas, then they can be obtained through direct perception. People in the world generally do not believe this. In a scattered state of mind, the five sense organs cannot be obtained through direct perception. The five sense organs can only have the function of initiating the five consciousnesses, and their existence can be known through inference. The five sense organs only have function and are not visible forms created by the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) that exist outside the mind. The 'function' mentioned here refers to the function of generating the five consciousnesses. By observing the function, one can understand the substance, just like observing a newly sprouted bud and inferring the existence of the seed. Someone asks: 'How do we know that visible forms are transformations of internal consciousness?' The answer is: 'External visible forms (having resistance - referring to the nature of interaction and mutual obstruction), after rational reasoning, cannot be established. Therefore, it should be known that visible forms must be transformations of internal consciousness.' Someone asks: 'Since the eyes and other five sense organs are transformations of consciousness, why are the eyes and other five sense organs also called sense organs and also called basis of support?' The answer is: 'Because they can initiate the eye and other five consciousnesses, they are called the eye and other sense organs. And these eye and other sense organs are taken as the co-existent basis (basis of support), and the eye and other five consciousnesses are produced, so they are also called the basis of support.' Next, the object of perception of the five consciousnesses will be explained. The external object-condition of the eye and other five consciousnesses does not exist in principle, so it should be admitted that it is a transformation of one's own consciousness, serving as the object-condition of the five consciousnesses. The phrase 'should be admitted' here is admitted by Mahayana Buddhism itself. Because Hinayana Buddhism only admits the essential visible form that is separate from the eye consciousness and does not admit the aspect-visible form that is not separate from the eye consciousness. Mahayana Buddhism uses the word 'self-admission' to summarize, which can avoid the fault of incompletely following the doctrines of others.",
    
    "(The object-condition of the five consciousnesses) refers to the (aspect-visible form) that can give rise to something similar to one's own consciousness."
  ]
}

者(至)勿第二月等能生五識故。

  此破和合也。經部師以外和合色。亦能引生似自識相。可作眼等識所緣緣。故觀所緣緣論云。或執和合。以識生時。帶彼相故。非但能生者。謂能緣識帶彼相起。及有實體。令能緣識托彼而生。具此二支。名所緣緣。不但以能生一支。便可名所緣緣也。若以能生一支名為所緣緣者。則因緣。等無間緣。增上緣。皆有能生一義。皆可名為所緣緣。而四緣混濫無別矣。勿者。猶言莫得也。和合與和集不同和合。即金剛經所謂一合相。如男女天地等。以眾。緣合故。攬眾微以成於色。合五陰以成於人。名一合相。其瓶甌等。名和集相。或謂和合即和集。以瓶甌為和合。皆非也。眼等五識了色等時。但緣和合似色之相。此和合相。非離極微有實自體。能生識者既無實體。則所生之識何自而有哉。故和合相。于眼等識。縱作所緣。且無緣義。若有緣義。莫得錯亂眼所見第二月。亦能生五識耶。立量云。汝和合粗色是有法。設為眼識所緣非緣宗。因云。汝執假色無體故。喻如第二月。

  非諸極微共和合位(至)色等極微非五識境。

  此破和合中極微也。正量部救云。和合粗色。雖則是假。而有能成一一極微。此是實有。各得為緣。能生五識。故此破云。非諸極微共和合位。可與五識各作所緣。以眼等識上。不帶極微相故。猶如眼識不帶眼根相。其眼等五根。但能生眼等五識。然眼等五識。即不能緣眼等五根。將根為喻。立量云。汝和合色等能成極微是有法。設為五識緣非所緣宗。因云。五識生時。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本:",
    "『者(至)勿第二月等能生五識故。』",
    
    "這是爲了駁斥和合的觀點。經部師認為外在和合的色法,也能引生類似自身識相的顯現,可以作為眼等識的所緣緣。所以《觀所緣緣論》說:『或者有人執著和合,因為識產生時,會帶有它的相狀。』不僅僅是能生者,而是說能緣的識帶有彼相而生起,並且具有實體,使得能緣的識依託它而生。具備這兩個條件,才能稱為所緣緣。如果僅僅以能生這個條件就稱為所緣緣,那麼因緣、等無間緣、增上緣都具有能生的含義,都可以稱為所緣緣,這樣四緣就混淆不清,沒有區別了。",
    
    "『勿』,相當於『莫得』,也就是『不要』的意思。和合與和集不同。和合,就是《金剛經》所說的一合相,比如男女、天地等,因為眾多因緣聚合,聚集眾多微塵而形成色法,聚合五陰而形成人,稱為一合相。而瓶子、瓦盆等,稱為和集相。或者有人認為和合就是和集,把瓶子瓦盆也當成和合,這些都是不對的。眼等五識了別色等時,只是緣取和合的類似色法的相狀。這種和合相,並非脫離極微而有真實的自體。能生識者既然沒有實體,那麼所生的識又從何而來呢?所以和合相,對於眼等識來說,即使作為所緣,也沒有緣的意義。如果有緣的意義,難道眼所見的第二個月亮也能生起五識嗎?",
    
    "可以這樣立論:你所說的和合粗色是有法(論題所指的對象),設定為眼識所緣但並非(真實的)緣(宗),因為你認為它是虛假的色法,沒有實體(因),就像第二個月亮一樣(喻)。",
    
    "『非諸極微共和合位(至)色等極微非五識境。』",
    
    "這是爲了駁斥和合中極微的觀點。正量部辯解說:和合的粗色,雖然是虛假的,但是有能成就一個個極微的作用,這些極微是真實存在的,各自可以作為緣,能生起五識。因此這裡反駁說:各個極微共同處於和合的位置,不能各自作為五識的所緣,因為眼等識上,不帶有極微的相狀,就像眼識不帶有眼根的相狀一樣。眼等五根,只能生起眼等五識,然而眼等五識,卻不能緣取眼等五根。用根作為比喻,可以這樣立論:你所說的和合色等能成就的極微是有法,設定為五識的緣但並非(真實的)所緣(宗),因為五識生起時,不帶有極微的相狀(因)。",
    
    "English version:",
    "『者(至)勿第二月等能生五識故.』",
    
    "This is to refute the view of aggregation (和合, héhé). The Sautrāntika (經部師, Jīngbù shī) school believes that external aggregated (和合, héhé) forms can also give rise to appearances similar to their own consciousness-aspects, and can serve as the object-condition (所緣緣, suǒyuán yuán) for eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses. Therefore, the *Treatise on the Object-Condition* (觀所緣緣論, Guān suǒyuán yuán lùn) says: 'Or some may cling to aggregation (和合, héhé), because when consciousness arises, it carries their appearance.' It is not merely the 'producer' (能生者, néng shēng zhě), but rather that the 'cognizing consciousness' (能緣識, néng yuán shí) arises carrying that appearance, and possesses substance, so that the cognizing consciousness relies on it to arise. Only when both of these conditions are met can it be called an 'object-condition' (所緣緣, suǒyuán yuán). If only the condition of 'being able to produce' is called an 'object-condition' (所緣緣, suǒyuán yuán), then the causal condition (因緣, yīnyuán), the immediately preceding condition (等無間緣, děngwújiàn yuán), and the dominant condition (增上緣, zēngshàng yuán) all have the meaning of 'being able to produce', and can all be called 'object-condition' (所緣緣, suǒyuán yuán), thus the four conditions would be confused and indistinguishable.",
    
    "『勿 (wù)』 is equivalent to 『莫得 (mò dé)』, which means 『do not』. Aggregation (和合, héhé) is different from collection (和集, héjí). Aggregation (和合, héhé) is the 'one aggregate appearance' (一合相, yī hé xiàng) mentioned in the *Diamond Sutra* (金剛經, Jīngāng jīng), such as male and female, heaven and earth, etc., because of the aggregation of numerous causes and conditions, gathering numerous subtle particles to form form (色, sè), and aggregating the five aggregates (五陰, wǔyīn) to form a person, which is called the 'one aggregate appearance' (一合相, yī hé xiàng). While bottles, basins, etc., are called 'collected appearances' (和集相, héjí xiàng). Or some may think that aggregation (和合, héhé) is the same as collection (和集, héjí), and regard bottles and basins as aggregation (和合, héhé), which is incorrect. When eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses discern form (色, sè), they only perceive the appearance of aggregation (和合, héhé) that resembles form (色, sè). This aggregated appearance (和合相, héhé xiàng) does not have a real self-nature apart from the subtle particles (極微, jīwēi). Since the 'producer of consciousness' (能生識者, néng shēng shí zhě) has no substance, from where does the produced consciousness arise? Therefore, the aggregated appearance (和合相, héhé xiàng), even if it serves as an object for eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses, has no meaning as a condition. If it has the meaning of a condition, could the second moon seen by the eye also give rise to the five consciousnesses?",
    
    "One can establish the following argument: Your asserted aggregated gross form (和合粗色, héhé cū sè) is the subject (有法, yǒu fǎ, the object to be proven). It is posited as an object of eye-consciousness but not a (real) condition (宗, zōng, the thesis). Because you believe it is a false form (假色, jiǎ sè) without substance (因, yīn, the reason), just like the second moon (喻, yù, the example).",
    
    "『非諸極微共和合位(至)色等極微非五識境.』",
    
    "This is to refute the view of subtle particles (極微, jīwēi) within aggregation (和合, héhé). The Vaibhāṣika (正量部, Zhèngliáng bù) school argues: Although the aggregated gross form (和合粗色, héhé cū sè) is false, it has the function of constituting each individual subtle particle (極微, jīwēi), and these subtle particles (極微, jīwēi) are real and can each serve as a condition to give rise to the five consciousnesses. Therefore, this refutation says: The individual subtle particles (極微, jīwēi) together in the position of aggregation (和合位, héhé wèi) cannot each serve as the object for the five consciousnesses, because eye-consciousness and other consciousnesses do not carry the appearance of subtle particles (極微, jīwēi), just as eye-consciousness does not carry the appearance of the eye-organ. The five sense organs, such as the eye-organ, can only give rise to the five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, but the five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, cannot perceive the five sense organs, such as the eye-organ. Using the sense organ as an analogy, one can establish the following argument: Your asserted subtle particles (極微, jīwēi) constituted by aggregated form (和合色, héhé sè) are the subject (有法, yǒu fǎ). It is posited as a condition for the five consciousnesses but not a (real) object (宗, zōng). Because when the five consciousnesses arise, they do not carry the appearance of subtle particles (極微, jīwēi) (因, yīn)."
  ]
}

不帶彼相故。同喻如五根。非諸下。明極微上無和合相。文顯可知。以無和合相故。即越諸根境。縱許為緣。不為所緣。

  有執色等一一極微(至)況無識外真實極微。

  此破極微中和集相也。據集論說。和合聚集。二相不同。和合者。謂極微已上。一切有方分色。更互和合。如濁水中一地水極微。更互和合。聚集者。謂方分聚色。展轉集會。如二泥團。相擊成聚。若水和砂。必不成聚。以水和土。即成泥團。可作瓶等。可見水土一一極微。各各具有和集之相。不和集時。無相可見。非五識境。共和集位。展轉集會。有粗相生。此和集相。與極微俱。乃是實有。以大乘縱許極微實有故。既帶彼相。又能生識。此乃雙支皆是有故。可與五識為所緣緣。此外計意也。彼執下。破。共和集位。與未集時。極微之體。和集之相。無差別故。還是極微。不成所緣。故觀所緣緣論云。和集如堅等。設於眼等識。是緣非所緣。許極微相故。如堅等相。雖是實有。于眼等識。容有緣義。而非所緣。眼等識上。無彼相故。色等極微諸和集相。理亦應爾。彼俱執為極微相故。瓶甌等物下。破轉計。彼遮體相是一之難。計有別相能生識故。如瓶甌等差別可見。為所緣緣。故彼論云。執眼等識能緣極微諸和集相。復有別生。瓶甌等覺相。彼執應無別。非形別故別。形別非實故。瓶甌等物大小等者。能成極微多少同故。緣彼覺相應無差別。若謂彼形物相別故。覺相別者。理亦不然。項等別形。惟在瓶等假法上有非極微故。彼不應執極微亦有差別形相。所以

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "『不帶彼相故』,因為極微本身不具有和合之相。『同喻如五根』,這就像五根(眼、耳、鼻、舌、身)一樣,雖然是緣,但不是所緣。『非諸下』,這部分經文闡明了在最小的極微之上,沒有和合之相,文義顯明易懂。『以無和合相故,即越諸根境』,因為沒有和合之相,所以超越了諸根所能感知的境界。即使允許極微作為緣,也不能作為所緣。",
    
    "『有執色等一一極微(至)況無識外真實極微』,有些人執著於色等一一極微。",
    
    "這段經文破斥了極微中的和集相。根據《集論》的說法,『和合』和『聚集』兩種相不同。『和合者,謂極微已上,一切有方分色,更互和合』,和合是指在極微之上,一切有方分(有方向和範圍)的色法,互相和合,例如渾濁的水中,地和水的極微互相和合。『聚集者,謂方分聚色,展轉**』,聚集是指有方分的聚色,互相接觸,例如兩個泥團,相互撞擊形成聚集。如果用水和砂混合,一定不能形成聚集,但是用水和土混合,就能形成泥團,可以製作瓶子等。可見水、土的每一個極微,各自具有和集之相。不和集時,沒有相可以看見,不是五識所能感知的境界。在共和集的狀態下,互相接觸,產生粗大的相。這種和集相,與極微同時存在,是真實存在的。因為大乘宗允許極微是真實存在的,既帶有彼相,又能產生識,這雙重條件都具備,所以可以作為五識的所緣緣。這是外道的計度之意。『彼執下』,以下破斥他們的執著。在共和集的狀態下,與未聚集時,極微的本體,和集之相,沒有差別,還是極微,不能成為所緣。所以《觀所緣緣論》說:『和集如堅等,設於眼等識,是緣非所緣,許極微相故』,和集就像堅硬等相,雖然是真實存在的,對於眼等識來說,容許有緣的作用,但不是所緣,因為眼等識上,沒有彼相。色等極微的各種和集相,道理也應該如此,因為他們都執著認為是極微的相。『瓶甌等物下』,以下破斥他們轉變的計度。他們爲了遮止體相是一的責難,認為有別的相能產生識,所以可以作為所緣緣,例如瓶子、甌子等差別可以看見。所以《觀所緣緣論》說:『執眼等識能緣極微諸和集相,復有別生,瓶甌等覺相,彼執應無別,非形別故別,形別非實故』,執著眼等識能夠緣極微的各種和集相,又另外產生瓶子、甌子的覺相,他們的執著應該沒有差別,不是因為形狀不同而有差別,因為形狀的不同不是真實的。『瓶甌等物大小等者,能成極微多少同故,緣彼覺相應無差別』,瓶子、甌子等物體的大小等,能夠形成的極微多少相同,緣這些物體的覺相應該沒有差別。『若謂彼形物相別故,覺相別者,理亦不然』,如果說那些形狀、物體相不同,所以覺相不同,道理也不成立。『項等別形,惟在瓶等假法上有非極微故』,頸部等不同的形狀,只存在於瓶子等假法上,不是極微所具有的。所以他們不應該執著極微也有差別的形狀。",
    ""
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "'Not possessing that characteristic,' because the ultimate particles themselves do not possess the characteristic of aggregation. 'The same analogy applies to the five roots,' just like the five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), although they are conditions, they are not the objects of perception. 'Not all below,' this section of the scripture clarifies that above the smallest ultimate particles, there is no characteristic of aggregation, and the meaning of the text is clear and easy to understand. 'Because there is no characteristic of aggregation, it transcends the realm of the senses,' because there is no characteristic of aggregation, it transcends the realm that the senses can perceive. Even if ultimate particles are allowed to be conditions, they cannot be objects of perception.",
    
    "'Some cling to each and every ultimate particle of form, etc. (to) let alone the real ultimate particles outside of consciousness,' some are attached to each and every ultimate particle of form, etc.",
    
    "This passage refutes the characteristic of aggregation in ultimate particles. According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 'aggregation' and 'collection' are two different characteristics. 'Aggregation refers to the mutual aggregation of all forms with spatial dimensions above the ultimate particles,' aggregation refers to the mutual aggregation of all forms with spatial dimensions (having direction and extent) above the ultimate particles, such as the ultimate particles of earth and water mutually aggregating in muddy water. 'Collection refers to the contact of colored aggregates with spatial dimensions,' collection refers to the contact of colored aggregates with spatial dimensions, such as two mud balls colliding to form a collection. If water and sand are mixed, a collection cannot be formed, but if water and soil are mixed, a mud ball can be formed, which can be made into bottles, etc. It can be seen that each ultimate particle of water and soil has the characteristic of aggregation. When not aggregated, no characteristic can be seen, and it is not the realm that the five senses can perceive. In the state of co-aggregation, they contact each other and produce a coarse characteristic. This characteristic of aggregation exists simultaneously with the ultimate particles and is real. Because the Mahayana school allows ultimate particles to be real, possessing both that characteristic and the ability to produce consciousness, these dual conditions are met, so it can be the object-condition of the five senses. This is the intention of externalists. 'Below their attachment,' the following refutes their attachment. In the state of co-aggregation, there is no difference between the essence of the ultimate particles and the characteristic of aggregation when not aggregated, it is still the ultimate particles and cannot become the object of perception. Therefore, the *Tattvarthasamgraha* says: 'Aggregation is like hardness, etc., if it is in the eye, etc., it is a condition but not an object, because the characteristic of ultimate particles is allowed,' aggregation is like hardness, etc., although it is real, for the eye, etc., it is allowed to have the function of a condition, but not an object, because there is no such characteristic on the eye, etc. The same principle should apply to the various aggregation characteristics of ultimate particles of form, etc., because they are all attached to the characteristic of ultimate particles. 'Below objects such as bottles and bowls,' the following refutes their changed calculation. In order to prevent the difficulty of the oneness of essence and characteristics, they believe that another characteristic can produce consciousness, so it can be the object-condition, such as the differences between bottles and bowls that can be seen. Therefore, the *Tattvarthasamgraha* says: 'Clinging to the eye, etc., consciousness can condition the various aggregation characteristics of ultimate particles, and another arises, the perception of bottles and bowls, their attachment should have no difference, not because the shape is different, because the difference in shape is not real,' clinging to the eye, etc., consciousness can condition the various aggregation characteristics of ultimate particles, and another arises, the perception of bottles and bowls, their attachment should have no difference, not because the shape is different, because the difference in shape is not real. 'Objects such as bottles and bowls, the size, etc., because the number of ultimate particles that can be formed is the same, the perception of them should have no difference,' the size, etc., of objects such as bottles and bowls, because the number of ultimate particles that can be formed is the same, the perception of these objects should have no difference. 'If it is said that those shapes and objects are different, so the perception is different, the principle is not established,' if it is said that those shapes and objects are different, so the perception is different, the principle is not established. 'Different shapes such as the neck only exist on the false dharmas such as bottles, not on ultimate particles,' different shapes such as the neck only exist on the false dharmas such as bottles, not on ultimate particles. Therefore, they should not cling to the idea that ultimate particles also have different shapes."
  ]
}

者何。極微量等故。形別唯在假。析彼至極微。彼覺定舍故。非瓶甌等能成極微有形量別。舍微圓相。故知別形在假非實。又形別物。析至極微。彼覺定舍。非青等物析至極微彼覺可舍。由此形別唯世俗有。非如青等亦在實物。微圓相者。極微自相。各各圓滿。不外假而足者也。粗相即和合。色處所攝。是五識境。細相即極微。法處所攝。是意識境。若粗相識可緣細相境。則色境識亦可緣聲境。而一識可緣一切境矣。即與世間現見共知事理相違。成大過失。許有極微。尚致如此。況汝所執心外極微。如龜毛等。本非實有。而可作五識所緣緣哉。

  由此定知自識所變(至)皆識變現非極微成。

  結成五識正所緣緣義。觀所緣緣論頌云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣。許彼相在識。及能生識故。內色即相分色。外境即本質色。且如眼根對色塵時。即眼識自證分現行。從自種而生。變似二分。其所變見分。說名眼識。其所變相分。似外境現。說名眼境。為所緣緣。是依他性。有體法故。不緣心外所執無法故。見托彼生者。謂能緣見分。托彼實體而生。即是緣義。然心起時。帶彼相起。名為所緣。別行鈔云。所緣緣者。謂是心之所慮處故。名為所緣。只此所緣境。又有牽心令生。是心之所託故。復說名緣。即所緣為緣。名所緣緣。緣是體。所緣是用。所緣即緣。持業釋也。然此內識變色之時。隨本質色量之大小。一時頓現大小相分。非別變作眾多極微。然後和合成一相分也。所以有此極微名者。為世間執粗色實有。佛愍其愚。故說極微。令

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "是什麼呢?因為極微的量相等。形體的差別僅僅在於假想。如果將物體分析到極微的程度,對形體的感知就會確定地消失。所以瓶子、甌等不能形成極微的有形量差別。捨棄了微小的圓形狀態。因此可知形體的差別是虛假的,不是真實的。而且形體的差別,分析到極微的程度,對形體的感知就會確定地消失。不是青色等物體分析到極微的程度,對青色的感知可以捨棄。由此可見,形體的差別僅僅是世俗意義上的存在,不像青色等顏色,也存在於真實物體中。微小的圓形狀態,指的是極微自身的形態,各自圓滿,不需要外在的假想就足夠了。粗糙的形態指的是和合,屬於色處所包含的,是五識的境界。精細的形態指的是極微,屬於法處所包含的,是意識的境界。如果粗糙形態的意識可以緣取精細形態的境界,那麼色境的意識也可以緣取聲境,那麼一個意識就可以緣取一切境界了。這與世間現見的、共知的常識事理相違背,會造成很大的過失。允許有極微的存在,尚且會導致這樣的問題,更何況你們所執著的心外極微,就像烏龜的毛一樣,本來就不是真實存在的,又怎麼能作為五識的所緣緣呢?",
    
    "由此可以確定地知道,是自識所變現的(一切),都是識的變現,不是由極微構成的。",
    
    "總結五識正所緣緣的意義。《觀所緣緣論》的頌文說:『內在的色法像外在的色法一樣顯現,是識的所緣緣。允許它們(相分和見分)相互存在於識中,並且能夠產生識。』內在的色法指的是相分色,外境指的是本質色。比如眼根面對色塵的時候,眼識的自證分就會現行,從自身的種子中產生,變現出兩個部分。它所變現的見分,被稱為眼識;它所變現的相分,像外境一樣顯現,被稱為眼境,作為所緣緣。這是依他性,因為是有實體的法。不緣取心外所執著的沒有實體的法。『見托彼生』,指的是能緣的見分,依託于那個實體而產生,這就是緣的意思。然而心生起的時候,帶著那個相一起生起,這叫做所緣。《別行鈔》中說:『所緣緣,指的是心所考慮的對象,所以叫做所緣。』僅僅是這個所緣境,又牽引著心使之生起,是心所依託的,所以又叫做緣。即所緣為緣,叫做所緣緣。緣是體,所緣是用。所緣即是緣,是持業釋。然而這個內在的識變現色法的時候,隨著本質色量的大小,一時之間頓然顯現大小不同的相分,不是分別變現出眾多極微,然後和合成為一個相分。之所以有極微這個名稱,是因為世間人執著粗糙的色法是真實存在的,佛陀憐憫他們的愚昧,所以才說極微,讓他們(理解)。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "What is it? Because the quantities of ultimate particles are equal. The difference in form exists only in assumption. If one analyzes an object to the point of ultimate particles, the perception of form will definitely disappear. Therefore, bottles, bowls, etc., cannot form the difference in tangible quantity of ultimate particles. The subtle circular state is abandoned. Thus, it can be known that the difference in form is false, not real. Moreover, the difference in form, when analyzed to the point of ultimate particles, the perception of form will definitely disappear. It is not that when objects such as blue are analyzed to the point of ultimate particles, the perception of blue can be abandoned. From this, it can be seen that the difference in form exists only in the mundane sense, unlike colors such as blue, which also exist in real objects. The subtle circular state refers to the inherent form of the ultimate particle, each being complete and self-sufficient without external assumption. The coarse form refers to aggregation, which is included in the realm of 'color' (rupa-ayatana) and is the object of the five consciousnesses. The subtle form refers to the ultimate particle, which is included in the realm of 'dharma' (dharma-ayatana) and is the object of the mind consciousness. If the consciousness of the coarse form can grasp the realm of the subtle form, then the consciousness of the 'color' realm can also grasp the 'sound' realm, and then one consciousness can grasp all realms. This contradicts the common sense and principles of things seen and known in the world, and would cause great faults. Allowing the existence of ultimate particles would still lead to such problems, let alone the external ultimate particles that you cling to, which are like the hair of a tortoise, originally non-existent, how can they be the objective support (alambana-pratyaya) of the five consciousnesses?",
    
    "From this, it can be definitely known that what is transformed by one's own consciousness (everything) is all a transformation of consciousness, not composed of ultimate particles.",
    
    "Concluding the meaning of the proper objective support of the five consciousnesses. The verse in the *Alambanapariksa* (Examination of the Objective Support) says: 'Internal color appears like external color, as the objective support of consciousness. It is allowed that they (the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect) exist in consciousness mutually, and are able to generate consciousness.' Internal color refers to the image-aspect (nimitta-bhaga) of color, and the external object refers to the object-aspect (alambana-bhaga) of color. For example, when the eye-sense faces the 'color' object (rupa-visaya), the self-cognizing aspect (svasamvedana-bhaga) of the eye-consciousness will manifest, arising from its own seed, transforming into two aspects. The seeing-aspect (darsana-bhaga) that it transforms is called eye-consciousness; the image-aspect that it transforms, appearing like an external object, is called the 'color' object, serving as the objective support. This is dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava), because it is a dharma with substance. It does not grasp the non-substantial dharma clung to outside the mind. 'Seeing arises relying on it' refers to the seeing-aspect, which is the perceiving aspect, arising relying on that substance, which is the meaning of 'support'. However, when the mind arises, it arises together with that appearance, which is called the objective support. The *Biexing Chao* says: 'The objective support refers to the object that the mind considers, therefore it is called the objective support.' Merely this objective support also pulls the mind to arise, it is what the mind relies on, so it is also called support. That is, the objective support is the support, called the objective support. Support is the substance, and the objective support is the function. The objective support is the support, which is a karmadharaya compound. However, when this internal consciousness transforms color, according to the size of the object-aspect of color, image-aspects of different sizes appear suddenly at once, not transforming separately into many ultimate particles and then combining to form one image-aspect. The reason why there is the name 'ultimate particle' is because worldly people cling to the coarse color as real, and the Buddha, pitying their ignorance, therefore spoke of ultimate particles, so that they (could understand)."
  ]
}

其除析。以入空觀耳。豈謂諸色有實極微哉。雜集論云。當知此中極微無體無實無性。唯假建立。展轉分析。無限量故。但由覺慧。漸漸分析。細分損滅。乃至可析邊際。即約此際。建立極微。問。若諸極微無實體性。何故建立。答。為遣一合想故。若以覺慧分分分析所有諸色。爾時妄執一切諸色為一合想即便舍離。由此順入數取趣無我性故。又為悟入諸所有色非真實故。若以覺慧如是分析所有諸色至無所有。爾時便能悟入諸色皆非真實。因此悟入唯識道理。由此順入諸法無我性故由此下總結。

  余無對色是此類故(至)而可說為真實色法。

  次破無對色。此類此字。指極微言。既名無對。即無色相。色法不成。心法何異。彼有對色。以理破除。識外尚無。而況無對乎。量云。無對色是有法。定非實色是宗。因云。極微類故。許無對故。喻如心心所。

  表無表色豈非實有(至)假名語表于理無違。

  次傍問分二。先破錶色后破無表色。今初。有所表示。故名有表。由動發勝思發動身語。恭敬乞愿。令知所為。名為有表。防發功能。自他不知。無表示相。名為無表。無表色。即受所引色。前已具明。外有對色。可非實有。表無表色。現有表示防發功能。豈非實有。此問意也。且身表下。答破。先破有宗計形。有宗云。身表許別形。故形為身表。如合掌等。許有別形。形即是表。表善惡故表即是業。此之形色。依身起故。名為身業。論主破云。若言是形。便非實有。形是長短方圓假色。依多顯色。假立長等。若分析時

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本:",
    "通過分析來進入空觀。難道說諸色具有真實的極微嗎?《雜集論》說:『應當知道,這裡所說的極微沒有自體、沒有實體、沒有自性,只是假立的。經過輾轉分析,因為沒有實在的**,所以只是通過覺慧,漸漸分析,細分損滅,乃至達到可分析的邊際。』就是根據這個邊際,建立極微。問:如果諸極微沒有實體自性,為什麼還要建立呢?答:爲了去除一合之想。如果用覺慧分分分析所有諸色,那時對於一切諸色為一合之想的妄執就會舍離。由此順入數取趣(Pudgala,補特伽羅,指有情)的無我性。又爲了悟入所有諸色並非真實。如果用覺慧這樣分析所有諸色直至一無所有,那時便能悟入諸色皆非真實。因此悟入唯識的道理。由此順入諸法無我性。』由此下面進行總結。",
    
    "其餘無對色與極微是同一類,因此(極微)不可說為真實色法。",
    
    "接下來破斥無對色。這裡的『此類』二字,指的是極微。既然名為『無對』,就沒有色相,色法就不能成立,與心法有什麼區別呢?那些有對色,已經被道理破除,識外尚且沒有,更何況是無對色呢?可以這樣立量:無對色是有法,必定不是真實色,這是宗。因為與極微是同一類,並且被認為是無對的,這是因。比如心和心所(Citta-caitta,心所有法)。",
    
    "表色和無表色難道不是真實存在的嗎?(如果不是,)假名語表在道理上沒有違背。",
    
    "接下來是旁問,分為兩部分,先破斥表色,后破斥無表色。現在先說表色。有所表示,所以名為有表。通過動發殊勝的思,發動身語,恭敬乞愿,使人知道所為,名為有表。防發的功能,自己和他人不知道,沒有表示的相,名為無表。無表色,就是受所引色,前面已經詳細說明。外面的有對色,或許可以說不是真實存在的。但是表色和無表色,現在有表示和防發的功能,難道不是真實存在的嗎?這是提問的意圖。且說身表下面,是回答破斥。先破斥有宗計執的形。有宗說:身表允許有別的形,所以形就是身表,比如合掌等。允許有別的形,形就是表,因為表可以表示善惡,表就是業。這種形色,因為依身而起,所以名為身業。論主破斥說:如果說是形,便不是真實存在的。形是長短方圓的假色,依靠多種顯色,假立長等。如果分析時",
    
    "english_translations": [
      "English version:",
      "It is through analysis that one enters the contemplation of emptiness. Does it mean that all forms have real ultimate particles? The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (Compendium of Determinations) says: 'It should be known that the ultimate particles here have no self-nature, no substance, and no intrinsic nature; they are merely provisionally established. Through repeated analysis, because there is no real **, they are gradually analyzed through wisdom, finely divided and destroyed, until the edge of analyzability is reached.' It is based on this edge that ultimate particles are established. Question: If the ultimate particles have no substantial self-nature, why are they established? Answer: To remove the thought of oneness. If one analyzes all forms part by part with wisdom, then the delusion of considering all forms as a single whole will be abandoned. Thus, one enters the non-self nature of *Pudgala* (person). Furthermore, it is to realize that all forms are not real. If one analyzes all forms in this way with wisdom until nothing remains, then one can realize that all forms are not real. Therefore, one realizes the principle of *Vijñapti-mātratā* (consciousness-only). Thus, one enters the non-self nature of all dharmas.' The following is a summary.",
      
      "The remaining non-resistant forms are of the same category as the ultimate particles, therefore (the ultimate particles) cannot be said to be real forms.",
      
      "Next, refute the non-resistant forms. The word 'this category' refers to the ultimate particles. Since it is called 'non-resistant', it has no color or shape, and form cannot be established. What is the difference from mental phenomena? Those resistant forms have already been refuted by reason, and there is nothing outside of consciousness, let alone non-resistant forms. One can establish the following syllogism: Non-resistant form is the subject, and it is definitely not a real form, this is the thesis. Because it is of the same category as the ultimate particles and is considered non-resistant, this is the reason. For example, *Citta* (mind) and *Caitta* (mental factors).",
      
      "Are manifested and unmanifested forms not real? (If not,) the nominal verbal expression does not contradict the principle.",
      
      "Next is the side question, divided into two parts, first refuting manifested forms, then refuting unmanifested forms. Now, let's talk about manifested forms first. Because it manifests something, it is called manifested form. By activating the superior thought, one activates the body and speech, respectfully begging and wishing, making people know what is being done, this is called manifested form. The function of preventing activation, which oneself and others do not know, has no manifesting appearance, this is called unmanifested form. Unmanifested form is the form induced by reception, which has been explained in detail earlier. External resistant forms may be said to be not real. But manifested and unmanifested forms now have the function of manifesting and preventing activation, are they not real? This is the intention of the question. Let's talk about bodily expression below, which is the answer and refutation. First, refute the form clung to by the Sarvāstivāda school. The Sarvāstivāda school says: Bodily expression allows for a separate form, so form is bodily expression, such as joining palms. It allows for a separate form, and form is expression, because expression can represent good and evil, and expression is karma. This kind of form, because it arises from the body, is called bodily karma. The master of the treatise refutes: If it is said to be form, then it is not real. Form is the false color of length, width, square, and round, relying on various manifest colors, falsely establishing length, etc. If analyzing"
    ]
  }

。長等極微不可得故。次破正量部計動。彼執動名身表。以身動時。由業動故。論主破云。若言是動。亦非實有。行動之時。即是有為。一切有為。皆有剎那。才得自體。從此無間必滅歸無。若此處生。即此處滅。無容從此轉至余方豈有動義。有為法滅不待因者俱舍云。待因謂果。滅無非果。故不待因。滅既不待因。才生已即滅。若初不滅。后亦應然。以後與初有性等故。既後有盡。知前有滅。廣如彼論。次復破有宗轉計。彼計云。別有一色名身表業。既非青黃明暗顯色。亦非長短方圓形色。是心力大。發動勝思。引生此色。能令手等合掌曲跽屈伸取捨。即以此色為身表業。論主破云。此亦不然。此引生色。以何為性。若言以動為性。其失已破如前。若言動因為性。動因即是風界。風非表色。觸身而知。觸唯無記不通善惡。云何成業。俱舍論說。身表唯通善不善性。不通無記。以無記心。勢力微劣。不能引發諸強業故。非顯之風。既是無記。非身表色。非顯香味。亦屬無記。亦非身表類觸應知。故身表業定非實有。然則此業何由而起。由是內心能轉變故。令第八識所變手等。作善作惡。因生果滅。因滅果生。相續不斷。轉趣余方。似有動作。表示此心。故名身表。豈離識外別有一法名身表哉。語表亦非實有聲性者。以教中言。名等是假。聲是實故。然名等即多剎那聲整合一字。集多字為所依。次能成名。詮諸法體。多名以後。方成句身。詮法差別。仁王護國般若經云九十剎那為一念。一念中一剎那經九百生滅。從唯臍等七處一剎那間出此聲

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本:",
    "因為長等極微細的物質是不可得的。接下來破斥說一切有部(Sarvāstivāda)中正量部( *Pudgalavāda*,又稱「勝論外道」)關於「動」的觀點。他們認為「動」是指身體的表示,當身體動的時候,是由業力驅動的。論主破斥說:如果說是「動」,也不是真實存在的。行動的時候,就是有為法。一切有為法,都有剎那生滅的特性。剛剛產生自體,從此沒有間隔必定滅亡歸於空無。如果在此處產生,就在此處滅亡,沒有可能從這裡轉移到其他地方,哪裡還有「動」的意義呢?有為法的滅不需要因緣,如《俱舍論》(Abhidharmakośa)所說:『待因』是指果,而滅不是果,所以不需要因。既然滅不需要因,那麼剛剛產生就已經滅亡了。如果最初不滅,後來也應該如此,因為後來和最初具有相同的性質。既然後來有窮盡,就知道先前已經滅亡。詳細的論述可以參考《俱舍論》。",
    "接下來又破斥有宗(Sarvāstivāda)的另一種觀點。他們認為:另外有一種色法叫做身表業(kāya-vijñapti)。它既不是青黃明暗等顯色,也不是長短方圓等形色,而是心力強大,發動殊勝的思慮,從而引生出這種色法,能夠使手等做出合掌、彎曲、跪拜、屈伸、取捨等動作。就以這種色法作為身表業。論主破斥說:這也是不對的。這種引生的色法,以什麼為體性呢?如果說是以動為體性,那麼它的過失已經在前面破斥過了。如果說是以動的原因為體性,那麼動的原因就是風界。風不是表色,而是通過身體的觸覺來感知的。觸覺只有無記性,不通於善惡,怎麼能成為業呢?《俱舍論》說,身表只通于善和不善的性質,不通於無記性。因為無記心的勢力微弱,不能引發各種強大的業力。不是顯色的風,既然是無記性,就不是身表色。不是顯色的香味,也屬於無記性,也不是身表,應該屬於觸覺。所以身表業一定不是真實存在的。",
    "那麼,這種業是從哪裡產生的呢?這是由於內心能夠轉變的緣故,使得第八識(阿賴耶識,Ālaya-vijñāna)所變現的手等,做出善或惡的行為。因生果滅,因滅果生,相續不斷,轉移到其他地方,看起來好像有動作,表示這個心,所以叫做身表。難道離開識之外,還有另外一種法叫做身表嗎?語表(vak-vijñapti)也不是真實存在的,因為教義中說,名等是假立的,聲音才是真實的。然而,名等是由多個剎那的聲音整合一個字,聚集多個字作為所依,然後才能成就名稱,詮釋諸法的體性。多個名稱之後,才能形成句身,詮釋法的差別。《仁王護國般若經》( *Renwang Huguo Bore Jing* )說:九十個剎那為一念,一念中一個剎那經歷九百次生滅。從唯臍等七處一個剎那間發出這個聲音。",
    "English version:",
    "Because the extremely subtle matter such as length is unattainable. Next, refuting the Sautrāntika school within the Sarvāstivāda (*Pudgalavāda*, also known as 'Vaibhāṣika') regarding the view of 'movement'. They hold that 'movement' refers to bodily expression, and when the body moves, it is driven by karma. The author refutes, saying: If it is said to be 'movement', it is also not truly existent. The time of action is conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta). All conditioned phenomena have the characteristic of momentary arising and ceasing. Just as it attains its own nature, it inevitably ceases and returns to nothing without interval. If it arises here, it ceases here, with no possibility of transferring from here to another place. Where is the meaning of 'movement'? The cessation of conditioned phenomena does not require causes, as the *Abhidharmakośa* says: 'Dependent cause' refers to the result, but cessation is not a result, so it does not require a cause. Since cessation does not require a cause, it ceases as soon as it arises. If it does not cease initially, it should be the same later, because the later and the initial have the same nature. Since the later has an end, it is known that the former has ceased. Detailed discussions can be found in the *Abhidharmakośa*.",
    "Next, refuting another view of the Sarvāstivāda. They believe that there is another form of matter called bodily expression (kāya-vijñapti). It is neither manifest color such as blue, yellow, bright, or dark, nor shape such as long, short, square, or round. Rather, it is the great power of the mind, initiating excellent thought, thereby giving rise to this form of matter, which can cause the hands, etc., to perform actions such as joining palms, bending, kneeling, stretching, taking, and giving. This form of matter is taken as bodily expression. The author refutes, saying: This is also incorrect. What is the nature of this form of matter that is brought forth? If it is said to be movement, then its fault has already been refuted earlier. If it is said to be the cause of movement, then the cause of movement is the wind element. Wind is not a representational form, but is perceived through the sense of touch. Touch only has the nature of neutral feeling, not connected to good or evil. How can it become karma? The *Abhidharmakośa* says that bodily expression is only connected to the nature of good and bad, not to neutral feeling. Because the power of the neutral mind is weak and cannot initiate various strong karmas. Wind that is not manifest color, since it is neutral, is not bodily expression. Fragrance that is not manifest color also belongs to neutral feeling, and is not bodily expression, it should belong to the sense of touch. Therefore, bodily expression is certainly not truly existent.",
    "So, where does this karma arise from? This is because the mind is capable of transformation, causing the hands, etc., transformed by the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), to perform good or evil actions. Cause arises and result ceases, cause ceases and result arises, continuously, transferring to other places, appearing as if there is movement, representing this mind, so it is called bodily expression. Is there another dharma called bodily expression apart from consciousness? Vocal expression (vak-vijñapti) is also not truly existent, because the teachings say that names, etc., are provisional, and sound is real. However, names, etc., are formed by multiple momentary sounds forming a word, gathering multiple words as the basis, and then the name can be accomplished, explaining the nature of all dharmas. After multiple names, the sentence body can be formed, explaining the differences of the Dharma. The *Renwang Huguo Bore Jing* says: Ninety moments are one thought, and in one thought, one moment experiences nine hundred births and deaths. This sound is emitted from seven places, including the navel, in one moment."
  ]
}

相。唸唸滅故。后聲非前聲。故無詮表若云。後後剎那。續前前故。為詮表者此亦不然後念生時若與前念為住相者。生相應無。亦無有滅。而今現見生滅相續。故知后念非前念。故曰多念相續便非實故。此言語者。既屬聲相。便屬有對。外有對色。前已破故。然因下。出正義。識變似聲。謂第八所變影像聲。聲雖唸唸滅。而能整合名句文身故似有表示。此二正義但約心變。即異小乘。

  表既實無無表寧實(至)現行思立故是假有。

  次明無表色。毗婆沙師。經部師。執無表實有。歷引契經為證。詳見俱舍。故此破云。有表尚虛無表寧實。然契經說無表色者。依他分位。假施設故。無表有二。一律儀有表色。即從師受戒時是。由此有表色。方熏得善思種子。有防惡發善功能。立無表色。一不律儀有表色。即正下刀殺生時是。由此有表色。方熏得不善思種子。有防善發惡功能。立無表色。故曰依思愿善惡分限假立無表。此似兼善惡說。下依勝身語。乃是就善一邊說。善是所發。惡是所防。故曰善惡思種。問。無表色以何為體。答。受戒之後。思種之上。防惡發善功能為體。問。思有多種。謂審慮決定動發思。何思種子有此功能。答。於三思中。取上品者。初念所熏種上。有此功能。何以故。初念所熏。為無表依故。問。何唯初念所熏之種為無表依。余后念種不立為依。皆上品故。答。如世皇儲。立一余非。問。防發功能。從何時有。答。從第三番羯磨竟時。防發功能任運增長。從彼時有。問。此功能何時萎歇。答。犯舍以後。及成

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "相(Lakshana,事物呈現的表象)。因爲念頭唸唸生滅,所以後一個聲音並非前一個聲音,因此無法詮釋表達。如果說,後後的剎那,延續前前的剎那,因此可以詮釋表達,這也是不成立的。后念生起時,如果與前念保持『住』相(Sthiti-lakshana,事物保持不變的表象),那麼生(Utpada,事物產生的表象)和相應(Samprayoga,事物之間的相互作用)都無法成立,滅(Bhanga,事物消滅的表象)也無法成立。但現在我們明明看到生滅相續不斷,因此可知后念並非前念。所以說,多個念頭相續,便不是真實的。這些言語,既然屬於聲相,便屬於有對(Sapratigha,有障礙、有對立)。外在的有對色,之前已經破斥過了。然而,下面要闡述真正的含義:識(Vijnana,意識)變現出類似聲音的影像,指的是第八識(Alaya-vijnana,阿賴耶識)所變現的影像聲。聲音雖然唸唸生滅,卻能整合名句文身(Nama-rupa-vyanjana,名稱、語句、文字的組合),因此看似具有表達功能。這兩種真正的含義,都只是就心識的變現而言,與小乘佛教的觀點不同。",
    
    "表達既然不是真實的,無表(Avijnapti-rupa,無表色,無法通過行為或語言表達的色法)又怎麼會是真實的呢?(直到)因為現行的思(Cetanā,意志、思想)而假立,所以是假有的。",
    
    "接下來闡明無表色。毗婆沙師(Vaibhashika,說一切有部論師)和經部師(Sautrantika,經量部論師)認為無表是真實存在的,並引用契經(Sutra,佛經)作為證據,詳細內容見《俱舍論》(Abhidharmakosha)。因此這裡破斥說,有表(Vijnapti-rupa,有表色,可以通過行為或語言表達的色法)尚且是虛假的,無表又怎麼會是真實的呢?然而,契經所說的無表色,是依他起性(Paratantra,依賴其他條件而生起的性質)的分位,是假施設的。無表有兩種:一是律儀有表色,即從師父那裡接受戒律時產生的。由此有表色,才能熏習得到善思(Kushala-cetanā,善的意志)的種子,具有防止惡行、引發善行的功能,因此假立為無表色。二是不律儀有表色,即正在揮刀殺生時產生的。由此有表色,才能熏習得到不善思(Akushala-cetanā,不善的意志)的種子,具有防止善行、引發惡行的功能,因此假立為無表色。所以說,是依據思愿的善惡界限,假立無表。這裡似乎是兼顧善惡兩方面來說的。下面依據勝身語(Adhisthana-kaya-vak,殊勝的身語),則是就善的一方面來說的。善是所引發的,惡是所防止的。所以說,是善惡思的種子。問:無表色以什麼為本體?答:受戒之後,思種之上,防止惡行、引發善行的功能為本體。問:思有多種,即審慮思(Parikalpana-cetanā,審慮的意志)、決定思(Viniscaya-cetanā,決定的意志)、動發思(Pratisthana-cetanā,行動的意志),哪種思的種子具有這種功能?答:在三種思中,取上品者,初念所熏習的種子之上,具有這種功能。為什麼呢?因為初念所熏習的,是無表所依賴的基礎。問:為什麼只有初念所熏習的種子是無表所依賴的基礎,其餘后唸的種子不能立為基礎呢?因為它們都是上品。答:如同世間的皇儲,隻立一個,其餘的不是。問:防止和引發的功能,從什麼時候開始有?答:從第三次羯磨(Karma,業)結束時,防止和引發的功能自然增長,從那時開始有。問:這種功能什麼時候會衰退消失?答:犯舍戒以後,以及成就……(此處原文未完)"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Lakshana (characteristics, the apparent form of things). Because thoughts arise and cease moment by moment, the subsequent sound is not the same as the previous sound, therefore it cannot express or represent anything. If it is said that each subsequent moment continues from the previous moment, thus it can express or represent something, this is also not valid. When a subsequent thought arises, if it maintains the 'Sthiti-lakshana' (the characteristic of remaining unchanged), then Utpada (arising) and Samprayoga (association) cannot be established, nor can Bhanga (cessation) be established. But now we clearly see arising and ceasing continuing without interruption, therefore we know that the subsequent thought is not the same as the previous thought. Therefore it is said that multiple thoughts continuing are not real. These words, since they belong to sound characteristics, belong to Sapratigha (having obstruction, having opposition). The external Sapratigha-rupa (obstructive form), has already been refuted before.",
    
    "However, the following will explain the true meaning: Vijnana (consciousness) manifests images similar to sound, referring to the image-sound manifested by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana). Although sound arises and ceases moment by moment, it can be integrated into Nama-rupa-vyanjana (combinations of names, sentences, and words), therefore it seems to have the function of expressing. These two true meanings are only in terms of the transformation of consciousness, which is different from the views of Hinayana Buddhism.",
    
    "Since expression is not real, how can Avijnapti-rupa (non-revealing form, form that cannot be expressed through actions or language) be real? (Until) Because it is provisionally established by the current Cetanā (volition, thought), it is therefore provisionally existent.",
    
    "Next, explain Avijnapti-rupa. Vaibhashika (Sarvastivada school) and Sautrantika (Sutra school) believe that Avijnapti is real, and cite Sutra (Buddhist scriptures) as evidence, detailed information can be found in Abhidharmakosha. Therefore, it is refuted here that if Vijnapti-rupa (revealing form, form that can be expressed through actions or language) is still false, how can Avijnapti be real? However, the Avijnapti-rupa mentioned in the Sutra is a division of Paratantra (dependent arising nature), which is provisionally established. There are two types of Avijnapti: one is the Vijnapti-rupa of precepts, which is produced when receiving precepts from a teacher. Only with this Vijnapti-rupa can the seeds of Kushala-cetanā (wholesome volition) be cultivated, having the function of preventing evil and initiating good, therefore it is provisionally established as Avijnapti-rupa. The second is the Vijnapti-rupa of non-precepts, which is produced when killing with a knife. Only with this Vijnapti-rupa can the seeds of Akushala-cetanā (unwholesome volition) be cultivated, having the function of preventing good and initiating evil, therefore it is provisionally established as Avijnapti-rupa. Therefore, Avijnapti is provisionally established based on the boundaries of good and evil of volition. This seems to be considering both good and evil aspects. The following, based on Adhisthana-kaya-vak (superior body and speech), is only in terms of the good aspect. Good is what is initiated, and evil is what is prevented. Therefore, it is the seeds of good and evil volition. Question: What is the substance of Avijnapti-rupa? Answer: After receiving the precepts, the function of preventing evil and initiating good on the seeds of volition is the substance. Question: There are many types of volition, namely Parikalpana-cetanā (deliberative volition), Viniscaya-cetanā (decisive volition), Pratisthana-cetanā (active volition), which seed of volition has this function? Answer: Among the three volitions, take the superior one, the seed cultivated by the initial thought has this function. Why? Because what is cultivated by the initial thought is the foundation upon which Avijnapti depends. Question: Why is only the seed cultivated by the initial thought the foundation upon which Avijnapti depends, and the remaining seeds of subsequent thoughts cannot be established as the foundation? Because they are all superior. Answer: Like the crown prince in the world, only one is established, and the rest are not. Question: When does the function of preventing and initiating begin to exist? Answer: From the end of the third Karma (action), the function of preventing and initiating naturally increases, and it exists from that time. Question: When will this function decline and disappear? Answer: After violating the precepts, and upon achieving..."
  ]
}

佛時。可爾萎歇。問。成佛已后。如何萎歇。答。如瓶滿。更不受添。所以歇也。問。戒有幾種。答。總有三種。謂別解脫戒。定俱戒。道俱戒。別解脫者。從師受戒。別別防非名別解脫。定俱者。入定之時。便有一分防發功能。名定俱戒。道俱者。聖道起時亦能防發。聖道即是無漏智也。問。此等戒法。以何為體。答。別解脫戒。思種為體。問。皆說防發功能為戒。何故卻取思及種子。答。既出體性。須取功能所依實體。問定道俱戒。既依現思應自表知。何名無表。答。現思之上。防發功能。豈得自知。問。佛戒萎歇。佛應無戒。且無防發。何用戒為。答。防發功能。雖不增長。戒體仍存。如君子帶劍。亦何傷理。

  世尊經中說有三業(至)唯有內識變似色生。

  小乘引經問言。世尊經中說有身口意三業。今撥身語業是假有。豈不違經。論主答云。非撥身語是無。但言身語非是汝等所執實色。能動身思至說名意業。此出三業體。業即是思。思即是識。以顯三業唯識非色之義。思有三種。一審慮思。二決定思。三動發思。以動發思。能動身發語。與身語相應。名身語業。審慮決定二思。唯與意識相應。由彼意念一動之後。審慮決定。然後能動身發語。故名意業。俱舍論說二種時。一籌量時。二作業時。籌量時唯是審慮一種思。其決定動發二思。俱屬作業時。以雖在意地。未有決定。未成業道。故非作業。是籌量也。然動發思。正起身語。作善作惡。說善說惡是二業體。說名為業。亦是審慮決定二思所游履處。通生苦樂。異熟果

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "佛陀在世時,戒律也會有衰退和止息的時候。有人問:『成佛之後,戒律如何衰退止息呢?』回答說:『就像瓶子裝滿了水,再也無法新增,所以就止息了。』",
    "有人問:『戒律有幾種呢?』回答說:『總共有三種,分別是別解脫戒、定俱戒和道俱戒。別解脫戒是指從師父那裡接受戒律,分別防止各種過失,所以稱為別解脫。定俱戒是指進入禪定的時候,自然會有一部分防止過失的功能產生,稱為定俱戒。道俱戒是指聖道生起的時候,也能防止過失,聖道就是無漏智慧。』",
    "有人問:『這些戒法的本體是什麼呢?』回答說:『別解脫戒以思的種子為本體。』有人問:『都說防止過失的功能是戒,為什麼卻取思和種子呢?』回答說:『既然要指出它的體性,就必須選取功能所依賴的實體。』",
    "有人問:『定俱戒和道俱戒,既然依賴於現行的思,應該能夠自己顯現和被認知,為什麼還稱為無表呢?』回答說:『在現行的思之上,防止過失的功能,怎麼能夠自己認知呢?』",
    "有人問:『佛陀的戒律衰退止息了,佛陀應該就沒有戒律了,既然沒有防止過失的功能,還要戒律做什麼呢?』回答說:『防止過失的功能雖然不再增長,但戒體的本質仍然存在,就像君子佩戴寶劍一樣,又有什麼妨礙呢?』",
    
    "世尊在經中說有三業(身、口、意),只有內在的識才能變現出類似色法的現象。",
    
    "小乘佛教引用經典提問說:『世尊在經中說有身、口、意三種業,現在你說身語業是假有的,豈不是違背了經典?』論主的回答是:『並非說身語是無,只是說身語不是你們所執著的真實色法。』能夠發動身體的思,乃至說話的思,稱為意業。這裡闡述了三業的本體,業就是思,思就是識,以此來顯示三業唯識而非色法的道理。",
    "思有三種:一是審慮思,二是決定思,三是動發思。通過動發思,能夠發動身體,發出語言,與身語相應,稱為身語業。審慮思和決定思,只與意識相應,因為意念一旦發動之後,經過審慮和決定,然後才能發動身體,發出語言,所以稱為意業。《俱舍論》中說了兩種時:一是籌量時,二是作業時。籌量時只有審慮一種思,而決定思和動發思,都屬於作業時。因為雖然在意識層面,但沒有決定,沒有形成業道,所以不是作業,而是籌量。然而動發思,正是起身語,作善作惡,說善說惡的本體。說名為業,也是審慮思和決定思所經歷的地方,共同產生苦樂的異熟果報。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "When the Buddha is alive, the precepts can also decline and cease. Someone asked: 'After becoming a Buddha, how do the precepts decline and cease?' The answer is: 'It's like a bottle filled with water, which can no longer be added to, so it ceases.'",
    "Someone asked: 'How many kinds of precepts are there?' The answer is: 'There are three kinds in total, namely Pratimoksha (individual liberation) precepts, Samadhi-born precepts, and Path-born precepts. Pratimoksha precepts refer to receiving precepts from a teacher and individually preventing various faults, hence the name Pratimoksha. Samadhi-born precepts refer to when entering Samadhi (meditative absorption), there will naturally be a portion of the function of preventing faults arising, called Samadhi-born precepts. Path-born precepts refer to when the Holy Path arises, it can also prevent faults; the Holy Path is none other than non-outflow wisdom.'",
    "Someone asked: 'What is the substance of these precepts?' The answer is: 'Pratimoksha precepts take the seed of thought (思) as their substance.' Someone asked: 'It is said that the function of preventing faults is the precept, why then take thought and the seed?' The answer is: 'Since the nature of the substance is to be pointed out, it is necessary to select the entity on which the function depends.'",
    "Someone asked: 'Since Samadhi-born and Path-born precepts rely on the present thought, they should be able to manifest and be known by themselves, why are they still called non-manifest (無表)?' The answer is: 'Above the present thought, how can the function of preventing faults know itself?'",
    "Someone asked: 'If the Buddha's precepts decline and cease, the Buddha should have no precepts. Since there is no function of preventing faults, what is the use of precepts?' The answer is: 'Although the function of preventing faults no longer increases, the essence of the precepts still exists, just like a gentleman wearing a sword, what harm is there?'",
    
    "The World Honored One said in the sutras that there are three karmas (body, speech, and mind), only the inner consciousness can transform into phenomena similar to form.",
    
    "The Hinayana (小乘) school quoted scriptures and asked: 'The World Honored One said in the sutras that there are three karmas of body, speech, and mind. Now you say that the karmas of body and speech are provisionally existent, isn't that contradicting the scriptures?' The master's answer is: 'It is not saying that body and speech are non-existent, but only saying that body and speech are not the real form that you are attached to.' The thought that can move the body, and even the thought that speaks, is called mind karma. This explains the substance of the three karmas; karma is thought, and thought is consciousness, thereby showing that the three karmas are only consciousness and not form.",
    "There are three types of thought: first, deliberative thought; second, decisive thought; and third, activating thought. Through activating thought, the body can be moved and language can be produced, corresponding to body and speech, called body and speech karma. Deliberative and decisive thoughts only correspond to consciousness, because once a thought is activated, after deliberation and decision, the body can then be moved and language can be produced, hence it is called mind karma. The *Abhidharmakośa* (俱舍論) speaks of two times: first, the time of deliberation; second, the time of action. The time of deliberation only has one type of thought, which is deliberative thought, while decisive and activating thoughts both belong to the time of action. Because although it is at the level of consciousness, there is no decision, and no path of karma has been formed, so it is not action, but deliberation. However, activating thought is precisely the substance of arising body and speech, doing good and doing evil, speaking good and speaking evil. Saying it is karma is also the place where deliberative and decisive thoughts have traveled, jointly producing the different ripening results of suffering and joy."
  ]
}

故。亦名為道。故知不獨身語為業。為業道。即意亦名為業。為業道。不唯意業。思為自性。即前身三口四。皆以思為自性也。七業道。即身三。口四。身表語表。皆是內思之所發故。假說為業思所游履。說名業道。俱舍云十業道中。后三唯道。業之道故。立業道名。彼相應思。說名為業。彼轉故轉。彼行故行。如彼勢力而造作故。前七是業。身語業故。亦業之道思所游故。由能等起身語業思。託身語業。為境轉故。有業之道。立業道名。譬喻論師。執貪瞋等即是意業。依何意釋彼名業道。應問彼師。然亦可言彼是意業。惡趣道故。立業道名。或互相乘。皆名業道。是則有表無表。同歸無色。唯有內識變現似色爾。通上一色法竟。

  不相應行亦非實有(至)如余假法非實有體。

  二不相應行分二。先總破。得等非能緣故。不與心心所相應。非質礙故。不與色相應。有生滅故。不與無為相應。故曰不相應行。二十四法中。小乘唯許十四。下束為六段破之。所以者何。徴釋非實義。此十四法。雖曰不與色心相應。然依色心分位段立。不如色心心所實有體相。亦非異色心心所別有作用。由此應知定非實有。顯揚十八云。當知心不相應行。皆是假有。假有之性。略有六種。云何為六。謂若事能起六種言論。何等名為六種言論。一屬主相應言論。二遠離此彼言論。三眾共施設言論。四眾法聚集言論。五不遍一切言論。六非常言論。廣如彼釋。此定非下。以非異色心心所有實體用為宗。宗立三比量。許蘊攝故。因。如色心等喻。或心心所及

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本:",
    "因此,(善)亦可稱為『道』(marga,道路,方法)。由此可知,不僅身和語是『業』(karma,行為,造作),作為『業道』(karmapatha,業的道路)的意(manas,思想,意念)也稱為『業』,是『業道』。不僅意業,思(cetana,意志,意圖)是其自性,而且前身的(身)三(業)和(語)四(業),都以思為自性。七『業道』,即身三(業)、語四(業),身表(kaya-vijnapti,身體的表述)和語表(vak-vijnapti,語言的表述),都是內在的思所引發的,所以假說為『業』的思所遊歷,稱為『業道』。《俱舍論》(Abhidharmakosa)說,十『業道』中,后三(意業)僅僅是『道』,因為是『業』的道路,所以立名為『業道』。與它們相應的思,被稱為『業』,因為它們(意業)轉變,思也轉變;它們(意業)行動,思也行動;就像它們的力量而造作。前七(身語業)是『業』,因為是身語業,也是『業』的道路,是思所遊歷之處。由於能夠等起(引發)身語業的思,依託身語業為境而轉變,所以有『業之道』,立名為『業道』。譬喻論師(Drshtantavadin)認為貪(raga,貪慾)、嗔(dvesa,嗔恨)等就是意業,應該問他們依據什麼意義解釋它們為『業道』。當然也可以說它們是意業,是惡趣(durgati,惡劣的去處)的道路,所以立名為『業道』。或者互相乘(支援),都稱為『業道』。這樣,有表(savijnaptika,有表業)和無表(avijnaptika,無表業)都歸於無色(arupa,非物質),只有內在的識(vijnana,意識)變現出類似色的東西罷了。以上是對色法的總括。",
    
    "『不相應行』(citta-viprayukta-samskara,不與心識相應的行蘊)也不是實有的(dravyasat,實體存在)……如同其餘假法(prajnapti-sat,假名存在)沒有實體的自性。",
    
    "二、『不相應行』分兩部分。先總破斥。『得』(prapti,獲得)等不能緣(alambana,作為對像),所以不與心(citta,心識)和心所(caitta,心所法)相應;不是質礙(rupa,物質)的,所以不與色(rupa,物質)相應;有生滅(utpada-vyaya,生起和滅壞)的,所以不與無為(asamskrita,非造作的)相應。所以說『不相應行』。二十四法中,小乘(Hinayana,小乘佛教)只承認十四種。下面歸納為六段來破斥它們。為什麼呢?征問解釋非實有的意義。這十四種法,雖然說不與色心相應,但卻是依據色心的分位階段而設立的,不如色心心所那樣有真實的體相,也不是與色心心所不同的、另外的作用。由此應該知道,它們一定不是實有的。 《顯揚聖教論》(Abhidharma-samuccaya)第十八卷說:『應當知道,心不相應行,都是假有的。假有的性質,大概有六種。什麼是六種呢?就是如果一件事能引起六種言論。什麼叫做六種言論呢?一是屬主相應言論,二是遠離此彼言論,三是眾共施設言論,四是眾法聚集言論,五是不遍一切言論,六是非常言論。』詳細的解釋如該論所述。『此定非下』,以『不是與色心心所不同的實體作用』為宗(paksa,論題)。宗立三個比量(anumana,推理):『許蘊攝故』為因(hetu,理由),『如色心等』為喻(drstanta,例子)。或者『心心所及』。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version:",
    "Therefore, (good) can also be called 'path' (marga, road, method). Hence, it is known that not only body and speech are 'karma' (action, creation), but also the mind (manas, thought, intention) as 'karmapatha' (path of karma) is also called 'karma', being the 'karmapatha'. Not only mental karma, with intention (cetana, will, intention) as its nature, but also the three (actions) of body and the four (actions) of speech from the previous life, all have intention as their nature. The seven 'karmapathas' are the three (actions) of body and the four (actions) of speech. Bodily expression (kaya-vijnapti, expression of the body) and verbal expression (vak-vijnapti, expression of speech) are both initiated by inner intention, so they are hypothetically said to be traversed by the intention of 'karma', and are called 'karmapatha'. The *Abhidharmakosa* says that among the ten 'karmapathas', the last three (mental karmas) are merely 'path', because they are the path of 'karma', hence the name 'karmapatha'. The intentions corresponding to them are called 'karma', because they (mental karmas) change, and intention also changes; they (mental karmas) act, and intention also acts; just like they create with their power. The first seven (body and speech karmas) are 'karma', because they are body and speech karmas, and also the path of 'karma', the place traversed by intention. Because they can initiate the intention of body and speech karmas, relying on body and speech karmas as objects to transform, there is a 'path of karma', hence the name 'karmapatha'. The *Drshtantavadin* (Exemplification School) believes that greed (raga, desire), hatred (dvesa, aversion), etc., are mental karmas. They should be asked on what basis they interpret them as 'karmapatha'. Of course, it can also be said that they are mental karmas, the path to bad destinies (durgati, bad realms), hence the name 'karmapatha'. Or they mutually support each other, and are all called 'karmapatha'. In this way, both expressed (savijnaptika, expressed karma) and unexpressed (avijnaptika, unexpressed karma) karmas return to the immaterial (arupa, non-material), only the inner consciousness (vijnana, consciousness) manifests something that resembles form. The above is a summary of form dharmas.",
    
    "'Non-associated formations' (citta-viprayukta-samskara, formations not associated with mind) are also not substantially existent (dravyasat, substantially existing)... like other nominal existences (prajnapti-sat, nominally existing) without substantial nature.",
    
    "Two, 'non-associated formations' are divided into two parts. First, a general refutation. 'Attainment' (prapti, obtaining) and others cannot be objects (alambana, as objects), so they are not associated with mind (citta, mind) and mental factors (caitta, mental factors); they are not obstructive (rupa, material), so they are not associated with form (rupa, material); they have arising and ceasing (utpada-vyaya, arising and destruction), so they are not associated with the unconditioned (asamskrita, unconditioned). Therefore, they are called 'non-associated formations'. Among the twenty-four dharmas, the Hinayana (Small Vehicle Buddhism) only recognizes fourteen. Below, they are summarized into six sections to refute them. Why? To inquire and explain the meaning of non-substantial existence. These fourteen dharmas, although said not to be associated with form and mind, are established based on the stages of form and mind, not like form, mind, and mental factors that have real substantial characteristics, nor are they different functions from form, mind, and mental factors. From this, it should be known that they are certainly not substantially existent. The *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (Compendium of Abhidharma), volume 18, says: 'It should be known that formations not associated with mind are all nominally existent. The nature of nominal existence roughly has six types. What are the six types? That is, if something can cause six kinds of statements. What are the six kinds of statements? First, statements corresponding to ownership; second, statements distant from this and that; third, statements commonly established; fourth, statements gathering many dharmas; fifth, statements not pervading all; sixth, statements not permanent.' Detailed explanations are as described in that treatise. 'This is certainly not below', taking 'not being a substantial function different from form, mind, and mental factors' as the thesis (paksa, proposition). Three inferences (anumana, reasoning) are established for the thesis: 'Because they are admitted to be included in the aggregates' is the reason (hetu, reason), 'like form, mind, etc.' is the example (drstanta, example). Or 'mind, mental factors, and'."
  ]
}

色無為所不攝故。因。如畢竟無。喻。或余實法所不攝故。因。如余假法。喻。許蘊攝者。頌曰。色攝十一全。受想各當一。七十三行蘊。八王識蘊收。謂五根六塵。皆屬色蘊。故云色攝十一全。遍行中受自當受蘊。想當想蘊。故曰受想各當一。五十一心所。二十四不相應。總有七十五法。除受想二。有七十三。此等皆是遷流造作。故行蘊攝。故曰七十三行蘊。八識心王皆是識故。皆識蘊攝。故曰八王識蘊收。是故五蘊攝前九十四法。唯除無為。今得等法既許行蘊所攝。則安得異色心等有實體用哉。又既不與色心無為相應。又非真如實際等實法。則亦龜毛兔角等耳。

  且彼如何知得非得(至)現在必有善種等故。

  二別破分七。一破得非得。得者。謂于善不善無記法。若增若減。假立獲得成就。非得者。一名異生性。謂于聖法不得。假立異生性。且彼如何知得非得異色心等有實體用。論主問也。契經下。外人答也。經不說此下。論主辯破。梵語補特伽羅。此云數取趣。謂數數造業取善惡趣。即異生性也。十無學法。謂正語。正業。正命。正念。正定。正見。正思惟。正精進。正解脫。正智。為第七十二解脫道時。證五分法身。立阿羅漢果。名無學位。戒。定。慧。解脫。解脫知見。五分能攝十法。故名十無學法。異產生就善惡。不成就聖法。聖者成就聖法。不成就煩惱。凡聖各有成不成。則互有得不得矣。此外計也。經不說下。論主辯破。俱舍云。諸有為法。若有墮在自相續中。有得非得。非他相續。無有成就他身法故。非非

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "色(rupa,物質)不是無為法(asaṃskṛta,未造作的法)所包含的,所以不是因。例如,畢竟不存在的事物。這是一個比喻。或者,因為色不是其餘真實法所包含的,所以是因。例如,其餘虛假法。這是一個比喻。如果你們允許五蘊(skandha,蘊)包含某些事物,那麼:",
    "頌曰:色蘊包含全部十一種(法),受蘊(vedanāskandha,感受蘊)和想蘊(saṃjñāskandha,想蘊)各自包含一種(法)。七十三種(法)由行蘊(saṃskāraskandha,行蘊)所收攝,八種心王(vijñānaskandha,識蘊)由識蘊所收攝。也就是說,五根(indriya,感覺器官)和六塵(viṣaya,感覺對像)都屬於色蘊,所以說『色蘊包含全部十一種』。遍行心所中的受(vedanā,感受)本身就是受蘊,想(saṃjñā,想)本身就是想蘊,所以說『受想各自包含一種』。五十一心所(caitta,心所)和二十四不相應行法(cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra,與心不相應的行法),總共有七十五種法。除去受和想這兩種,還有七十三種。這些都是遷流造作的,所以由行蘊所收攝,所以說『七十三行蘊』。八種識心王都是識,所以都由識蘊所收攝,所以說『八王識蘊收』。因此,五蘊收攝了前面的九十四種法,唯獨沒有包含無為法。現在,你們的『得』等法既然允許被行蘊所收攝,那麼又怎麼能與色、心等法不同,具有實體作用呢?而且,既然不與色、心、無為法相應,又不是真如(tathātā,如實)實際等真實法,那麼也就和龜毛兔角一樣,是不存在的。",
    
    "而且,他們如何知道『得』和『非得』(直到)現在必定有善種等原因呢?",
    
    "下面分別破斥七種觀點。第一,破斥『得』和『非得』。『得』是指對於善、不善、無記法,如果增加或減少,就假立為獲得成就。『非得』,又名異生性(pṛthag-jana-tva,凡夫性),是指對於聖法沒有獲得,就假立為異生性。而且,他們如何知道『得』和『非得』與色、心等法不同,具有實體作用呢?這是論主的提問。『契經』以下是外人的回答。『經不說此』以下是論主的辯駁破斥。梵語補特伽羅(pudgala),這裡翻譯為『數取趣』,意思是屢次造業,取善惡趣,也就是異生性。十無學法(aśaikṣadharma,無學法)是指正語(samyag-vāc,正語)、正業(samyak-karmānta,正業)、正命(samyag-ājīva,正命)、正念(samyak-smṛti,正念)、正定(samyak-samādhi,正定)、正見(samyag-dṛṣṭi,正見)、正思惟(samyak-saṃkalpa,正思惟)、正精進(samyag-vyāyāma,正精進)、正解脫(samyag-vimukti,正解脫)、正智(samyag-jñāna,正智)。在第七十二解脫道時,證得五分法身(pañca-skandha-dharmakāya,五分法身),建立阿羅漢果(arhat,阿羅漢),稱為無學位(aśaikṣabhūmi,無學位)。戒(śīla,戒)、定(samādhi,定)、慧(prajñā,慧)、解脫(vimukti,解脫)、解脫知見(vimukti-jñānadarśana,解脫知見)五分能收攝十法,所以稱為十無學法。異生能夠成就善惡,不能成就聖法。聖者能夠成就聖法,不能成就煩惱。凡夫和聖者各有成就和不成就,因此互相有『得』和『非得』。這是外道的計較。『經不說』以下是論主的辯駁破斥。《俱舍論》(Abhidharmakośa,阿毗達磨俱舍論)說:諸有為法(saṃskṛta-dharma,有為法),如果存在於自己的相續中,就有『得』和『非得』,不在他人的相續中,因為沒有成就他人之身法的緣故,不是非非。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Because rūpa (form, matter) is not encompassed by asaṃskṛta (the unconditioned), it is not a cause. For example, something that ultimately does not exist. This is a metaphor. Or, because rūpa is not encompassed by the remaining real dharmas, it is a cause. For example, the remaining hypothetical dharmas. This is a metaphor. If you allow the skandhas (aggregates) to encompass certain things, then:",
    "The verse says: The rūpa-skandha (aggregate of form) encompasses all eleven (dharmas). The vedanā-skandha (aggregate of feeling) and the saṃjñā-skandha (aggregate of perception) each encompass one (dharma). Seventy-three (dharmas) are collected by the saṃskāra-skandha (aggregate of mental formations), and the eight vijñāna-skandhas (aggregates of consciousness) are collected by the vijñāna-skandha (aggregate of consciousness). That is to say, the five indriyas (sense organs) and the six viṣayas (sense objects) all belong to the rūpa-skandha, so it is said 'the rūpa-skandha encompasses all eleven'. Vedanā (feeling) among the omnipresent mental factors is itself the vedanā-skandha, and saṃjñā (perception) is itself the saṃjñā-skandha, so it is said 'feeling and perception each encompass one'. The fifty-one caittas (mental factors) and the twenty-four cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras (non-associated formations), in total there are seventy-five dharmas. Excluding feeling and perception, there are seventy-three. These are all impermanent and fabricated, so they are collected by the saṃskāra-skandha, so it is said 'seventy-three saṃskāra-skandha'. The eight vijñāna-skandhas are all consciousness, so they are all collected by the vijñāna-skandha, so it is said 'eight vijñāna-skandha collected'. Therefore, the five skandhas collect the preceding ninety-four dharmas, only excluding the asaṃskṛta. Now, since your 'attainment' etc. are allowed to be collected by the saṃskāra-skandha, how can they be different from rūpa, mind, etc., and have substantial function? Moreover, since they are not associated with rūpa, mind, or the unconditioned, and are not tathātā (suchness), reality, etc., then they are like turtle hair and rabbit horns, non-existent.",
    
    "Moreover, how do they know that 'attainment' and 'non-attainment' (until) there must be good seeds etc. now?",
    
    "Below, seven viewpoints are refuted separately. First, refute 'attainment' and 'non-attainment'. 'Attainment' refers to the hypothetical establishment of obtaining and accomplishment if there is an increase or decrease in good, unwholesome, or neutral dharmas. 'Non-attainment', also known as pṛthag-jana-tva (the state of an ordinary being), refers to the hypothetical establishment of the state of an ordinary being because there is no attainment of the holy dharma. Moreover, how do they know that 'attainment' and 'non-attainment' are different from rūpa, mind, etc., and have substantial function? This is the question of the author. 'Scripture' below is the answer of the outsider. 'The scripture does not say this' below is the author's refutation. The Sanskrit word pudgala is translated here as 'seeker of rebirth', meaning repeatedly creating karma and seeking good and bad rebirths, which is the state of an ordinary being. The ten aśaikṣadharmas (unlearnable dharmas) refer to samyag-vāc (right speech), samyak-karmānta (right action), samyag-ājīva (right livelihood), samyak-smṛti (right mindfulness), samyak-samādhi (right concentration), samyak-dṛṣṭi (right view), samyak-saṃkalpa (right thought), samyak-vyāyāma (right effort), samyag-vimukti (right liberation), and samyag-jñāna (right knowledge). At the seventy-second path of liberation, the pañca-skandha-dharmakāya (fivefold body of dharma) is attained, and the state of arhat (worthy one) is established, called the aśaikṣabhūmi (state of no more learning). The five parts of śīla (morality), samādhi (concentration), prajñā (wisdom), vimukti (liberation), and vimukti-jñānadarśana (knowledge and vision of liberation) can collect the ten dharmas, so they are called the ten aśaikṣadharmas. Ordinary beings can accomplish good and unwholesome, but cannot accomplish holy dharmas. Holy ones can accomplish holy dharmas, but cannot accomplish afflictions. Ordinary beings and holy ones each have accomplishment and non-accomplishment, so there is mutual 'attainment' and 'non-attainment'. This is the calculation of the outsider. 'The scripture does not say' below is the author's refutation. The Abhidharmakośa says: If saṃskṛta-dharmas (conditioned dharmas) exist in one's own continuum, there is 'attainment' and 'non-attainment', not in the continuum of others, because there is no accomplishment of the dharma of another's body, it is not non-non."
  ]
}

相續。無有成就非情法故。如汝所言。則諸非情及他相續亦應成就。所以者何。契經說故。如契經說。苾芻當知。有轉輪王成就七寶。乃至廣說。像寶。馬寶。如寶。主藏臣寶。主兵臣寶。皆屬他身。輪寶。摩尼珠寶。皆屬非情。故曰豈即成就他身非情。若謂輪王於七寶有自在業力。應念而有。假說成就者。則前所引善惡等法。何不許其有自在業力。假說成就。而執為實得乎。若謂七寶現在有故。可假說成而善惡不然者誰知善惡法亦不離現在有也。何也。現在之外。無實法也。縱不起現行。而種子常存也。

  又得於法有何勝用(至)得實無故非得亦無。

  上明得無實體。此明得無實用。若此得是諸行生因。有能生用。則應現在有情具此得者。于有為生滅法中。應起不生不滅無為之法。從來一切無情之法。此既無有生因之得。應永不生。何俱不然。已失者。過去也。未得者。未來也。言俱生者。揀前後生。法若過去。得亦過去。法若未來。得亦未來。法若現在。得亦現在。為俱生得。此唯無記。勢力劣故。無前後生。不通善惡。俱舍云。若謂此得亦有作用。謂作所得諸法生因。是則無為應無有得。又所得法未得已舍。界地轉易及離染故。彼現無得。當云何生。若俱生得。為生因者。則汝所執生與生生。復何所作。又具縛者。下中上品煩惱現起差別應無。得無別故。若由余因有差別者。即應由彼諸法得生。得復何用(此以上俱捨本文)。若謂得是諸法不失之因。有情由此成就諸法者。則諸可成法。不離有情。若離有情。實不可得汝

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "相續。因為沒有成就非情法(沒有情感的事物)的緣故。如果像你所說的那樣,那麼所有非情之物以及他人的相續也應該成就。為什麼呢?因為契經(佛經)這樣說。如契經所說:『苾芻(比丘),你們應當知道,有轉輪王成就七寶』,乃至廣說。像寶、馬寶、如意寶、主藏臣寶、主兵臣寶,都屬於他人之身;輪寶、摩尼珠寶,都屬於非情之物。所以說,難道是成就了他人的身體和非情之物嗎?如果說轉輪王對於七寶有自在的業力,應該意念而生,假說是成就,那麼前面所引用的善惡等法,為什麼不承認它們有自在的業力,假說是成就,而要執著認為是真實得到的呢?如果說七寶現在存在,可以假說是成就,而善惡不是這樣,那麼誰知道善惡之法也不離現在存在呢?為什麼呢?因為在現在之外,沒有真實存在的法。即使不起現行,而種子也常存。\n\n又得到法有什麼殊勝的作用呢?(直到)得到真實不存在,所以得到也是不存在的。\n\n上面說明『得』沒有實體,這裡說明『得』沒有實用。如果這個『得』是諸行(事物)生起的原因,有能生起的作用,那麼現在具有這個『得』的有情,在有為生滅法中,應該生起不生不滅的無為之法。從來一切無情之法,既然沒有生起原因的『得』,應該永遠不生起。為什麼都並非如此呢?已經失去的,是過去;未得到的,是未來。說『俱生』,是爲了區別前後生。法如果是過去,『得』也是過去;法如果是未來,『得』也是未來;法如果是現在,『得』也是現在。作為俱生的『得』,這只是無記(非善非惡),勢力弱小,沒有前後生,不通善惡。《俱舍論》說:『如果說這個『得』也有作用,是所得諸法生起的原因,那麼無為法應該沒有『得』。』又所得的法,未得就已經捨棄,因為界地轉移以及遠離染污的緣故。它們現在沒有『得』,應當如何生起?如果俱生的『得』是生起的原因,那麼你所執著的生與生生,又有什麼作用呢?又具縛者(被煩惱束縛的人),下中上品煩惱現起差別應該沒有,因為『得』沒有差別。如果由於其他原因有差別,就應該由那些法生起,『得』又有什麼用呢?(以上是《俱舍論》的原文)。如果說『得』是諸法不失的原因,有情由此成就諸法,那麼所有可以成就的法,不離開有情。如果離開有情,實際上是得不到的。",
    "English version",
    "Continuity. Because there is no achievement of non-sentient dharmas (things without sentience). If it is as you say, then all non-sentient things and the continuities of others should also be achieved. Why is that? Because the Sutras say so. As the Sutras say: 'Bhikkhus (monks), you should know that there is a Chakravartin (wheel-turning king) who achieves the seven treasures,' and so on. The elephant treasure, the horse treasure, the wish-fulfilling jewel, the treasurer minister treasure, the military minister treasure, all belong to the bodies of others; the wheel treasure, the Mani (wish-fulfilling) jewel, all belong to non-sentient things. Therefore, it is said, is it achieving the bodies of others and non-sentient things? If it is said that the Chakravartin has the power of free will over the seven treasures, and they should arise from his thoughts, and it is falsely said to be achievement, then why not admit that the good and evil dharmas cited earlier have the power of free will, and falsely say it is achievement, but insist on considering it as truly obtained? If it is said that the seven treasures exist now, and it can be falsely said to be achievement, but good and evil are not like this, then who knows that good and evil dharmas are also inseparable from present existence? Why is that? Because outside of the present, there are no truly existing dharmas. Even if they do not arise in manifestation, the seeds always remain.\n\nFurthermore, what is the superior function of obtaining dharma? (Until) Because obtaining is not truly existent, obtaining is also non-existent.\n\nThe above explains that 'obtaining' has no substance, and this explains that 'obtaining' has no practical use. If this 'obtaining' is the cause of the arising of all phenomena (things), and has the function of being able to arise, then sentient beings who now possess this 'obtaining' should, in conditioned and impermanent dharmas, give rise to unconditioned dharmas that neither arise nor cease. Since all non-sentient dharmas have never had the 'obtaining' that is the cause of arising, they should never arise. Why is it that none of these are the case? What has been lost is the past; what has not been obtained is the future. Saying 'co-arising' is to distinguish between before and after arising. If a dharma is past, 'obtaining' is also past; if a dharma is future, 'obtaining' is also future; if a dharma is present, 'obtaining' is also present. As a co-arising 'obtaining', this is only neutral (neither good nor evil), with weak power, without before and after arising, and does not extend to good and evil. The Abhidharma-kosa (Treasury of Knowledge) says: 'If it is said that this 'obtaining' also has a function, which is the cause of the arising of the dharmas obtained, then unconditioned dharmas should have no 'obtaining'.' Furthermore, the dharmas obtained are abandoned before they are obtained, because of the change of realms and the separation from defilements. They do not have 'obtaining' now, so how should they arise? If co-arising 'obtaining' is the cause of arising, then what is the function of the arising and arising of arising that you insist on? Furthermore, those who are bound (by afflictions) should have no difference in the arising of lower, middle, and upper grade afflictions, because 'obtaining' has no difference. If there are differences due to other causes, then they should arise from those dharmas, so what is the use of 'obtaining'? (The above is the original text of the Abhidharma-kosa). If it is said that 'obtaining' is the cause of the non-loss of all dharmas, and sentient beings achieve all dharmas through this, then all dharmas that can be achieved do not leave sentient beings. If they leave sentient beings, they are actually unobtainable."
  ]
}

等云何執離色心有得等耶。以諸有情即色心故。故得於法俱為無用。結破得有勝用義。得實無故二句。牒無得義。例破非得。

  然依有情可成諸法(至)于諸聖法未成就故。

  此得非得正義。種子業因也。自在。業力也。現行。業果也。集論云。何等種子成就。謂若生欲界。色無色界系煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。及生得善。若生色界。欲界系煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。亦名不成就。色無色界系煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。及生得善。若生無色界。欲界色界系煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。亦名不成就。無色界系煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。及生得善。若已得三界對治道。隨如是如是品類。對治已生如此如此品類。由種子成就。得不成就。隨如是如是品類。對治未生如此如此品類。由種子成就故成就。何等自在成就。謂諸加行善法。若世出世靜慮解脫三摩地三摩缽底等功德。及一分無記法。由自在成就故成就。何等現行成就。謂諸蘊界處法。隨所現前。若善若不善。若無記。彼由現行成就故成就。若已斷善者所有善法。由種子成就故成就。亦名不成就。若非涅槃法一闡底迦究竟成就。雜染諸法。由闕解脫因。亦名阿顛底迦。以彼解脫得因畢竟不成就故。于成就善巧得何勝利能。善了知諸法增減。知增減故。於世興衰。離決定想。乃至能斷若愛若恚。俱舍云。言生得善者。不由功力修得故。加行善者。要由功力修得。不由功力修得者。若所依中。種未被損。名為成就。種已被損。名不成就。謂斷

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "『等』如何執著于離開色和心而有所得呢?因為一切有情眾生就是色和心組成的,所以認為通過『得』可以獲得佛法是毫無用處的。總結來說,破除『得』的觀念才具有殊勝的作用和意義。『得實無故』這兩句,是重申『無得』的意義,並以此為例來破斥『非得』的觀念。",
    
    "然而,依靠有情眾生可以成就諸法(直到)對於諸聖法尚未成就。",
    
    "這裡所說的『得』和『非得』,是真正的意義。『種子』是業的因,『自在』是業的力量,『現行』是業的果。《集論》中說:什麼是『種子成就』?如果眾生生於欲界,對於欲界、色界、無色界的煩惱和隨煩惱,由於『種子成就』而成就,以及生來就有的善法。如果生於色界,對於欲界的煩惱和隨煩惱,由於『種子成就』而成就,也可以說是不成就。對於色界和無色界的煩惱和隨煩惱,由於『種子成就』而成就,以及生來就有的善法。如果生於無色界,對於欲界和色界的煩惱和隨煩惱,由於『種子成就』而成就,也可以說是不成就。對於無色界的煩惱和隨煩惱,由於『種子成就』而成就,以及生來就有的善法。如果已經獲得了三界的對治道,隨著不同品類的對治道已經生起,如此這般地對治了相應的品類,這是由於『種子成就』。對於尚未生起的相應品類的對治道,由於『種子成就』而成就。什麼是『自在成就』?是指諸加行善法,如世間和出世間的禪定、解脫、三摩地、三摩缽底等功德,以及一部分無記法,由於『自在成就』而成就。什麼是『現行成就』?是指諸蘊、界、處等法,隨著它們的現前,無論是善、不善還是無記,都是由於『現行成就』而成就。如果已經斷除了善根的人,他所擁有的善法,由於『種子成就』而成就,也可以說是不成就。如果不是涅槃之法,一闡提迦(Icchantika,斷善根者)最終成就的,都是雜染的諸法,因為缺少解脫的因,也可以說是『阿顛底迦』(Adyantika,無有終結者),因為他們獲得解脫的因畢竟不能成就。對於成就的善巧,能獲得什麼利益呢?能夠清楚地瞭解諸法的增減,因爲了解增減,對於世間的興衰,就能遠離決定性的想法,乃至能夠斷除愛和恚。《俱舍論》中說:『生得善』是指不由功力修得的善法,『加行善』是指要通過功力修得的善法。不由功力修得的善法,如果在所依的身體中,種子沒有被損壞,就叫做『成就』;如果種子已經被損壞,就叫做『不成就』,也就是斷除了善根。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "How does 『etc.』 cling to the idea of gaining something by separating from form and mind? Because all sentient beings are composed of form and mind, thinking that one can attain the Dharma through 『gain』 is useless. In conclusion, dispelling the notion of 『gain』 has supreme value and meaning. The two sentences 『because the reality of gain is non-existent』 reiterate the meaning of 『no gain,』 and use this as an example to refute the notion of 『no non-gain.』",
    
    "However, relying on sentient beings can accomplish all dharmas (until) one has not yet accomplished all the noble dharmas.",
    
    "Here, 『gain』 and 『non-gain』 are the true meanings. 『Seed』 is the cause of karma, 『mastery』 is the power of karma, and 『manifestation』 is the result of karma. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says: What is 『seed accomplishment』? If a being is born in the Desire Realm, regarding the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms, they are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment,』 as well as the innate good dharmas. If born in the Form Realm, regarding the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the Desire Realm, they are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment,』 and can also be said to be unaccomplished. Regarding the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the Form and Formless Realms, they are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment,』 as well as the innate good dharmas. If born in the Formless Realm, regarding the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the Desire and Form Realms, they are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment,』 and can also be said to be unaccomplished. Regarding the afflictions and secondary afflictions of the Formless Realm, they are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment,』 as well as the innate good dharmas. If one has already attained the antidote path of the Three Realms, as different categories of antidote paths have arisen, they have counteracted the corresponding categories in this way, due to 『seed accomplishment.』 Regarding the corresponding categories of antidote paths that have not yet arisen, they are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment.』 What is 『mastery accomplishment』? It refers to the virtuous dharmas of effort, such as mundane and supramundane dhyana, liberation, samadhi, samapatti, and other merits, as well as a portion of neutral dharmas, which are accomplished due to 『mastery accomplishment.』 What is 『manifestation accomplishment』? It refers to the aggregates, realms, and sense bases, as they manifest, whether they are virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral, they are accomplished due to 『manifestation accomplishment.』 If a person has already severed their roots of virtue, the virtuous dharmas they possess are accomplished due to 『seed accomplishment,』 and can also be said to be unaccomplished. If it is not the Dharma of Nirvana, what an Icchantika (one who has severed their roots of virtue) ultimately accomplishes are all defiled dharmas, because they lack the cause of liberation, and can also be said to be 『Adyantika』 (one without end), because their cause for attaining liberation ultimately cannot be accomplished. What benefit can be gained from skill in accomplishment? One can clearly understand the increase and decrease of dharmas, and because one understands increase and decrease, one can be free from fixed ideas about the rise and fall of the world, and even be able to sever love and hatred. The *Abhidharmakosa* says: 『Innate virtue』 refers to virtuous dharmas that are not cultivated through effort, while 『effort』 refers to virtuous dharmas that must be cultivated through effort. Virtuous dharmas that are not cultivated through effort, if the seed has not been damaged in the dependent body, it is called 『accomplishment』; if the seed has been damaged, it is called 『unaccomplishment,』 which means severing the roots of virtue."
  ]
}

善者。由邪見力。損所依中善根種子。應知名斷。非所依中善根種子畢竟被害。說名為斷。要由功力而修得者。若所依中。彼法已起。生彼功力。自在無損。說名成就。與此相違。名不成就。如是二種。亦假非實。故所依中。唯有種子未拔未損。增長自在。于如是位。立成就名。無有別物。此類雖多下。結成非得義。見所斷種。即分別惑。斷此惑故。成就聖法。若未永害非聖性法。名異生性。異生。即六趣眾生也。

  復如何知異色心等(至)分位差別假立同分。

  二破眾同分。集論云。何等眾同分。謂如是如是有情。于種種類。自體相似。假立眾同分。于種種類者。於人天等種種差別。于自體相似者。於一種類性。首句。論主問也。契經說故下。小乘答也。外執同分有實體者略有二師。勝論執有總同句義。於一切法。總同言智。由此發生。彼復執有同異句義。于異品類。同異言智。於此發生。毗婆沙師所執。與此義類不同。以說一物于多轉故。又縱于彼若顯不顯。然此同分必有實物。契經說故。如世尊言。若還來此。得人同分。乃至廣說。此經不說下。論主總破。若同智言下。展轉辯破。俱舍敘外執云。若無實物。無差別相。名同分者。展轉差別諸有情中。有情有情等無差別。覺及施設不應得有。覺即同智。施設即同言。故此破云。若同智言因斯起故知實有者則草木等應有同分。以不許有無情同分故故俱舍云。又何因不許有無情同分。諸穀麥豆金鐵庵羅半娜娑等亦有自類互相似故。又同分既能起同智言。亦應能起別同分。如是

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "善良的人啊,由於邪見的勢力,損害了所依(指身心)中的善根種子,這應該被稱為『斷』。並非所依中的善根種子完全被摧毀,才被稱為『斷』。只有通過努力修行才能獲得的功德,如果已經在所依中生起,那麼產生這種功德的力量就會自在無損,這被稱為『成就』。與此相反的情況,則被稱為『不成就』。這兩種狀態也只是假立的,並非真實的。因此,在所依中,只有善根種子未被拔除、未被損害,並且能夠自在增長,在這種狀態下,才安立『成就』之名,而沒有其他的實在之物。",
    "這類情況雖然很多,下面總結為『非得』的含義。見所斷的種子,就是指分別惑。斷除這種惑,就能成就聖法。如果還沒有永遠斷除非聖性的法,就稱為『異生性』。異生,就是指六道眾生。",
    
    "又如何知道異色的心等(乃至)分位的差別,是假立的同分呢?",
    
    "二、破斥眾同分。在《集論》中說:『什麼是眾同分?』是指像這樣像那樣的有情,在種種種類中,自體相似,假立為眾同分。『在種種種類中』,是指在人、天等種種差別之中。『于自體相似者』,是指在同一種類性中。首句是論主提問。",
    "『因為契經這樣說』,這是小乘的回答。外道執著同分有實體,大致有兩派。勝論派執著有總同句義,認為對一切法,總體的相同言語和智慧,由此產生。他們又執著有同異句義,認為對不同品類,相同的和不同的言語和智慧,由此產生。毗婆沙師所執著的,與此義理不同,因為他們說一個事物在多個事物中轉變。而且即使在他們那裡,如果顯現或不顯現,但這個同分必定有實物,因為契經這樣說。例如世尊說:『如果還來這裡,得到人的同分』,乃至廣說。",
    "『此經沒有這樣說』,這是論主總體的破斥。『如果因為相同的智慧和言語因此產生,就知道有實物』,這是輾轉辯駁。俱舍宗敘述外道的執著說:『如果沒有實物,沒有差別相,而名為同分,那麼在輾轉差別的諸有情中,有情和有情等就沒有差別,覺知和施設不應該存在。』覺知就是相同的智慧,施設就是相同的言語。所以這裡破斥說:『如果因為相同的智慧和言語因此產生,就知道有實物,那麼草木等也應該有同分。』因為不承認無情之物有同分。所以《俱舍論》說:『又因為什麼不承認無情之物有同分?』諸如穀物、麥子、豆子、金、鐵、庵羅、半娜娑等,也有自己的類別互相相似的緣故。",
    "又,同分既然能夠產生相同的智慧和言語,也應該能夠產生別的同分,像這樣。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "O virtuous one, due to the power of wrong views, the seeds of virtue within the support (referring to the body and mind) are damaged, and this should be known as 'severance'. It is not that the seeds of virtue within the support are completely destroyed to be called 'severance'. Only the merits that can be obtained through diligent practice, if they have already arisen within the support, then the power to generate such merits will be unhindered and unimpaired, and this is called 'accomplishment'. The opposite of this is called 'non-accomplishment'. These two states are also merely provisional and not real. Therefore, within the support, only the seeds of virtue that have not been uprooted or damaged, and are able to grow freely, in this state, the name 'accomplishment' is established, and there is no other real entity.",
    "Although there are many such cases, they are summarized below as the meaning of 'non-attainment'. The seeds to be severed by views refer to the afflictions of discrimination. By severing these afflictions, one can accomplish the holy Dharma. If the non-holy Dharma has not been permanently severed, it is called 'the nature of an ordinary being'. Ordinary beings refer to the beings of the six realms.",
    
    "Furthermore, how do we know that the differences in divisions of different colors, minds, etc. are provisionally established as commonality?",
    
    "Secondly, refuting the commonality of beings. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Compendium of Abhidharma) says: 'What is the commonality of beings?' It refers to sentient beings like this and like that, in various kinds, whose self-natures are similar, and are provisionally established as the commonality of beings. 'In various kinds' refers to the various differences among humans, gods, etc. 'Whose self-natures are similar' refers to the same kind of nature. The first sentence is a question from the master of the treatise.",
    "'Because the sutras say so', this is the answer of the Hinayana. Externalists who cling to the reality of commonality are roughly divided into two schools. The Vaisheshika school clings to the meaning of general commonality, believing that the general common language and wisdom about all dharmas arise from this. They also cling to the meaning of similarity and difference, believing that the same and different language and wisdom about different categories arise from this. The views held by the Vaibhashika masters are different from this meaning, because they say that one thing transforms into many things. Moreover, even in their view, whether it appears or does not appear, this commonality must have a real entity, because the sutras say so. For example, the World-Honored One said: 'If they return here, they will obtain the commonality of humans', and so on.",
    "'This sutra does not say so', this is the master's overall refutation. 'If the same wisdom and language arise from this, then we know there is a real entity', this is a roundabout refutation. The *Abhidharmakosha* (Treasury of Abhidharma) narrates the externalist's clinging, saying: 'If there is no real entity, no different characteristics, and it is called commonality, then among the sentient beings with roundabout differences, there would be no difference between sentient beings, and cognition and establishment should not exist.' Cognition is the same wisdom, and establishment is the same language. Therefore, this refutation says: 'If the same wisdom and language arise from this, then we know there is a real entity, then grass, trees, etc. should also have commonality.' Because they do not admit that inanimate objects have commonality. Therefore, the *Abhidharmakosha* says: 'And why do you not admit that inanimate objects have commonality?' Things like grains, wheat, beans, gold, iron, *amra* (mango), *pannasa* (jackfruit), etc., also have their own categories that are similar to each other.",
    "Furthermore, since commonality can generate the same wisdom and language, it should also be able to generate other commonalities, like this."
  ]
}

展轉。成無窮過。若不許起別同分。云何許起同智言耶。故俱舍云。又諸同分展轉差別。如何于彼更無同分。而起無別覺施設耶。若謂同分為因而起同事同欲。故知同分是實有者。理亦不然。事即身業。欲即意業。如殺生者。望殺生者。乃至諸邪見者。望邪見者。離殺生者。望離殺生者。乃至正見者。望正見者。皆名同事欲。此皆前生習氣為因。故今生起如是業。豈實有殺生等同分。然後起耶。然依有情下。出正義。謂依于彼彼處受生有情。同界。同趣。同生。同類。位。性。形等。由彼彼分互相似性。假立同分。身心即應上事欲也。

  復如何知異色心等(至)住時決定假立命根。

  三破命根。集論云。何等命根。謂于眾同分。先業所感。住時決定。假立壽命。眾同分者。於一生中諸蘊相續。住時決定者。劑爾所時。令眾同分常得安住。或經百年千年等。由業所引。功能差別。又依業所引第八識種。令色心不斷。名為命根。此是正義。余乘于識暖外。別執壽為命根。死此生彼。以為實有。如世人以命盡為死。詳見俱舍。首句。論主問也。契經說故下。小乘答也。此經不說下。論主總破。又先已成下。展轉辯破。先已成者。前所論過也。先已成立離識。無色。何執離識有別命根乎。若命根離識有。則應如受等。剎那生滅。非實命根矣。量云。汝所執命根是有法。非實命根是宗。因云。異識實有故。喻如受等。小乘問云。既離識外無別命根。只應說識。云何經說壽暖識三。論主答云。雖是一識。義別說三。謂阿賴耶識相分色法。身

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "輾轉相續,造成無窮的過失。如果不允許設立『別同分』,又怎麼能允許設立『同智言』呢?所以《俱舍論》說:『又各種同分輾轉差別,如何在那些差別中沒有同分,而產生無差別的覺知施設呢?』如果說因為同分為因而產生同樣的事業和同樣的慾望,所以知道同分是真實存在的,這個道理也是不成立的。『事』就是身業,『欲』就是意業。比如殺生的人,希望殺生的人,乃至各種邪見的人,希望邪見的人,遠離殺生的人,希望遠離殺生的人,乃至正見的人,希望正見的人,都叫做『同事欲』。這些都是前生的習氣作為原因,所以在今生生起這樣的業,難道真的有殺生等等的同分,然後才生起這些業嗎?然而,下面依據有情,闡述正確的意義。就是依據在各個地方受生的有情,在同一個界、同一個趣、同一個生、同一個類、同一個位、同一個性、同一個形等等方面,由於這些方面的互相相似性,假立為『同分』。身和心就應該包括上面的『事』和『欲』了。",
    
    "又如何知道不同的色、心等等(一直到)住留的時間決定,是假立的命根呢?",
    
    "三、破斥命根。《集論》說:『什麼是命根?就是在眾同分中,由先前的業力所感,住留的時間決定,假立為壽命。』『眾同分』,是指在一生中各種蘊的相續。『住留的時間決定』,是指在一定的時間內,使眾同分能夠安住,或者經過一百年、一千年等等,由業力所引導的功能差別。又是依據業力所引導的第八識(阿賴耶識)的種子,使色和心不斷絕,這叫做命根。這是正確的意義。其他宗派在識和暖之外,另外執著有『壽』作為命根,認為死亡是從這裡到那裡,是真實存在的。就像世人認為生命結束就是死亡。詳細的解釋可以參見《俱舍論》的首句。論主提出問題。『契經說故』以下,是小乘的回答。『此經不說』以下,是論主總體的破斥。『又先已成』以下,是輾轉辯論破斥。『先已成』,是指前面所論述的過失。既然先前已經成立了離開識就沒有色,為什麼還要執著離開識有別的命根呢?如果命根離開識而存在,那麼就應該像受等等一樣,剎那生滅,不是真實的命根了。可以這樣衡量:你所執著的命根是有法,不是真實的命根是宗。原因是:它和識是不同的,是真實存在的。比如受等等。小乘提問說:既然離開識之外沒有別的命根,只應該說識,為什麼經典說壽、暖、識三種呢?論主回答說:雖然是一個識,但意義不同,所以說三種。所謂阿賴耶識的相分色法,就是身體。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Transmitting and transforming, creating endless faults. If it is not allowed to establish 'separate commonality' (別同分), how can it be allowed to establish 'common wisdom speech' (同智言)? Therefore, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*俱舍論*) says: 'Moreover, various commonalities transform and differentiate. How can there be no commonality in those differences, and give rise to undifferentiated perception and designation?' If it is said that because commonality is the cause of the same actions and the same desires, therefore it is known that commonality is truly existent, this reasoning is also not valid. 'Actions' (事) are bodily actions, and 'desires' (欲) are mental actions. For example, those who kill, those who desire to kill, and even those with various wrong views, those who desire wrong views, those who abstain from killing, those who desire to abstain from killing, and even those with right views, those who desire right views, are all called 'same actions and desires' (同事欲). These are all caused by the habits of previous lives, so such actions arise in this life. Is it really that there is a commonality of killing, etc., and then these actions arise? However, based on sentient beings, the correct meaning is explained below. That is, based on sentient beings who are born in various places, in the same realm, the same destiny, the same birth, the same kind, the same position, the same nature, the same form, etc., due to the mutual similarity of these aspects, 'commonality' (同分) is provisionally established. Body and mind should include the above 'actions' and 'desires'.",
    
    "Furthermore, how do we know that different forms, minds, etc. (up to) the determined duration of dwelling, are provisionally established as the life faculty (命根)?",
    
    "Third, refuting the life faculty. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*集論*) says: 'What is the life faculty? It is, within the multitude of commonalities, the determined duration of dwelling, caused by previous karma, provisionally established as life.' 'Multitude of commonalities' (眾同分) refers to the continuity of various aggregates in one lifetime. 'Determined duration of dwelling' (住時決定) refers to the period of time that allows the multitude of commonalities to abide, or for hundreds or thousands of years, due to the functional differences guided by karma. Furthermore, based on the seed of the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識) guided by karma, the uninterruptedness of form and mind is called the life faculty. This is the correct meaning. Other schools, in addition to consciousness and warmth, separately cling to 'lifespan' (壽) as the life faculty, believing that death is a real existence from here to there. A detailed explanation can be found in the first sentence of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The master of the treatise raises the question. 'Because the sutras say so' below is the response of the Hinayana. 'This sutra does not say' below is the master of the treatise's overall refutation. 'Furthermore, already established' below is the refutation through repeated debate. 'Already established' refers to the faults discussed earlier. Since it has already been established that there is no form apart from consciousness, why cling to a separate life faculty apart from consciousness? If the life faculty exists apart from consciousness, then it should arise and cease momentarily like feeling (受), and not be a real life faculty. The following can be used as a measure: The life faculty you cling to is the subject (有法), not a real life faculty is the thesis (宗). The reason is: it is different from consciousness and truly exists. For example, feeling, etc. The Hinayana asks: Since there is no separate life faculty apart from consciousness, only consciousness should be mentioned. Why do the scriptures say that there are three: lifespan, warmth, and consciousness? The master of the treatise answers: Although it is one consciousness, it is said to be three because the meanings are different. The form aspect of the ālaya-vijñāna is the body."
  ]
}

根所得。名暖。此識之種名壽。以能持識故。現行識是識。故言三法。義別說之。非謂別有體性是則身舍暖時。有餘二不必舍。如無色界生。如餘二舍時。暖必隨舍。然今此生。約義別說。但是一體。如四正斷。即四正勤也。未生善。令速生起。已生善。令其增長。未生惡。令彼不生。已生惡。令速除滅(斷就惡言勤就善言)。義雖有四。但是一精進數。故以為喻。問。既壽暖不異識者。住無心位。既無有識。壽暖應無。何故此身不即壞爛。答。豈不經說識不離身。無心位中。身雖舍暖。不捨壽識。故身不壞。如無色界。餘二不捨。既爾如何名無心位。小乘問也。論主答云。彼滅轉識。故名無心。非無第八。下文二定。及三卷引滅定有心廣明此義。此識下。結成前義。謂唯此本識。足為三界五趣受果之體。無勞別執離識之外有實命根。然依親生下。出正義。言此者。簡親生余識種子。言識者。簡相應法種。唯取識故。言種者。簡現行不取第八現行為命根故。彼所簡者皆非命根。今取親生之名言種上。由先世業所引。持身差別功能。令色心等住時決定。依此功能。說為命根。非取生現行識義。以此種子為業力故。有持一報之身功能差別。令得決定若此種子無此功能。身便爛壞。阿賴耶識現行。由此種故。能緣及任持。于眼等法。亦名能持。此種正能持于現行之識。若不爾者。現行之識應不得有。及無能持余根等法。由此功能故。識持于身。現行內種力故生。及緣持法。不名命根。非根本故。由種生故。此種不由現行有故。種為諸法之根本故。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "根所得到。名為『暖』。此識的種子名為『壽』,因為它能夠保持住識。現行識就是識,所以說這三種法,只是在意義上有所區別,並不是說有不同的體性。這樣說來,當身體捨棄『暖』的時候,其餘二者不一定捨棄,比如無想生(指進入無想定或無想天的眾生)。如果其餘二者捨棄的時候,『暖』必定隨之捨棄。然而現在這裡所說的『生』,是就意義上的區別來說的,實際上它們是一個整體,就像四正斷,也就是四正勤一樣。未生的善,令其迅速生起;已生的善,令其增長;未生的惡,令其不生;已生的惡,令其迅速除滅(『斷』是就惡來說的,『勤』是就善來說的)。意義上雖然有四種,但實際上只是一種精進的心理作用,所以用這個來比喻。問:既然『壽』和『暖』與識沒有區別,那麼在住于無心位的時候,既然沒有識,『壽』和『暖』應該也沒有,為什麼這個身體不會立刻壞爛呢?答:難道經典不是說識不離開身體嗎?在無心位中,身體雖然捨棄了『暖』,但沒有捨棄『壽識』,所以身體不會壞爛,就像無想生(指進入無想定或無想天的眾生)一樣,其餘二者沒有捨棄。既然這樣,為什麼還叫無心位呢?這是小乘的提問。論主的回答是:他們滅掉了轉識,所以叫做無心,並不是沒有第八識(阿賴耶識)。下文的二定,以及第三卷引用滅定有心,都廣泛地闡明了這個道理。『此識下』,總結並完成了前面的意思。意思是說,只有這個本識(阿賴耶識),才足以作為三界五趣承受果報的本體,不需要另外執著于離開識之外還有真實的命根。『然依親生下』,闡述正確的含義。『此』,是簡別于親生的其他識的種子。『識』,是簡別于相應的法種。只取識的種子。『種』,是簡別于現行,不取第八識的現行作為命根。他們所簡別的東西都不是命根。現在所取的是親生的名言種上,由先世的業力所引導的,保持身體差別的功能,使色心等住留的時間得以決定。依據這個功能,說它是命根,而不是取生起現行識的意義。因為這個種子是業力所致,具有保持一期果報之身的功能差別,使其能夠得以決定。如果這個種子沒有這個功能,身體就會腐爛壞掉。阿賴耶識的現行,由於這個種子的緣故,能夠緣取和任持眼等法,也可以叫做能持。這個種子真正能夠保持住現行的識。如果不是這樣,現行的識就不應該存在,以及沒有能夠保持其餘根等法的功能。由於這個功能,識才能保持住身體。現行是由於內在種子的力量而生起,以及緣取和保持法,不能叫做命根,因為它不是根本。由於種子生起,這個種子不是由現行而有的,種子是諸法的根本。",
    "English version",
    "Root obtained. Named 'Warmth' (Ūṣman, the element of heat or warmth that sustains life). The seed of this consciousness is named 'Life' (Āyu, the duration of life), because it can maintain consciousness. The manifest consciousness is consciousness, hence the three dharmas are spoken of, distinguished in meaning, not implying separate entities. Thus, when the body abandons 'Warmth', the other two are not necessarily abandoned, such as in the case of the non-percipient birth (Asamjñika, referring to beings born in the realm of non-perception). If the other two are abandoned, 'Warmth' must necessarily be abandoned along with them. However, the 'birth' spoken of here is in terms of a distinction in meaning; in reality, they are a single entity, like the Four Right Exertions (Samyak-pradhāna), which are the same as the Four Right Efforts. Unborn good, cause it to arise quickly; born good, cause it to increase; unborn evil, cause it not to arise; born evil, cause it to be quickly eliminated (cessation refers to evil, effort refers to good). Although there are four meanings, they are actually one mental factor of diligence, hence the metaphor. Question: Since 'Life' and 'Warmth' are not different from consciousness, then when dwelling in a state of no-mind, since there is no consciousness, 'Life' and 'Warmth' should also be absent. Why then does the body not immediately decay? Answer: Does the scripture not say that consciousness does not leave the body? In the state of no-mind, although the body abandons 'Warmth', it does not abandon 'Life-consciousness' (Āyu-vijñāna), so the body does not decay, like the non-percipient birth (Asamjñika), where the other two are not abandoned. If that is the case, why is it called a state of no-mind? This is a question from the Hinayana. The treatise master answers: They extinguish the transforming consciousness (Pravṛtti-vijñāna), hence it is called no-mind, not that there is no eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). The two samādhis in the following text, and the third volume citing the mind in cessation samādhi, extensively clarify this meaning. 'This consciousness below' concludes and completes the preceding meaning. It means that only this fundamental consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) is sufficient as the entity that receives the fruition of the three realms and five destinies; there is no need to separately cling to a real life-force outside of consciousness. 'However, relying on the seed produced directly' elucidates the correct meaning. 'This' distinguishes it from the seeds of other consciousnesses produced directly. 'Consciousness' distinguishes it from the seeds of corresponding dharmas. Only the seed of consciousness is taken. 'Seed' distinguishes it from the manifest, not taking the manifest of the eighth consciousness as the life-force. What they distinguish are not the life-force. What is now taken is the seed of name and form produced directly, guided by the karma of previous lives, the function of maintaining the differences of the body, so that the duration of the dwelling of form, mind, etc., can be determined. Based on this function, it is said to be the life-force, not taking the meaning of the arising of manifest consciousness. Because this seed is caused by karmic force, it has the functional difference of maintaining the body of one retribution, so that it can be determined. If this seed does not have this function, the body will decay. The manifestation of Ālaya-vijñāna, due to this seed, can apprehend and sustain the eye and other dharmas, and can also be called the sustainer. This seed truly sustains the manifest consciousness. If it were not so, the manifest consciousness should not exist, and there would be no function to sustain the remaining roots and other dharmas. Because of this function, consciousness can sustain the body. The manifestation arises from the power of the internal seed, and apprehends and sustains dharmas, but it is not called the life-force, because it is not fundamental. Because it arises from the seed, and this seed is not caused by the manifest, the seed is the root of all dharmas."
  ]
}

又現行識是所持故。從所持。說能持種識為命根。命根之法。持體非命根。令六處住時決定故。故種子為命根。余現行色心等非命根。不恒續故。非業所引故。然業正牽時。唯牽此種子。種子方能造生現行。非謂現行名命根。故唯種是根。又夫命根者。依心假立。命為能依。心為所依。生法師云。焚薪之火旋之成輪。輪必攬火而成照。情亦如之。必資心成用也。命之依心。如情之依心矣。

  復如何知二無心定(至)故此三法亦非實有。

  四破無心定。滅盡定。無想異熟。無心定者。謂已離凈欲。未離上地欲。由於無想天起出離想。雜集論云。于不恒行心心所滅。假立無想定不恒行者轉識所攝。滅者。謂定心所引。不恒現行諸心心所暫時間滅。滅盡定者。謂已離無所有處欲。或入非想非非想處定。又云。欲超過有頂。作止息想作意為先。故於不恒行諸心心所及恒行一分心心所滅。假立滅盡定。此中所以不言未離上欲者。為顯離有頂欲阿羅漢等亦得此定故。一分恒行者。謂染污意所攝。無想天者。謂於此間得無想定。由此後生無想有情天中。于不恒行心心所滅。假立無想異熟。首句。論主問。若無實性下。小乘答。意謂此三若無實性。何以能遮心心所法令不得起。由此二定。能遮未來諸心心所暫不起故。若無心位下。論主辯破。若有實法遮心不起名無心定。則亦應有實法礙色不起名無色定。既不許色由礙無。云何執遮心是實。如堤塘是假。亦能遮水。何須實法。乃能遮心乎。謂修定時下。出正義。定加行者。定前方便也。粗動心者

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "又,現行識是所持(被支援)的緣故,從所持(被支援)的角度來說,稱能持(支援)種子的阿賴耶識為命根。命根的法則是,支援身體,但身體並非命根,而是爲了使六處(眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意)在住留時能夠確定。所以說,種子是命根,其餘現行的色、心等不是命根,因為它們不是恒常持續的,也不是業力直接牽引的。然而,當業力真正牽引時,只會牽引這個種子,種子才能產生現行。並非說現行就是命根,所以只有種子才是根源。而且,所謂的命根,是依心而假立的,命是能依(依靠者),心是所依(被依靠者)。生法師說,燃燒的柴火旋轉起來形成輪子的形狀,輪子必定包含著火焰才能發光。情感也是如此,必定要依靠心才能發揮作用。命之依心,就像情感之依心一樣。",
    
    "『又如何知道二無心定』(滅盡定和無想定)……『所以這三種法也不是真實存在的。』",
    
    "四、破斥無心定。滅盡定(Nirodha-samāpatti,滅盡三昧),無想異熟(Asaññasamāpatti,無想定)。所謂的無心定,是指已經脫離了凈居天的慾望,但尚未脫離上界天的慾望,由於對無想天產生了出離的想法。《雜集論》中說,對於不恒常執行的心和心所的滅除,假立為無想定。不恒常執行的心識是指轉識所攝的心識。滅除是指由定心所引導的,不恒常顯現的各種心和心所暫時地滅除。滅盡定是指已經脫離了無所有處的慾望,或者進入了非想非非想處的禪定。又說,想要超越有頂天,以止息想的作意為先導,因此對於不恒常執行的各種心和心所,以及恒常執行的一部分心心所的滅除,假立為滅盡定。這裡之所以沒有說尚未脫離上界天的慾望,是爲了表明脫離了有頂天慾望的阿羅漢等也能獲得這種禪定。一部分恒常執行的心心所,是指染污意所攝的心心所。無想天是指,在此世間獲得了無想定,由此之後投生到無想有情天中,對於不恒常執行的心和心所的滅除,假立為無想異熟。",
    "首句是論主提問。『若無實性』以下是小乘的回答。意思是說,如果這三種法沒有真實自性,怎麼能夠遮止心和心所,使它們無法生起呢?因為這兩種禪定,能夠遮止未來各種心和心所暫時不生起。『若無心位』以下是論主辯駁破斥。如果有一種真實的法能夠遮止心不生起,叫做無心定,那麼也應該有一種真實的法能夠阻礙色法不生起,叫做無色定。既然不承認色法是由阻礙而沒有的,為什麼執著于遮止心是真實的呢?就像堤壩是假的,也能阻擋水流,何須真實的法才能遮止心呢?『謂修定時』以下是闡述正確的含義。定加行是指禪定前的方便。粗動心是指……"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Furthermore, the present active consciousness is what is supported. From the perspective of what is supported, the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, 阿賴耶識) that supports the seeds is called the life-faculty (jīvitendriya, 命根). The principle of the life-faculty is that it supports the body, but the body is not the life-faculty. It allows the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana, 六處) to be determined when they dwell. Therefore, the seed is the life-faculty, and the other present active forms and minds are not the life-faculty because they are not constant and continuous, nor are they directly drawn by karma. However, when karma truly draws, it only draws this seed, and the seed can then create present activity. It is not that present activity is called the life-faculty, so only the seed is the root. Moreover, the so-called life-faculty is provisionally established based on the mind. Life is the dependent (niśraya, 能依), and the mind is the supported (āśraya, 所依). The Dharma Master Sheng said, 'The fire of burning firewood rotates to form the shape of a wheel, and the wheel must contain the fire to shine. Emotions are also like this; they must rely on the mind to function. Life depends on the mind, just as emotions depend on the mind.'",
    
    "'Furthermore, how do we know the two mindlessness attainments' (nirodha-samāpatti and asaññasamāpatti) ... 'Therefore, these three dharmas are also not truly existent.'",
    
    "Four, refuting the mindlessness attainments. Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment, 滅盡定), Asaññasamāpatti (non-perception attainment, 無想定). The so-called mindlessness attainment refers to one who has already detached from the desires of the Pure Abode Heavens but has not yet detached from the desires of the upper realms. Due to the thought of detachment from the Heaven of Non-Perception, the *Saṃgrahaṇī* says, 'With the cessation of non-constant mind and mental factors, the non-perception attainment is provisionally established.' Non-constant consciousness refers to the consciousness contained within the transformed consciousness. Cessation refers to the temporary cessation of various minds and mental factors that are guided by the mind of concentration and are not constantly manifest. Nirodha-samāpatti refers to one who has already detached from the desire for the Realm of Nothingness or has entered the concentration of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception. It also says, 'Wanting to transcend the Peak of Existence, taking the intention of cessation as the forerunner, therefore, with the cessation of various non-constant minds and mental factors, as well as a portion of constant minds and mental factors, the cessation attainment is provisionally established.' The reason why it is not said here that one has not yet detached from the desires of the upper realms is to show that arhats who have detached from the desires of the Peak of Existence can also attain this concentration. A portion of the constantly operating minds and mental factors refers to those contained within the defiled mind. The Heaven of Non-Perception refers to one who has attained the non-perception attainment in this world, and after this, is reborn in the Heaven of Sentient Beings Without Perception. With the cessation of non-constant minds and mental factors, the result of non-perception is provisionally established.",
    "The first sentence is the question of the treatise master. 'If there is no real nature' below is the answer of the Hinayana. The meaning is that if these three dharmas do not have a real self-nature, how can they prevent the mind and mental factors from arising? Because these two concentrations can prevent various future minds and mental factors from temporarily arising. 'If there is no mind position' below is the treatise master's debate and refutation. If there is a real dharma that can prevent the mind from arising, it is called the mindlessness attainment, then there should also be a real dharma that can prevent form from arising, called the formlessness attainment. Since it is not admitted that form is absent due to obstruction, why cling to the idea that preventing the mind is real? Just as a dam is false, it can also block the flow of water, so why is a real dharma needed to prevent the mind? 'The so-called cultivation of concentration' below explains the correct meaning. The preliminary practice of concentration refers to the preparatory means before concentration. Coarse and moving mind refers to..."
  ]
}

。前六轉識也。不言第七者。以二定同釋。唯就無想義故。勝期愿者。勝願心起。期生靜慮。願力漸增。粗動漸細。由細入微。微而又微。以此微心。燻蒸第八。成極增上厭心種子。損伏粗動心心所種。粗動心等亦不現行。依此心心所現行伏滅分位。假立二種定名。種通善性。故此二定。俱名為善。無想定前下。別顯無想異熟正義。謂修定時。求彼天果。熏成種子招彼天異熟。受彼天果報。故俱舍云。此法一向是異熟果。誰之異熟(問)。謂無想定(答)。無想有情。居在何處(問)。居在廣果。謂廣果天中。有高勝處。如中間靜慮。名無想天(答)。彼為恒無想。為亦有想耶(問)。生死位中。多時有想。言無想者由彼有情。中間長時。想不起故。如契經說彼諸有情。由想起故。從彼處歿。然彼有情。如久睡覺。還起于想。從彼歿已。必生欲界。非余處所。先修定行。勢力盡故。于彼不能更修定故。如箭射空。力盡便墮。若諸有情。應生彼處。必有欲界順后受業。如應生彼北俱盧洲。必定應有生天之業。故此下。總結三法非實。

  成唯識論卷第一 卍新續藏第 50 冊 No. 0822 成唯識論證義(第1卷-第3卷)

  成唯識論卷第二

  金壇居士 王肯堂 證義

  復如何知諸有為相(至)是故四相皆是假立。

  五破三有為。俱舍論頌曰。相謂諸有為。生住異滅性。釋曰。由此四種是有為相。法若有此。應是有為。與此相違。是無為法。此于諸法能起名生。能安名住。能衰名異。能壞名滅。性是

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本:",
    "前六識是指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識和意識。這裡沒有提到第七識末那識,是因為無想定和滅盡定都可以用相同的道理來解釋。這裡只就無想定的意義進行說明。『勝期愿者』,是指發起殊勝的願望,期望能夠生到靜慮天。通過願力的逐漸增強,粗重的念頭逐漸變得細微,由細微進入到更加微細的狀態。用這種微細的心識,熏習第八識阿賴耶識,形成極其增上的厭離心種子,從而減損和降伏粗重的『心』和『心所』的種子。粗重的『心』和『心所』也因此不再現行。根據這種『心』和『心所』現行、伏滅的不同階段,假立了無想定和滅盡定這兩種定的名稱。因為種子具有通於善的性質,所以這兩種定都被稱為善。在解釋無想定之前,先單獨顯明無想異熟果的正義。也就是說,在修習禪定時,如果追求無想天的果報,就會熏成種子,招感無想天的異熟果,從而承受無想天的果報。所以《俱舍論》中說,這種法完全是異熟果。那麼,這是誰的異熟果呢?(問)是無想定的異熟果。(答)無想有情居住在哪裡呢?(問)居住在廣果天。也就是說,在廣果天中,有高勝的地方,就像中間靜慮一樣,被稱為無想天。(答)他們一直是無想狀態,還是也有產生念頭的時候呢?(問)在生死輪迴中,他們大部分時間是有念頭的。之所以稱為『無想』,是因為這些有情在中間很長的時間裡,念頭不起。就像經書上說的那樣,這些有情因為產生念頭,所以從那個地方死去。然而,這些有情就像睡了很久之後醒來一樣,還會重新產生念頭。從那裡死去之後,必定會生到欲界,不會去其他地方。這是因為他們先前修習禪定的力量已經耗盡,無法在那裡繼續修習禪定。就像箭射向天空,力量耗盡就會墜落一樣。如果有些有情應該生到那個地方,必定會有欲界的順后受業。就像應該生到北俱盧洲的人,必定會有生天的業力一樣。所以,下面總結這三種法(有為法、無為法、非有為非無為法)都不是真實的。",
    
    "《成唯識論》卷第一",
    "卍新續藏第 50 冊 No. 0822 《成唯識論證義》(第1卷-第3卷)",
    
    
    "《成唯識論》卷第二",
    
    "金壇居士 王肯堂 證義",
    
    "再者,如何知道諸有為相(生、住、異、滅)……因此,四相(生、住、異、滅)都是假立的。",
    
    "五、破斥三有為。\n《俱舍論》的頌詞說:『相是指諸有為法的生、住、異、滅的性質。』解釋說:因為這四種是有為相,如果法具有這四種,就應該是有為法;與此相反,就是無為法。這四種相對於諸法,能夠產生作用的叫做『生』,能夠安住的叫做『住』,能夠衰退的叫做『異』,能夠壞滅的叫做『滅』。『性』是指……"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version:",
    "The first six consciousnesses are eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness. The seventh consciousness, *manas* (意, the faculty of thinking), is not mentioned here because the *asaṃjñā-samāpatti* (無想定, the cessation attainment of non-perception) and *nirodha-samāpatti* (滅盡定, the cessation attainment of feeling and perception) can be explained in the same way. Here, only the meaning of *asaṃjñā-samāpatti* is explained. 'Superior aspiration' refers to the arising of a superior aspiration, hoping to be born in the *rūpadhātu* (色界, the realm of form). Through the gradual increase of the power of aspiration, the coarse thoughts gradually become subtle, from subtle to more subtle. With this subtle mind, the eighth consciousness, *ālayavijñāna* (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness), is perfumed, forming an extremely enhanced seed of aversion, thereby reducing and subduing the seeds of coarse 'mind' and 'mental factors'. The coarse 'mind' and 'mental factors' also cease to manifest. Based on the different stages of manifestation and suppression of this 'mind' and 'mental factors', the names of these two *samādhi* (定, concentration) states, *asaṃjñā-samāpatti* and *nirodha-samāpatti*, are provisionally established. Because the seeds have the nature of being connected to goodness, these two *samādhi* states are both called good. Before explaining *asaṃjñā-samāpatti*, the correct meaning of the *vipāka* (異熟, result of maturation) of *asaṃjñā* (無想, non-perception) is separately clarified. That is to say, when practicing *dhyāna* (禪定, meditation), if one seeks the fruit of the *asaṃjñā* heavens, one will perfume the seeds, attracting the *vipāka* of the *asaṃjñā* heavens, thereby receiving the fruit of the *asaṃjñā* heavens. Therefore, the *Kośa* (俱舍論, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya) says that this *dharma* (法, phenomenon) is entirely the *vipāka* fruit. Then, whose *vipāka* fruit is this? (Question) It is the *vipāka* fruit of *asaṃjñā-samāpatti*. (Answer) Where do the *asaṃjñā* beings reside? (Question) They reside in the *Bṛhatphala* (廣果天, heaven of great fruit). That is to say, in the *Bṛhatphala* heaven, there is a high and superior place, like the intermediate *dhyāna*, called the *Asaṃjñasattva* (無想天, heaven of non-perception). (Answer) Are they always in a state of non-perception, or do they also have times when thoughts arise? (Question) In the cycle of birth and death, they have thoughts most of the time. The reason they are called 'non-perception' is because these beings do not have thoughts arising for a long time in between. Just as the *sūtras* (契經, scriptures) say, these beings die from that place because of the arising of thoughts. However, these beings, like waking up after a long sleep, will re-arise thoughts. After dying from there, they will definitely be born in the *kāmadhātu* (欲界, the realm of desire), and will not go to other places. This is because the power of their previous practice of *dhyāna* has been exhausted, and they cannot continue to practice *dhyāna* there. Just like an arrow shot into the sky, it will fall when its power is exhausted. If some beings should be born in that place, there must be *karma* (業, action) of the *kāmadhātu* that will be received later. Just like those who should be born in *Uttarakuru* (北俱盧洲, north kuru continent), they must have the *karma* of being born in the heavens. Therefore, the following summarizes that these three *dharmas* (conditioned *dharmas*, unconditioned *dharmas*, and neither conditioned nor unconditioned *dharmas*) are not real.",
    
    "《Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》 Volume 1",
    "卍Xuzangjing Volume 50 No. 0822 Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (Volumes 1-3)",
    
    
    "《Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》 Volume 2",
    
    "Layman of Jintan Wang Kentang Commentary",
    
    "Furthermore, how do we know the conditioned characteristics (birth, duration, change, and extinction)... Therefore, the four characteristics (birth, duration, change, and extinction) are all provisionally established.",
    
    "5. Refuting the Three Conditioned Characteristics.\nThe *Kośa* verse says: 'Characteristics refer to the nature of birth, duration, change, and extinction of conditioned *dharmas*.' Explanation: Because these four are conditioned characteristics, if a *dharma* has these four, it should be a conditioned *dharma*; the opposite is an unconditioned *dharma*. Regarding these four characteristics, that which can produce *dharmas* is called 'birth', that which can abide is called 'duration', that which can decay is called 'change', and that which can be destroyed is called 'extinction'. 'Nature' refers to..."
  ]
}

體義。豈不經說有三有為之有為相。於此經中應說有四。不說者何。所謂住相。然經說住異。是此異別名。如生名起。滅名為盡。如是應知異名住異。若法全行三世遷流。此經說為有為之相。令諸有情生厭畏故。謂彼諸行生力所遷。令從未來流入現在。異及滅相力所遷。迫。令從現在流入過去。令其衰異及壞滅故。傳說如有人處稠林。有三怨敵。欲為損害。一從稠林牽之令出。一衰其力。一壞命根。三相於行。應知亦爾。住于彼行攝受安立。嘗樂與彼不相舍離。故不立在有為相中。又無為法有自相住。住相濫彼。故經不說。先大乘問。次余乘答。此經下。大乘破。先總斥非第六聲下。次別破。別破又分三。初約能所破。第六聲。即八轉聲中第六屬聲也。俱舍云。生相若無。應無生覺。又第六轉言不應成。謂色之生。受之生等。此外計也。又云。是故生等唯假建立。無別實物。爲了諸行本無今有。假立為生。如是本無。今有生相。依色等法種類眾多。為簡所餘。說第六轉。言色之生受之生等。為令他知此生唯色非余受等。余例亦然。如世間說旃檀者香。石子之體。此亦應爾。如是住等。隨應當知。此彼論破詞也。此中破意。謂非第六屬聲。便表生等離色等外有實自體。以色受等之生住滅。即色受等五蘊攝故。生等為能相。色等為所相。非生等相異色等相。不可說言堅相異地相。濕相異水相故若有為體異有為相者。則無為體應異無為相。今無為體不異無為相。則有為體。亦豈異有為相哉。又生等相下。二約體用破。謂若生等三俱有實體者。應一

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "體義:難道經中不是說有三種有為法的有為相嗎?為什麼這部經中應該說有四種,卻沒有說呢?所說的『住相』,其實經中所說的『住』和『異』,是同一個意思的不同名稱。就像『生』也叫做『起』,『滅』也叫做『盡』一樣。應該這樣理解,『異』就是『住異』。如果有一種法,完全經歷三世的遷流變化,這部經就把它說成是有為法的相狀,爲了讓所有眾生對它產生厭惡和畏懼。意思是說,那些諸行的生起之力所推動,使它從未來流入現在;『異』和『滅』相之力所推動、逼迫,使它從現在流入過去,讓它衰敗、變異和壞滅。傳說就像有人身處茂密的森林中,有三個怨敵想要加害於他:一個從森林中把他拉出來,一個衰減他的力量,一個破壞他的命根。這三種相對於諸行來說,也應該這樣理解。『住』這個相,對於那些諸行,是攝受、安立,常常喜歡和它在一起,不願舍離它,所以沒有把它列在有為相中。而且,無為法有它自身的『住』相,『住相』容易和它混淆,所以經中沒有說。先是大乘提出問題,然後其他乘回答。這部經的下文,大乘會進行破斥。先總的駁斥『非第六聲』,然後分別破斥。分別破斥又分為三個部分,首先從能和所的角度進行破斥。『第六聲』,就是八轉聲中的第六個屬聲。《俱舍論》中說:『如果生相不存在,那麼就不應該有生的感覺。』而且第六轉的說法也不應該成立,比如『色的生』、『受的生』等等。這是外道的計較。又說:『所以生等等只是假立的,沒有別的實體。』爲了說明諸行本來沒有現在才有,假立為『生』。像這樣,本來沒有,現在才有『生』相,依據色等法的種類眾多,爲了簡別其餘的,所以說第六轉,比如『色的生』、『受的生』等等,爲了讓別人知道這個『生』只是色的,不是其餘的受等等,其餘的例子也是這樣。就像世間說旃檀的香,石子的體性一樣,這裡也應該這樣理解。像這樣,『住』等等,應該根據情況來理解。這是他們論中的破斥之詞。這裡破斥的意思是說,不是第六屬聲,就表示『生』等等離開色等等之外有真實的自體。因為色、受等等的生住滅,就是色、受等等五蘊所包含的。『生』等等是能相,色等等是所相,不是『生』等等的相異於色等等的相,不能說堅硬的相異於地的相,濕潤的相異於水的相。如果說有為法的體異於有為法的相,那麼無為法的體就應該異於無為法的相。現在無為法的體不異於無為法的相,那麼有為法的體,又怎麼會異於有為法的相呢?還有,『生』等等的相,第二,從體和用的角度進行破斥。意思是說,如果『生』等等三種都有實體,那麼應該是一。",
    "english_translations": [
      "English version",
      "The Meaning of Essence: Doesn't the sutra say there are three characteristics of conditioned phenomena (有為相)? Why does this sutra say there should be four, but doesn't mention it? The so-called 'characteristic of abiding' (住相), the 'abiding' (住) and 'difference' (異) mentioned in the sutra are different names for the same meaning. Just as 'birth' (生) is also called 'arising' (起), and 'cessation' (滅) is also called 'extinction' (盡). It should be understood that 'difference' is 'abiding difference' (住異). If a dharma completely experiences the flux of the three times, this sutra describes it as the characteristic of conditioned phenomena, in order to make all sentient beings generate aversion and fear towards it. It means that the power of the arising of those phenomena propels them to flow from the future into the present; the power of the characteristics of 'difference' and 'cessation' propels and forces them to flow from the present into the past, causing them to decay, change, and perish. It is said that like a person in a dense forest, there are three enemies who want to harm him: one pulls him out of the forest, one weakens his strength, and one destroys his life. These three characteristics should be understood in the same way in relation to phenomena. The characteristic of 'abiding' (住), for those phenomena, is to embrace and establish them, always liking to be with them and not wanting to leave them, so it is not listed among the characteristics of conditioned phenomena. Moreover, unconditioned dharmas have their own characteristic of 'abiding' (住), and the 'characteristic of abiding' (住相) is easily confused with it, so the sutra does not mention it. First, the Mahayana raises the question, and then other vehicles answer. In the following part of this sutra, the Mahayana will refute. First, there is a general refutation of 'not the sixth case' (非第六聲), and then separate refutations. The separate refutations are divided into three parts, first refuting from the perspective of the agent and the object. 'The sixth case' (第六聲) is the sixth genitive case in the eight cases. The *Abhidharmakośa* says: 'If the characteristic of birth (生相) does not exist, then there should be no feeling of birth.' Moreover, the statement of the sixth case should not be established, such as 'the birth of form' (色的生), 'the birth of feeling' (受的生), etc. This is the calculation of externalists. It also says: 'Therefore, birth, etc., are only provisionally established, without separate entities.' In order to explain that phenomena originally did not exist and only exist now, 'birth' (生) is provisionally established. In this way, originally not existing, now existing, the characteristic of 'birth' (生相), based on the numerous types of dharmas such as form, in order to distinguish the rest, the sixth case is mentioned, such as 'the birth of form' (色的生), 'the birth of feeling' (受的生), etc., in order to let others know that this 'birth' is only of form, not of other feelings, etc., and the remaining examples are also like this. Just as the world says the fragrance of sandalwood, the nature of a stone, it should also be understood here in the same way. In this way, 'abiding' (住), etc., should be understood according to the situation. These are the words of refutation in their arguments. The meaning of the refutation here is that it is not the sixth genitive case, which means that 'birth' (生), etc., have real entities separate from form, etc. Because the birth, abiding, and cessation of form, feeling, etc., are contained in the five aggregates of form, feeling, etc. 'Birth' (生), etc., are the agent characteristics, and form, etc., are the object characteristics. It is not that the characteristics of 'birth' (生), etc., are different from the characteristics of form, etc. It cannot be said that the characteristic of hardness is different from the characteristic of earth, and the characteristic of wetness is different from the characteristic of water. If the essence of conditioned phenomena is different from the characteristics of conditioned phenomena, then the essence of unconditioned phenomena should be different from the characteristics of unconditioned phenomena. Now that the essence of unconditioned phenomena is not different from the characteristics of unconditioned phenomena, then how can the essence of conditioned phenomena be different from the characteristics of conditioned phenomena? Furthermore, the characteristics of 'birth' (生), etc., secondly, refuting from the perspective of essence and function. It means that if the three of 'birth' (生), etc., all have entities, then they should be one."
    ]
  }

切時齊興作用。則一法一時。有生住滅更互相違。成大過失。世間不見一法一時有生住滅。唯見異法異時有三故。若以用相違故。無頓興之理者。則體亦相違。如何俱有。便有自語相違之過。又住異滅互相違反。用不應俱。而能所相不待因緣。體俱本有。體既如此。用亦應然。體用不容有二性故。若謂體雖本有不待因緣。而用非本有必待因緣和合而有者。所待因緣從外來故。定非本有。所待既爾。能待亦然。又汝既許從因緣生。又執生等復何所用。若謂諸有為法是恒有故。而與生滅相合。則應無為法亦是恒有。亦有生滅。何以故。有為無為同一因故。立量云。三有為法。與生等合。所相恒有故。如三無為。三無為法。與生等合。所相恒有故。如三有為。今既不同無為則有為所相。定非恒有。所相尚非恒有。況能相生滅而實有哉。又去來世下。三。約三世破。為彼宗執生在未來。現在已生。不更生故。過去已滅。都無生用。故以來同去破之。過去已滅。未來未生。已滅非常。未生非現。體如空華。無實有性。量云。去來世非實有性宗。因云。非現非常故。喻如空華。生即已生。非同未生。豈在未來。滅即已滅。非同未滅。應非現在。若以滅為非無。應以生為非有。又滅無住有。二相相違。生與住。俱屬現有。相不相違。今彼以過現為一起。未來為一起。滅屬過去。住屬現在。生屬未來。則滅與住同時。而住與生異世矣。豈理也哉。進退之詳。具廣百論。然有為法。仗因托緣而得生起。故一切法緣合則生。緣散則滅。表異無為。假立四相。非謂

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "切時齊興作用,則一法一時,有生、住、滅更互相違,成大過失。世間不見一法一時有生、住、滅,唯見異法異時有三故。若以用相違故,無頓興之理者,則體亦相違,如何俱有?便有自語相違之過。又住異滅互相違反,用不應俱,而能所相不待因緣,體俱本有。體既如此,用亦應然,體用不容有二性故。若謂體雖本有不待因緣,而用非本有必待因緣和合而有者,所待因緣從外來故,定非本有。所待既爾,能待亦然。又汝既許從因緣生,又執生等復何所用?若謂諸有為法是恒有故,而與生滅相合,則應無為法亦是恒有,亦有生滅。何以故?有為無為同一因故。立量云:『三有為法,與生等合,所相恒有故,如三無為。三無為法,與生等合,所相恒有故,如三有為。』今既不同無為,則有為所相,定非恒有。所相尚非恒有,況能相生滅而實有哉?",
    "又去來世下,三,約三世破。為彼宗執生在未來,現在已生,不更生故;過去已滅,都無生用。故以來同去破之。過去已滅,未來未生,已滅非常,未生非現,體如空華,無實有性。量云:『去來世非實有性宗,因云:非現非常故,喻如空華。』生即已生,非同未生,豈在未來?滅即已滅,非同未滅,應非現在。若以滅為非無,應以生為非有。又滅無住有,二相相違。生與住,俱屬現有,相不相違。今彼以過現為一起,未來為一起。滅屬過去,住屬現在,生屬未來,則滅與住同時,而住與生異世矣。豈理也哉?進退之詳,具廣百論。然有為法,仗因托緣而得生起,故一切法緣合則生,緣散則滅。表異無為,假立四相,非謂實有。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "When all actions arise simultaneously, it means that one dharma (法, law, principle) exists at one time, and birth (生), abiding (住), and cessation (滅) contradict each other, leading to great errors. In the world, we do not see one dharma having birth, abiding, and cessation at the same time; we only see different dharmas having these three at different times. If, because their functions contradict each other, there is no reason for them to arise simultaneously, then their substance (體, essence) also contradicts each other. How can they both exist? This would lead to the fault of self-contradiction. Furthermore, abiding and cessation contradict each other, so their functions should not occur together. However, the 'able' and 'able-to-be' aspects do not depend on conditions (因緣, hetu-pratyaya), and their substance is inherently present. Since the substance is like this, the function should also be like this, because substance and function cannot have two natures. If it is said that although the substance is inherently present and does not depend on conditions, the function is not inherently present and must depend on the combination of conditions to exist, then the conditions relied upon come from outside and are definitely not inherently present. If what is relied upon is like this, then what relies upon is also like this. Moreover, since you admit that it arises from conditions, then what is the use of insisting on birth, etc.? If it is said that all conditioned dharmas (有為法, saṃskṛta dharma) are eternally existent and therefore combine with birth and cessation, then unconditioned dharmas (無為法, asaṃskṛta dharma) should also be eternally existent and also have birth and cessation. Why? Because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas have the same cause. It can be established as follows: 'The three conditioned dharmas combine with birth, etc., because their characteristics are eternally existent, like the three unconditioned dharmas. The three unconditioned dharmas combine with birth, etc., because their characteristics are eternally existent, like the three conditioned dharmas.' Since it is now different from the unconditioned, then the characteristics of the conditioned are definitely not eternally existent. If the characteristics are not eternally existent, how can they truly exist while undergoing birth and cessation?",
    "Furthermore, regarding the past, future, and present, these three are used to refute the three times. Because that school holds that birth is in the future, what is born in the present is not born again; what has ceased in the past has no function of birth. Therefore, the future is used to refute the past. The past has ceased, and the future has not yet arisen. What has ceased is not permanent, and what has not yet arisen is not present. Their substance is like flowers in the sky (空華, imaginary flower), without real existence. It can be established as follows: 'The past and future are not truly existent, because they are neither present nor permanent, like flowers in the sky.' Birth is what has already been born, not the same as what has not yet been born; how can it be in the future? Cessation is what has already ceased, not the same as what has not yet ceased; it should not be in the present. If cessation is considered not non-existent, then birth should be considered not existent. Furthermore, cessation is without abiding and existence, these two characteristics contradict each other. Birth and abiding both belong to existence and do not contradict each other. Now, they consider the past and present as one group, and the future as another group. Cessation belongs to the past, abiding belongs to the present, and birth belongs to the future. Then cessation and abiding are simultaneous, while abiding and birth are in different times. How can this be reasonable? The details of advancement and retreat are fully explained in the *Hundred Treatises* (*廣百論*). However, conditioned dharmas arise by relying on causes and conditions. Therefore, all dharmas arise when conditions combine and cease when conditions disperse. To distinguish them from the unconditioned, four characteristics (四相, four marks of conditioned existence) are provisionally established, but they are not truly existent."
  ]
}

實有。瑜伽問云。若有為法生住異滅四有為相具足可得。何故世尊但說三種。答。由一切行三世所顯故。從未來世本無而生。是故世尊由未來世。于有為法說生有為相。彼既生已落謝過去。是故世尊由過去世。于有為法說滅有為相現在世法。二相所顯。唯現在世有住可得。前後變異。亦唯現在。是故世尊由現在世。于有為法總說住異為一有為相。前三有故四句。揀異小乘生在未來。餘三現在如何無法與有為相難也。表此後無為相何失。總答也。余乘問。后一既是無法。如何亦預有為相中。故答云。表此現在生住異法后定是無。為有為相有何過失。且此四相各有所表無而忽有。故以生表。有而後無。故以滅表。變易不常。故以異表。暫時有用。故以住表。此在有為雖俱名錶。而所表相各各有異。此依剎那唸唸不停。假立四相。非約三世。若約一期生死果報始終分位。亦有四相。初出胎時名生。命終名滅。生已。或二三十年。或七八十年。只是此身相續不斷名住。自少而壯。自壯而老。遷變不同名異。故俱舍云。無始以來色等諸法。名言熏習種類不同。及先所造諸有趣業。種種差別功能轉變。隨所遇緣成熟發起。變生色等生等差別。所言緣者。謂精血等是其生緣。衣食定等是其住緣。毒藥災橫四大亂等是其滅緣。是故四相皆是假立。總結也。

  復如何知異色心等(至)香味等假立三故。

  六破名句文身。瑜伽論云。云何名身。謂依諸法自性施設自相施設由遍分別。為隨言說唯建立想。是謂名身。云何向身。謂即依彼自相施設所有諸

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "實有。瑜伽行者問:『如果說有為法(Samskrta dharma,指由因緣和合而成的法)的生、住、異、滅四種有為相(Samskrta-laksana,有為法的特性)都具足且可以觀察到,為什麼世尊(Buddha,佛陀)只說了三種?』",
    "答:『因為一切行(Sarva-samskara,一切有為法)由過去、現在、未來三世所顯現。從未來世本來沒有而產生,因此世尊從未來世的角度,對於有為法說了「生」的有為相。它既然已經產生,就會衰落消逝到過去,因此世尊從過去世的角度,對於有為法說了「滅」的有為相。現在的法,由「住」和「異」二相所顯現,只有現在世才能觀察到「住」,前後變異也只發生在現在。因此世尊從現在世的角度,對於有為法總括地說「住」和「異」為一個有為相。』",
    "前三種有為相的緣故,可以構成四句邏輯判斷,用來區別于小乘佛教的觀點,小乘認為「生」發生在未來,其餘三個發生在現在,這樣如何能用「無法」來與有為相抗衡呢?這是表明此後沒有無為相的缺失,是總體的回答。",
    "其他宗派問:『后一個「異」既然是無法,為什麼也預先包含在有為相中?』所以回答說:『表明這現在生、住、異的法,之後必定是無,作為有為相有什麼過失呢?』而且這四相各自有所表述:從無到有突然出現,所以用「生」來表述;從有到無消失,所以用「滅」來表述;變易不恒常,所以用「異」來表述;暫時有用,所以用「住」來表述。這些在有為法中雖然都稱為「表」,但所表述的相各不相同。這是依據剎那(Ksana,極短的時間單位)唸唸不停留,假立的四相,不是約三世來說的。如果約一期生死果報的始終分位來說,也有四相:最初出胎時稱為「生」,命終時稱為「滅」,出生后,或者二三十年,或者七八十年,只是此身相續不斷稱為「住」,從年少到壯年,從壯年到老年,遷變不同稱為「異」。",
    "所以《俱舍論》(Abhidharmakosa,佛教論書)說:『從無始以來,色等諸法,名言熏習的種類不同,以及先前所造的各種趣業,種種差別的功能轉變,隨著所遇到的因緣成熟而發起,變生色等生等差別。』所說的『緣』,是指精血等是其生緣,衣食禪定等是其住緣,毒藥災禍四大分離等是其滅緣。因此,四相都是假立的。』這是總結。",
    "『又如何知道異於色、心等,香味等是假立的三種呢?』",
    "六、破名句文身。《瑜伽師地論》(Yogacarabhumi-sastra,瑜伽行派的根本論書)說:『什麼是名身(Nama-kaya,名稱的集合)?就是依據諸法的自性施設,依據自相施設,通過普遍分別,爲了隨順言說而唯獨建立想,這就是名身。什麼是句身(Pada-kaya,語句的集合)?就是依據那些自相施設的所有諸……』"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "It truly exists. A yogi asks: 'If the four conditioned characteristics (Samskrta-laksana), namely arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, of conditioned dharmas (Samskrta dharma) are complete and observable, why did the World-Honored One (Buddha) only speak of three?'",
    "The answer is: 'Because all activities (Sarva-samskara) are manifested by the three times: past, present, and future. They arise from the future, from a state of non-existence. Therefore, the World-Honored One, from the perspective of the future, spoke of the conditioned characteristic of 'arising' in relation to conditioned dharmas. Once they have arisen, they decline and vanish into the past. Therefore, the World-Honored One, from the perspective of the past, spoke of the conditioned characteristic of 'ceasing' in relation to conditioned dharmas. Present dharmas are manifested by the two characteristics of 'abiding' and 'changing.' Only in the present can 'abiding' be observed, and changes also only occur in the present. Therefore, the World-Honored One, from the perspective of the present, collectively spoke of 'abiding' and 'changing' as one conditioned characteristic in relation to conditioned dharmas.'",
    "Because of the first three conditioned characteristics, four logical propositions can be formed to distinguish them from the views of Hinayana Buddhism, which believes that 'arising' occurs in the future, and the other three occur in the present. How can 'non-existence' be used to contend with conditioned characteristics? This indicates that there is no lack of unconditioned characteristics afterward, which is a general answer.",
    "Other schools ask: 'Since the last one, 'changing,' is non-existent, why is it also included in conditioned characteristics?' Therefore, the answer is: 'It indicates that these dharmas of arising, abiding, and changing in the present will definitely be non-existent afterward. What fault is there in considering it a conditioned characteristic?' Moreover, these four characteristics each have their own expressions: from non-existence to sudden appearance, hence 'arising' is used to express it; from existence to disappearance, hence 'ceasing' is used to express it; change and impermanence, hence 'changing' is used to express it; temporary usefulness, hence 'abiding' is used to express it. Although these are all called 'expressions' in conditioned dharmas, the characteristics they express are different from each other. This is based on the momentary (Ksana) non-stopping of thoughts, falsely establishing the four characteristics, not speaking in terms of the three times. If speaking in terms of the beginning and end divisions of a lifetime of karmic retribution, there are also four characteristics: the initial emergence from the womb is called 'arising,' the end of life is called 'ceasing,' after birth, whether it is twenty or thirty years, or seventy or eighty years, it is just this body continuously existing, called 'abiding,' from youth to adulthood, from adulthood to old age, changes and differences are called 'changing.'",
    "Therefore, the Abhidharmakosa says: 'From beginningless time, the various types of dharmas such as form, the different types of verbal imprints, and the functional transformations of the various interesting karmas previously created, mature and arise according to the conditions they encounter, transforming and producing differences such as form and arising.' The 'conditions' mentioned refer to the essence and blood as the conditions for arising, clothing, food, meditation, etc., as the conditions for abiding, and poisons, disasters, and the separation of the four great elements as the conditions for ceasing. Therefore, the four characteristics are all falsely established.' This is a conclusion.",
    "'Furthermore, how do we know that it is different from form, mind, etc., and that flavors, etc., are the three falsely established?'",
    "Six, refuting the body of names, phrases, and sentences. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'What is the body of names (Nama-kaya)? It is the establishment based on the self-nature of dharmas, the establishment based on self-characteristics, through universal discrimination, solely establishing thought in order to accord with speech. This is the body of names. What is the body of phrases (Pada-kaya)? It is all those based on the establishment of those self-characteristics...'"
  ]
}

法差別。施設建立功德。過失。雜染。清凈。戲論。是謂句身。云何文身。謂名身句身所依止性所有字身。是謂文身又於一切所知所詮事中極略想是文若中是名。若廣是句。若唯依文。但可了達音韻而已。不能了達所有事義。若依止名。便能了達彼彼諸法自性自相。亦能了達所有音韻。不能了達所揀法深廣差別。若依止句。當知一切皆能了達。復如何知異色心等有實詮表名句文身。論主問也。契經說故如契經說佛得希有名句文身。小乘答也。此經不說異色心等有實名等為證不成。論主總破。若名句文異聲實有下。論主廣破。據俱舍論等。經部師言。名句文身用聲為體。色自性攝。所以者何。由教及理。知別有故。教。謂經言語身文身。若文即語。別說何為。又說應持正法文句。又言依義不依于文等。由此等教。證知別有能詮諸義名句文身。猶如語聲實而非假。理。謂現見有時得聲而不得字有時得字而不得聲。故知體別。有時得聲不得字者。謂雖聞聲而不了義。現見有人粗聞他語。而複審問汝何所言。此聞語聲不了義者。都由未達所發文故。如何乃執文不異聲。有時得字不得聲者。謂不聞聲而得了義。現見有人不聞他語。睹唇等動。知其所說。此不聞聲得了義者。都由己達所發文故。由斯理證。文必異聲等。廣如彼說。薩婆多。亦有名由聲生。名由聲顯。二義。故論主取生。破顯云。若名句文異聲實有。則名句文同色香味。非實能詮。以離聲無別能詮故。量云。名句文身非實能詮。異聲實有故喻如色等。若謂聲能生名句文者。此聲必有音韻屈

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "法有什麼差別?施設、建立、功德、過失、雜染、清凈、戲論,這些被稱為句身。什麼是文身呢?就是名身和句身所依賴的本質,也就是所有的字身,這被稱為文身。另外,在一切所知和所詮釋的事物中,最簡略的意想是文,中等的意想是名,廣大的意想是句。如果僅僅依靠文,只能瞭解音韻,不能瞭解所有事物的意義。如果依靠名,就能瞭解各種法的自性和各自的相狀,也能瞭解所有的音韻,但不能瞭解所選擇的法在深廣上的差別。如果依靠句,應當知道一切都能瞭解。",
    "又如何知道不同於色和心等的法,有真實的詮表,也就是名句文身呢?這是論主提出的問題。",
    "經書上說:『佛陀獲得了希有的名句文身。』這是小乘的回答。",
    "這部經並沒有說不同於色和心等的法有真實的名等,所以不能作為證據。這是論主總體的駁斥。",
    "如果名句文和聲音不同,並且是真實存在的,下面是論主廣泛的駁斥。根據《俱舍論》等,經部師說,名句文身以聲音為本體,屬於色的自性。為什麼呢?因為通過教證和理證,知道它們是不同的。教證,就是經書上說的『語身』和『文身』,如果文就是語,為什麼還要分別說呢?又說『應當堅持正法的文句』,又說『依靠意義,不依靠文字』等等。通過這些教證,證明確實存在能夠詮釋各種意義的名句文身,就像語聲一樣,是真實的而不是虛假的。理證,就是現在看到有時能聽到聲音卻看不到字,有時能看到字卻聽不到聲音,所以知道它們的本體是不同的。有時能聽到聲音卻看不到字,是指雖然聽到聲音卻不瞭解意義。現在看到有人粗略地聽到別人說話,然後又仔細地詢問『你說了什麼?』這種聽到語聲卻不瞭解意義的情況,都是因為沒有理解所發出的文。為什麼還要堅持文和聲音沒有區別呢?有時能看到字卻聽不到聲音,是指沒有聽到聲音卻瞭解了意義。現在看到有人沒有聽到別人說話,但通過觀察嘴唇等的動作,就知道他說了什麼。這種沒有聽到聲音卻瞭解了意義的情況,都是因為已經理解了所發出的文。通過這些理證,文一定和聲音不同等等,詳細的論述就像他們所說的那樣。",
    "薩婆多(一切有部),也有名由聲生,名由聲顯這兩種說法。所以論主取『生』,來駁斥『顯』,說:『如果名句文和聲音不同,並且是真實存在的,那麼名句文就和色香味一樣,不是真實能夠詮釋意義的,因為離開了聲音,就沒有其他的能夠詮釋意義了。』論證說:『名句文身不是真實能夠詮釋意義的,因為它們和聲音不同,並且是真實存在的,就像色等一樣。』如果認為聲音能夠產生名句文,那麼這種聲音一定有音韻屈折。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "What is the difference between Dharma? The establishment, construction, merit, demerit, defilement, purity, and playfulness are called 'kaya of sentence'. What is 'kaya of letter'? It is the nature upon which 'kaya of name' and 'kaya of sentence' rely, that is, all 'kaya of letters', which is called 'kaya of letter'. In addition, among all knowable and expressible things, the most concise idea is 'letter', the medium idea is 'name', and the broad idea is 'sentence'. If one relies only on 'letter', one can only understand the phonetics and cannot understand the meaning of all things. If one relies on 'name', one can understand the self-nature and characteristics of various Dharmas, and also understand all phonetics, but cannot understand the deep and broad differences of the selected Dharmas. If one relies on 'sentence', one should know that everything can be understood.",
    "How do we know that things different from form and mind have real expressions, that is, 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter'? This is the question raised by the debater.",
    "The sutras say: 'The Buddha attained the rare 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter'.' This is the answer of the Hinayana.",
    "This sutra does not say that things different from form and mind have real names, etc., so it cannot be used as evidence. This is the overall refutation of the debater.",
    "If 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter' are different from sound and are real, the following is the extensive refutation of the debater. According to the Abhidharma-kosa, the Sautrantika says that 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter' take sound as their substance and belong to the nature of form. Why? Because through scriptural and logical proofs, we know that they are different. Scriptural proof refers to the 'kaya of speech' and 'kaya of letter' mentioned in the sutras. If 'letter' is the same as 'speech', why should they be mentioned separately? It also says, 'One should adhere to the phrases of the true Dharma', and 'Rely on the meaning, not on the words', and so on. Through these scriptural proofs, it is proved that there are indeed 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter' that can express various meanings, just like the sound of speech, which is real and not false. Logical proof refers to the fact that sometimes one can hear the sound but not see the letter, and sometimes one can see the letter but not hear the sound, so one knows that their substances are different. Sometimes one can hear the sound but not see the letter, which means that although one hears the sound, one does not understand the meaning. Now, one sees someone roughly hearing someone else's words, and then carefully asking, 'What did you say?' This situation of hearing the sound of speech but not understanding the meaning is all because one has not understood the letter that was uttered. Why insist that the letter is no different from the sound? Sometimes one can see the letter but not hear the sound, which means that one does not hear the sound but understands the meaning. Now, one sees someone not hearing someone else's words, but knowing what he said by observing the movements of his lips, etc. This situation of not hearing the sound but understanding the meaning is all because one has already understood the letter that was uttered. Through these logical proofs, the letter must be different from the sound, etc. The detailed discussion is as they say.",
    "Sarvastivada also has two views: name is produced by sound, and name is revealed by sound. Therefore, the debater takes 'produced' to refute 'revealed', saying: 'If 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter' are different from sound and are real, then 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter' are the same as color, smell, taste, etc., and cannot truly express meaning, because without sound, there is nothing else that can express meaning.' The argument says: ''Kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter' cannot truly express meaning, because they are different from sound and are real, just like color, etc.' If one thinks that sound can produce 'kaya of name', 'kaya of sentence', and 'kaya of letter', then this sound must have phonetic inflections."
  ]
}

曲。此已足成能詮。何用名等為耶。正理師救云。聲上屈曲是名句文體異於聲而是實有。故論主破云。若謂聲上音韻屈曲即名句文。異聲實有。名能詮者。則所見色上形量屈曲。亦應異色處別有實體。亦名能詮。若謂聲上音韻屈曲。如絃管聲非能詮者。則此語聲音韻屈曲。亦應如絃管聲不能詮表。不能別生名等矣。彼又難云。誰說彼絃管聲定不能詮乎。論主答云。聲若能詮。則應現前風鈴聲等皆有詮用。今此語聲與風鈴聲等無詮表。不別生實名句文身。故知語聲非實能詮。若唯語聲能生名等。而風鈴聲等不能者。如何不許唯語能詮。而謂絃管聲亦能詮耶。外人問云。若一切外聲皆非能詮。據何道理定知能詮即是言語。寧知非語亦有能詮。論主答云。語為能詮人天共了者。謂人與天俱用語言有詮表用。為欲界以音聲為佛事故。天愛非餘者。或有天中不用語為能詮。如光明說法。天鼓說法之類。唯是色界光音以上等天。不通地獄。故曰非余。今固人也。而天語乎。次假外問云。既聲體即是能詮。何有名等三種差別。故論主申正義云。然依語聲分位差別等。于中有四。從初至假建立名句文身。一顯假差別。此論主解依聲建立名句文身。如梵音斫芻(此翻眼)。若但言斫。唯言芻。未有所目。說為字分位。若二連合。能詮法體。詮于眼體。說為名分位。然未有句位。更添言阿薩利縛。名為眼有漏。說為句位。故依分位以立名等。依一切位。非自在故。外又問曰。何者是分位差別。故答云。名詮自性至為二所依。二。顯三用殊。名詮諸法自性。句詮諸

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "曲(qū)。這樣就足以構成能表達意義的要素了,為什麼還需要名稱等等呢?",
    "正理師(Nyaya)辯解說:『聲音上的彎曲變化就是名稱、句子、文句的實體,它不同於聲音,而是真實存在的。』",
    "論主反駁說:『如果說聲音上的音韻彎曲就是名稱、句子、文句,並且不同於聲音而真實存在,是能表達意義的,那麼所見顏色上的形狀大小彎曲,也應該不同於顏色而有別的實體,也能表達意義。如果說聲音上的音韻彎曲,比如絃樂管樂的聲音不能表達意義,那麼這種語言聲音的音韻彎曲,也應該像絃樂管樂的聲音一樣,不能表達意義,不能分別產生名稱等等了。』",
    "對方又反駁說:『誰說絃樂管樂的聲音一定不能表達意義呢?』",
    "論主回答說:『如果聲音能表達意義,那麼現在的風聲、鳥鳴等等都應該有表達意義的作用。現在這種語言聲音與風聲、鳥鳴等等沒有表達意義的作用,不能分別產生真實的名稱、句子、文句的實體,所以知道語言聲音不是真實能表達意義的。如果只有語言聲音能產生名稱等等,而風聲、鳥鳴等等不能,為什麼不允許只有語言能表達意義,而說絃樂管樂的聲音也能表達意義呢?』",
    "外人問道:『如果一切外在的聲音都不能表達意義,根據什麼道理一定知道能表達意義的就是語言?怎麼知道不是語言的聲音也有能表達意義的呢?』",
    "論主回答說:『語言是能表達意義,人和天共同理解的。』這是說人和天都使用語言有表達意義的作用,因為欲界以音聲作為佛事的原因。『天愛非餘者』,或者有些天中不使用語言來表達意義,比如光明說法,天鼓說法之類。只是**光音天(Ābhāsvara)以上等等的天,不通達地獄,所以說『非余』。現在是人,而說的是天語嗎?",
    "其次假設外人提問說:『既然聲音的本體就是能表達意義的,為什麼有名等等三種差別?』",
    "所以論主闡述正義說:『然而依據語言聲音的分位差別等等,其中有四種。從最初到假設建立名稱、句子、文句的實體,一是顯示假設的差別。』",
    "這裡論主解釋依據聲音建立名稱、句子、文句的實體,比如梵語斫芻(cakṣu,此翻譯為眼)。如果只說斫(cak),只說芻(ṣu),沒有所指的對象。說為字的分位。如果二者連合,能表達法體,表達眼的本體,說為名稱的分位。然而沒有句子的分位。再新增言阿薩利縛(阿薩利縛),名為眼有漏,說為句子的分位。所以依據分位來建立名稱等等,依據一切分位,不是自在的緣故。",
    "外人又問:『什麼是分位的差別?』",
    "所以回答說:『名稱詮釋自性,直到作為二者所依賴。』",
    "二,顯示三種作用的差別。名稱詮釋諸法的自性,句子詮釋諸法

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

法差別。文即是字。為名句之所依。不能詮自性及差別故。文者彰義。與二為依。彰義二故。又名為顯。與二為依。能顯義故。而體非顯。字者。無改轉義是其字型。文。是功能。功能即體。故言文即是字等。或字為初首。即多剎那聲整合一字。集多字為所依。次能成名詮諸法體。多名已后。方成句身。詮法差別。即雜集論云。自性差別。及此二言。如是三法。總攝一切。彼二言者。即是字也。字即語故。說之為言。名句二種所依止之言也。瑜伽論云。名于自性施設。句於差別施設。名句所依止性。說之為字。又顯揚言。句必有名。名不必有句。名必有字。字不必有名等。此三離聲至亦不即聲。三。明不即不離。論主答難。謂先有問言。上來雖言名等即聲。若名等是不相應行者。色上屈曲非不相應。聲何故爾。故此答曰。此三離聲雖無別體。而名等是假。聲是實有。假實異故。故名等三非即是聲。非聲處攝。但是差別之聲義說名等。以詮義故。是不相應。無別種子生。故言即聲。外人問。言若名等即聲。法詞二無礙解。境有何別。故論答云。由此法詞至亦各有異。即緣此故。二境有異。法無礙解。緣假名等。詞無礙解。緣實聲等。故說境差別。非二俱緣實。雖二自性互不相離。法對所詮。故但取名。詞多對機。故但說聲。耳聞聲已竟了義故。以所對不同。說二有異。非體有異也。又此二境及名等三與聲別者。蘊處界攝亦有異故色蘊。聲處。聲界。唯屬於聲行蘊。法處。法界。屬名句文。問曰。聲上屈曲假。即言不相應。色上屈曲假。應非色

```json
{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "法的差別。『文』就是『字』(梵文字母),是『名』(名稱)、『句』(語句)所依賴的基礎。因為它不能直接詮釋事物的自性和差別。『文』的作用是彰顯意義,它依賴於意義和字,因為要彰顯意義。因此,『文』又被稱為『顯』,它依賴於意義和字,因為它能顯現意義,但其本身並非顯現者。『字』的含義是不可改變和轉化的,這是它的本質。『文』是一種功能,功能即是本體,所以說『文』就是『字』等等。或者說,『字』是最初的開端,是多個剎那的音聲集合成一個字。多個字集合起來成為所依賴的基礎,然後才能形成『名』,詮釋諸法的本體。在有了多個『名』之後,才能形成『句』,詮釋法的差別。正如《雜集論》所說:『自性、差別,以及這二者的言語,這三種法總攝一切。』這裡所說的『二者的言語』,指的就是『字』。『字』就是語言,所以被稱為『言』,是『名』和『句』這兩種的所依止。如《瑜伽師地論》所說:『名』是對自性的施設,『句』是對差別的施設,『名』和『句』所依賴的自性,就被稱為『字』。又如《顯揚聖教論》所說:『句』必然有名,『名』不一定有『句』,『名』必然有『字』,『字』不一定有『名』等等。這三者(名、句、文)既不離聲音,也不等同於聲音。",
    "三、說明不即不離。",
    "論主回答提問,先前有人提問說:『上面雖然說『名』等同於聲音,如果『名』等是不相應行法,那麼色上的屈曲並非不相應,為什麼聲音上的屈曲也是如此呢?』所以這裡回答說:這三者(名、句、文)雖然離開聲音沒有獨立的自體,但是『名』等是假立的,聲音是真實存在的。因為假和真不同,所以『名』等三者不等同於聲音,不屬於聲音的範疇,只是對差別之聲音的意義進行詮釋,才稱為『名』等。因為它們沒有獨立的種子生起,所以說它們等同於聲音。",
    "外人提問:『如果『名』等同於聲音,那麼法無礙解和詞無礙解在境界上有什麼區別呢?』所以論主回答說:『由於法無礙解和詞無礙解各自的境界不同,所以二者的境界也有差異。』法無礙解緣于假立的『名』等,詞無礙解緣于真實的聲音等。所以說二者在境界上有差別,並非二者都緣于真實。雖然二者的自性互相不分離,但法無礙解主要針對所詮釋的意義,所以只取『名』;詞無礙解多針對聽者,所以只說『聲』。因為耳朵聽到聲音后就能理解意義。因為所針對的對象不同,所以說二者有差異,並非本體有差異。",
    "另外,這二者的境界以及『名』等三者與聲音的區別在於,它們在五蘊、十二處、十八界中的歸屬也有所不同。色蘊、聲處、聲界只屬於聲音;行蘊、法處、法界屬於『名』、『句』、『文』。",
    "提問:『聲音上的屈曲是假立的,所以說不相應;顏色上的屈曲是假立的,難道不應該屬於色法嗎?』"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "The difference in Dharma. 『Wen』 is 『Zi』 (Sanskrit alphabet), which is the basis upon which 『Ming』 (name) and 『Ju』 (sentence) rely. Because it cannot directly interpret the self-nature and differences of things. The function of 『Wen』 is to manifest meaning, and it relies on meaning and characters because it manifests meaning. Therefore, 『Wen』 is also called 『Xian』, which relies on meaning and characters because it can manifest meaning, but it is not the manifester itself. The meaning of 『Zi』 is that it cannot be changed or transformed, which is its essence. 『Wen』 is a function, and function is the body, so it is said that 『Wen』 is 『Zi』, etc. Or, 『Zi』 is the initial beginning, which is the collection of sounds of multiple moments into one character. Multiple characters are collected to become the basis of reliance, and then 『Ming』 can be formed to interpret the essence of all Dharmas. After there are multiple 『Ming』, 『Ju』 can be formed to interpret the differences in Dharma. As stated in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: 『Self-nature, difference, and the language of the two, these three Dharmas encompass everything.』 The 『language of the two』 mentioned here refers to 『Zi』. 『Zi』 is language, so it is called 『Yan』, which is the basis of reliance for 『Ming』 and 『Ju』. As stated in the *Yogacarabhumi-sastra*: 『Ming』 is the establishment of self-nature, 『Ju』 is the establishment of difference, and the self-nature that 『Ming』 and 『Ju』 rely on is called 『Zi』. Also, as stated in the *Asanga-sastra*: 『Ju』 must have 『Ming』, 『Ming』 does not necessarily have 『Ju』, 『Ming』 must have 『Zi』, 『Zi』 does not necessarily have 『Ming』, etc. These three (Ming, Ju, Wen) are neither separate from sound nor equal to sound.",
    "3. Explaining neither identity nor difference.",
    "The master of the treatise answers the question, someone previously asked: 『Although it is said above that 『Ming』 is equal to sound, if 『Ming』 is a non-corresponding formation, then the curvature on color is not non-corresponding, why is the curvature on sound also like this?』 So here is the answer: Although these three (Ming, Ju, Wen) do not have an independent self-nature apart from sound, 『Ming』 is a false establishment, and sound is real. Because false and real are different, the three of 『Ming』 are not equal to sound, and do not belong to the category of sound, but only interpret the meaning of the different sounds, so they are called 『Ming』. Because they do not have an independent seed to arise, it is said that they are equal to sound.",
    "An outsider asks: 『If 『Ming』 is equal to sound, then what is the difference in the realm between the unobstructed understanding of Dharma and the unobstructed understanding of words?』 So the master of the treatise answers: 『Because the realms of the unobstructed understanding of Dharma and the unobstructed understanding of words are different, there are also differences in the realms of the two.』 The unobstructed understanding of Dharma is related to the falsely established 『Ming』, and the unobstructed understanding of words is related to the real sound, etc. Therefore, it is said that there are differences in the realms of the two, and the two are not both related to reality. Although the self-natures of the two are not separated from each other, the unobstructed understanding of Dharma mainly focuses on the meaning being interpreted, so it only takes 『Ming』; the unobstructed understanding of words is mostly aimed at the listener, so it only says 『Sound』. Because the ears can understand the meaning after hearing the sound. Because the objects they are aimed at are different, it is said that there are differences between the two, not that the bodies are different.",
    "In addition, the difference between the realms of these two and the three of 『Ming』 and sound lies in the fact that their affiliations in the five aggregates, twelve entrances, and eighteen realms are also different. The form aggregate, sound entrance, and sound realm only belong to sound; the formation aggregate, Dharma entrance, and Dharma realm belong to 『Ming』, 『Ju』, and 『Wen』.",
    "Question: 『The curvature on sound is falsely established, so it is said to be non-corresponding; the curvature on color is falsely established, shouldn't it belong to the form Dharma?』"
  ]
}

處攝。答云。聲上有教。名等不相應。色上無教。故是色處攝。又問云。聲上有屈曲。即以為教。色上有屈曲。亦應得為教。故論主答云。且依此土說名句文至假立三故。四。會相違。謂且依此土。依聲假立名句文身。非謂一切界土亦依聲立。問曰。余界土中依何立耶。答云。諸餘佛土。亦依光明妙香味等。假立名句文身。以彼見聞覺知光明香味能了義故。此所引。即維摩詰所說經。而言等者。等取觸思取等。上皆得假立名等三種。亦是不相應攝此三法故。以眾生機欲對待故假。又梵云便善那。此有四義。一者扇。二相好。三根形四味。此即是鹽。能顯諸物中味故。味即是文。如言文義巧妙等。目之為便善那。此中四義。總是一顯義故。古德說名為味。對法論云。此文名顯。能顯彼義。故為名句所依能顯義故。惡察那是字。是無改轉義。如對法說。缽陀是跡。如尋象跡以覓象等。此名為句。理應名跡。義之跡故。尋此知義也。順古所翻。稱之為句。

  有執隨眠異心心所(至)準前理趣皆應遮止。

  七破余執。隨眠。即貪等染心所。隨者俱生義。眠者種子義。謂煩惱種子。隨逐有情。眠伏藏識。彼執是不相應行蘊攝。故論主破云。貪等種子。名貪等故即如貪等現行。定與染心相應。豈得名為不相應耶。量云。所執隨眠非不相應。名貪等故。如現貪等有餘不相應行者。即后未破十法。謂流轉。定異。相應。勢速。次第。時方。數。和合性。不和合性。準前理趣者準前所破十四法之理趣。遮止者。遮止異色心等有實自性也。

  

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "處所的攝屬問題。回答說:『聲音』上有教示,名稱等與它不相應;『顏色』上沒有教示,所以是被『色處』所攝屬。又問:『聲音』上有屈曲變化,就可以作為教示;『顏色』上有屈曲變化,也應該可以作為教示。』所以論主回答說:『且依此土(指我們這個世界)來說,依名、句、文來假立三種(教示)。』",
    
    "四、會通相違之處。意思是說,且依此土,依『聲音』假立名、句、文身,不是說一切世界都依『聲音』來建立。問:『其他世界中依什麼來建立呢?』回答說:『諸餘佛土,也依光明、妙香、美味等,假立名、句、文身,因為他們通過見、聞、覺、知光明、香味就能瞭解意義。』這裡所引用的,就是《維摩詰所說經》。而『等』字,是等取觸、思、取等,以上都可以假立名等三種,也是不相應行所攝屬的這三種法。因為眾生的根機和慾望不同,所以假立。",
    
    "又,梵語『便善那』(Vyañjana),這裡有四種含義:一是扇子,二是相好,三是根形,四是味道。這裡指的是鹽,能夠顯現諸物中的味道,所以『味道』就是『文』,如說『文義巧妙』等,就稱之為『便善那』。這其中的四種含義,總的來說都是顯現意義。古德解釋為『味』。《對法論》說:『此文名為顯,能顯彼義。』所以是名句所依,能顯現意義。『惡察那』(Akshara)是字,是無改轉之義,如《對法》所說。『缽陀』(Pada)是跡,如尋找象跡以覓象等,這稱為『句』,理應名為『跡』,是意義的軌跡,通過尋找它來了解意義。順應古人的翻譯,稱之為『句』。",
    
    "有人執著隨眠(Anusaya)與心、心所不同(直到)按照之前的理趣,都應該禁止這種說法。",
    
    "七、破斥其他的執著。隨眠,就是貪等染污的心所。『隨』是俱生的意思,『眠』是種子的意思,指煩惱的種子,隨逐有情,眠伏于藏識。他們執著隨眠是不相應行蘊所攝。所以論主破斥說:『貪等的種子,名為貪等,就如同貪等現行一樣,必定與染污的心相應,怎麼能稱為不相應呢?』量式是:所執著的隨眠不是不相應,因為它名為貪等,如同現行的貪等。至於其餘未破的十法,即流轉、定異、相應、勢速、次第、時、方、數、和合性、不和合性。『準前理趣』,是準照之前所破斥的十四法的理趣。『遮止』,是遮止異於色、心等有真實的自性。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Regarding the scope of places. The answer is: 'Sound' has teachings, but names and the like are not in accordance with it; 'color' has no teachings, so it is included in the 'sphere of color'. Another question: 'Sound' has inflections, which can be taken as teachings; 'color' has inflections, which should also be able to be taken as teachings.' Therefore, the author of the treatise answers: 'Let's just say that in this land (referring to our world), teachings are provisionally established based on names, sentences, and words.'",
    
    "Fourth, reconciling contradictions. It means that, just in this land, names, sentences, and word-bodies are provisionally established based on 'sound', not that all worlds are established based on 'sound'. Question: 'What are they based on in other worlds?' The answer is: 'In other Buddha-lands, names, sentences, and word-bodies are also provisionally established based on light, wonderful fragrance, delicious taste, etc., because they can understand the meaning through seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing light and fragrance.' What is quoted here is the *Vimalakirti Sutra*. The word 'etc.' includes touch, thought, grasping, etc. All of the above can provisionally establish the three types of names, etc., which are also included in the non-associated formations. Because sentient beings have different faculties and desires, provisional establishments are made.",
    
    "Furthermore, the Sanskrit word 'Vyañjana' has four meanings here: first, a fan; second, auspicious marks; third, the form of the sense organs; and fourth, taste. Here it refers to salt, which can bring out the taste in all things, so 'taste' is 'text', such as saying 'the text and meaning are ingenious', which is called 'Vyañjana'. The four meanings here all generally reveal meaning. Ancient scholars explained it as 'taste'. The *Abhidharma-samuccaya* says: 'This text is called revealing, it can reveal that meaning.' Therefore, it is what names and sentences rely on, and can reveal meaning. 'Akshara' is a letter, which means immutable, as the *Abhidharma* says. 'Pada' is a trace, like searching for elephant tracks to find elephants, etc. This is called a 'sentence', and should be called a 'trace', the trace of meaning, which is used to understand the meaning by searching for it. Following the ancient translation, it is called a 'sentence'.",
    
    "Some hold that Anusaya (latent tendencies) are different from mind and mental factors (until) according to the previous reasoning, all such claims should be prohibited.",
    
    "Seven, refuting other attachments. Anusaya (隨眠) refers to defiled mental factors such as greed. 'Anu' (隨) means co-arising, and 'saya' (眠) means seed, referring to the seeds of afflictions, which follow sentient beings and lie dormant in the store consciousness (Alaya-vijnana). They hold that Anusaya is included in the non-associated formations aggregate. Therefore, the author of the treatise refutes: 'The seeds of greed, etc., are called greed, etc., just like the manifest greed, etc., and are certainly associated with the defiled mind. How can they be called non-associated?' The syllogism is: the Anusaya that is held is not non-associated, because it is called greed, etc., like manifest greed, etc. As for the remaining ten unrefuted dharmas, namely, transformation, fixed difference, association, speed, sequence, time, space, number, combination, and non-combination. 'According to the previous reasoning' means according to the reasoning of the fourteen dharmas that were previously refuted. 'Prohibition' means prohibiting the existence of a real self-nature different from form, mind, etc."
  ]
}

諸無為法離色心等(至)離色心等實無為性。

  三無為法分三。一總破。先總斥。且定有下。為將破無為。先舉有為為例。先標數。下別釋。如色心等者。即是五識身他心智境。謂色等五塵及心心所。此約總聚。不別分別此何識境。現量所知。非境所知。如瓶衣等者。此雖現見受用。而非現量所緣。是假法故。但是現世所受用物。問。此中緣瓶等心是何量攝。答。非量收。不親緣得法自體故。非比度故非量所收。不待因成者。言此二法不待宗因比量成立。共知是有故。如眼耳等者。此五色根非現量得。亦非現世人所共知。此眼耳等。各由彼彼有發識用。比知是有。言證知者。證成道理也。以現見果。比有因故。果。謂所生心心所法。比量知有諸凈色根。此非現量他心智成。然今大乘第八識境。亦現量得。佛智緣時。亦現量得。除佛已外。共許為論。非世共悉。是故但言比知是有。若無為者。既非現所知法。又非有作用法(現受用是假法。今但破無為非實。故此不揀)。設許有作用。則應是無常。如何執定有無為耶。然諸下。正顯無為不實之義。所知性者。謂從聞說無為名。領納心中有無為性。所顯性者。色心有為。因果義盡或緣闕時。無有為義。顯是無為。此所知性。及所顯性。如色心等悉是無常。故不可執離心實有。量云無為是有法。不應執為離色心等實無為性是宗因云。所知性故。或色心等所顯性故。喻如色心等。

  又虛空等為一為多(至)應如兔角非異心等有。

  二別破。是無為法。約諸經論凡有六種。一虛空無

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "諸無為法,離開色、心等(有為法),乃至離開色、心等,實無自性,並非真實的無為法。",
    
    "三種無為法,分為三部分來闡述。第一部分是總破,先總體的駁斥。『且定有下』,是爲了將要破斥無為法,先舉有為法為例證。『先標數下別釋』,先標出數量,下面分別解釋。『如色心等者』,指的是五識身和他心智所緣的境界。即色等五塵以及心和心所。這是總體的概括,不分別這是哪個識的境界。這是現量所知,不是境界本身能知。『如瓶衣等者』,這些雖然是現見並受用的,但不是現量所緣,因為是假法。只是現世所受用的事物。問:緣于瓶等的心,屬於什麼量?答:不屬於量,因為它不能直接緣取法的自體,也不是比量,所以不屬於量。『不待因成者』,意思是這兩種法不需要通過宗因比量來成立,大家都知道它們是存在的。『如眼耳等者』,這五種色根不是現量所得,也不是現世人所共知的。這眼耳等,各自通過它們所具有的產生識的作用,通過比量得知它們是存在的。『言證知者』,意思是證明的道理。因為現見結果,比量得知有原因。結果,指的是所生的心和心所法。通過比量得知有諸凈色根。這不是現量和他心智所能瞭解的。然而現在大乘的第八識所緣的境界,也是現量所得。佛智緣取時,也是現量所得。除了佛以外,一般都認為是論證。不是世間普遍知道的,所以只說是通過比量得知它們是存在的。如果無為法存在,它既不是現量所知的法,又不是有作用的法(現受用是假法,現在只是破斥無為法不是真實的,所以這裡不作揀擇)。假設允許它有作用,那麼它應該是無常的,怎麼能執著地認為有恒常不變的無為法呢?『然諸下』,正是顯示無為法不真實的含義。『所知性者』,指的是從聽聞無為法的名稱,在心中領納的無為法的性質。『所顯性者』,色心有為法,因果的意義完盡或者因緣缺失時,沒有有為法的意義,這顯示出是無為法。這所知性,以及所顯性,如色心等都是無常的,所以不可執著認為離開心識而實有。量云:無為是有法,不應執為離開色心等,實無為性。這是宗,因是:所知性故,或者色心等所顯性故。喻如色心等。",
    
    "又,虛空等是一還是多?乃至,應當像兔角一樣,不是與心識等不同的存在。",
    
    "第二部分是分別破斥。關於無為法,根據各種經論,大概有六種。一是虛空無為。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "All unconditioned dharmas, apart from form, mind, etc. (conditioned dharmas), even apart from form, mind, etc., have no inherent nature and are not truly unconditioned.",
    
    "The three unconditioned dharmas are discussed in three parts. The first part is a general refutation, starting with a general rejection. 'Moreover, asserting existence below' is to refute the unconditioned by first using conditioned dharmas as examples. 'First, listing the numbers, then explaining separately below' means first listing the numbers and then explaining them separately. 'Such as form, mind, etc.' refers to the objects of the five consciousnesses and the objects of other-minds' knowledge. That is, the five sense objects such as form, and the mind and mental factors. This is a general summary, without distinguishing which consciousness's object it is. This is known by direct perception, not by the object itself knowing. 'Such as bottles, clothes, etc.' Although these are seen and used directly, they are not objects of direct perception because they are provisional dharmas. They are merely things used in the present world. Question: What kind of valid cognition is the mind that apprehends bottles, etc.? Answer: It is not a valid cognition because it does not directly apprehend the intrinsic nature of the dharma, nor is it an inference, so it is not included in valid cognitions. 'Not established by causes' means that these two dharmas do not need to be established through the subject, reason, and example of inference; everyone knows they exist. 'Such as eyes, ears, etc.' These five sense faculties are not obtained through direct perception, nor are they commonly known by people in the present world. These eyes, ears, etc., each through their respective functions of producing consciousness, are known to exist through inference. 'The term 'proving knowledge'' means the principle of proof. Because we directly see the result, we infer that there is a cause. The result refers to the produced mind and mental factors. Through inference, we know that there are pure sense faculties. This cannot be understood through direct perception or other-minds' knowledge. However, the object of the eighth consciousness in Mahayana is also obtained through direct perception. When the Buddha's wisdom apprehends it, it is also obtained through direct perception. Except for the Buddha, it is generally considered an argument. It is not universally known in the world, so it is only said that it is known to exist through inference. If the unconditioned exists, it is neither a dharma known by direct perception nor a dharma with function (present use is a provisional dharma; now we are only refuting that the unconditioned is not real, so there is no selection here). If we allow it to have function, then it should be impermanent. How can we stubbornly believe that there is a constant and unchanging unconditioned dharma? 'However, below' precisely reveals the meaning that the unconditioned is not real. 'The knowable nature' refers to the nature of the unconditioned that is apprehended in the mind from hearing the name of the unconditioned. 'The manifestable nature' means that when the cause-and-effect meaning of conditioned dharmas such as form and mind is exhausted or when the conditions are lacking, there is no meaning of conditioned dharmas, which reveals that it is unconditioned. This knowable nature and manifestable nature, like form, mind, etc., are all impermanent, so it is not permissible to cling to the belief that it exists apart from the mind. The inference states: The unconditioned is an existent dharma; it should not be clung to as being truly unconditioned apart from form, mind, etc. This is the subject. The reason is: because it is a knowable nature, or because it is a manifestable nature of form, mind, etc. The example is like form, mind, etc.",
    
    "Furthermore, is space, etc., one or many? ... It should be like a rabbit's horn, not something different from mind, etc.",
    
    "The second part is a separate refutation. Regarding the unconditioned dharmas, according to various sutras and treatises, there are roughly six types. The first is unconditioned space."
  ]
}

為者。離一切色心諸法障礙所顯真理。名為虛空無為。虛空有三。一識變虛空。即六識上作解心。變起虛空相分。二法性虛空。即真如體有。離諸障礙故。名為虛空。三事虛空。即所見頑空是也。二擇滅無為。由無漏智起簡擇。滅諸障染。所顯真如理故。三非擇滅無為。有法不由擇力起無漏智簡擇。而本性凈。即自性清凈涅槃是也。即真如本性。離諸障染。不由起智斷惑。本體凈故。四不動無為。第四禪離八患三災。證得不動無為。五想受滅無為。從第四禪已上。至無所有處已來。舍受不行。並粗想亦無。顯得真如。名想受滅無為。六真如無為。有二。一約對得名。謂真如理。對事得名。二簡法者。即真如。簡遍計。離於生滅也。余乘只許初二三種。離色心等實有自體。先約一多破。又虛空等為一為多。等者。等餘二種。若體是一下。出一體過。若體是多下。出多體過。初出一體過中。虛空容受下。破虛空非一。一部一品下。破擇滅非一。一法緣闕下。破非擇滅非一。若體是一。遍一切處。標彼宗所執也。虛空若不能容受色等。何名虛空。既能容受色等。即與色等合而爲一。色等既多。虛空之體亦應多。何言是一。一法合處。余皆不合。何言遍一切處若不與一法合而合余法者。則應諸法互相周遍。以虛空悉入一切法故。若謂虛空是一。不與諸法相合而合一法者。則應虛空不能容受。如余無為。以余無為不能攝受諸法故。量云虛空無為是有法。應非容受宗。因云。不與法合故。喻如余無為。又色等中有虛空否。有則空色雜而不分。無則空色離

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "『為』是指遠離一切色(rupa,物質現象)心(citta,精神現象)諸法障礙所顯現的真理,稱為虛空無為(ākāśa-asaṃskṛta)。虛空有三種:一是識變虛空,即第六識上產生的理解心,變現出虛空的相分;二是法性虛空,即真如(tathatā)本體所具有的,因為它遠離各種障礙,所以稱為虛空;三是事虛空,即我們所見到的頑空。",
    
    "二擇滅無為(pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-asaṃskṛta)。由於無漏智(anāsrava-jñāna)生起簡擇,滅除各種障礙和染污,所顯現的真如理。",
    
    "三非擇滅無為(apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-asaṃskṛta)。有些法不由簡擇之力,不通過生起無漏智進行簡擇,而其本性就是清凈的,這就是自性清凈涅槃(prakṛti-pariśuddha-nirvāṇa)。也就是真如的本性,遠離各種障礙和染污,不需要通過生起智慧斷除迷惑,其本體就是清凈的。",
    
    "四不動無為(āniñjya-asaṃskṛta)。第四禪(caturtha-dhyāna)遠離八種患難和三種災害,證得不動無為。",
    
    "五想受滅無為(saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha-asaṃskṛta)。從第四禪以上,到無所有處(ākiṃcanyāyatana)為止,捨棄了受(vedanā)不行,並且粗想(saṃjñā)也沒有了,所顯現的真如,名為想受滅無為。",
    
    "六真如無為(tathatā-asaṃskṛta)。有兩種:一是約對而得名,即真如理,相對於事而得名;二是簡法者,即真如,簡別遍計所執性(parikalpita),遠離生滅。",
    
    "其他乘只承認最初的兩種或三種。他們認為,離開色心等,存在真實自體的無為法。首先,從一和多的角度進行破斥。又,虛空等為一還是為多?『等』字,包括其餘兩種無為。如果本體是一個,下面就指出一體的過失;如果本體是多個,下面就指出多體的過失。首先指出一體的過失,其中,『虛空容受』以下,破斥虛空不是一個;『一部一品』以下,破斥擇滅不是一個;『一法緣闕』以下,破斥非擇滅不是一個。",
    
    "如果本體是一個,就應該遍一切處。這是標明他們的宗派所執持的觀點。虛空如果不能容受色等,還叫什麼虛空?既然能夠容受色等,就應該與色等合而爲一。色等既然是多的,虛空的本體也應該多,怎麼能說是一個?一種法結合的地方,其餘的法都不結合,怎麼能說遍一切處?如果不與一種法結合而與其餘的法結合,那麼就應該諸法互相周遍,因為虛空完全進入一切法中。如果說虛空是一個,不與諸法相結合而只與一種法結合,那麼虛空就應該不能容受,如同其餘的無為法一樣。因為其餘的無為法不能攝受諸法。可以這樣衡量:虛空無為是有法,應該不是容受者。原因是:不與法結合。例如其餘的無為法。又,色等之中有虛空嗎?有,那麼空和色就混雜而不分;沒有,那麼空和色就分離。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "'Asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned) refers to the truth revealed by being apart from all obstacles of rūpa (form, material phenomena), citta (mind, mental phenomena), and all dharmas (phenomena), and is called ākāśa-asaṃskṛta (unconditioned space). There are three types of ākāśa: first, vijñāna-pariṇāma-ākāśa (space transformed by consciousness), which is the mind of understanding arising from the sixth consciousness, manifesting the aspect of space; second, dharmatā-ākāśa (space of suchness), which is inherent in the essence of tathatā (suchness), and is called space because it is free from all obstacles; third, vastu-ākāśa (substantial space), which is the inert space we see.",
    
    "Second, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-asaṃskṛta (unconditioned cessation by discrimination). It is the principle of tathatā revealed by the arising of anāsrava-jñāna (undefiled wisdom), which discriminates and eliminates various obstacles and defilements.",
    
    "Third, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-asaṃskṛta (unconditioned cessation without discrimination). Some dharmas are inherently pure without the power of discrimination, without arising undefiled wisdom to discriminate. This is prakṛti-pariśuddha-nirvāṇa (naturally pure nirvāṇa). That is, the nature of tathatā is free from various obstacles and defilements, and its essence is pure without the need to generate wisdom to eliminate delusion.",
    
    "Fourth, āniñjya-asaṃskṛta (unconditioned immovability). The fourth dhyāna (meditative absorption) is free from the eight difficulties and three calamities, and attains unconditioned immovability.",
    
    "Fifth, saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha-asaṃskṛta (unconditioned cessation of perception and sensation). From the fourth dhyāna upwards, up to ākiṃcanyāyatana (the sphere of nothingness), sensation (vedanā) is abandoned and does not function, and coarse perception (saṃjñā) is also absent. The revealed tathatā is called unconditioned cessation of perception and sensation.",
    
    "Sixth, tathatā-asaṃskṛta (unconditioned suchness). There are two types: first, named in relation to something else, that is, the principle of tathatā, named in relation to phenomena; second, that which distinguishes dharmas, that is, tathatā, distinguishing parikalpita (the imagined nature), being apart from arising and ceasing.",
    
    "Other schools only acknowledge the first two or three types. They believe that there are unconditioned dharmas with real self-nature, apart from rūpa and citta. First, they are refuted from the perspective of one and many. Furthermore, are space and so on one or many? 'And so on' includes the other two unconditioned states. If the essence is one, the fault of being one will be pointed out below; if the essence is many, the fault of being many will be pointed out below. First, the fault of being one is pointed out, in which, 'space accommodates' below refutes that space is not one; 'one part, one category' below refutes that cessation by discrimination is not one; 'one dharma, condition lacking' below refutes that cessation without discrimination is not one.",
    
    "If the essence is one, it should be everywhere. This marks the view held by their school. If space cannot accommodate form and so on, what is it called space? Since it can accommodate form and so on, it should be combined with form and so on into one. Since form and so on are many, the essence of space should also be many, how can it be said to be one? Where one dharma combines, the others do not combine, how can it be said to be everywhere? If it does not combine with one dharma but combines with the others, then all dharmas should pervade each other, because space completely enters all dharmas. If it is said that space is one, not combined with all dharmas but only combined with one dharma, then space should not be able to accommodate, like the other unconditioned dharmas. Because the other unconditioned dharmas cannot encompass all dharmas. It can be measured in this way: unconditioned space is an existent dharma, it should not be an accommodator. The reason is: it does not combine with dharmas. For example, the other unconditioned dharmas. Furthermore, is there space in form and so on? If there is, then space and form are mixed and not separated; if there is not, then space and form are separated."
  ]
}

而不遍。次以擇滅非擇滅例破云。若是一體者。則應斷一部一品結時。不但得一部一品擇滅。餘一切部一切品擇滅皆得。一法緣闕不生時。不但得一非擇滅。應得一切非擇滅。何以故。彼執體一。則一即一切。理應爾故。結。是思惑。有八十一品。分屬九部。九部即九地。后出多體過云。若虛空等體是多。應非實無為是宗。因云。有品類故。喻如色等。又虛空應非遍容受是宗。因云。有品類故。喻如色等。擇滅。非擇滅。準此應知。餘部所執下。總顯無為非實有。餘部所執。即后三種無為。準前應破者。準前一多有無等例。更相徴詰也。又申量總破云。諸無為非異心等有是宗。因云。許無因果故喻如兔角。

  然契經說有虛空等(至)故諸無為非定實有。

  三顯正義。一依識變假施設有者。此依識變出體。謂空無為。初無本質。唯心所變。猶如極微。假而無體。于佛等處。聞其名故。而心變之。聞說空等五種無為。數數串習薰陶力故。諸識生時。變似空等影像相分。為所緣境。此所現相。前後相似。無有變易。唯有一類空等相故。假說為常。若說本質無為者。即不離於識變有也。問。若言識變相分說是無為者。即是相狀之相。隨識而為。何成無為耶。答。此說是識變。假說是無為。其實非是無為。無為是常住法故。今此依無為體者。但取隨識獨影相分為體。以相似不變。故假說為常耳。此六無為。地前菩薩識變。即是有漏。若地上后得智變。即無漏也。二依法性假施設有者。此依法性出體。五種無為。皆是真如。真如體外。更無

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "而不周遍。接下來用擇滅(Pratisamkhya-nirodha,通過智慧力斷滅煩惱而證得的無為法)和非擇滅(Apratisamkhya-nirodha,不依靠智慧力,因緣不具足而自然止息的無為法)為例來反駁他們說,如果無為法是一個整體,那麼在斷除某一部或某一品的煩惱時,不應該僅僅得到該部該品的擇滅,而應該得到所有部所有品的擇滅。同樣,當一個法生起的因緣缺失而不生起時,不應該僅僅得到一個非擇滅,而應該得到所有的非擇滅。為什麼呢?因為他們認為無為法是一個整體,一個即是一切,理應如此。『結』指的是思惑,共有八十一品,分屬於九部,九部即九地。後面會提出多體過失說,如果虛空等的本體是多個,那麼就應該不是真實的無為法,這是他們的宗(命題)。他們的因(理由)是,因為有品類差別,比如色法等。另外,虛空應該不是普遍容受一切的,這是他們的宗(命題)。他們的因(理由)是,因為有品類差別,比如色法等。擇滅和非擇滅,可以參照這個例子來理解。『餘部所執下』,總的顯示無為法不是真實存在的。『餘部所執』,指的是後面的三種無為法。『準前應破者』,參照前面關於一多、有無等的例子,互相質問。又進一步總的衡量反駁說,諸無為法不是異於心等而存在的,這是他們的宗(命題)。他們的因(理由)是,承認無為法沒有因果,比如兔角。",
    
    "然而契經上說有虛空等(省略原文)所以諸無為法不是絕對真實存在的。",
    
    "三、闡明正確的義理。一、依靠識變假立施設:這是依靠識變來確定無為法的體性。所謂的空無為,最初並沒有本質,只是心所變現出來的,就像極微一樣,是虛假的而沒有實體。因為在佛等處聽聞到空的名字,所以心中就變現出空。因為聽聞並數數串習薰陶空等五種無為,所以在諸識生起時,變現出類似空等影像的相分,作為所緣境。這種顯現的相,前後相似,沒有變易,只有一類空等的相,所以假說為常。如果說本質是無為法,那麼就離不開識變而存在。問:如果說識變現的相分是無為法,那麼這只是相狀的相,隨著識而變化,怎麼能成為無為法呢?答:這裡說是識變,假說是無為法,其實它不是真正的無為法。無為法是常住法。現在這裡依據無為法的體性,只是取隨識而生的獨影相分為體,因為它相似不變,所以假說為常而已。這六種無為法,地前菩薩的識變是有漏的,如果是地上菩薩后得智所變的,就是無漏的。二、依法性假立施設:這是依法性來確定無為法的體性。五種無為法,都是真如。真如體外,沒有其他。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "and not all-pervading. Next, using Pratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation through wisdom) and Apratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation without wisdom) as examples, it refutes them by saying that if unconditioned phenomena are a single entity, then when one part or one category of affliction is severed, not only should one obtain the Pratisamkhya-nirodha of that part or category, but one should obtain the Pratisamkhya-nirodha of all parts and all categories. Similarly, when the conditions for a dharma to arise are absent, not only should one obtain one Apratisamkhya-nirodha, but one should obtain all Apratisamkhya-nirodhas. Why? Because they hold that unconditioned phenomena are a single entity, one is all, and it should be so. 'Klesha' refers to the afflictions of thought, which have eighty-one categories, belonging to nine divisions, the nine divisions being the nine grounds. Later, the fallacy of multiple entities is presented, saying that if the nature of space, etc., is multiple, then it should not be a real unconditioned phenomenon; this is their thesis. Their reason is that it has categories, like form, etc. Furthermore, space should not be universally receptive; this is their thesis. Their reason is that it has categories, like form, etc. Pratisamkhya-nirodha and Apratisamkhya-nirodha should be understood accordingly. 'Yu bu suo zhi xia', generally reveals that unconditioned phenomena are not truly existent. 'Yu bu suo zhi' refers to the latter three types of unconditioned phenomena. 'Zhun qian ying po zhe', refer to the previous examples of one and many, existence and non-existence, etc., to question each other. Furthermore, a general measure of refutation is presented, saying that all unconditioned phenomena are not different from mind, etc.; this is their thesis. Their reason is that they admit that unconditioned phenomena have no cause and effect, like rabbit horns.",
    
    "However, the sutras say that there is space, etc. (omitting the original text) Therefore, all unconditioned phenomena are not definitely real.",
    
    "Three, clarifying the correct meaning. One, relying on consciousness transformation to falsely establish: This relies on consciousness transformation to determine the nature of unconditioned phenomena. The so-called space unconditioned phenomenon initially has no essence, but is only transformed by the mind, like an extremely small particle, which is false and has no substance. Because one hears the name of space in the presence of Buddhas, etc., the mind transforms into space. Because one hears and repeatedly practices and cultivates the five types of unconditioned phenomena such as space, when the consciousnesses arise, they transform into image-aspects similar to space, etc., as the object of cognition. This appearing aspect is similar before and after, without change, and only has one type of aspect of space, etc., so it is falsely said to be permanent. If one says that the essence is unconditioned phenomena, then it cannot be separated from the existence of consciousness transformation. Question: If one says that the aspect-division manifested by consciousness transformation is unconditioned phenomena, then this is only the aspect of the aspect, which changes with consciousness, how can it become unconditioned phenomena? Answer: Here it is said that it is consciousness transformation, falsely said to be unconditioned phenomena, but in fact it is not a true unconditioned phenomenon. Unconditioned phenomena are permanent dharmas. Now, according to the nature of unconditioned phenomena, only the solitary-image aspect arising from consciousness is taken as the nature, because it is similar and unchanging, so it is falsely said to be permanent. These six types of unconditioned phenomena, the consciousness transformation of Bodhisattvas before the ground is tainted, and if it is transformed by the wisdom attained after the ground, it is untainted. Two, relying on the nature of dharma to falsely establish: This relies on the nature of dharma to determine the nature of unconditioned phenomena. The five types of unconditioned phenomena are all Suchness. Outside of the nature of Suchness, there is nothing else."
  ]
}

別出。六種無為。各皆依真如實德也。此體須證人法二空。無我之後。方得顯故。言有則墮增益謗。言無則墮減損謗。言亦有亦無則墮相違謗。言非有非無則墮戲論謗。故曰有無俱非。心欲緣而慮亡。口欲言而辭喪。故曰心言路絕。性相各別。故曰非一。即性即相。故曰非異。為法之性。故曰法性。無諸障礙。故曰虛空。擇滅者。亦名數緣滅。數。謂慧數。由慧為緣。揀擇諸惑。能顯滅理。故唐三藏譯為譯滅。擇力所得滅。名為擇滅。如牛所駕車。名曰牛車也。此以離係爲性。由無漏智。斷諸障染。遠離繫縛。證得解脫。假名擇滅。非擇滅者。亦名非數緣滅。非由慧數滅惑所得。但以性凈。及於緣闕之所顯故。緣闕者俱舍論云。畢竟礙當生。別得非擇滅。釋云。當生者。當來生法。緣會則生。緣闕不生。于不生時。得非擇滅。此非擇滅。礙當生法。令永不起。名畢竟礙。言別得者。謂非擇滅有實體相。緣闕位中。起別得故。非擇滅得。不因擇滅。但由緣闕。名非擇滅。論指事明云。如眼與意。專一色時。余色聲香味觸等謝。緣彼境界五識身等。住未來世。畢竟不生。由彼不能緣過去境。緣不具故得非擇滅。釋曰。謂眼緣色時亦合緣聲等。以專注色故。耳等不緣聲等。同時聲等剎那已謝。故令緣聲等識更不復生。以前五識唯緣現量。不緣過未。而言觸等者。等取法中有與能緣同時為所緣境者。如他心智所緣境是也。此他心智。唯緣現在心王。亦合緣心所。以專注心王。故於心所得非擇滅。不動者。離前三定。至第四禪。離三災。出八難。無喜

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "別出。六種無為,各自都依據真如實德。這種本體必須證悟人法二空,在無我之後才能顯現。如果說『有』,就墮入增益謗;如果說『無』,就墮入減損謗;如果說『亦有亦無』,就墮入相違謗;如果說『非有非無』,就墮入戲論謗。所以說『有』和『無』都不是。心想要攀緣卻思慮停止,口想要言說卻詞語喪失,所以說『心言路絕』。自性與現象各自不同,所以說『非一』。即是自性即是現象,所以說『非異』。作為諸法的自性,所以說『法性』(Dharmata)。沒有一切障礙,所以說『虛空』(Akasha)。",
    "擇滅(Pratisankhya-nirodha),也叫做數緣滅。『數』,指的是智慧之數。由於智慧作為因緣,揀擇諸種迷惑,能夠顯現滅的道理。所以唐三藏翻譯為『譯滅』,即通過選擇的力量所得到的滅,叫做擇滅。如同牛所駕的車,叫做『牛車』一樣。這種滅以離係爲特性,通過無漏智慧,斷除各種障礙和染污,遠離繫縛,證得解脫,假名為擇滅。",
    "非擇滅(Apratisankhya-nirodha),也叫做非數緣滅。不是通過智慧之數滅除迷惑所得,而是因為自性清凈,以及因緣缺失而顯現。『緣闕』,《俱舍論》中說:『畢竟礙當生,別得非擇滅。』解釋說,『當生』,指的是將來要生的法,因緣聚合就會生起,因緣缺失就不會生起。在不生起的時候,得到非擇滅。這種非擇滅,阻礙將要生起的法,使其永遠不能生起,叫做『畢竟礙』。『別得』,指的是非擇滅有實體相,在因緣缺失的位中,產生不同的獲得。非擇滅的獲得,不是因為擇滅,而是因為因緣缺失,所以叫做非擇滅。《論指事明》中說:『如眼與意,專一色時,余色聲香味觸等謝,緣彼境界五識身等,住未來世,畢竟不生。由彼不能緣過去境,緣不具故得非擇滅。』解釋說,當眼睛緣取顏色時,也同時能夠緣取聲音等。因為專注顏色,所以耳朵等不能緣取聲音等。同時聲音等剎那已經過去,所以使得緣取聲音等的識不再生起。因為前五識只能緣取現量,不能緣取過去和未來,所以說因為因緣不具足而得到非擇滅。這裡說『觸等』,是等同於法中與能緣同時作為所緣境的,比如他心智所緣的境界就是如此。這種他心智,只能緣取現在的心王,也能夠緣取心所。因為專注心王,所以在心所中得到非擇滅。",
    "不動(Anenja),離開前面三個禪定,到達第四禪,遠離三災,超出八難,沒有喜。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Beyond description. The six kinds of unconditioned (Asamskrita) each rely on the true and real virtues of Suchness (Tathata). This essence can only be revealed after realizing the emptiness of both persons and phenomena, and after the absence of self. To say 'it exists' falls into the slander of augmentation; to say 'it does not exist' falls into the slander of diminution; to say 'it both exists and does not exist' falls into the slander of contradiction; to say 'it is neither existent nor non-existent' falls into the slander of sophistry. Therefore, it is said that both existence and non-existence are not. The mind desires to grasp but thoughts cease; the mouth desires to speak but words fail. Hence, it is said that 'the path of mind and speech is cut off.' Nature and characteristics are distinct, hence it is said 'not one.' Being both nature and characteristics, hence it is said 'not different.' Being the nature of all dharmas, hence it is called 'Dharmata' (法性). Without any obstructions, hence it is called 'Akasha' (虛空).",
    "Pratisankhya-nirodha (擇滅), also known as numerary cessation. 'Numerary' refers to the number of wisdom. Because wisdom serves as a condition, selecting and discerning various delusions, it can reveal the principle of cessation. Therefore, the Tang Dynasty Tripitaka translates it as 'cessation by selection,' meaning cessation obtained through the power of choice is called Pratisankhya-nirodha. Just as a cart driven by an ox is called an 'ox cart.' This cessation is characterized by detachment. Through non-outflow wisdom, it cuts off various obstacles and defilements, moving away from bondage, attaining liberation, and is nominally called Pratisankhya-nirodha.",
    "Apratisankhya-nirodha (非擇滅), also known as non-numerary cessation. It is not obtained by eliminating delusions through the number of wisdom, but is manifested due to the purity of nature and the absence of conditions. 'Absence of conditions' is described in the Abhidharmakosa as: 'Ultimately obstructing what is to arise, separately obtaining Apratisankhya-nirodha.' It explains that 'what is to arise' refers to dharmas that will arise in the future. If conditions are met, they will arise; if conditions are absent, they will not arise. When they do not arise, Apratisankhya-nirodha is obtained. This Apratisankhya-nirodha obstructs the dharmas that are about to arise, preventing them from ever arising, and is called 'ultimate obstruction.' 'Separately obtaining' refers to Apratisankhya-nirodha having a real substance. In the state of absent conditions, different attainments arise. The attainment of Apratisankhya-nirodha is not due to Pratisankhya-nirodha, but due to the absence of conditions, hence it is called Apratisankhya-nirodha. The Treatise on Manifestation of Meaning states: 'For example, when the eye and mind focus on one color, the remaining colors, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations cease. The five consciousnesses, etc., that cognize those objects, remain in the future, ultimately not arising. Because they cannot cognize past objects, Apratisankhya-nirodha is obtained due to the incompleteness of conditions.' It explains that when the eye cognizes color, it can also cognize sounds, etc., simultaneously. Because of focusing on color, the ears, etc., cannot cognize sounds, etc. At the same time, the moment of sounds, etc., has passed, so the consciousnesses that cognize sounds, etc., no longer arise. Because the first five consciousnesses can only cognize the present, not the past or future, it is said that Apratisankhya-nirodha is obtained due to the incompleteness of conditions. Here, 'tactile sensations, etc.' are equivalent to dharmas that are simultaneously the object of cognition with the cognizer, such as the object of cognition of the mind-reading wisdom. This mind-reading wisdom can only cognize the present mind-king and can also cognize mental factors. Because of focusing on the mind-king, Apratisankhya-nirodha is obtained in the mental factors.",
    "Immovable (Anenja). Leaving the previous three Dhyanas (定), reaching the fourth Dhyana, leaving the three calamities, transcending the eight difficulties, without joy."
  ]
}

樂等搖動身心所顯真理。名不動滅。想受滅者。謂已離無所有處欲。超過有頂。暫止息想。作意為先。故諸不恒行心心所滅。及恒行一分心心所滅。所顯真理。名想受滅。真如亦是假施設者。真如約詮。而詮體是一。此五無為。依真如上假名空等。而真如體非如非不如。故真如名亦是假立。如食油蟲。不稱彼體。唯言顯故。譬如有蟲名曰食油。實非食油。不稱體故。真如亦爾。遮空見者。說如為有。遮小乘中化地部等執定實有。故說為空。非言無為體即空也。勿謂虛幻者。虛揀遍計。幻揀依他。即顯真如是圓成實。以無虛妄顛倒法故。名真如也。故宗鏡錄云。問。如何聖教說真如實耶。答。今言有者。不是真如名實有但說有。即是遣惡取空。故說有體是妙有真空。故言非空非有。問。如何聖教說真如為空耶。答。為破執真如心外實有。故說為空。即空其情執。不空真如體也。通上二破余乘竟。

  外道余乘所執諸法(至)如執外境亦是法執。

  三總破。此破外道余乘法執已竟。亦如我執例。立一比量總破之。彼先能后所。此先所后能。以我屬根。法屬境故。所執諸法異心心所。是前陳有法。非實有性。是后陳宗體。因云。是所取假相分故。喻如心心所也。能取彼法之覺。亦不緣彼法是宗。因云。是能取見分故。喻如緣此能緣之覺也。謂第六識緣假法時。其假相分。但從見分變生。自無其種。亦無所仗本質。名獨影唯從見。故以心心所緣此覺為同喻。此是遍計所執性。以前既明異心心所非實有性。恐人遂執諸心心所是實有性。故申

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "『樂等搖動身心所顯真理』,名為『不動滅』。『想受滅者』,是指已經遠離無所有處(ākincanyāyatana)的慾望,超越有頂天(bhavāgra),暫時止息思想,以作意(manasikara)為先導,因此,諸如不恒常執行的心和心所(citta-caitta)的滅盡,以及恒常執行的一部分心和心所的滅盡,所顯現的真理,名為『想受滅』。",
    "真如(tathatā)也是假施設的。真如就詮釋而言,其本體是一。這五種無為法(asaṃskṛta dharma),依據真如之上假名安立空等。而真如的本體非如非不如,所以真如之名也是假立的。如同『食油蟲』,不稱合它的本體,只是爲了顯說而這樣稱呼。譬如有一種蟲名叫『食油』,實際上它並不吃油,因為這個名稱不符合它的本體。真如也是這樣,爲了遮止空見者,說真如為『有』;爲了遮止小乘(Hīnayāna)中化地部(Mahīśāsaka)等執著真如是真實存在的,所以說真如是『空』。並非說無為法的本體就是空。不要認為真如是虛幻的,『虛』是爲了揀擇遍計所執性(parikalpita-svabhāva),『幻』是爲了揀擇依他起性(paratantra-svabhāva),這樣就顯現出真如是圓成實性(pariniṣpanna-svabhāva),因為它沒有虛妄顛倒的法,所以名為『真如』。",
    "所以《宗鏡錄》中說:『問:為什麼聖教說真如是真實的呢?答:現在說「有」,不是說真如這個名字是實有,只是說「有」,就是爲了遣除惡見,取證空性,所以說有體是妙有真空,所以說非空非有。問:為什麼聖教說真如是空呢?答:爲了破除執著真如在心外真實存在的觀點,所以說真如是空,即空掉情執,不空真如的本體。』以上是總破其他乘的觀點。",
    
    "外道和其他乘所執著的諸法(直到)如同執著外境也是法執。",
    
    "三、總破。以上破斥外道和其他乘的法執已經完畢。也像破斥我執一樣,建立一個比量來總破法執。外道和其他乘是先能取后所取,這裡是先所取后能取,因為『我』屬於根,『法』屬於境的緣故。所執著的諸法,異於心和心所,這是前陳(pakṣa),有法(dharmin)。『非實有性』,這是后陳(sādhya),宗體(dharma)。因為『是所取假相分』,這是因(hetu)。例如心和心所也是這樣。能取彼法之覺,也不緣彼法,這是宗(pakṣa)。因為『是能取見分』,這是因(hetu)。例如緣此能緣之覺也是這樣。意思是說,第六識(mano-vijñāna)緣假法時,其假相分,只是從見分變生,自身沒有種子,也沒有所依賴的本質,名為獨影唯識,所以用心和心所緣此覺作為同喻(dṛṣṭānta)。這是遍計所執性。因為前面已經說明異於心和心所的法不是實有自性,恐怕有人就執著諸心心所是實有自性,所以申明。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "'The truth revealed by the joy and movement of body and mind' is called 'Immovable Cessation'. 'Those who have extinguished perception and feeling' refers to those who have abandoned the desire for the realm of nothingness (ākincanyāyatana), transcended the peak of existence (bhavāgra), and temporarily ceased thought, with attention (manasikara) as the guide. Therefore, the truth revealed by the cessation of impermanent minds and mental factors (citta-caitta), as well as the cessation of a portion of permanent minds and mental factors, is called 'Cessation of Perception and Feeling'.",
    "Suchness (tathatā) is also a provisional designation. In terms of explanation, the essence of suchness is one. These five unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta dharma) are provisionally established upon suchness with names like emptiness. However, the essence of suchness is neither like nor unlike, so the name 'suchness' is also provisionally established. It is like the 'oil-eating insect,' which does not correspond to its essence, but is only called that for the sake of expression. For example, there is an insect called 'oil-eating,' but it does not actually eat oil because the name does not correspond to its essence. Suchness is also like this. To prevent those who hold to the view of emptiness, it is said that suchness is 'existent'; to prevent the Sarvāstivāda school (Mahīśāsaka) and others in the Small Vehicle (Hīnayāna) from clinging to the idea that suchness is truly existent, it is said that suchness is 'empty.' It is not that the essence of the unconditioned is emptiness. Do not think that suchness is illusory. 'Illusory' is to distinguish the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), and 'illusion' is to distinguish the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), thus revealing that suchness is the perfectly accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva), because it has no false or inverted dharmas, so it is called 'suchness'.",
    "Therefore, the *Zong Jing Lu* says: 'Question: Why do the holy teachings say that suchness is real? Answer: When we say \"existent\" now, it is not that the name suchness is truly existent, but simply saying \"existent\" is to dispel evil views and attain emptiness. Therefore, it is said that the essence of existence is wondrous existence and true emptiness, so it is said to be neither empty nor existent. Question: Why do the holy teachings say that suchness is empty? Answer: To break the attachment to the view that suchness exists outside the mind, it is said to be empty, that is, emptying emotional attachments, not emptying the essence of suchness.' The above is a general refutation of the views of other vehicles.",
    
    "The dharmas clung to by externalists and other vehicles (up to) such as clinging to external objects is also clinging to dharmas.",
    
    "Three, general refutation. The above refutation of the dharma-clinging of externalists and other vehicles is now complete. Just as with the clinging to self, a syllogism is established to generally refute dharma-clinging. Externalists and other vehicles take the grasper before the grasped, here we take the grasped before the grasper, because 'self' belongs to the root, and 'dharma' belongs to the object. The dharmas clung to, different from mind and mental factors, this is the subject (pakṣa), the property holder (dharmin). 'Not truly existent', this is the predicate (sādhya), the property (dharma). Because 'it is a grasped false image', this is the reason (hetu). For example, mind and mental factors are also like this. The awareness that grasps those dharmas also does not cognize those dharmas, this is the thesis (pakṣa). Because 'it is the grasping aspect', this is the reason (hetu). For example, cognizing this cognizing awareness is also like this. The meaning is that when the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) cognizes false dharmas, its false image aspect is only transformed from the seeing aspect, it has no seed of its own, and no supporting essence, it is called a single-image consciousness, so using mind and mental factors cognizing this awareness as a similar example (dṛṣṭānta). This is the imagined nature. Because it has already been explained that dharmas different from mind and mental factors are not truly existent, fearing that people will then cling to the idea that all minds and mental factors are truly existent, it is clarified."
  ]
}

量云。諸心心所是有法。非真實有是宗。因云。依他起故。喻如幻事。設有問云。諸心心所既非實有。何故教中說唯有識。故此答云。為遣外道余乘所執離心心所別有實境。是故教中說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者。還同妄執外境實有。亦是法執。由是理故。但應遣彼心外之境。同兔角無。能緣彼心。如幻事有。故少分不同。非謂即心亦名實有。故轉識論云。立唯識義者。本為遣境遣心。今境界既無。唯識又泯。即是了唯識義成也。此即凈品煩惱。及境界二俱無故。問。遣境存識乃可稱唯識義。既境識俱遣。何識可成。答。立唯識。乃一往遣境留心。卒終為論。遣境為欲空心。故境識俱泯。是其正義。此境識俱泯。即是實性。實性即阿摩羅識也。古德云。如緣真如。作有如解。即是法執。若作無解。雖不稱如。仍因成聖。釋曰。若作如解即是法執者。若起能解之心即立所證之理。所境既立。迷現量心。知解才生便成比量。失唯識宗。所以華嚴經云。智外無如為智所入。如外無智慧證於如。則心境如如。一道清凈。

  然諸法執略有二種(至)法空真如即能除滅。

  四總舉通執。蘊處界相者。教中即一念而開色心。即色心而開五蘊。即色塵而開十二處。又即五蘊而開十八界。五蘊合色為一。開心為四。為迷心不迷色者設也。十二處合心為一半(對前開四故今。云合。謂意處全。及法處一分。適公曰。意所取境。名之為法。法處有四。一心所。二不相應行。三無為。四無表色。今指心所一分。故云半也)。開色為十半(對前合色為一為

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "量云:諸心和心所(chitta and chaitasika,指精神活動及其伴隨的心理現象)是有法(dhamma,指事物、法則)的,但並非真實存在,這是我的宗義。原因是它們是依他起(paratantra,指依賴其他條件而生起)的。比如幻術變出的事物。如果有人問:既然諸心和心所都不是真實存在的,為什麼佛經中說『唯有識』(vijñānamātra,指只有意識)呢?對此回答說:爲了遣除外道(tirthika,指佛教以外的修行者)和其他乘(yāna,指不同的修行途徑,如聲聞乘、緣覺乘)所執著的,認為在心和心所之外,還存在著真實存在的客觀境(viṣaya,指認識的對象)。所以佛經中才說『唯有識』。如果執著于『唯識』是真實存在的,那就和妄執外境真實存在一樣,也是一種法執(dharmagraha,指對法的執著)。因此,應該遣除心外的客觀境,認為它如同兔角一樣不存在。而能緣(ālambana,指認識作用所依賴的條件)彼境的心,如同幻術變出的事物一樣存在。所以說少部分不同。並非說心本身也是真實存在的。所以《轉識論》(Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra,唯識學的論著)中說:『建立唯識的意義,本來是爲了遣除境和遣除心。現在境界既然不存在,唯識也消泯了,這就是了達唯識的意義成就了。』這就是說,清凈品(指修行者)的煩惱(kleśa,指使人煩惱的心理活動)和境界(viṣaya,指認識的對象)都已不存在了。",
    "問:遣除境界而保留識,才可以稱為唯識的意義。既然境界和識都遣除了,還有什麼識可以成就呢?答:建立唯識,只是一開始遣除境界而保留心。最終的論點是,遣除境界是爲了空掉心。所以境界和識都消泯,才是其真正的意義。這境界和識都消泯,就是實性(tathatā,指事物的真實本性)。實性就是阿摩羅識(amalavijñāna,指清凈無垢的意識)。古德說:『如果緣真如(tathatā,指事物的真實本性),而理解為「有」,那就是法執。如果理解為「無」,雖然不符合真如,仍然可以因此而成聖。』解釋說:如果理解為『如』,那就是法執。如果生起能理解的心,就建立了所證的理。所境一旦建立,就迷惑了現量心(pratyakṣa,指直接的、不帶分別的認知)。知解一旦產生,就變成了比量(anumāna,指通過推理得出的認知),失去了唯識宗的宗旨。所以《華嚴經》(Avataṃsaka Sūtra,大乘佛教的重要經典)說:『智外無如,為智所入。如外無智,能證於如。』那麼心境如如(tathatā,指事物的真實本性),一道清凈。",
    "然而,諸法執(dharmagraha,指對法的執著)略有二種……法空真如(dharmasunyata-tathata,指諸法空性的真實本性)就能除滅。",
    "四、總括地執著于蘊(skandha,指構成個體經驗的五種要素,即色、受、想、行、識)、處(āyatana,指感覺器官和感覺對象,共有十二處)和界(dhātu,指構成經驗的十八種要素,包括六根、六境和六識)的相狀。佛經中說,一念之間就展開了色和心。即從色和心展開了五蘊。即從色塵展開了十二處。又從五蘊展開了十八界。五蘊合色為一,開心為四,這是為那些迷惑於心而不迷惑於色的人設立的。十二處合心為一半(相對於前面展開為四,所以現在說是合。意處是全部,法處是一部分。適公說:意所取境,名為法。法處有四種:一心所、二不相應行、三無為、四無表色。現在指的是心所的一部分,所以說是半)。開色為十半(相對於前面合色為一,為……"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Treatise on Consciousness-only: All minds and mental factors (chitta and chaitasika) are dharmas (dhamma), but they are not truly existent. This is my thesis. The reason is that they arise dependently (paratantra). For example, like illusory events. If someone asks: Since all minds and mental factors are not truly existent, why does the sutra say 'only consciousness' (vijñānamātra)? The answer is: To refute the heretics (tirthika) and other vehicles (yāna) who hold that there is a truly existent objective realm (viṣaya) separate from minds and mental factors. That is why the sutra says 'only consciousness'. If one clings to the idea that 'only consciousness' is truly existent, it is the same as falsely clinging to the idea that the external realm is truly existent. This is also a form of dharma-attachment (dharmagraha). Therefore, one should refute the external objective realm, considering it as non-existent as a rabbit's horn. However, the mind that cognizes (ālambana) that realm exists like an illusory event. Therefore, there is a slight difference. It does not mean that the mind itself is also truly existent. Therefore, the Treatise on the Transformation of Consciousness (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra) says: 'Establishing the meaning of consciousness-only is originally for the purpose of refuting the realm and refuting the mind. Now that the realm does not exist, consciousness-only is also extinguished. This is the accomplishment of understanding the meaning of consciousness-only.' This means that the afflictions (kleśa) and the objective realm of the pure practitioner no longer exist.",
    "Question: Refuting the realm while preserving consciousness can be called the meaning of consciousness-only. Since both the realm and consciousness are refuted, what consciousness can be accomplished? Answer: Establishing consciousness-only is initially for the purpose of refuting the realm while preserving the mind. The ultimate point is that refuting the realm is for the purpose of emptying the mind. Therefore, the extinction of both the realm and consciousness is its true meaning. This extinction of both the realm and consciousness is the suchness (tathatā). Suchness is the amala-consciousness (amalavijñāna). An ancient master said: 'If one contemplates suchness (tathatā) and understands it as 'existent', that is dharma-attachment. If one understands it as 'non-existent', although it does not conform to suchness, one can still become a saint because of it.' Explanation: If one understands it as 'such', that is dharma-attachment. If one generates a mind that can understand, one establishes the principle to be realized. Once the object is established, one is deluded by the direct perception (pratyakṣa). Once knowledge arises, it becomes inference (anumāna), and one loses the purpose of the Consciousness-only school. Therefore, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'Outside of wisdom, there is no suchness for wisdom to enter. Outside of suchness, there is no wisdom to realize suchness.' Then the mind and the realm are suchness (tathatā), and the path is pure.",
    "However, there are roughly two types of dharma-attachment (dharmagraha)... The suchness of the emptiness of dharmas (dharmasunyata-tathata) can eliminate them.",
    "Fourth, generally clinging to the characteristics of the aggregates (skandha), sense bases (āyatana), and elements (dhātu). The sutra says that in a single thought, form and mind are unfolded. That is, from form and mind, the five aggregates are unfolded. That is, from the form-dust, the twelve sense bases are unfolded. And from the five aggregates, the eighteen elements are unfolded. The five aggregates combine form into one, and open the mind into four. This is established for those who are deluded about the mind but not deluded about form. The twelve sense bases combine the mind into half (relative to the previous unfolding into four, so now it is said to be combined. The mind-base is whole, and the dharma-base is a part. Shi Gong said: The object taken by the mind is called dharma. There are four types of dharma-base: 1. mental factors, 2. non-associated formations, 3. unconditioned, 4. non-revealing form. Now it refers to a part of the mental factors, so it is said to be half). Opening form into ten and a half (relative to the previous combining form into one, for..."
  ]
}

開也。謂色聲香味觸及眼耳鼻舌身全為十。言半者。即法處中無表色)。為迷色不迷心者設也。十八界心色俱開(謂開色為十半。如前開心為七半。即六識為六。意根及法處心所也)。為心色俱迷者設也。皆是假立。豈有實法。而可執耶。因所緣有開有合。故能緣亦或總或別。此法執與前我執。若約大乘分別二執。初地初心一時頓斷。俱生二執。于地地中各斷一分。乃至等覺。尚有二愚。金剛後心。一時頓盡。故曰。分別我法極喜無。六七俱生地地除。第七修道除種現金剛道后等皆無。若約小乘。初見道時。頓斷分別我執。即證初果。斷盡俱生。遂證四果。而法執不與焉。自性等相。即數論等所執冥初自性等類。余文例前我執可知。

  如是所說一切法執(至)依他起性如幻事等。

  此總結內外法執。自心外法。即蘊處界等相本質之法。自心內蘊。即自心變起影像相分法。或有或無者。影像相分是有。分別計度假法是無。又第七是有。第六是無。一切皆有者。第六識上變起影像相分必是有故。如前已明。然雖許此心上變起似法之相一切皆有。以依他起故。亦如幻有耳。若所執實有。是遍計執。如石女兔角。決定非有。既立二量。又引聖教以證結之。廣百論云。一切所見。皆識所為。離識無有一法是實。為無始來數習諸見。隨所習見。隨所遇緣。隨自種子成熟差別。變似種種法相而生。猶如夢中所見事等。皆虛妄現。都無一實。一切皆是識心所為。難。若爾。大乘應如夢啞。撥一切法皆悉是虛。不能辯說一切世間出世間法自性差別

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "開也。』開』是指色、聲、香、味、觸以及眼、耳、鼻、舌、身,合起來就是十種。』半』是指法處中的無表色(為針對迷於色但不迷於心的人而設立)。十八界是心和色都『開』(指『開』色為十『半』,如同之前『開』心為七『半』,即六識為六,意根及法處心所)。這是為心和色都迷惑的人設立的。這些都是假立的,哪裡有真實存在的法可以執著呢?因為所緣境有『開』有『合』,所以能緣的心識也或者總括或者分別。這種法執與之前的我執,如果按照大乘來分別這兩種執著,初地(菩薩修行階位的第一階)的初心可以一時頓斷,俱生的兩種執著,在各個地中各自斷除一部分,乃至等覺(菩薩修行的最高階位),尚且還有兩種愚昧。金剛後心(指最後階段的菩薩心),一時頓然斷盡。所以說:『分別我法極喜無,六七俱生地地除,第七修道除種現金剛道后等皆無。』如果按照小乘,初見道時,頓然斷除分別我執,就證得初果。斷盡俱生我執,就證得四果。而法執不包含在內。自性等相,就是數論等所執著的冥初自性等類別。其餘文字可以參照之前的我執來理解。",
    
    "『如是所說一切法執(至)依他起性如幻事等。』",
    
    "這是總結內外法執。自心外的法,就是蘊、處、界等相的本質之法。自心內的蘊,就是自心變現出來的影像相分法。『或有或無』,影像相分是『有』,分別計度的假法是『無』。又第七識是『有』,第六識是『無』。『一切皆有』,第六識上變現出來的影像相分必定是『有』的,如同前面已經說明的。然而即使允許這種心上變現出來的類似法相的一切都是『有』的,因為是依他起性,也就像幻象一樣。如果所執著的是真實存在的,那就是遍計執,如同石女的兔角,決定是不存在的。既已建立兩種衡量標準,又引用聖教來證明並總結。廣百論說:『一切所見,皆識所為,離識無有一法是實。為無始來數習諸見,隨所習見,隨所遇緣,隨自種子成熟差別,變似種種法相而生。猶如夢中所見事等,皆虛妄現,都無一實。一切皆是識心所為。』有人問難:『如果這樣,大乘應該像啞巴做夢一樣,否定一切法都是虛假的,不能辯說一切世間出世間法的自性差別。』"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "'Kai ye.' 'Kai' refers to form (色, se), sound (聲, sheng), smell (香, xiang), taste (味, wei), touch (觸, chu), and the sense organs of eye (眼, yan), ear (耳, er), nose (鼻, bi), tongue (舌, she), and body (身, shen), which together make ten. 'Ban' refers to the non-manifested form within the 'dharma-sphere' (法處, fa chu) (established for those who are deluded by form but not by mind). The eighteen realms are where both mind and form are 'open' (meaning 'opening' form into ten 'halves,' as before 'opening' mind into seven 'halves,' i.e., the six consciousnesses as six, the 'manas' (意根, yi gen) and the mental functions of the 'dharma-sphere'). This is established for those who are deluded by both mind and form. These are all provisional establishments; where are the truly existing 'dharmas' (法, fa) to be clung to? Because the object of cognition is either 'open' or 'closed,' the cognizing consciousness is either comprehensive or discrete. This 'dharma-attachment' (法執, fa zhi) and the previous 'self-attachment' (我執, wo zhi), if distinguished according to 'Mahayana' (大乘, Da Cheng), can be instantly and completely severed at the initial mind of the first 'bhumi' (初地, chu di) (the first stage of a Bodhisattva's practice). The co-arisen two attachments are each severed in part in each 'bhumi,' even up to 'Equal Enlightenment' (等覺, deng jue) (the highest stage of a Bodhisattva's practice), there are still two obscurations. The final 'vajra-like mind' (金剛後心, jin gang hou xin) (referring to the final stage of a Bodhisattva's mind) instantly and completely eradicates them. Therefore, it is said: 'Discriminating self and dharma are absent in the Extremely Joyful (極喜, ji xi), the sixth and seventh co-arise and are removed in each bhumi, the seventh is removed through cultivation, manifesting in the Vajra Path, and after that, all are absent.' If according to 'Hinayana' (小乘, Xiao Cheng), at the initial 'path of seeing' (見道, jian dao), the discriminating self-attachment is instantly severed, thus attaining the first fruit (初果, chu guo). Completely severing the co-arisen self-attachment leads to attaining the fourth fruit (四果, si guo). But dharma-attachment is not included in this. 'Self-nature' (自性, zi xing) and other characteristics are like the 'primordial nature' (冥初自性, ming chu zi xing) and other categories clung to by the 'Samkhya school' (數論, shu lun). The remaining text can be understood by referring to the previous self-attachment.",
    
    "'Thus, all dharma-attachments spoken of (up to) the dependent nature is like a magical illusion, etc.'"
    
    "This summarizes the internal and external dharma-attachments. The dharmas external to one's own mind are the essential dharmas of aggregates (蘊, yun), spheres (處, chu), realms (界, jie), and other characteristics. The aggregates within one's own mind are the image-aspect dharmas transformed by one's own mind. 'Sometimes existent, sometimes non-existent' means that the image-aspect is 'existent,' while the falsely conceived dharmas are 'non-existent.' Also, the seventh consciousness is 'existent,' while the sixth consciousness is 'non-existent.' 'Everything is existent' means that the image-aspects transformed on the sixth consciousness are certainly 'existent,' as explained earlier. However, even if it is allowed that everything that appears as dharma-aspects transformed on this mind is 'existent,' because it is of dependent nature, it is also like an illusion. If what is clung to is truly existent, that is conceptual attachment (遍計執, bian ji zhi), like the horns of a rabbit of a barren woman, which are definitely non-existent. Having established two standards of measurement, the sacred teachings are also cited to prove and conclude. The 'Extensive Treatise in One Hundred Verses' (廣百論, Guang Bai Lun) says: 'All that is seen is made by consciousness; apart from consciousness, there is not a single dharma that is real. Because of the repeated practice of various views from beginningless time, according to the views practiced, according to the circumstances encountered, according to the maturation of one's own seeds, various dharma-aspects are transformed and arise. Like the things seen in a dream, they are all falsely manifested and have no reality at all. Everything is made by the mind of consciousness.' Someone asks: 'If that is the case, then Mahayana should be like a mute person dreaming, denying that all dharmas are false and unable to explain the differences in the self-nature of all worldly and transcendental dharmas.'"
  ]
}

。是大苦哉。我等不能隨喜如是大乘所立虛假法義。以一切法皆可現見。不可撥無現見法故。答。奇哉可愍。薄福愚人。不能信解大乘法義。若有能見。可見所見。能見既無。誰見所見。以諸能見。不能自審。知自有體。亦不審他。于審察時。能見所見皆無所有。是故不應執現見法決定有體。以迴心時。諸所緣境皆虛假故。所以者何。起憶念時。實無見等種種境界。但隨因緣自心變似見等種種境相而生。以所憶念非真實故。唯有虛假憶念名生。如曾更諸法體相。迴心追憶。故名爲念。當憶念時。曾所更境皆無有故。能念亦無。而名念者。隨順慣習顛倒諸見。假名施設。由此念故。世間有情妄起種種分別諍論。競執諸法自性差別。沒惡見泥。不能自出。若無所見。亦無所聞。是則一切都無所有。云何今時編石為筏。通上二破法執竟。

  如是外道余乘所執(至)習氣擾濁心故似彼而轉。

  第三總結。離識我法皆非實有。故心心所決定不用離識色法不相應法及無為法為所緣緣。以離識外皆無實體故。親所緣緣。必依有體真實法故。若非心變。色等諸法。決不親緣。現在下。乃二比量。現在者。揀過未。現在觸緣。必有同時一聚心心所法相應現起。故名為聚。以八個識各有四分。自見分只能親緣自相分。不能親緣他識四分。故曰現在彼聚心心所法。非此聚識親所緣緣。因云。他聚攝故。喻如非所緣。如色非耳所緣。聲非眼所緣也。即一識中同聚心所。亦非同聚心王親緣。以王與所。自體異故。喻如余非所取。所取即相分。能取即見分。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本:",
    "這是多麼大的痛苦啊!我們不能隨喜像這樣的大乘所建立的虛假法義,因為一切法都可以被現見,不能否定現見之法。回答:真是奇怪又可憐!沒有福報的愚人,不能相信和理解大乘的法義。如果有所謂的能見,那必然有可見和所見。如果能見本身不存在,那麼誰來見所見呢?因為所有的能見,都不能自己審察,知道自己有自體,也不能審察其他。在審察的時候,能見和所見都是空無所有的。所以不應該執著現見之法決定有自體,因為在迴心的時候,所有的所緣境都是虛假的。為什麼呢?因為在生起憶念的時候,實際上沒有見等等種種境界,只是隨著因緣,自心變現出類似見等等種種境相而生起。因為所憶念的不是真實的,所以只有虛假的憶念之名產生。就像曾經經歷過諸法的體相,迴心追憶,所以叫做念。當憶念的時候,曾經經歷過的境界都沒有了,能唸的也沒有了。而之所以稱之爲念,是隨順慣習的顛倒諸見,假名施設。由於這個唸的緣故,世間有情妄起種種分別諍論,競相執著諸法的自性差別,沉沒在惡見的泥潭中,不能自己出來。如果沒有所見,也沒有所聞,那麼一切都將不存在。那麼現在又怎麼能編石為筏呢?以上是破斥外道對於法的執著。",
    
    "像這樣外道和其他乘所執著的(到)習氣擾亂渾濁的心,所以(境界)看起來像他們那樣運轉。",
    
    "第三,總結。離開識的我和法都不是真實存在的。所以心和心所決定不能用離開識的色法、不相應法以及無為法作為所緣緣。因為離開識之外,都沒有實體。親所緣緣,必須依靠有實體、真實的法。如果不是心的變現,色等諸法,決不能作為親所緣緣。現在以下,是兩個比量。現在,是用來揀擇過去和未來。現在的觸緣,必然有同時一聚的心和心所法相應現起,所以叫做聚。因為八個識各有四分,自見分只能親緣自相分,不能親緣他識的四分,所以說現在的彼聚心心所法,不是此聚識的親所緣緣。原因是,屬於他聚所攝。比如,非所緣,就像色不是耳朵的所緣,聲音不是眼睛的所緣一樣。即使在一個識中,同聚的心所,也不是同聚心王的親緣,因為心王和心所,自體是不同的。比如,余非所取,所取就是相分,能取就是見分。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version:",
    "This is such great suffering! We cannot rejoice in such false Dharma teachings established by the Mahayana, because all Dharmas can be directly seen, and the directly seen Dharma cannot be denied. Answer: How strange and pitiful! Unfortunate and foolish people cannot believe and understand the Dharma teachings of the Mahayana. If there is so-called 'seeing,' then there must be the 'seen' and the 'seeable.' If the 'seeing' itself does not exist, then who sees the 'seeable'? Because all 'seeings' cannot examine themselves, know that they have a self-nature, nor can they examine others. When examining, both the 'seeing' and the 'seeable' are empty and non-existent. Therefore, one should not cling to the idea that directly seen Dharmas definitely have a self-nature, because when turning the mind back, all objects of focus are false. Why? Because when recollection arises, there are actually no such things as 'seeing' and other various realms; it is only that, according to conditions, the mind itself transforms and appears to be like 'seeing' and other various realms that arise. Because what is recollected is not real, only the name of false recollection arises. It is like having experienced the essence of various Dharmas, and then recollecting them, so it is called 'recollection.' When recollecting, the realms that were once experienced are all gone, and the 'recollector' is also gone. The reason it is called 'recollection' is because it follows the habitual inverted views, and is a provisional designation. Because of this 'recollection,' sentient beings in the world falsely give rise to various discriminations and disputes, competing to cling to the self-nature differences of Dharmas, sinking into the mud of evil views, unable to free themselves. If there is nothing seen, and nothing heard, then everything will be non-existent. Then how can one now weave stones into a raft? The above is the refutation of the heretics' clinging to Dharmas.",
    
    "Like this, what is clung to by heretics and other vehicles (to) the habitual energy disturbing and clouding the mind, so (the realms) appear to operate like them.",
    
    "Third, a summary. Neither the 'self' nor the 'Dharma' apart from consciousness are real. Therefore, mind and mental factors definitely cannot use form, non-associated formations, and unconditioned Dharmas apart from consciousness as the object-condition. Because apart from consciousness, there is no substance. The immediately preceding object-condition must rely on real Dharmas with substance. If it is not a transformation of the mind, form and other Dharmas can never be the immediately preceding object-condition. Below 'now' are two analogies. 'Now' is used to distinguish the past and the future. The present touch-condition necessarily has a simultaneous aggregate of mind and mental factors arising in accordance, so it is called an 'aggregate.' Because each of the eight consciousnesses has four aspects, the self-seeing aspect can only directly connect with its own object-aspect, and cannot directly connect with the four aspects of other consciousnesses. Therefore, it is said that the present aggregate of mind and mental factors is not the immediately preceding object-condition of this aggregate of consciousness. The reason is that it is included in another aggregate. For example, a non-object-condition, just as form is not the object-condition of the ear, and sound is not the object-condition of the eye. Even within one consciousness, the mental factors of the same aggregate are not the immediately preceding object-condition of the mind-king of the same aggregate, because the mind-king and the mental factors are different in nature. For example, what is taken is not the object-aspect, and what can take is the seeing-aspect."
  ]
}

余非所取。即是不對能取者說名余也。由此二比量義。可見全無外境。唯有內識似外境生又引契經證之。

  有作是難若無離識(至)如何說心似外境轉。

  第四重釋外難。此難即從上似字而生。謂相見說為似我法者。為當似誰。曰。以內似外。以有似無。約此說似也。故此難云。有真事方有似事。依此二事共相。然後可說似事為假。如有真火。方說有似火人。以此人有似火猛赤色法。方可假說此人為火。我法既無。復何所似。豈可牛毛返似龜毛耶。似既不成。云何說言心似彼轉。

  彼難非理離識我法(至)由此假說不依實成。

  此釋難分二。先明喻。后顯法。喻中一總二別。總中特破真火二字。為彼以真火喻所執我法故。言汝之真火。已破成非。何勞再舉。緣前廣破我法執皆不成故。故依類依實假說火等皆不成也。同德曰類。共體曰實。依類即是共法。依實即是真火。下分二節破之。破依類云。火以能熱能照為德。人猛赤相無此德故。即非同類。若與火無共德而可假說為火人者。則亦可於水等物假說火等名矣。何為依類乎。若謂德雖不同。而人與猛赤常不相離。亦可假說者。則現見猛赤非人。人非猛赤。即猛赤在人。亦有時而不現者。安在其為不相離也。既不共德。又互相離。若依類方可假說者。則不應言有似火人。而今常言有似火人。則知假說不依似事立矣。破依實云。人與火共體。方可言依實。人與火猛赤德非共體有。故依實假說理亦不成。謂猛赤之德。在火則能熱能照。在人則身熱心煩。其體各別。其所依

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "『余』並非被『取』之物。也就是說,『余』這個概念,是不對能『取』者而說的。由此二種比量義,可見根本沒有外境存在,只有內在的意識顯現出類似外境的現象。下面再引用契經來證明這一點。",
    
    "有人提出這樣的疑問:如果不存在離開意識而獨立存在的『我』和『法』(dharma,佛法、事物),那麼如何解釋『心』會像外境一樣運轉呢?",
    
    "這是第四重對外難的解釋。這個疑問是針對前面所說的『似』字而產生的。如果說『相見』可以被說成是『似我法』,那麼這個『似』是相似於誰呢?回答是:以內在的意識去相似於外在的境界,以『有』去相似於『無』。是根據這種情況而說『似』的。所以這個疑問說,必須有真實存在的事物,才能有相似的事物。只有依據這兩種事物共同的特性,才能說相似的事物是虛假的。比如,只有存在真實的火,才能說存在『似火人』。因為這個人具有類似火的猛烈赤色,所以才能假借地說這個人是火。既然『我』和『法』都不存在,又相似於什麼呢?難道能說牛毛反過來相似於龜毛嗎?如果『似』都不能成立,又怎麼能說『心』會像外境一樣運轉呢?",
    
    "這種疑問是不合理的。離開意識,根本不存在所謂的『我』和『法』,因此,這種假借的說法並不是依據真實存在的事物而成立的。",
    
    "這段解釋分為兩部分。首先闡明比喻,然後闡明佛法。比喻部分又分為總說和別說。總說中特別破斥了『真火』二字,因為對方用『真火』來比喻他們所執著的『我』和『法』。所以說,你所說的『真火』,已經被破斥為不存在了,何必再提呢?因為前面已經廣泛地破斥了『我』和『法』的執著,所以無論是依據相似的類別,還是依據真實的存在,假借的說法都不能成立。『同德』叫做『類』,『共體』叫做『實』。依據相似的類別,就是指共同的性質。依據真實的存在,就是指真實的火。下面分為兩節來破斥。破斥依據相似的類別:火以能夠發熱和照明為特性,而人的猛烈赤色並沒有這些特性,所以並不是同一類別。如果與火沒有共同的特性,也可以假借地說成是『似火人』,那麼也可以用水等其他事物假借地說成是火等名稱了。這又怎麼能說是依據相似的類別呢?如果說特性雖然不同,但是人和猛烈的赤色常常不相分離,也可以假借地說,那麼現在看到猛烈的赤色並不是人,人也不是猛烈的赤色,而且猛烈的赤色在人身上,有時也不顯現出來,又怎麼能說是不相分離呢?既然不具有共同的特性,又互相分離,如果依據相似的類別才能假借地說,那麼就不應該說有『似火人』。而現在人們常常說有『似火人』,那麼就知道假借的說法並不是依據相似的事物而成立的。破斥依據真實的存在:人和火具有共同的本體,才能說依據真實的存在。人和火的猛烈赤色並不是共同的本體,所以依據真實的存在而假借的說法也是不能成立的。因為猛烈赤色的特性,在火中能夠發熱和照明,在人身上則表現爲身體發熱和內心煩躁,它們的本體各不相同,它們所依據的..."
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "'Remainder' is not something that is 'taken.' That is to say, the concept of 'remainder' is not spoken of in relation to the one who can 'take.' From these two lines of reasoning, it can be seen that there is no external world at all; only internal consciousness manifests phenomena that resemble the external world. Furthermore, I will cite a sutra to prove this point.",
    
    "Someone raises this question: If there is no 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' (teachings, things) that exist independently of consciousness, how can it be explained that the 'mind' operates like an external environment?",
    
    "This is the fourth layer of explanation against external objections. This question arises from the word 'resembles' mentioned earlier. If it is said that 'seeing each other' can be described as 'resembling self and dharma,' then what does this 'resembling' resemble? The answer is: internal consciousness resembles external realms, 'existence' resembles 'non-existence.' It is based on this situation that 'resembling' is spoken of. Therefore, this question says that there must be real things in order to have similar things. Only based on the common characteristics of these two things can it be said that similar things are false. For example, only if there is real fire can it be said that there is a 'fire-like person.' Because this person has fierce red color similar to fire, it can be said metaphorically that this person is fire. Since 'self' and 'dharma' do not exist, what do they resemble? Can it be said that cow hair resembles tortoise hair? If 'resembling' cannot be established, how can it be said that the 'mind' operates like an external environment?",
    
    "This question is unreasonable. Apart from consciousness, there is no so-called 'self' and 'dharma.' Therefore, this metaphorical statement is not based on real things.",
    
    "This explanation is divided into two parts. First, clarify the metaphor, and then clarify the Dharma. The metaphor part is divided into general and specific. The general explanation specifically refutes the words 'real fire,' because the other party uses 'real fire' to compare to their attachment to 'self' and 'dharma.' Therefore, it is said that the 'real fire' you mentioned has been refuted as non-existent, so why mention it again? Because the attachment to 'self' and 'dharma' has been widely refuted before, whether it is based on similar categories or based on real existence, metaphorical statements cannot be established. 'Same virtue' is called 'category,' and 'common body' is called 'reality.' According to similar categories, it refers to common properties. According to real existence, it refers to real fire. The following is divided into two sections to refute it. Refuting based on similar categories: Fire is characterized by being able to generate heat and illuminate, but the fierce red color of people does not have these characteristics, so they are not in the same category. If it can be said metaphorically that it is a 'fire-like person' even if there is no common characteristic with fire, then water and other things can also be said metaphorically to be fire and other names. How can this be said to be based on similar categories? If it is said that although the characteristics are different, people and fierce red are often inseparable, and it can also be said metaphorically, then it is now seen that fierce red is not a person, and a person is not fierce red, and fierce red is on a person, and sometimes it does not appear, how can it be said that it is inseparable? Since they do not have common characteristics and are separated from each other, if it can be said metaphorically based on similar categories, then it should not be said that there is a 'fire-like person.' And now people often say that there is a 'fire-like person,' then it is known that metaphorical statements are not based on similar things. Refuting based on real existence: People and fire have a common entity, so it can be said to be based on real existence. The fierce red color of people and fire is not a common entity, so the metaphorical statement based on real existence cannot be established. Because the characteristics of fierce red, in fire can generate heat and illuminate, in people it manifests as body heat and inner irritability, their entities are different, and what they depend on..."
  ]
}

則有情無情亦各別故。無共德而假說彼。有水濫火名之過。猶夫前耳。若謂人有暖德與火相似。可假說者。理亦不然。說火在人。是猛赤相。非在暖德說人似火。故知假說亦不依實事立也。

  又假必依真事立者(至)故於識所變假說我法名。

  此又明假事不依真事立。后結成正義。宗鏡云。何故名自相共相。曰。若法自體。唯證智知。言說不及。是為自相。若法體性。言說所及。假智所緣。是為共相。言假智者。即作行解心。名假智也。言詮者。心上解心名句文。及聲上名句文。是能詮。皆不得所詮自相也。顯假不依真。唯依共相轉。即此真事。不說心識實體名真。但心所取法自體相。言說不及。假智緣不著。說之為真。此唯現量智知。性離言說。及智分別。此出真體。非智詮及。如色法等而為自性。水濕為性。但可證知。言說不及。第六意識。隨五識後起。緣此智故。發言語等。但是所緣所說法之共相。非彼自相。又遮得自相。名得共相。若所變中有共相法是可得者。即得自體。應一切法可說可緣。故共相法亦說緣不及。然非是執。不堅取故。又言說若著自相者。說火之時。火應燒口。火以燒物為自相故。緣亦如是。緣火之時。火應燒心。今不燒心。及不燒口。明緣及說俱得共相。若爾。喚火何不得水。不得火之自相故。如喚於水。此理不然。無始慣習共呼故。又自相者。即諸法之自體相。如火以暖為自相。喚火之時不得暖故。不得自相。此暖自相。唯身識現量證故。非名所得。共相者。此以名下所詮之義名共相。如詮火等

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "那麼有情和無情也各有區別,因為沒有共同的性質,才假設它們(有情和無情)有。如果認為水能滅火,就犯了用水來概括火的錯誤,就像前面耳朵的例子一樣。如果說人有溫暖的性質,與火相似,所以可以假設人像火,這個道理也是不成立的。說火在人身上,指的是猛烈和赤紅的表象,而不是指溫暖的性質。所以說,假設也不是依據真實的事物而建立的。",
    
    "又,如果假設必定依據真實的事物而建立……所以對於識所變現的事物,假設為我(ātman,靈魂)和法(dharma,事物)。",
    
    "這又是說明假設的事物不是依據真實的事物而建立的,後面總結成正確的觀點。《宗鏡錄》中說:『為什麼叫做自相和共相呢?』回答說:『如果法的自體,只有證智才能知道,言語無法表達,這就是自相。如果法的體性,言語可以表達,假智可以緣取,這就是共相。』所說的假智,就是作意、行解的心,叫做假智。言詮,指的是心上的解心(理解)和名句文(名稱、語句、文字),以及聲音上的名句文,這些是能詮(能表達的),都不能得到所詮(所表達的)的自相。這表明假設不依據真實,只依據共相而運轉。這裡所說的真實,不是指心識的實體叫做真實,而是指心所取法的自體相,言語無法表達,假智緣取而不執著,就稱之為真實。這隻有現量智才能知道,其性質遠離言語和智的分別。這指出了真實的本體,不是智詮所能及的,如色法等作為自性,水的濕性作為自性,只能通過證知,言語無法表達。第六意識隨著五識之後生起,緣取這種智慧,然後發出言語等,但這只是所緣取、所說法的共相,不是它們的自相。又,遮止得到自相,就叫做得到共相。如果在識所變現的事物中有共相法是可以得到的,那麼就得到了自體,應該一切法都可以說、可以緣取。所以共相法也說是言語和緣取無法觸及的。然而這並非是執著,因為不是堅固的取著。又,如果言語執著于自相,那麼說火的時候,火應該燒口,因為火以燒物為自相。緣取也是如此,緣取火的時候,火應該燒心。現在不燒心,也不燒口,說明緣取和言說都得到的是共相。如果這樣,叫火為什麼不能得到水呢?因為沒有得到火的自相。就像叫水一樣,這個道理是不成立的,因為無始以來習慣了共同的稱呼。又,自相,就是諸法的自體相,如火以暖為自相,叫火的時候得不到溫暖,所以得不到自相。這個溫暖的自相,只有身識現量才能證知,不是名稱所能得到的。共相,就是以名稱所表達的意義叫做共相,如表達火等。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Then sentient and non-sentient beings are also distinct from each other, because there is no common characteristic, so they are hypothetically designated as such. If one thinks that water can extinguish fire, it is a mistake of generalizing fire with water, just like the previous example of the ear. If it is said that a person has a warm characteristic similar to fire, so it can be hypothetically said that a person is like fire, this reasoning is also not valid. Saying that fire is in a person refers to the appearance of fierceness and redness, not the warm characteristic. Therefore, it is known that hypothetical designation is not established based on real things.",
    
    "Furthermore, if a hypothetical designation must be established based on a real thing... therefore, regarding the things transformed by consciousness, they are hypothetically designated as 'self' (ātman, soul) and 'dharma' (things).",
    
    "This further clarifies that hypothetical things are not established based on real things, and later concludes with the correct view. The *Zong Jing Lu* (Record of the Source Mirror) says: 'Why are they called *svalakṣaṇa* (self-characteristic) and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (common characteristic)?' The answer is: 'If the self-nature of a dharma can only be known by *pratyakṣa-jñāna* (direct perception), and cannot be expressed by language, this is *svalakṣaṇa*. If the nature of a dharma can be expressed by language and can be apprehended by *kalpita-jñāna* (hypothetical knowledge), this is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.' The so-called *kalpita-jñāna* refers to the mind of intention, action, and understanding, which is called *kalpita-jñāna*. *Vacana* (expression) refers to the understanding in the mind and the *nāma-pada-vyañjana* (name, word, and phrase) in the mind, as well as the *nāma-pada-vyañjana* in sound. These are the *abhidhāna* (that which expresses), and none of them can obtain the *svalakṣaṇa* of the *abhidheya* (that which is expressed). This shows that the hypothetical does not rely on the real, but only operates based on the common characteristic. The so-called real here does not mean that the substance of consciousness is called real, but rather the self-characteristic of the dharma taken by the mind, which cannot be expressed by language and is apprehended by *kalpita-jñāna* without attachment, is called real. This can only be known by *pratyakṣa-jñāna*, and its nature is separate from language and intellectual discrimination. This points out the real substance, which cannot be reached by intellectual expression, such as the nature of form, etc., and the nature of wetness of water, which can only be known through direct perception and cannot be expressed by language. The sixth consciousness arises after the five consciousnesses and apprehends this wisdom, and then utters words, etc., but this is only the common characteristic of the dharma that is apprehended and spoken, not their self-characteristic. Furthermore, preventing the attainment of the self-characteristic is called attaining the common characteristic. If there is a common characteristic dharma in the things transformed by consciousness that can be obtained, then the self-nature is obtained, and all dharmas should be able to be spoken and apprehended. Therefore, it is said that the common characteristic dharma cannot be touched by language and apprehension. However, this is not attachment, because it is not a firm grasping. Furthermore, if language is attached to the self-characteristic, then when saying 'fire', the fire should burn the mouth, because fire takes burning things as its self-characteristic. Apprehension is also the same; when apprehending fire, the fire should burn the heart. Now, it does not burn the heart, nor does it burn the mouth, indicating that both apprehension and speech obtain the common characteristic. If so, why does calling 'fire' not obtain water? Because the self-characteristic of fire is not obtained. Just like calling 'water', this reasoning is not valid, because of the habitual common calling since beginningless time. Furthermore, *svalakṣaṇa* is the self-characteristic of all dharmas, such as fire taking warmth as its self-characteristic. When calling 'fire', warmth is not obtained, so the self-characteristic is not obtained. This warm self-characteristic can only be directly perceived by the body consciousness, and cannot be obtained by name. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is the meaning expressed by the name, which is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, such as expressing fire, etc."
  ]
}

法時。遮非火等。此義即通一切火上。故名共相也。能詮。即言說。所詮。即假智。此假智詮。亦非離此共相。外別有方便。施設自相。為彼所依。然假智詮。必依相似言聲而起。聲不及處此假智詮。便不流轉。由能詮所詮。俱不能親證自相。故知假說不依真事。但依似事而轉。似謂增益者。謂現量智了自相已。於後剎那。有同類智。是有分別變現影像。乃從相上增益其相。故名為似。如照鏡人。形之與影。宛然二人。非增益乎。聲依智詮。唯依增益似相而轉。故不可說假必依真也。問。既假事不依真立。此假我法依何而起。答云。雖不依真。然依內識變現而有。由彼外道余乘。妄計心外實有我法。為對遣此執。故說似我似法是內識所變。其意若曰。外境雖無。談汝執情。外境實有。故為所似耳。以內似外。以有似無。此之謂也。此段近結當文。遠結前文頌中。由假說我法。有種種相轉。彼依識所變三句。通上略辨唯識分中。一釋前三句頌竟。

  識所變相雖無量種(至)名為異熟非謂一切。

  二釋三能變。即后三句頌。此即釋頌中此能變唯三一句。識所變相。即牒上頌中語。以該我法種種相也。初能變名異熟者。有三義故。謂變異而熟。異時而熟。異類而熟。種變異時。果方熟故。造因果熟。定異時故。因通善惡。果唯無記。因果性異故。異字屬因。熟字屬果。因果不同。作相違釋。異及熟也。或異之熟。若異字屬果。異即是熟。或異熟屬現。異熟即識。持業釋也。若異熟屬種。異熟之識。依主釋也。雖第六亦有異熟。而唯一

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "法時,遮止(修行者)對火等的執著。這個意義適用於一切與火相關的事物,所以稱為『共相』(Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa,普遍相)。『能詮』(abhidhāna)指的是言語表達,『所詮』(abhidheya)指的是假立的智慧(prajñapti-jñāna)。這種假智所詮釋的內容,並非脫離共相之外,另有其他方便,去施設自相(svalakṣaṇa,個別相),作為它的依據。然而,假智的詮釋,必定依賴相似的言語聲音而生起。聲音無法觸及的地方,這種假智的詮釋便無法流傳。由於能詮和所詮,都無法親自證得自相,因此可知假說不依賴真實存在的事物,而是依賴相似的事物而運轉。『似』指的是增益,也就是現量智(pratyakṣa-jñāna)了知自相之後,在後一剎那,產生同類的智慧,這種智慧是有分別的,變現出影像,乃是從相上增益其相,所以稱為『似』。如同照鏡子的人,形體和影子,宛然是兩個人,這不是增益嗎?聲音依賴智詮,僅僅依賴增益的相似相而運轉,所以不可說假必依真。問:既然假事不依真而立,那麼這種假立的我法(ātma-dharma)依什麼而生起呢?答:雖然不依真,但依賴內識(antar-vijñāna)的變現而有。由於那些外道(tīrthika)和其他乘(hīnayāna)的修行者,妄計心外實有我法,爲了對治這種執著,所以說相似的我法是內識所變現的。其意思是說,外境雖然沒有,但就你們的執情而言,外境是真實存在的,所以才有所相似。以內識的『有』,去相似外境的『無』,這就是所謂的『似』。這段話總結了當下的文義,也遙相呼應了前文頌中的『由假說我法,有種種相轉,彼依識所變』三句。這三句貫通了前面略辨唯識的部分,第一重解釋前三句頌完畢。",
    
    "『識所變相雖無量種』(到)『名為異熟非謂一切』。",
    
    "第二重解釋三能變(tri-pariṇāma),也就是後面的三句頌。這裡解釋頌中的『此能變唯三』一句。『識所變相』,是引用上面的頌文,總括我法種種相。第一個能變名為『異熟』(vipāka),有三種含義:變異而成熟,異時而成熟,異類而成熟。種子變異時,果才能成熟;造因和果的成熟,必定在不同時間;因通善惡,果唯無記(avyākṛta),因果性質不同。『異』字屬於因,『熟』字屬於果,因果不同,作相違的解釋,『異』和『熟』是不同的。或者『異』就是『熟』,如果『異』字屬於果,那麼『異』就是『熟』。或者『異熟』屬於現行,『異熟』就是識,這是持業釋。如果『異熟』屬於種子,『異熟』之識,這是依主釋。雖然第六識(manovijñāna)也有異熟,但只有第一識(ālayavijñāna)是主要的異熟識。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "At the time of the Dharma, it prevents (practitioners) from clinging to fire and other things. This meaning applies to all things related to fire, so it is called 'Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa' (universal characteristic). 'Abhidhāna' (the expresser) refers to verbal expression, and 'abhidheya' (the expressed) refers to the provisional wisdom (prajñapti-jñāna). The content expressed by this provisional wisdom is not separate from the universal characteristic, nor is there any other means to establish the svalakṣaṇa (individual characteristic) as its basis. However, the expression of provisional wisdom must rely on similar verbal sounds to arise. Where the sound cannot reach, this expression of provisional wisdom cannot circulate. Since neither the expresser nor the expressed can personally realize the individual characteristic, it is known that provisional speech does not rely on truly existing things, but relies on similar things to operate. 'Similar' refers to augmentation, that is, after the direct perception (pratyakṣa-jñāna) knows the individual characteristic, in the next moment, a similar wisdom arises. This wisdom is discriminatory, manifesting images, and augmenting the characteristic from the aspect of the characteristic, so it is called 'similar'. Like a person looking in a mirror, the form and the shadow are clearly two people, is this not augmentation? Sound relies on intellectual expression, and only relies on the augmented similar appearance to operate, so it cannot be said that the provisional must rely on the real. Question: Since provisional things are not established based on the real, then what does this provisionally established self and dharma (ātma-dharma) arise from? Answer: Although it does not rely on the real, it relies on the manifestation of the inner consciousness (antar-vijñāna). Because those non-Buddhist (tīrthika) and practitioners of other vehicles (hīnayāna) falsely believe that the self and dharma really exist outside the mind, in order to counter this attachment, it is said that the similar self and dharma are transformed by the inner consciousness. The meaning is that although the external environment does not exist, in terms of your attachment, the external environment is real, so there is similarity. Using the 'existence' of inner consciousness to resemble the 'non-existence' of the external environment, this is what is called 'similar'. This passage summarizes the current meaning of the text, and also echoes the previous verse: 'Because of the provisional speaking of self and dharma, there are various aspects of transformation, which rely on the transformation of consciousness.' These three sentences connect the previous brief explanation of the Consciousness-Only, and the first interpretation of the first three verses is completed.",
    
    "'Although the appearances transformed by consciousness are countless' (to) 'It is called Vipāka, but not everything'.",
    
    "The second interpretation of the three transformations (tri-pariṇāma), which are the last three verses. Here, the verse 'These transformations are only three' is explained. 'The appearances transformed by consciousness' is a quote from the above verse, summarizing all aspects of self and dharma. The first transformation is called 'Vipāka' (resultant), which has three meanings: transforming and maturing, maturing at different times, and maturing in different categories. The fruit can only mature when the seed transforms; the creation of cause and the maturation of fruit must be at different times; the cause includes good and evil, and the fruit is only neutral (avyākṛta), and the nature of cause and effect are different. The word 'different' belongs to the cause, and the word 'mature' belongs to the fruit. Cause and effect are different, making a contradictory explanation, 'different' and 'mature' are different. Or 'different' is 'mature', if the word 'different' belongs to the fruit, then 'different' is 'mature'. Or 'Vipāka' belongs to the present, 'Vipāka' is consciousness, which is a possessive compound. If 'Vipāka' belongs to the seed, the consciousness of 'Vipāka' is a dependent compound. Although the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna) also has Vipāka, only the first consciousness (ālayavijñāna) is the main Vipāka consciousness."
  ]
}

分。八識偏多。故曰多異熟性。二能變名思量者。思。謂思慮。量。謂量度。慮度第八見分為自內我。恒者。無間義。審者。執我義思。量即識。持業釋也。雖諸識皆有思量。然或恒而不審。或審而不恒。唯第七亦恒亦審故。三能變名了境者。了。謂了達。雖七八識亦能了境。依內門轉。唯了細境唯第六識住外門故。了粗相境。及言。明頌中及字。乃前五識與第六識合為一種也。前五取境。必有同時意識起故。次釋能變義。一因能變。即種子現行門。種子生現行。名因習氣。于中有二。先標。后釋。等流習氣者。即前七識中三性種子。各生自現。熏第八種。而令增長。唯除第八。不能熏故。異熟習氣者。由前六識善惡現行。熏第八善惡異熟種子而令增長。唯除第七。七是無記。非異熟因故。前是因緣。此增上緣也。二果能變。即前二因所生現果。謂有緣法能變現者。名果能變。種種相者。即第八識相應心所相見分等。及苦樂等種種現果。等流習氣為因緣下。別釋。前七識以三性力熏第八識成種生長。即現八識三性種子各自生現。名等流果。所生之果。與能生種。性是一故。因果相似名等。是彼類故名流。善種生善現行。煩惱種生惡現行。無記種生無記現行。是等流果。殺生得短命報。放生得長壽報。名假等流。是增上果。異熟果者。由前六善惡業為殊勝增上緣。招感第八酬他引業。長時無間。立異熟名。引。謂牽引。謂業有力能引總報。即前六識造善惡業。牽引第八受善惡報。相續不斷。名異熟果。其前六識所造之業。能滿自識善惡二果。

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "分。八識偏多,故曰多異熟性。二能變名思量者,嗯,謂思慮;量,謂量度。慮度第八見分為自內我。恒者,無間義;審者,執我義思。量即識,持業釋也。雖諸識皆有思量,然或恒而不審,或審而不恒,唯第七亦恒亦審故。三能變名了境者,了,謂了達。雖七八識亦能了境,依內門轉,唯了細境唯第六識住外門故,了粗相境。及言,明頌中及字,乃前五識與第六識合為一種也。前五取境,必有同時意識起故。次釋能變義。一因能變,即種子現行門。種子生現行,名因習氣。于中有二,先標,后釋。等流習氣者,即前七識中三性種子,各生自現,熏第八種,而令增長。唯除第八,不能熏故。異熟習氣者,由前六識善惡現行,熏第八善惡異熟種子而令增長。唯除第七,七是無記,非異熟因故。前是因緣,此增上緣也。二果能變,即前二因所生現果。謂有緣法能變現者,名果能變。種種相者,即第八識相應心所相見分等,及苦樂等種種現果。等流習氣為因緣下,別釋。前七識以三性力熏第八識成種生長,即現八識三性種子各自生現,名等流果。所生之果,與能生種,性是一故。因果相似名等,是彼類故名流。善種生善現行,煩惱種生惡現行,無記種生無記現行。是等流果。殺生得短命報,放生得長壽報,名假等流,是增上果。異熟果者,由前六善惡業為殊勝增上緣,招感第八酬他引業,長時無間,立異熟名。引,謂牽引,謂業有力能引總報,即前六識造善惡業,牽引第八受善惡報,相續不斷,名異熟果。其前六識所造之業,能滿自識善惡二果。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "Dividing. The eight consciousnesses are numerous, hence the term 'manifoldly ripening nature'. The second transforming consciousness is called 'Manas' (思量者), where 'Manas' (思) means thinking and 'Manas' (量) means measuring. It contemplates and measures the eighth consciousness's seeing-portion as its inner self. 'Constant' (恒者) means uninterrupted, and 'deliberate' (審者) means clinging to the idea of self. 'Manas' (量) is consciousness, which is a possessive compound. Although all consciousnesses have thinking, some are constant but not deliberate, or deliberate but not constant. Only the seventh consciousness is both constant and deliberate. The third transforming consciousness is called 'cognizing the object' (了境者), where 'cognizing' (了) means understanding. Although the seventh and eighth consciousnesses can also cognize objects, they operate internally. Only the sixth consciousness cognizes subtle objects because it resides externally, thus cognizing coarse objective realms. The word 'and' (及) in the verse combines the first five consciousnesses with the sixth consciousness as one type. When the first five consciousnesses grasp an object, a simultaneous consciousness arises. Next, the meaning of 'transformation' is explained. First, 'causal transformation' (因能變) refers to the seed-manifestation principle. When a seed gives rise to a manifestation, it is called 'causal habit energy' (因習氣). There are two aspects to this, first stated and then explained. 'Equal-flowing habit energy' (等流習氣者) refers to the seeds of the three natures in the first seven consciousnesses, each giving rise to its own manifestation, which then perfumes the eighth consciousness, causing it to grow. Only the eighth consciousness cannot perfume others. 'Differently ripening habit energy' (異熟習氣者) arises from the wholesome and unwholesome actions of the first six consciousnesses, which perfume the eighth consciousness's wholesome and unwholesome ripening seeds, causing them to grow. This excludes the seventh consciousness, as it is neutral and not a cause of different ripening. The former is the causal condition, while this is the supporting condition. Second, 'resultant transformation' (果能變) refers to the manifest result produced by the previous two causes. That which can transform and manifest due to conditioned dharmas is called 'resultant transformation'. 'Various appearances' (種種相者) refers to the mental functions, seeing-portion, etc., associated with the eighth consciousness, as well as various manifest results such as suffering and happiness. 'Equal-flowing habit energy as the causal condition' (等流習氣為因緣下) is explained separately. The first seven consciousnesses use the power of the three natures to perfume the eighth consciousness, causing the seeds to grow. That is, the seeds of the three natures in the present eight consciousnesses each give rise to their own manifestation, which is called the 'equal-flowing result' (等流果). The result produced is of the same nature as the seed that produced it. Cause and effect are similar, hence the term 'equal' (等), and they are of the same category, hence the term 'flowing' (流). Wholesome seeds give rise to wholesome manifestations, afflictive seeds give rise to unwholesome manifestations, and neutral seeds give rise to neutral manifestations. This is the equal-flowing result. Killing living beings results in a short lifespan, while releasing living beings results in a long lifespan. This is called 'false equal-flowing' (假等流), which is a supporting result. 'Differently ripening result' (異熟果者) arises from the wholesome and unwholesome karma of the first six consciousnesses as a superior supporting condition, which attracts the eighth consciousness to receive the retributive karma. It is long-lasting and uninterrupted, hence the term 'different ripening' (異熟). 'Attracting' (引) means pulling, indicating that karma has the power to attract the overall retribution. That is, the first six consciousnesses create wholesome and unwholesome karma, which attracts the eighth consciousness to receive wholesome and unwholesome retribution, continuing without interruption. This is called the 'differently ripening result'. The karma created by the first six consciousnesses can fulfill the wholesome and unwholesome results of their own consciousnesses."
  ]
}

名異熟生。以從第八體上生故。不名異熟。以前六識有間斷故。六識不遍無色界等。無心定等。六識皆不行故。故第八名總報主。而第六名別報主也。單言異熟。不攝別報。言異熟生。總別皆是。因通善惡。果唯無記。故曰果異因故。此異熟名。雖有多義。此中但取受熏持種能變善惡二果本識。名為異熟。非謂異時異聖變異等一切義也。通上略辨唯識竟。

  下廣辨唯識分二。一明三能變。二答五外問。一又分三。即初二三種能變。

  今初能變分三。一結前標問。二天親頌。三釋頌意。

  雖已略說能變三名(至)且初能變其相云何。

  一結前標問。

  頌曰初阿賴耶識(至)恒轉如暴流阿羅漢位舍。

  此天親第二半頌。及第三第四頌。總有十二門。一自相門。即初阿賴耶識。二果相門。即異熟。三因相門。即一切種。四不可知門。即不可知。五所緣門。即執受處。六行相門。即了。七相應門。即常與觸作意受想思相應。八受俱門。即唯舍受。九三性門。即是無覆無記。十心所例王門。即觸等亦如是。十一因果法喻門。即恒轉如暴流。十二伏斷位次門。即阿羅漢位舍。

  下三釋頌意分二。

  一正釋頌意。二證有識體。

  一正釋頌意分八。

  論曰初能變識大小乘教(至)藏初過重是故偏說。

  一釋自相門。大小乘教名阿賴耶。真諦就名翻為無沒識。取不失之義。奘師就義翻為藏識。能含藏諸法種故。為此識體具三藏義。能藏所藏執藏故。一能藏者。即能含藏義。猶如庫藏。能

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "名曰異熟生(Vipāka-ja)。因為它從第八識的體性上產生,所以不稱為異熟(Vipāka)。因為前六識有間斷,而且六識不是普遍存在,例如在無想等持(asaññā-samāpatti)等無心定中,六識都不起作用。所以第八識被稱為總報主,而第六識被稱為別報主。單獨說異熟,不包括別報;說異熟生,則總報和別報都包括。因可以通於善和惡,而果只有無記(avyākrta),所以說果與因不同。這個異熟之名,雖然有很多含義,但在這裡只取其受熏、持種、能變善惡二果的根本識的含義,稱為異熟,而不是指異時、異聖、變異等一切含義。以上簡略地辨析了唯識。",
    
    "下面廣泛地辨析唯識,分為兩部分:一是說明三種能變,二是回答五個外來提問。第一部分又分為三部分,即初能變、二能變和三種能變。",
    
    "現在開始講初能變,分為三部分:一是總結前文並提出問題,二是天親(Vasubandhu)的頌,三是解釋頌的意思。",
    
    "雖然已經簡略地說了能變的三種名稱(到)且初能變的相是什麼樣的?",
    
    "一是總結前文並提出問題。",
    
    "頌曰:初阿賴耶識(ālaya-vijñāna)(到)恒常流轉如暴流,在阿羅漢(Arhat)位捨棄。",
    
    "這是天親的第二半頌,以及第三和第四頌。總共有十二個方面:一是自相門,即初阿賴耶識;二是果相門,即異熟;三是因相門,即一切種;四是不可知門,即不可知;五是所緣門,即執受處;六是行相門,即了;七是相應門,即常與觸(sparśa)、作意(manaskāra)、受(vedanā)、想(saṃjñā)、思(cetanā)相應;八是受俱門,即只有舍受(upekṣā);九是三性門,即是無覆無記(anivṛtāvyākṛta);十是心所例王門,即觸等也像這樣;十一是因果法喻門,即恒常流轉如暴流;十二是伏斷位次門,即在阿羅漢位捨棄。",
    
    "下面解釋頌的意思,分為兩部分:",
    
    "一是正式解釋頌的意思,二是證明有識的體性。",
    
    "正式解釋頌的意思,分為八部分:",
    
    "論曰:初能變識,大小乘教(到)藏初過重,是故偏說。",
    
    "一是解釋自相門。大小乘教都稱之為阿賴耶。真諦(Paramārtha)就名稱翻譯為無沒識,取其不失的含義。玄奘(Xuanzang)法師就意義翻譯為藏識,因為它能含藏諸法種子。這個識的體性具有三種藏的含義:能藏、所藏、執藏。一是能藏,即能含藏的含義,猶如倉庫,能夠..."
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "It is called Vipāka-ja (resultant-born) because it arises from the nature of the eighth consciousness. It is not called Vipāka (resultant) because the first six consciousnesses have interruptions, and the six consciousnesses are not universally present, such as in asaṃjñā-samāpatti (non-perceptual attainment) and other mindless states, where the six consciousnesses do not function. Therefore, the eighth consciousness is called the chief of general retribution, while the sixth consciousness is called the chief of specific retribution. Speaking of Vipāka alone does not include specific retribution; speaking of Vipāka-ja includes both general and specific retribution. The cause can be good or evil, while the result is only avyākrta (undetermined), so it is said that the result is different from the cause. Although the name Vipāka has many meanings, here it only refers to the fundamental consciousness that receives impressions, holds seeds, and can transform into the two results of good and evil, and is called Vipāka, not referring to all meanings such as different times, different sages, or transformations. The above briefly analyzes Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only).",
    
    "The following extensively analyzes Vijñaptimātratā, divided into two parts: one is to explain the three transformations, and the other is to answer five external questions. The first part is further divided into three parts, namely the first transformation, the second transformation, and the three transformations.",
    
    "Now we begin to discuss the first transformation, divided into three parts: one is to summarize the previous text and raise questions, two is Vasubandhu's verse, and three is to explain the meaning of the verse.",
    
    "Although the three names of transformation have been briefly mentioned (to) what is the nature of the first transformation?",
    
    "One is to summarize the previous text and raise questions.",
    
    "Verse: The first Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) (to) constantly flows like a violent torrent, abandoned in the state of Arhat.",
    
    "This is the second half of Vasubandhu's verse, and the third and fourth verses. There are a total of twelve aspects: one is the self-nature aspect, which is the first Ālaya-vijñāna; two is the result aspect, which is Vipāka; three is the cause aspect, which is all seeds; four is the unknowable aspect, which is unknowable; five is the object aspect, which is the object of clinging; six is the characteristic aspect, which is 'understanding'; seven is the corresponding aspect, which is always corresponding to sparśa (contact), manaskāra (attention), vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (perception), and cetanā (volition); eight is the accompanying feeling aspect, which is only upekṣā (equanimity); nine is the three-nature aspect, which is anivṛtāvyākṛta (uncovered and undetermined); ten is the mind-object example of the king aspect, which is that sparśa etc. are also like this; eleven is the cause-result dharma metaphor aspect, which is constantly flowing like a violent torrent; twelve is the suppression and cutting position aspect, which is abandoned in the state of Arhat.",
    
    "The following explains the meaning of the verse, divided into two parts:",
    
    "One is to formally explain the meaning of the verse, and the other is to prove the nature of consciousness.",
    
    "Formally explaining the meaning of the verse, divided into eight parts:",
    
    "Treatise: The first transforming consciousness, teachings of Mahayana and Hinayana (to) the fault of storing is heavy at the beginning, therefore it is particularly explained.",
    
    "One is to explain the self-nature aspect. Both Mahayana and Hinayana teachings call it Ālaya. Paramārtha translated the name as Amaḷa-vijñāna (immaculate consciousness), taking the meaning of non-loss. Xuanzang translated the meaning as Storehouse Consciousness, because it can contain the seeds of all dharmas. The nature of this consciousness has the meaning of three storehouses: the able to store, the stored, and the clinging to. One is the able to store, which is the meaning of being able to contain, like a warehouse, able to..."
  ]
}

含藏寶貝。故得藏名。此能含藏雜染種故名為藏。亦即持義。此約持種邊說。二所藏者。即是所依義。猶如庫藏。是寶等所依故。此識是雜染所依處故。此約受熏邊說。三執藏者。堅守不捨義。猶如金銀等藏。為人堅守。執為自內我。故名為藏。此識為染末那堅執為我。故名為藏。起信鈔釋云。第八能藏所藏義者。且所藏義。謂此識體藏。是根身種子器世間所藏處也。以根身等是此識相分故。如藏中物像。如身在室內。欲覓賴耶識。只在色心中。欲覓摩尼珠。只在青黃內。次能藏義。謂根身等法。皆藏在識身之中。如像在珠內。欲覓一切法。總在賴耶中。欲覓一切像。總在摩尼內。與前義互為能所。雜染者。簡清凈法。互為緣。即更互為因果。說見后條。即具能所二藏義。有情執為自內我者。釋執藏義。以第七為有情識故。自內我。揀他外我。以色等為他外我故。此即顯示下。釋此藏名。依自相立。以藏識能攝持因果故。攝謂收攝。持謂執持。攝是能藏所藏義。持是執藏義。然無能藏。亦無所藏執藏。二種唯能藏義過失最重。是故偏說。此明藏識專以能藏得名之故。世親云。謂緣一切雜染品法。所有熏習。能生於彼功能差別。識為自性。為欲顯示如是功能。故說攝持種子相應。謂依一切雜染品法所有熏習。即與彼法為能生因。攝持種子者。功能差別也。相應者是修義。是名安立此識自相。

  此是能引諸界趣生(至)異熟實不共故偏說之。

  二釋果相門。由前世前六修五戒十善等業。招感今生天人總別異熟樂果。若前世前六作十

{
  "translations": [
    "現代漢語譯本",
    "含藏寶貝,因此得名『藏』(Ālaya)。此識能含藏各種雜染的種子,所以稱為『藏』,也具有『持』的含義。這是從持種子的角度來說的。",
    "二、『所藏』是指所依之義,就像庫藏,是寶物等所依賴的地方。此識是雜染的所依之處,這是從受熏的角度來說的。",
    "三、『執藏』是指堅守不捨的含義,就像金銀等寶藏,被人堅守,執著為自身內在的『我』。此識被染污的末那識堅執為『我』,所以稱為『藏』。",
    "《起信鈔》解釋說:『第八識能藏、所藏的含義是,所藏的含義是指此識的本體藏是根身、種子、器世間所藏之處。因為根身等是此識的相分,就像藏中的物品影像,就像身體在室內。想要尋找阿賴耶識,只需在色心中尋找;想要尋找摩尼寶珠,只需在青黃等顏色中尋找。』",
    "『能藏的含義是指根身等法,都藏在識身之中,就像影像在寶珠內。想要尋找一切法,都在阿賴耶識中;想要尋找一切影像,都在摩尼寶珠內。』與前面的意義互為能所(能藏與所藏)。",
    "『雜染』是相對於清凈法而言的,互相為緣,即互相為因果,後面會詳細說明。這就具備了能藏和所藏兩種含義。『有情執為自內我』,解釋了執藏的含義,因為第七識是有情識。『自內我』是爲了區別于『他外我』,因為色等是他外我。",
    "這顯示了下面要解釋的,依自相而立名,因為藏識能攝持因果。『攝』是收攝,『持』是執持。『攝』是能藏和所藏的含義,『持』是執藏的含義。然而,沒有能藏,也沒有所藏和執藏,這兩種情況中,唯有能藏的過失最為嚴重,所以偏重說明這一點。這說明藏識專門以能藏而得名。",
    "世親菩薩說:『是指緣於一切雜染品法,所有熏習,能生起對於這些法的功用差別。識以此為自性,爲了顯示這樣的功用,所以說攝持種子相應。』『依於一切雜染品法所有熏習』,就是與這些法互為能生之因。『攝持種子』,就是功用差別。『相應』是修習的含義。這就是安立此識的自相。",
    
    "『此識能夠引生諸界趣生(各種境界和輪迴),異熟果實不共通,所以特別說明。』",
    
    "二、解釋果相門。由於前世前六識修習五戒十善等業,招感今生天人的總報和別報的異熟樂果。如果前世前六識造作十惡業等,招感今生地獄、餓鬼、畜生的總報和別報的異熟苦果。"
  ],
  "english_translations": [
    "English version",
    "It is named 『Ālaya』 (藏) because it contains and conceals treasures. This consciousness can contain the seeds of various defilements, so it is called 『Ālaya,』 which also has the meaning of 『holding.』 This is from the perspective of holding seeds.",
    "Second, 『contained』 refers to the meaning of reliance, just like a treasury, which is where treasures and other things rely. This consciousness is the place where defilements rely, which is from the perspective of being influenced.",
    "Third, 『clinging』 refers to the meaning of firmly guarding and not letting go, just like treasures such as gold and silver, which are firmly guarded by people, clinging to them as their own inner 『self.』 This consciousness is clung to as 『self』 by the defiled Manas consciousness, so it is called 『Ālaya.』",
    "The *Qixin Chao* (起信鈔) explains: 『The meaning of the eighth consciousness being able to contain and being contained is that the meaning of being contained refers to the fact that the substance of this consciousness is the place where the roots, body, seeds, and the world are contained. Because the roots, body, etc., are the aspect-division of this consciousness, just like the image of an object in a treasury, just like the body is in a room. If you want to find the Ālaya consciousness, just look in the mind of form; if you want to find the Mani jewel, just look in the colors of blue and yellow.』",
    "『The meaning of being able to contain refers to the fact that the dharmas such as the roots and body are all contained within the body of consciousness, just like the image is within the jewel. If you want to find all dharmas, they are all in the Ālaya; if you want to find all images, they are all in the Mani jewel.』 The meanings are mutually able and contained (able to contain and being contained).",
    "『Defilement』 is relative to pure dharma, and they are mutually conditioned, that is, mutually cause and effect, which will be explained in detail later. This possesses both the meanings of being able to contain and being contained. 『Sentient beings cling to it as their own inner self』 explains the meaning of clinging, because the seventh consciousness is the consciousness of sentient beings. 『Inner self』 is to distinguish it from 『outer self,』 because form, etc., are outer self.",
    "This shows what will be explained below, establishing the name based on its own characteristics, because the Ālaya consciousness can encompass and hold cause and effect. 『Encompass』 means to collect, and 『hold』 means to cling. 『Encompass』 is the meaning of being able to contain and being contained, and 『hold』 is the meaning of clinging. However, there is no being able to contain, nor being contained and clinging. Among these two situations, the fault of only being able to contain is the most serious, so it is emphasized. This explains that the Ālaya consciousness is named specifically because of its ability to contain.",
    "Vasubandhu said: 『It refers to all the defiled dharmas, all the influences, which can give rise to the functional differences for these dharmas. Consciousness takes this as its own nature, and in order to show such function, it is said to encompass and hold the corresponding seeds.』 『Relying on all the influences of defiled dharmas』 means that they are mutually the cause of arising. 『Encompassing and holding the seeds』 is the functional difference. 『Corresponding』 is the meaning of cultivation. This is the establishment of the self-nature of this consciousness.",