X53n0848_因明入正理論疏
卍新續藏第 53 冊 No. 0848 因明入正理論疏
No. 848
因明入正理論序疏卷第一
大莊嚴寺沙門 文軌 撰
因明者五明之一明也竊尋五明論名傳之尚矣然聲明辨以詞韻方異不可而翻醫方工巧二明俗事人多不譯今古所翻經論多是內明所收于中如實論等並即因明所攝而或者管窺乃言舊無新有或尋之不曉便云外道論門此猶捧土以塞孟津而不知其量且內明之用也為信者而施之因明之用也為謗者而制之夫至理沖邈非淺識所知故於奧義之中諸見競起或謗空而撥有或耽斷而玩常或計法自生或執相由起或言我作業或言[穴/俱]是因或言過未無或言三世有遂使道分九十六種部折二十不同並謂握隋候之珠冠輪王之寶然法門不二豈有殊歸一理若真諸宗便偽故欲觀形好醜則鑒以凈鏡清池定理正邪必照以因明現比故雜心論云因明論方便是即為法辨所以大聖散說因明門人纂成別部或以如實存號或以正理標名故世親習舊五支鞭骨彰德陳那創勒三令吼石表能其于大業追蹤遺芳難紀有商羯羅主菩薩者生知至理善鑒物機爰撮廣文制茲略論欲使始學之徒識方隅之反升堂之眾有知十之由惟今三藏法師器逾瑚璉道邁舟航既嗟群闇為心遂以五明成念乃問道西域留意茲文旋踵東華頗即翻譯(軌)以不敏之文瞢道膚淺幸同入室時聞指掌每記之以污簡書之大帶所恨今之學者立義非宗難無定例不崇因明之大典翻慕委巷之庸談乃謂八並八轉為機樞四門中非為高論或學初章中假之法或依龍遊蛇勢之文此並詞理渾肴無分勝負問答峰起孰定是非
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"因明是五明(聲明、工巧明、醫方明、因明、內明)之一。我私下認為,五明之名流傳已久。然而,聲明在於辨別詞語韻律,各地不同難以翻譯;醫方明和工巧明是世俗之事,人們大多不翻譯。如今古人所翻譯的經論,大多屬於內明所包含的內容。其中,如《如實論》等,都屬於因明所攝。但有些人見識短淺,就說過去沒有因明,現在才出現,或者研究不明白,就說是外道論典。這就像用一把土去堵塞孟津渡口,而不知道自己的力量。《內明》的用處,是為信奉佛法的人而設;《因明》的用處,是為誹謗佛法的人而設。至高的真理深奧玄妙,不是淺薄的見識所能瞭解的,所以在深奧的義理之中,各種見解競相產生。有人誹謗空性而否定實有,有人沉溺於斷滅而玩味常恒,有人認為萬法自然產生,有人執著于現象由因緣而起,有人說是我在造業,有人說一切都是因,有人說過去和未來不存在,有人說過去、現在、未來三世都存在。於是導致佛道分為九十六種,派別分為二十種不同,都認為自己握著隋侯的寶珠,戴著轉輪王的寶冠。然而,佛法之門不是兩條路,怎麼會有不同的歸宿呢?真理如果真實,其他宗派就都是虛假的。所以想要觀察事物的好壞,就要用乾淨的鏡子和清澈的池水來鑑別;想要確定道理的正邪,必須用因明(邏輯)的現量和比量來照亮。《雜心論》說,因明論是一種方便法門,是爲了辯論佛法。所以佛陀廣為宣說因明,門人將其纂整合為單獨的論典,有的以『如實』為名,有的以『正理』為名。所以世親(Vasubandhu)學習舊有的五支作法,鞭策後學,彰顯其德行;陳那(Dignāga)創立新的三支作法,吼石立誓,表明其能力。他們對於佛法大業的追隨,遺留下來的光輝難以全部記載。有商羯羅主(Śaṅkarasvāmin)菩薩,生來就通曉真理,善於鑑別事物的機要,於是從廣博的論著中摘取要點,製作了這部簡略的論著,想要使剛開始學習的人知道方向,使已經登堂入室的人知道十分之幾。如今三藏法師(指玄奘)的器量超過瑚璉,道行超越舟船,既感嘆眾生的愚昧,於是以五明來成就其心念,前往西域求法,留意這部論著,很快就回到東土,並加以翻譯。我(文軌)以不敏的文筆,淺薄的見識,有幸一同進入譯場,時常聽到指點,於是記錄下來,寫在大帶上。所遺憾的是,如今的學者立論沒有宗本,難以有確定的準則,不崇尚因明的大典,反而羨慕里巷的庸俗之談,竟然說八並八轉是關鍵,四門中非是高論,或者學習初章中的假法,或者依靠龍遊蛇勢的文章。這些都是詞語和道理混淆不清,無法分辨勝負,問答蜂擁而起,誰能確定是非呢?",
"English version",
"The Hetuvidyā (因明, science of reasoning) is one of the five sciences (pañcavidyāsthāna, 五明): Śabdavidyā (聲明, science of language), Śilpakarmasthānavidyā (工巧明, science of crafts), Cikitsāvidyā (醫方明, science of medicine), Hetuvidyā (因明, science of reasoning), and Adhyātmavidyā (內明, science of inner knowledge). I privately believe that the name of the five sciences has been circulating for a long time. However, Śabdavidyā lies in distinguishing the rhythm of words, which varies from place to place and is difficult to translate; Cikitsāvidyā and Śilpakarmasthānavidyā are secular matters, and people mostly do not translate them. Nowadays, the scriptures and treatises translated by the ancients mostly belong to the content included in Adhyātmavidyā. Among them, such as the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* (如實論) and others, are all included in Hetuvidyā. However, some people with limited knowledge say that Hetuvidyā did not exist in the past and only appeared now, or they do not understand it and say that it is a heretical doctrine. This is like using a handful of soil to block the Mengjin ferry, without knowing one's own strength. The use of Adhyātmavidyā is for those who believe in Buddhism; the use of Hetuvidyā is for those who slander Buddhism. The supreme truth is profound and subtle, and cannot be understood by shallow knowledge. Therefore, in the profound meaning, various views arise in competition. Some slander emptiness and deny existence, some indulge in annihilation and savor permanence, some believe that all dharmas arise naturally, some are attached to phenomena arising from conditions, some say that I am creating karma, some say that everything is cause, some say that the past and future do not exist, some say that the past, present, and future exist. This leads to the division of the Buddhist path into ninety-six kinds, and the sects into twenty different kinds, all believing that they are holding the pearl of Suihou and wearing the crown of the Wheel-Turning King. However, the gate of the Dharma is not two roads, how can there be different destinations? If the truth is true, then all other sects are false. Therefore, if you want to observe the good and bad of things, you must use a clean mirror and clear pool water to distinguish them; if you want to determine the right and wrong of reason, you must use the direct perception (pratyakṣa, 現量) and inference (anumāna, 比量) of Hetuvidyā to illuminate them. The *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (雜心論) says that the Hetuvidyā is a convenient method for debating the Dharma. Therefore, the Buddha widely preached Hetuvidyā, and his disciples compiled it into separate treatises, some named 'Tattvasiddhi' (如實), some named 'Nyāya' (正理). Therefore, Vasubandhu (世親) learned the old five-membered syllogism (pañcāvayava-vākya, 五支作法), urging later learners and demonstrating his virtue; Dignāga (陳那) created a new three-membered syllogism (trairūpya-hetu-cakra, 三支作法), roaring at the stone and expressing his ability. Their pursuit of the great cause of the Dharma, the glory left behind is difficult to fully record. There is the Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin (商羯羅主), who was born with knowledge of the truth and was good at discerning the essentials of things, so he extracted the key points from the vast literature and created this brief treatise, wanting to enable those who are just beginning to learn to know the direction, and those who have already entered the hall to know a fraction of it. Now the Tripiṭaka Master (三藏法師, referring to Xuanzang 玄奘) has a capacity exceeding the *húlián* (瑚璉, a type of ritual vessel), and his conduct surpasses boats, lamenting the ignorance of sentient beings, so he used the five sciences to fulfill his mind, went to the Western Regions to seek the Dharma, paid attention to this treatise, and soon returned to the Eastern Land and translated it. I (Wengui 文軌) with my unskillful writing and shallow knowledge, was fortunate to enter the translation field together, often hearing guidance, so I recorded it and wrote it on my belt. What is regrettable is that today's scholars establish theories without a basis, and it is difficult to have a definite standard. They do not admire the great canon of Hetuvidyā, but instead admire the vulgar talk of the streets, and even say that the eight combinations and eight transformations are the key, and the four doors are not high theories, or they learn the false methods in the initial chapter, or rely on the articles of the dragon swimming and snake's momentum. These are all words and principles that are mixed and unclear, unable to distinguish between victory and defeat, and questions arise in swarms, who can determine right and wrong?"
]
}
但以語後者優不以理前者為正學徒不悟習以生常豈若因明總攝諸論可以權衡立破可以楷定正邪可以褒貶是非可以鑑照現比譬之日月既明爝火自滅霖雨已降溉灌無施。
所言因明入正理論者因以利果為義未生之智令生明以鑑照為功未顯之義令顯顯者文稱正理生者題標為入此即入與正理俱是果名若因若明併爲因稱生果親賴多言因名即兼收義智顯果正由鑒達明名亦傍及義言果既體非多言入理唯收智義論者評也即評以八門論以兩悟以言盡理故稱為論故云因明入正理論。
商羯羅主菩薩造者。
大自在天化身接物形如骨鎖號此則以商羯羅時人慕之圖形敬事論主誕應因祈此天遂主此天以為厥號此即以商羯羅為主名商羯羅主也。
能立與能破 及似唯悟他 現量與比量 及似唯自悟
述曰文有三分一總標綱要分二依標別解分三結略示廣分如其次第即初頌次長行后頌也此即初分于中義開八合為兩悟合前四門為悟他合後四門為自悟前四門者一能立(善申比量獨現己宗邪歒屏言故曰能立)二似立(謬像三支妄陳偽執危猶累卵故名似立)三能破(妙斥宗非或彈因喻威同逐北故名能破)四似破(螳螂之斧欲抗[降]車偽難同之故名似破)及似二字該上立破故有四門夫立破之興在於言論言論既起邪正可分分在於言理非自悟言申立破明是為他雖復正似不同發言皆為濟物故此四義合為悟他。
后四門者五現量(證法自相不帶名言如鏡鑑形故名現量)六似現量(目觀玄黃謂見瓶等猶觀旋火名似現量)七比量(托驅于顯幽旨可包類契
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:\n\n但如果只重視辯論的技巧,而不以符合真理為標準,那就不算是真正的學術。學徒如果不能領悟並經常練習,又怎麼能像學習因明那樣,總攝各種理論,可以用來衡量、確立和駁斥觀點,可以用來判定正邪,可以用來褒揚或批評是非,可以用來鑑別現量和比量呢?這就好比太陽和月亮已經照亮,那麼小火把自然熄滅;充沛的雨水已經降臨,就不需要再進行灌溉。\n\n所謂『因明入正理論』,『因』是以『利果』為意義,使未產生的智慧得以產生;『明』是以『鑑照』為作用,使未顯明的道理得以顯明。『顯』在文中稱為『正理』,『生』在題目中稱為『入』,這裡的『入』和『正理』都是果的名稱,而『因』和『明』都是因的名稱。產生結果主要依賴於多方面的因素,所以用『因』來命名,也兼顧了其他意義。顯現結果主要通過鑑別和通達,所以用『明』來命名,也旁及其他意義。既然結果的本體並非多方面因素,那麼『入理』就只包含智慧的意義。這是論者的評論,即用八個方面來評論,用兩種領悟來論述,用語言來窮盡真理,所以稱為『論』,因此說『因明入正理論』。\n\n『商羯羅主菩薩造』。\n\n大自在天(Maheśvara)化身,接引眾生的形象如同骨鎖,(人們)稱他為商羯羅(Śaṅkara)。當時的人們仰慕他,描繪他的形象來敬奉。論主(作者)的誕生應驗了祈求這位天神的願望,於是就以這位天神為主,作為自己的稱號。這就是以商羯羅為主,稱為商羯羅主。\n\n『能立與能破,及似唯悟他,現量與比量,及似唯自悟』。\n\n敘述:文義分為三個部分:一是總標綱要,二是依照綱要分別解釋,三是總結略示廣義。按照這樣的順序,分別是最初的頌文、其次的長行文、最後的頌文。這裡是第一部分,其中義理展開為八個方面,合併爲兩種領悟:合併前四門為『悟他』,合併后四門為『自悟』。前四門是:一、能立(Sādhanavākya,善於闡述比量,獨自展現自己的宗義,使邪惡的敵對者無話可說,所以稱為『能立』);二、似立(Sādhanābhāsa,謬誤的表象,虛妄地陳述三支論證,虛假的執著像累卵一樣危險,所以稱為『似立』);三、能破(Dūṣaṇavākya,巧妙地駁斥對方的宗義錯誤,或者反駁對方的因和喻,威力如同追擊敗北的敵人,所以稱為『能破』);四、似破(Dūṣaṇābhāsa,如同螳螂揮舞手臂想要阻擋車輪,虛假的辯難與之相似,所以稱為『似破』)。『及似』二字涵蓋了上面的『立』和『破』,所以共有四門。能立和能破的產生在於言論,言論產生后,邪正就可以區分。區分在於言語的道理,並非自我領悟,而是通過言語來闡述能立和能破,這表明是爲了幫助他人。即使正確和謬誤不同,但發言都是爲了幫助他人,所以這四種意義合併爲『悟他』。\n\n后四門是:五、現量(Pratyakṣa,直接認識事物的自性,不帶有任何名言概念,如同鏡子映照物體,所以稱為『現量』);六、似現量(Pratyakṣābhāsa,眼睛看到黑色和黃色,卻說看到了瓶子等等,如同觀看旋轉的火把,稱為『似現量』);七、比量(Anumāna,通過已知的現象來推斷未知的道理,如同類別相符,"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:\n\nHowever, if one only values the skill of debate and does not take conformity with truth as the standard, then it cannot be considered true scholarship. If a student cannot comprehend and practice constantly, how can they, like studying Hetu-vidyā (因明, science of reasoning), comprehensively grasp various theories, which can be used to measure, establish, and refute viewpoints, to judge right and wrong, to praise or criticize merits and demerits, and to discern Pratyakṣa (現量, perception) and Anumāna (比量, inference)? This is like the sun and moon already shining brightly, then the small torch naturally goes out; abundant rain has already fallen, then there is no need for irrigation.\n\nThe so-called 『Nyāyapraveśa-tarkaśāstra』 (因明入正理論, Introduction to the Science of Logic), 『Hetu』 (因, cause) takes 『benefiting the result』 as its meaning, causing unproduced wisdom to be produced; 『vidyā』 (明, knowledge) takes 『illumination』 as its function, causing unmanifested principles to be manifested. 『Manifestation』 is called 『Nyāya』 (正理, right reason) in the text, and 『production』 is called 『praveśa』 (入, entrance) in the title. Here, 『praveśa』 and 『Nyāya』 are both names of the result, while 『Hetu』 and 『vidyā』 are both names of the cause. The production of the result mainly relies on many factors, so it is named 『Hetu』, also considering other meanings. The manifestation of the result mainly comes through discernment and understanding, so it is named 『vidyā』, also touching upon other meanings. Since the essence of the result is not many factors, then 『praveśa』 only contains the meaning of wisdom. This is the commentator's remark, that is, commenting with eight aspects, discussing with two kinds of understanding, and exhausting the truth with language, so it is called 『śāstra』 (論, treatise), therefore it is said 『Nyāyapraveśa-tarkaśāstra』.\n\n『Composed by Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin』 (商羯羅主菩薩造).\n\nAn incarnation of Maheśvara (大自在天), whose form of receiving beings is like a bone lock, (people) call him Śaṅkara (商羯羅). People at that time admired him, depicting his image to worship. The birth of the author (of the treatise) fulfilled the wish of praying to this deity, so he took this deity as his master, as his title. This is taking Śaṅkara as the master, called Śaṅkarasvāmin (商羯羅主).\n\n『Statement and Refutation, and their semblances, are solely for the enlightenment of others; Perception and Inference, and their semblances, are solely for self-enlightenment.』\n\nExplanation: The meaning of the text is divided into three parts: first, a general outline of the essentials; second, separate explanations according to the outline; and third, a summary showing the broad meaning. According to this order, they are the initial verse, then the prose, and the final verse. This is the first part, in which the meaning unfolds into eight aspects, combined into two kinds of enlightenment: combining the first four doors into 『enlightenment of others』, and combining the last four doors into 『self-enlightenment』. The first four doors are: 1. Statement (Sādhanavākya, 能立, skillful in explaining inference, uniquely showing one's own doctrine, silencing evil opponents, therefore called 『Statement』); 2. Semblance of Statement (Sādhanābhāsa, 似立, a false appearance, falsely stating the three parts of the argument, a false attachment is as dangerous as stacked eggs, therefore called 『Semblance of Statement』); 3. Refutation (Dūṣaṇavākya, 能破, skillfully refuting the opponent's errors in doctrine, or refuting the opponent's Hetu (因, reason) and Dṛṣṭānta (喻, example), its power is like chasing defeated enemies, therefore called 『Refutation』); 4. Semblance of Refutation (Dūṣaṇābhāsa, 似破, like a mantis waving its arms trying to stop a chariot, a false challenge is similar to this, therefore called 『Semblance of Refutation』). The words 『and semblance』 cover the above 『Statement』 and 『Refutation』, so there are four doors in total. The emergence of Statement and Refutation lies in speech, and after speech arises, right and wrong can be distinguished. The distinction lies in the principles of speech, not self-enlightenment, but using speech to explain Statement and Refutation, which shows that it is to help others. Even if right and wrong are different, speaking is to help others, so these four meanings are combined into 『enlightenment of others』.\n\nThe last four doors are: 5. Perception (Pratyakṣa, 現量, directly recognizing the self-nature of things, without any nominal concepts, like a mirror reflecting objects, therefore called 『Perception』); 6. Semblance of Perception (Pratyakṣābhāsa, 似現量, the eyes see black and yellow, but say they see a vase, etc., like watching a spinning torch, called 『Semblance of Perception』); 7. Inference (Anumāna, 比量, inferring unknown principles through known phenomena, like categories matching,"
]
}
真宗故名比量)八似比量(圖形於影未盡麗容擬而失真名似比量)及似二字該上現比亦有四門夫現比之興在於心識心識既起邪正可分分在於心理非他悟心遊現在足明自益雖復正似有殊內鑒皆為曉己故此四義合為自悟問自疾先救方可濟人何故此中前陳他悟答余經據行生起次第必先自後他此論宗明立破故先他后自有人釋此難言菩薩為懷先人後己故此論內前述悟他者不然豈可為他說無常已後方比知無常義耶故前解為正。
如是總攝諸論要義。
述曰此下第二分也三一顯標勝用二此中下依標正解三且止下抑解顯略此即初也古制因明文義煩雜纂成此頌括要已周顯此勝能故云如是總等此則指前一頌八義兩悟總攝集量理門等論諸要義也。
此中宗等多言名為能立。
述曰此下第二依標解有八一能立二似立三現量四比量五似現量六似比量七能破八似破此先解能立有三一辨名二解體三結定辨名有二一先約體定二就用釋成此即先約體定也。
言此中者有兩義一將有所述泛詞曰此中二取此非彼簡取曰此中即八義中簡取能立也。
宗等多言名為能立者陳那已前諸師皆云宗為一言因為二言喻為三言如多名身言即是名故云多言此之多言總名能立故對法雲所立有二一自性謂色等二差別謂可見等能立有八一宗二因三喻四合五結六現量七比量八至教量陳那云宗言是所立因等是能立舉其能等意取所等所等之中因一喻二即是多言如此多言名為能立能立立其所立故舉所立等之若不舉所立不知誰之能立也陳那意以古師云宗因喻三俱是能立不能乖古
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"真宗故名比量(真實可靠的比量),八似比量(通過不完整的影象或影子來推測,未能完全展現事物的真實面貌,這種擬比而失真的比量稱為似比量)。『似』字涵蓋了上述的現比和比量,也各有四種情況。現比和比量的產生都源於心識,心識產生后,就可以區分邪正。這種區分在於心理活動,而非其他。領悟心遊走于現在,足以明白自身的益處。即使正比量和似比量有所不同,內心的審視都是爲了瞭解自己。因此,這四種意義合起來就是自悟。有人問:『要先治好自己的疾病,才能救助他人,為什麼這裡先陳述他悟?』回答說:其他經典是根據修行生起的次第,必須先自後他。而這部論的宗旨在於闡明立論和破論,所以先他后自。有人解釋這個疑問,說菩薩心懷慈悲,總是先人後己,所以這部論中先陳述悟他。這種說法不對,難道可以先為他人說無常,之後才自己比知無常的道理嗎?所以之前的解釋是正確的。",
"像這樣總括了各部論典的要義。",
"述曰:下面是第二部分,分為三點:一、顯明標示殊勝的作用;二、從『此中』開始,依據標示進行正確的解釋;三、從『且止』開始,抑制解釋以顯明簡略。這裡是第一點。古代的因明文義繁瑣複雜,編纂成這首頌,概括了要點,已經很全面地顯明瞭這種殊勝的能力,所以說『如是總等』。這裡指的是前面一頌中的八義兩悟,總括了集量論、理門論等論典的各種要義。",
"此中,宗(論題)、因(理由)等多種言論,稱為能立(論證)。",
"述曰:下面是第二點,依據標示解釋,共有八種:一、能立;二、似立(似是而非的論證);三、現量(現前認識);四、比量;五、似現量(似是而非的現前認識);六、似比量;七、能破(駁論);八、似破(似是而非的駁論)。這裡先解釋能立,分為三點:一、辨別名稱;二、解釋體性;三、總結確定。這裡是先從體性上確定。",
"說『此中』,有兩種含義:一是指將要敘述的內容,泛泛地說『此中』;二是取此舍彼,簡要地選取,說『此中』,即從八義中簡要地選取能立。",
"『宗』、『因』等多種言論,稱為能立。在陳那(Dignāga)之前,各位論師都說『宗』是一個言論,『因』是兩個言論,『喻』是三個言論。如同『多名身言』,『言』就是『名』,所以說『多言』。這多種言論總稱為能立。所以《對法論》說,所立有兩種:一是自性,如色等;二是差別,如可見等。能立有八種:一、宗;二、因;三、喻;四、合;五、結;六、現量;七、比量;八、至教量。陳那說,『宗』是所立,『因』等是能立。舉出『能』等,意在包括『所』等。在『所』等之中,『因』是一個,『喻』是兩個,就是多種言論。這樣多種言論稱為能立。能立樹立其所立,所以舉出所立等,如果不舉出所立,就不知道誰的能立了。陳那的意思是,古代論師說『宗』、『因』、『喻』三者都是能立,不能違背古義。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"The true principle is called valid inference (a reliable means of knowledge). The eight pseudo-inferences (inferring through incomplete images or shadows, failing to fully represent the true nature of things; such distorted inferences are called pseudo-inferences). The word 'pseudo' encompasses both perception and inference mentioned above, each having four aspects. The emergence of perception and inference originates from consciousness. Once consciousness arises, right and wrong can be distinguished. This distinction lies in mental activity, not elsewhere. Comprehending the mind's activity in the present is sufficient to understand one's own benefit. Even if valid and pseudo-inferences differ, inner examination is for self-understanding. Therefore, these four meanings combine to form self-realization. Someone asks: 'One must first cure one's own illness before helping others. Why is the understanding of others presented first here?' The answer is: Other scriptures follow the order of arising in practice, necessarily self before others. This treatise's purpose is to clarify establishing and refuting arguments, so it is others before self. Someone explains this difficulty by saying that Bodhisattvas are compassionate, always putting others before themselves, so this treatise first presents the understanding of others. This is incorrect. Could one first speak of impermanence to others and only then infer the principle of impermanence for oneself? Therefore, the previous explanation is correct.",
"Thus, the essential meanings of various treatises are summarized.",
"Commentary: The following is the second part, divided into three points: 1. Clearly indicating the excellent function; 2. Starting from 'Herein,' correctly explaining based on the indication; 3. Starting from 'Let us stop,' suppressing the explanation to show brevity. This is the first point. Ancient Hetuvidya (logic) texts were cumbersome and complex. Compiling this verse, summarizing the key points, has comprehensively shown this excellent ability. Therefore, it is said 'Thus, summarizing, etc.' This refers to the eight meanings and two understandings in the previous verse, summarizing the essential meanings of treatises such as the Compendium on Valid Cognition (Pramāṇasamuccaya), and the Treatise on the Door to Reasoning (Nyāyamukha).",
"Herein, the subject (thesis), reason, etc., are called the means of proof (establishing the argument).",
"Commentary: The following is the second point, explaining based on the indication, with eight aspects: 1. Means of proof; 2. Pseudo-proof; 3. Perception (pratyakṣa); 4. Inference (anumāna); 5. Pseudo-perception; 6. Pseudo-inference; 7. Means of refutation; 8. Pseudo-refutation. Here, the means of proof is explained first, divided into three points: 1. Distinguishing the name; 2. Explaining the nature; 3. Concluding and determining. Here, the determination is first made based on the nature.",
"Saying 'Herein' has two meanings: 1. Referring to the content to be narrated, generally saying 'Herein'; 2. Taking this and discarding that, briefly selecting, saying 'Herein,' that is, briefly selecting the means of proof from the eight meanings.",
"'Subject,' 'reason,' etc., are called the means of proof. Before Dignāga, the teachers all said that 'subject' was one statement, 'reason' was two statements, and 'example' was three statements. Like 'multiple name-body statements,' 'statement' is 'name,' so it is said 'multiple statements.' These multiple statements are collectively called the means of proof. Therefore, the Abhidharma says that what is to be established has two aspects: one is the self-nature, such as form, etc.; the other is the difference, such as visibility, etc. The means of proof has eight aspects: 1. Subject; 2. Reason; 3. Example; 4. Application; 5. Conclusion; 6. Perception; 7. Inference; 8. Authoritative teaching. Dignāga said that 'subject' is what is to be established, and 'reason,' etc., are the means of proof. Mentioning 'means,' etc., intends to include 'what,' etc. Among 'what,' etc., 'reason' is one, and 'example' is two, which are multiple statements. Such multiple statements are called the means of proof. The means of proof establishes what is to be established, so mentioning what is to be established, etc., is necessary. If what is to be established is not mentioned, it is not known whose means of proof it is. Dignāga's intention is that the ancient teachers said that 'subject,' 'reason,' and 'example' are all means of proof, and this cannot contradict the ancient meaning."
]
}
故舉其宗言雖同古意恒異也。
問宗為能立諸論備詳今曰所成豈非乖古答據義有別理亦無違何者古師以諸法自性差別總為一聚為所成立於中別隨自意所許取一自性及一差別合之為宗宗既合彼總中別法合非別故故是能立今陳那意云本合別法為宗欲以因喻成立因喻既是能立能立必立所宗故知宗是所成立也此則古師以宗望其別法故是能成陳那以宗望其因喻即是所立問對法能立既八此中何故唯三答今此三分即攝對法五支宗因兩同喻攝彼喻及合結也彼論三量攝入此論自悟門中故悟他中不攝三量問彼量既三此何故二答至教即是比量所收至文當釋。
由宗因喻多言開示諸有問者未了義故。
述曰此就用釋成也且如無常等義敵證未明謂由無知故不知是無常由疑知故為常無常耶由顛倒知故乃謂為常今立義者以宗等多言開示令解也。
故者釋成也謂證敵解了功由宗等故此多言名為能立證敵一聞未解應更審問初聞縱解可有問義故敵證人俱名問者問夫證義者謂善諸宗何故於義仍言未了答證人久解而暫廢忘為令記憶故開示也又立敵紛紜亂證者神慮故於義理解慧不生故立義人重開示也。
此中宗者。
述曰此下第二解體有三一宗二因三喻今先解宗有三一牒章二懸解三指體此即牒章即三支中牒初宗也。
謂極成有法極成能別。
述曰此下第二懸解有五一辨依二明體三示則四簡濫五結定此即初也。
言有法能別者諸法有二一自性謂色聲香等二差別謂常無常等自性有兩名一有法二所別差別有兩名一法二能別常無常等有
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"因此,即使所提出的宗旨與古義在字面上相同,其內在含義也常常不同。",
"問:能立(Sādhanā,證明)包含各種論證,非常詳盡。如今所建立的(宗,thesis),難道不是與古義相悖嗎?答:依據義理來看,是有區別的,但從道理上來說,並沒有違背。為什麼呢?因為古代論師將諸法的自性差別總括為一個整體,作為所要成立的。在其中,可以根據自己的意願,選取一個自性或一個差別,將它們結合起來作為宗。宗既然是結合了總括中的差別法,那麼它就不是差別法本身,所以是能立。而陳那(Dignāga,約公元480-540年)的意思是,原本結合的差別法作為宗,想要用因(hetu,reason)和喻(dṛṣṭānta,example)來成立。因和喻既然是能立,能立必定要成立所宗,所以可知宗是所要成立的。這就是古代論師以宗相對於其差別法來說,宗是能成;而陳那以宗相對於其因和喻來說,宗是所立。問:對法(Abhidharma)的能立既然有八支,這裡為什麼只有三支?答:現在這三分就攝取了對法的五支,宗和因兩支相同,喻攝取了彼喻和合、結。彼論的三量(pramāṇa,認知方式)攝入此論的自悟門中,所以在悟他(parārthānumāna,為他人而作的推論)中不攝取三量。問:彼論的量既然有三種,這裡為什麼只有兩種?答:至教(āpta-vacana,可靠的教導)就是比量(anumāna,推論)所包含的,至文將在後面解釋。",
"由於宗、因、喻的多方言辭開示,對於那些有疑問而未能理解意義的人。",
"述曰:這是就作用來解釋成立。比如無常等的意義,敵論者和證人沒有明白,因為由於無知,所以不知道是無常;由於懷疑,所以認為是常還是無常;由於顛倒的認知,所以認為是常。現在立義者用宗等多種言辭開示,使他們理解。",
"『故』是解釋成立。意思是說,證人和敵論者理解了,是因為宗等的作用。這種多方言辭被稱為能立。證人和敵論者第一次聽到時沒有理解,應該進一步審問。即使第一次聽到就理解了,也可能有疑問。所以敵論者和證人都被稱為問者。問:那些證明義理的人,應該精通各種宗旨,為什麼對於義理仍然說未能理解呢?答:證人雖然很久以前就理解了,但暫時忘記了,爲了讓他們回憶起來,所以要開示。而且立論者和敵論者爭論紛紛,擾亂了證人的思緒,所以在義理理解上智慧不能產生,所以立義的人要重新開示。",
"這裡所說的宗。",
"述曰:下面第二部分解釋體性,有三個方面:一、宗,二、因,三、喻。現在先解釋宗,有三個步驟:一、標出章節,二、懸空解釋,三、指明體性。這裡是標出章節,即三支中的第一個宗。",
"是指極成(prasiddha,雙方都認可)的有法(dharmin,具有某種性質的事物)和極成的能別(viśeṣaṇa,限定詞)。",
"述曰:下面第二部分懸空解釋,有五個方面:一、辨別所依,二、闡明體性,三、揭示法則,四、簡別排除,五、總結確定。這裡是第一個方面。",
"所說的『有法』和『能別』,諸法有兩種:一是自性,如色、聲、香等;二是差別,如常、無常等。自性有兩個名稱:一是有法,二是所別。差別有兩個名稱:一是法,二是能別。常、無常等有"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"Therefore, even if the stated thesis is verbally the same as the ancient meaning, its inherent meaning often differs.",
"Question: Sādhanā (proof), as the establisher, includes various arguments in great detail. Does what is now established (thesis) not contradict the ancient meaning? Answer: According to the meaning of the doctrine, there are differences, but in terms of principle, there is no contradiction. Why? Because ancient teachers collectively regarded the self-nature differences of all dharmas as a whole, as what is to be established. Among them, one can choose a self-nature or a difference according to one's own intention, and combine them as the thesis. Since the thesis combines the difference dharmas in the whole, it is not the difference dharma itself, so it is the establisher. However, Dignāga's (c. 480-540 CE) intention is that the originally combined difference dharmas are the thesis, and he wants to establish it with hetu (reason) and dṛṣṭānta (example). Since hetu and dṛṣṭānta are the establisher, the establisher must establish the thesis, so it can be known that the thesis is what is to be established. This means that ancient teachers regarded the thesis as the establisher relative to its difference dharmas; while Dignāga regarded the thesis as what is to be established relative to its hetu and dṛṣṭānta. Question: Since the Abhidharma's establisher has eight limbs, why are there only three here? Answer: The current three parts include the five limbs of the Abhidharma. The thesis and hetu are the same, and the example includes the example, agreement, and conclusion. The three pramāṇas (means of cognition) of that treatise are included in the self-realization gate of this treatise, so the three pramāṇas are not included in parārthānumāna (inference for others). Question: Since there are three types of pramāṇas in that treatise, why are there only two here? Answer: Āpta-vacana (reliable teaching) is included in anumāna (inference), and the text will be explained later.",
"Because of the multifaceted verbal explanations of the thesis, reason, and example, for those who have doubts and have not understood the meaning.",
"Commentary: This explains the establishment in terms of function. For example, the meaning of impermanence, etc., is not clear to the opponent and the witness, because due to ignorance, they do not know that it is impermanent; due to doubt, they think it is permanent or impermanent; due to inverted cognition, they think it is permanent. Now the establisher uses various words such as the thesis to explain, so that they can understand.",
"『Therefore』 explains the establishment. It means that the witness and the opponent understand because of the function of the thesis, etc. These multifaceted words are called the establisher. If the witness and the opponent do not understand when they hear it for the first time, they should ask further questions. Even if they understand it the first time they hear it, there may be questions. Therefore, both the opponent and the witness are called questioners. Question: Those who prove the doctrine should be proficient in various theses, why do they still say that they have not understood the meaning? Answer: Although the witness understood it a long time ago, they have temporarily forgotten it, so to remind them, it is necessary to explain. Moreover, the establisher and the opponent argue endlessly, disturbing the witness's thoughts, so wisdom cannot arise in the understanding of the doctrine, so the establisher must explain it again.",
"The thesis mentioned here.",
"Commentary: The second part below explains the nature, which has three aspects: one, the thesis; two, the reason; three, the example. Now, first explain the thesis, which has three steps: one, mark the chapter; two, explain in suspension; three, indicate the nature. Here is the marking of the chapter, which is the first thesis in the three limbs.",
"Refers to the prasiddha (mutually agreed upon) dharmin (subject possessing a certain property) and the prasiddha viśeṣaṇa (qualifier).",
"Commentary: The second part below explains in suspension, which has five aspects: one, distinguish the basis; two, clarify the nature; three, reveal the rules; four, distinguish and exclude; five, summarize and determine. Here is the first aspect.",
"The so-called 『dharmin』 and 『viśeṣaṇa』, there are two types of dharmas: one is self-nature, such as color, sound, smell, etc.; the other is difference, such as permanence, impermanence, etc. Self-nature has two names: one is dharmin, and the other is what is qualified. Difference has two names: one is dharma, and the other is viśeṣaṇa. Permanence, impermanence, etc. have"
]
}
軌則義名之為法即色聲等能有此法故名有法即此色等自性為常無常之所差別令殊內外故名所別常無常等既能差別色等自性故名能別其猶臘有方圓印文印文為能別能別此臘成方圓故亦名為法有軌則義故臘體名所別為方圓印文所差別故亦名有法能有方圓印文法故此從多釋若據理言之不簡自性及差別但先陳者為有法及所別後述者為法及能別且如思是自性我與無我是差別數論立我為思我差別為有法及所別思自性為法及能別故知不必要以自性為所別有法差別為法能別也四名不可並彰故各舉一號問何不彰所別及法乃舉有法及能別答設依此舉還有一難又釋能別別於他有法能有他勝故偏彰所別為他別法不能有他劣故不舉也。
言極成者主賓俱許名為極成法及有法或自非他各有四句。
有法四句者且如大乘對小乘立一切諸聲皆不離識若以他方佛聲為有法者此即自成他不成也若以小乘所許釋迦菩薩實惡罵等不善性聲為有法者此即他成自不成也若以此方共許之聲為有法者此則自他俱極成也若以石女兒聲為有法者此則自他俱不成也前之兩句自他互有第四一句自他並無此之三句不能為彼能別作依唯第三句極成有法是宗依也問菩薩惡聲自不許立不離識非極成常住神我唯他有立言體無非有法謂大乘立言神我是無以非作故如龜毛等答一解如數論者對佛弟子立我是思自成他不成故則非極成故知大乘對數論者言神我是無他成自不成故亦非極成此是他比量故不須有法俱極成也二解宗法有三一有義法如言聲是無常雖復遮常正欲詮表生滅法故二無義法如言我無此但遮有不別
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『軌則』(Gueize)之義,名為『法』(Dharma),即色、聲等能夠具有此『法』,故名『有法』(Dharmin),即此色等自性,以常與無常的差別,使其內外不同,故名『所別』(Visesya)。常、無常等既然能夠差別色等自性,故名『能別』(Visesana),這就像蠟有方圓,印文為『能別』,『能別』此蠟成為方圓,故也名為『法』,有軌則之義。蠟體名為『所別』,為方圓印文所差別,故也名『有法』,能有方圓印文之『法』。這是從多方面解釋。若從理上說,不區分自性和差別,但先陳述的為『有法』及『所別』,后敘述的為『法』及『能別』。比如思是自性,我與無我是差別,數論立『我』為思,『我』的差別為『有法』及『所別』,思的自性為『法』及『能別』。可知不必要以自性為『所別』、『有法』,差別為『法』、『能別』。四名不可同時彰顯,故各舉一個名號。",
"問:為何不彰顯『所別』及『法』,而舉『有法』及『能別』?",
"答:假設依照此舉,還有一難。又解釋『能別』,是區別于其他『有法』,能夠具有其他殊勝之處,故偏彰顯『所別』,因為其他差別之『法』不能具有其他劣勢,故不舉。",
"『極成』(Prasiddha)是指主方和賓方都認可的,名為『極成法』及『有法』。或者自身、他人各有四句。",
"『有法』四句是:比如大乘對小乘立論,一切諸聲都不離識。若以他方佛聲為『有法』,這即是自方成立,他方不成立。若以小乘所許的釋迦菩薩真實惡罵等不善性聲為『有法』,這即是他方成立,自方不成立。若以此方共同認可的聲音為『有法』,這則是自他雙方都『極成』。若以石女兒的聲音為『有法』,這則是自他雙方都不成立。前兩種情況是自他互相存在,第四種情況是自他雙方都沒有。這三種情況不能作為彼『能別』的依據,只有第三種情況『極成有法』是宗依。",
"問:菩薩惡聲自方不認可,立『不離識』並非『極成』。常住神我只有他方立論,言語的本體沒有不是『有法』的,謂大乘立論神我是無,以非作為故,如龜毛等。",
"答:一種解釋是,如數論者對佛弟子立論『我』是思,自方成立他方不成立,故非『極成』。可知大乘對數論者說神我是無,他方成立自方不成立,也非『極成』。這是他方比量,故不須『有法』都『極成』。另一種解釋是,宗法有三種:一、『有義法』,如說『聲是無常』,雖然遮止常,正是想要詮表生滅之法。二、『無義法』,如說『我無』,這只是遮止有,不分別。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"The meaning of 'Gueize' (rule, standard) is called 'Dharma' (law), that is, form, sound, etc., which can possess this 'Dharma', hence the name 'Dharmin' (possessor of Dharma), that is, the self-nature of this form, etc., distinguishes between permanence and impermanence, making them different internally and externally, hence the name 'Visesya' (distinguished). Since permanence, impermanence, etc., can distinguish the self-nature of form, etc., hence the name 'Visesana' (distinguisher), just as wax has squareness and roundness, the seal is the 'Visesana', 'Visesana' makes this wax square and round, so it is also called 'Dharma', having the meaning of rule. The wax body is called 'Visesya', distinguished by the square and round seal, so it is also called 'Dharmin', capable of possessing the 'Dharma' of square and round seal. This is explained from multiple perspectives. If speaking from the principle, it does not distinguish between self-nature and difference, but what is stated first is 'Dharmin' and 'Visesya', and what is described later is 'Dharma' and 'Visesana'. For example, thought is self-nature, self and non-self are differences, Samkhya establishes 'self' as thought, the difference of 'self' is 'Dharmin' and 'Visesya', the self-nature of thought is 'Dharma' and 'Visesana'. It can be known that it is not necessary to take self-nature as 'Visesya', 'Dharmin', and difference as 'Dharma', 'Visesana'. The four names cannot be manifested simultaneously, so each cites one name.",
"Question: Why not manifest 'Visesya' and 'Dharma', but cite 'Dharmin' and 'Visesana'?",
"Answer: Suppose according to this citation, there is still one difficulty. Also explain 'Visesana', which is distinguished from other 'Dharmin', capable of possessing other superiorities, so it particularly manifests 'Visesya', because other differential 'Dharma' cannot possess other inferiorities, so it is not cited.",
"'Prasiddha' (established) refers to what is recognized by both the proponent and the opponent, called 'Prasiddha Dharma' and 'Dharmin'. Or self and others each have four sentences.",
"The four sentences of 'Dharmin' are: For example, Mahayana establishes against Hinayana that all sounds are inseparable from consciousness. If the sound of a Buddha from another realm is taken as 'Dharmin', then this is established by the self, not established by the other. If the sound of Shakyamuni Bodhisattva's real evil curses and other unwholesome nature sounds, which are accepted by Hinayana, is taken as 'Dharmin', then this is established by the other, not established by the self. If the sound commonly recognized by this realm is taken as 'Dharmin', then this is 'Prasiddha' by both self and other. If the sound of a stone woman's son is taken as 'Dharmin', then this is not established by both self and other. The first two situations are that self and other exist mutually, and the fourth situation is that neither self nor other exists. These three situations cannot be used as the basis for the 'Visesana' of the other, only the third situation 'Prasiddha Dharmin' is the subject of the thesis.",
"Question: The Bodhisattva's evil sound is not recognized by the self, and establishing 'inseparable from consciousness' is not 'Prasiddha'. The permanent self is only established by the other, and the substance of language is not without 'Dharmin', saying that Mahayana establishes that the self is non-existent, because it is not made, like turtle hair, etc.",
"Answer: One explanation is that, like the Samkhya proponent establishing against the Buddhist disciple that 'self' is thought, the self is established and the other is not established, so it is not 'Prasiddha'. It can be known that Mahayana says to the Samkhya proponent that the self is non-existent, the other is established and the self is not established, so it is also not 'Prasiddha'. This is the other's inference, so it is not necessary for 'Dharmin' to be all 'Prasiddha'. Another explanation is that there are three types of thesis: First, 'meaningful Dharma', such as saying 'sound is impermanent', although it prevents permanence, it is precisely intended to express the Dharma of arising and ceasing. Second, 'meaningless Dharma', such as saying 'I am not', this only prevents existence, without distinguishing."
]
}
詮顯無無體故三通二法如言諸法皆是所知若有若無皆所知故若有義法必須有體有法為依若無義法若通二法俱以有體無體有法為依問有義非是無無義得依有無義非是有有義得依無答有義宗法本賴所依所依若無有義不立故有義法不可依無無義宗法遮遣共知所依縱有彌順宗法故無義法通依二也今此所立釋迦菩薩實不善聲言不離識不離識法既是有義此聲無故所別不成言立我無無義之法得依有無故成有法。
能別四句者如大乘對小乘立聲即真如此則自成他不成也若就勝義立聲實有此則他成自不成也以自約勝義不立實有法故若立聲無常此則自他俱極成也若就勝義聲即真如此則自他俱不成也初二第四不能簡別所依有法唯第三句成宗所依問違現量等並非宗依何故此中簡編三種答曰理應具簡然宗親攬法有法成故欲明宗先辨宗所依法順現量等六是差別義門不攬成宗故依中不說。
差別為性。
述曰此明體也古因明師或有以聲為宗以成立聲為無常故或有以無常為宗以不許聲有無常故或有以聲無常合以為宗以聲無常別非宗故陳那破云聲及無常元來共許何得為宗故我但取聲及無常不相離性以之為宗以敵論者不許不相離故謂聲是何聲為常無常聲此以無常別常聲無常是何無常為色為聲是聲無常此以聲別色無常故言差別如言青蓮華青是何青為葉為華是蓮花青花是何花為白為青是青蓮花青與蓮花相差別也為性者如此更相差別總合為一不相離性如此不相離性方是宗體問聲與無常既相差別何故能別獨在無常答如其名也簡法實齊對敵申宗便為能別何者敵論但疑聲常
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"爲了闡釋『無』並非絕對的空無,而是具有普遍性和二重性的法,就像說一切法都是所知一樣。無論存在還是不存在,都是所知。如果是有意義的法,必須有其本體,有法作為依據。如果是無意義的法,或者兼具二重性的法,都以有本體或無本體,有法作為依據。有人問:『有』的意義並非是『無』,怎麼能依據『有』呢?『無』的意義並非是『有』,怎麼能依據『無』呢?』回答說:『有』的宗法本來依賴於所依據的對象,如果所依據的對象不存在,那麼『有』的意義就無法成立。因此,有意義的法不能依據『無』。『無』的宗法是爲了遮遣共同認知的所依據對象,即使有,也更加順應宗法。因此,無意義的法可以普遍地依據二者。現在這裡所立的釋迦菩薩(Śākyamuni Bodhisattva,佛教創始人)確實是不善之聲,言語不離識,不離識的法既然是有意義的,那麼這種聲音就不存在,所要區別的對象就無法成立。說我沒有無意義的法,可以依據『有』或『無』,因此可以成立有法。",
"能夠區分四句,就像大乘佛教(Mahāyāna)針對小乘佛教(Hīnayāna)所立的『聲音即是真』一樣,這樣就自己成立而他人不成立。如果就勝義諦(paramārtha-satya,最高真理)而言,聲音是真實存在的,那麼就是他人成立而自己不成立。因為自己從勝義諦的角度不立真實存在的法。如果立『聲音是無常』,那麼就是自己和他人雙方都極度認可的。如果就勝義諦而言,『聲音即是真』,那麼就是自己和他人雙方都不成立。前兩種和第四種都不能簡別所依據的有法,只有第三句才能成立宗所依據的對象。有人問:『違背現量(pratyakṣa,現量,感官認知)等並非宗依,為什麼這裡要簡別三種呢?』回答說:『理應全部簡別,然而宗親近地把握法和有法才能成立,因此想要闡明宗,首先要辨別宗所依據的法,順應現量等六種是差別義門,不把握就能成立宗,因此在依據中沒有說。』",
"差別是其自性。",
"敘述說:這是說明它的本體。古代的因明師,有的以聲音為宗,爲了成立聲音是無常的;有的以無常為宗,因為不承認聲音具有無常;有的將聲音和無常合在一起作為宗,因為聲音和無常的差別並非是宗。陳那(Dignāga,古印度佛教邏輯學家)駁斥說,聲音和無常本來就是共同認可的,怎麼能作為宗呢?所以我只取聲音和無常不相離的性質作為宗,因為敵論者不承認不相離的性質。所謂聲音是什麼聲音?是常還是無常的聲音?這是用無常來區別常聲。無常是什麼無常?是色還是聲音的無常?這是用聲音來區別色的無常。所以說差別,就像說『青蓮花』,青是什麼青?是葉子的青還是花的青?是蓮花的青。花是什麼花?是白色的花還是青色的花?是青蓮花。青和蓮花相互區別。所謂『為性』,就是這樣相互區別,總合為一個不相離的性質。這樣不相離的性質才是宗的本體。有人問:『聲音和無常既然相互區別,為什麼能區別的只有無常呢?』回答說:『正如它的名稱一樣,簡別法確實是相同的,爲了針對敵論者申明宗,就成為能區別的。』為什麼呢?因為敵論者只是懷疑聲音是常的。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"To explain that 'non-existence' is not absolute emptiness but a dharma (法, law, principle) with universality and duality, just as it is said that all dharmas are knowable. Whether existent or non-existent, all are knowable. If it is a dharma with meaning ('existence'), it must have its own substance (體, essence), with dharma as its basis. If it is a dharma without meaning ('non-existence'), or a dharma with both aspects, both rely on having or not having substance, and having dharma as a basis. Someone asks: 'The meaning of 'existence' is not 'non-existence', how can it rely on 'existence'? The meaning of 'non-existence' is not 'existence', how can it rely on 'non-existence'?' The answer is: 'The zongfa (宗法, thesis-property) of 'existence' originally relies on the object it is based on. If the object it is based on does not exist, then the meaning of 'existence' cannot be established. Therefore, a dharma with meaning cannot rely on 'non-existence'. The zongfa of 'non-existence' is to negate the commonly known object it is based on. Even if it exists, it is even more in accordance with the zongfa. Therefore, a dharma without meaning can universally rely on both. Now, the Śākyamuni Bodhisattva (釋迦菩薩, the founder of Buddhism) established here is indeed an inauspicious sound. Speech is inseparable from consciousness (識, vijñāna), and since the dharma inseparable from consciousness has meaning, then this sound does not exist, and the object to be distinguished cannot be established. Saying that I do not have a dharma without meaning can rely on 'existence' or 'non-existence', therefore it can establish having dharma.'",
"Being able to distinguish the four statements is like the Mahāyāna (大乘佛教, Great Vehicle) establishing 'sound is truth' against the Hīnayāna (小乘佛教, Lesser Vehicle), thus establishing itself while others are not established. If, from the perspective of paramārtha-satya (勝義諦, ultimate truth), sound is truly existent, then others are established while oneself is not established. Because oneself does not establish truly existent dharma from the perspective of paramārtha-satya. If one establishes 'sound is impermanent', then both oneself and others extremely acknowledge it. If, from the perspective of paramārtha-satya, 'sound is truth', then neither oneself nor others are established. The first two and the fourth cannot distinguish the existent dharma on which they are based; only the third statement can establish the object on which the zong (宗, thesis) is based. Someone asks: 'Contradicting pratyakṣa (現量, direct perception) and so on are not zongyi (宗依, thesis-basis), why distinguish three types here?' The answer is: 'All should be distinguished, but the zong closely grasps dharma and existent dharma to be established, so to clarify the zong, one must first distinguish the dharma on which the zong is based. Conforming to the six types of pratyakṣa and so on is the difference in meaning, and grasping it can establish the zong, so it is not mentioned in the basis.'",
"Difference is its nature.",
"The narration says: This explains its substance. Ancient logicians of Hetuvidya (因明, logic), some took sound as the zong in order to establish that sound is impermanent; some took impermanence as the zong because they did not acknowledge that sound has impermanence; some combined sound and impermanence as the zong because the difference between sound and impermanence is not the zong. Dignāga (陳那, ancient Indian Buddhist logician) refuted, saying that sound and impermanence are originally commonly acknowledged, how can they be taken as the zong? Therefore, I only take the inseparable nature of sound and impermanence as the zong because the opponent does not acknowledge the inseparable nature. What is called sound? Is it permanent or impermanent sound? This is to distinguish permanent sound with impermanence. What is impermanence? Is it the impermanence of form or sound? This is to distinguish the impermanence of form with sound. Therefore, it is said to be difference, like saying 'blue lotus flower', what is blue? Is it the blue of the leaves or the blue of the flower? It is the blue of the lotus flower. What is the flower? Is it a white flower or a blue flower? It is a blue lotus flower. Blue and lotus flower are mutually distinguished. What is called 'nature' is that they are mutually distinguished in this way, and combined into one inseparable nature. This inseparable nature is the substance of the zong. Someone asks: 'Since sound and impermanence are mutually distinguished, why can only impermanence distinguish?' The answer is: 'Just like its name, distinguishing dharma is indeed the same. In order to declare the zong to the opponent, it becomes distinguishable.' Why? Because the opponent only suspects that sound is permanent."
]
}
無常立者即以無常簡別聲云聲是無常故無常為能別不疑無常是聲非聲不可以聲簡無常云無常是聲故聲但所別設有此疑其聲亦即是能別也雖以後述者為能別然名必遮故但云聲是無常其聲即簡色等無常故聲無常相差別也。
隨自。
述曰此示則也宗有三種一眾共許宗如聲是所聞等二自所學宗如鵂鹠子所學六句義等三傍顯論宗如立無常兼顯空無我等夫立論之則勿顧此三但隨自意善者便立如鵂鹠子立佛法義等或佛門人樹鵂鹠義等問因喻成宗亦應隨自何故宗內獨示此言答宗云隨自因喻實同但助而非正故不俱述。
樂為所成立性。
述曰此簡濫也即簡因喻一釋宗因喻言俱成已義理應三種齊得名宗為去此濫故以兩義簡之二樂為簡不樂為謂所立之宗違他順己自所尊重是所樂為能立喻因自他共許成宗故立非所樂為故樂為是宗餘二非也二所成立性簡能成立性謂宗義既是所成即唯自所尊主因喻既是能立共許何得名宗故所立為宗餘二非也二釋宗為因喻所成即非能立因喻更須成立應得名宗為簡此濫故云樂為所成立性謂似因似喻亦是所立所樂為者即非喻因故以樂為所立簡名宗也三釋二濫同上為簡前濫故以所成立性簡之以真因喻唯能立故為去後濫故以樂為簡之以似因喻非所樂故問何者因喻是所成耶答如對聲顯論者立聲無常因云所作性故其聲顯論不許聲是所作遂更立云聲是所作因云以隨緣變故同喻云如燈焰等其同喻等準此可知也。
是名為宗。
述曰此結定也。
如有成立聲是無常。
述曰此第三指體也如佛法等對聲論立
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"無常的性質確立,就用『無常』來區分『聲』,說『聲是無常』,因此『無常』能作為區分的依據,不必懷疑『無常』是『聲』還是『非聲』。不能用『聲』來區分『無常』,說『無常是聲』,因此『聲』只是被區分的對象。即使有這樣的疑問,『聲』也可以作為區分的依據。雖然之後陳述的作為區分的依據,但名稱必須有所遮蔽,所以只說『聲是無常』,這個『聲』就區分了色等無常,所以『聲』和『無常』的相狀是有差別的。",
"隨自。",
"解釋:這裡說明了立宗的原則。宗有三種:一是大眾共同認可的宗,如『聲是所聞』等;二是自己所學的宗,如鵂鹠子(一種鳥的名字,這裡指人名)所學的六句義等;三是旁顯論宗,如立『無常』兼顯示『空』、『無我』等。確立論點的原則,不要顧及這三種情況,只要隨自己的意願,好的就確立,如鵂鹠子確立佛法義等,或者佛門人確立鵂鹠義等。問:因、喻成立宗,也應該隨自己的意願,為什麼在宗內單獨說明這句話?答:宗說隨自己的意願,因、喻實際上相同,但只是輔助而不是主要的,所以不一起說明。",
"樂為所成立性。",
"解釋:這是爲了簡別容易混淆的情況。即簡別因和喻。一種解釋是,宗、因、喻都已成就意義,道理上應該三種都可稱為宗,爲了去除這種混淆,用兩種含義來簡別。一是『樂為』,簡別『不樂為』,所謂所立的宗,是違揹他人、順從自己,自己所尊重的是『樂為』,能成立的喻和因是自他共同認可的,成就宗,所以確立自己所『樂為』的,其餘兩種不是。二是『所成立性』,簡別『能成立性』,宗的意義是所要成立的,即只是自己所尊重的;因和喻是能成立的,是大家共同認可的,怎麼能稱為宗呢?所以『所立』是宗,其餘兩種不是。第二種解釋是,宗是被因和喻所成立的,就不是能成立的,因和喻更需要成立,應該可以稱為宗,爲了簡別這種混淆,所以說『樂為所成立性』,所謂相似的因和喻也是所立的、所樂為的,就不是喻和因,所以用『樂為所立』來簡別,稱為宗。第三種解釋,兩種混淆的情況與上面相同,爲了簡別前面的混淆,用『所成立性』來簡別,因為真正的因和喻只能成立;爲了去除後面的混淆,用『樂為』來簡別,因為相似的因和喻不是自己所樂意的。問:什麼因和喻是所成立的呢?答:如對聲顯論者,立『聲是無常』,因是『所作性』,聲顯論不認可『聲是所作』,於是進一步確立『聲是所作』,因是『以隨緣變故』,同喻是『如燈焰等』,其他的同喻等可以依此類推。",
"是名為宗。",
"解釋:這是總結確定。",
"如有成立聲是無常。",
"解釋:這是第三個指出宗的體性。如佛法等對聲論立。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"The nature of impermanence is established, and 'impermanence' is used to distinguish 'sound', saying 'sound is impermanent'. Therefore, 'impermanence' can be used as a basis for distinction, and there is no need to doubt whether 'impermanence' is 'sound' or 'non-sound'. 'Sound' cannot be used to distinguish 'impermanence', saying 'impermanence is sound', therefore 'sound' is only the object to be distinguished. Even if there is such a question, 'sound' can also be used as a basis for distinction. Although what is stated later serves as the basis for distinction, the name must be obscured, so it is only said that 'sound is impermanent', and this 'sound' distinguishes the impermanence of form, etc. Therefore, the characteristics of 'sound' and 'impermanence' are different.",
"Following one's own (inclination).",
"Explanation: This explains the principle of establishing a thesis (宗, zōng). There are three types of theses: first, a thesis commonly accepted by the public, such as 'sound is audible'; second, a thesis learned by oneself, such as the six-sentence meaning learned by the owlet (鵂鹠子, xiūliúzi, a type of bird, here referring to a person's name); third, a thesis that reveals other doctrines, such as establishing 'impermanence' while also revealing 'emptiness' (空, kōng) and 'no-self' (無我, wúwǒ). The principle of establishing a thesis is not to consider these three situations, but to establish whatever is good according to one's own wishes, such as the owlet establishing the meaning of the Buddha's teachings, or a Buddhist establishing the meaning of the owlet. Question: The reason (因, yīn) and analogy (喻, yù) establish the thesis, and should also follow one's own wishes. Why is this sentence explained separately within the thesis? Answer: The thesis says to follow one's own wishes, and the reason and analogy are actually the same, but they are only auxiliary and not the main thing, so they are not explained together.",
"The nature of being pleased to be established.",
"Explanation: This is to distinguish easily confused situations. That is, to distinguish between reason and analogy. One explanation is that the thesis, reason, and analogy have all achieved meaning, and in principle all three should be called the thesis. In order to remove this confusion, two meanings are used to distinguish. The first is 'being pleased to', which distinguishes 'not being pleased to'. The so-called thesis that is established is to violate others and follow oneself. What one respects is 'being pleased to'. The analogy and reason that can be established are recognized by both oneself and others, and achieve the thesis. Therefore, establish what one is 'pleased to', and the other two are not. The second is 'the nature of being established', which distinguishes 'the nature of being able to establish'. The meaning of the thesis is what is to be established, that is, only what one respects; the reason and analogy are what can be established, and are recognized by everyone. How can they be called the thesis? Therefore, 'what is established' is the thesis, and the other two are not. The second explanation is that the thesis is established by the reason and analogy, so it cannot establish. The reason and analogy need to be established further, and should be called the thesis. In order to distinguish this confusion, it is said 'the nature of being pleased to be established'. The so-called similar reason and analogy are also what is established and what one is pleased to, so they are not analogy and reason. Therefore, 'what is pleased to be established' is used to distinguish and is called the thesis. The third explanation, the two confusing situations are the same as above. In order to distinguish the previous confusion, 'the nature of being established' is used to distinguish, because the true reason and analogy can only establish; in order to remove the later confusion, 'being pleased to' is used to distinguish, because the similar reason and analogy are not what one is pleased with. Question: What reason and analogy are established? Answer: For example, to the sound theorist, establish 'sound is impermanent', the reason is 'the nature of being produced'. The sound theorist does not recognize 'sound is produced', so further establish 'sound is produced', the reason is 'because it changes with conditions', and the similar analogy is 'like the flame of a lamp', etc. Other similar analogies can be inferred from this.",
"This is called a thesis.",
"Explanation: This is a summary and confirmation.",
"For example, establishing that sound is impermanent.",
"Explanation: This is the third point to indicate the nature of the thesis. Such as the Buddhist teachings, etc., establish against the sound theory."
]
}
聲是無常。
因有三相。
述曰此下解因有二一懸解二辨體前中有四一舉相數二依數徴三隨徴答四逐難解此即舉相數也因者所以也又利果義也因有二種一生因如種生牙等二了因如燈焰照物等。
生因有三一言生因謂立論者以立因言能生敵論決定之解故故是生因故此論云由宗因喻多言開示諸有問者未了義故二智生因即立論者發言之智生因因故名為生因又遠生他解亦名生因三義生因即立論者言所詮義生因詮故名為生因又為境能生敵論解故亦名生因此釋既以敵論了宗智為果故言是正因智義依詮通名因也故論唯云由宗等多言開示問者不言智義能生他解然文中雲因三相者欲明言說詮三相義方是正因故兼舉也。
了因亦三一智了因謂敵論者有解所作等智故便能顯了無常等義故是了因故理門云但由智力了所說義二言了因謂由因言了所說義故名了因又敵論者了宗之智正是了因立者言說能生此智了因因故亦名了因故理門云若爾既取智爲了因是言便失能成立性此亦不然令彼憶念本極成故三義了因謂以有所作等義故能顯無常等宗故理門云如前二因於義所立也又敵論智正是了因其所作義是了因境亦名了因此釋既以無常等義為所了宗故敵論智正是了因言義因境通名因也問理門云宗法唯取立敵俱許俱許即是立敵兩解何故此中唯取敵智答彼言立敵俱許等者意取敵論知其因義俱許之智非謂所知立敵俱許即是了因若俱許即是親了因者豈可立者自許所作敵者便了無常宗義故取敵智為親了因。
上來生了義雖有六然意正存生言了智由立者言生因故敵
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『聲』(Śabda,聲音)是無常的。",
"因為有三種『因』(Hetu,理由、原因)。",
"解釋說,下面解釋『因』有三種相,分為兩部分:一是懸解,二是辨體。前面有四部分:一是舉出相的數量,二是根據數量提問,三是隨著提問回答,四是逐個辯駁難題。這裡就是舉出相的數量。『因』的意思是『所以』,也有『利益結果』的意思。『因』有兩種:一是『生因』(Janaka-hetu,產生之因),如種子生出牙等;二是『了因』(Jñāpaka-hetu,使人瞭解之因),如燈焰照亮物體等。",
"『生因』有三種:一是『言生因』(Śabda-janaka-hetu),指立論者用立『因』的言辭,能使對方產生對論題的確定理解,所以是『生因』。因此本論說,由於宗、因、喻等多種言辭開示,使那些對意義不瞭解的提問者得以理解。二是『智生因』(Jñāna-janaka-hetu),即立論者發言的智慧產生『因』,因此名為『生因』,又指能間接產生他人理解的也稱為『生因』。三是『義生因』(Artha-janaka-hetu),即立論者言辭所詮釋的意義產生『因』,因為詮釋的緣故名為『生因』,又因為作為境能產生對方的理解,也稱為『生因』。這個解釋既然以對方瞭解宗的智慧為結果,所以說言辭是正『因』,智慧和意義通過詮釋都可稱為『因』。因此論中只說由於宗等多種言辭開示提問者,沒有說智慧和意義能產生他人的理解,然而文中說『因』有三種相,是想說明言說詮釋三種相的意義才是正『因』,所以一併舉出。",
"『了因』也有三種:一是『智了因』(Jñāna-jñāpaka-hetu),指對方具有理解所作等事的智慧,因此便能明顯瞭解無常等意義,所以是『了因』。因此《理門》說,僅僅憑藉智慧的力量了解所說的意義。二是『言了因』(Śabda-jñāpaka-hetu),指通過『因』的言辭瞭解所說的意義,所以名為『了因』。又指對方瞭解宗的智慧正是『了因』,立論者的言說能產生這種智慧,作為『了因』的『因』,也名為『了因』。因此《理門》說,如果這樣,既然選取智慧作為『了因』,那麼言辭便失去了能成立的性質。這也不對,因為能使對方回憶起原本已經確立的道理。三是『義了因』(Artha-jñāpaka-hetu),指憑藉有所作等意義,能明顯瞭解無常等宗。因此《理門》說,如前兩種『因』對於意義所建立的。又指對方的智慧正是『了因』,其所作的意義是『了因』的境,也名為『了因』。這個解釋既然以無常等意義為所瞭解的宗,所以對方的智慧正是『了因』,言辭和意義作為『因』的境都可稱為『因』。問:《理門》說宗法只取立論者和對方都認可的,都認可就是立論者和對方都理解,為什麼這裡只取對方的智慧?答:那裡說立論者和對方都認可等,意思是取對方瞭解『因』的意義都認可的智慧,不是說所知的立論者和對方都認可就是『了因』。如果都認可就是親『了因』,難道立論者自己認可所作,對方就能瞭解無常的宗義嗎?所以取對方的智慧作為親『了因』。",
"上面『生』和『了』的意義雖然有六種,但主要在於『生』,言辭瞭解智慧是由立論者的言辭產生的,所以對方。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'Sound' (Śabda) is impermanent.",
"Because there are three 'Hetus' (reasons, causes).",
"Explanation: The following explains that there are three aspects of 'Hetu', divided into two parts: one is a general explanation, and the other is distinguishing the substance. The former has four parts: one is listing the number of aspects, two is questioning based on the number, three is answering according to the questions, and four is refuting the difficulties one by one. This is listing the number of aspects. 'Hetu' means 'therefore', and also has the meaning of 'benefiting the result'. There are two types of 'Hetu': one is 'Janaka-hetu' (productive cause), such as a seed producing a sprout; the other is 'Jñāpaka-hetu' (illuminative cause), such as a lamp illuminating an object.",
"There are three types of 'Janaka-hetu': one is 'Śabda-janaka-hetu' (verbal productive cause), which refers to the fact that the proponent uses the words of establishing 'Hetu' to enable the opponent to produce a definite understanding of the thesis, so it is a 'Janaka-hetu'. Therefore, this treatise says that due to the exposition of various words such as thesis, reason, and example, those who ask questions without understanding the meaning can understand. The second is 'Jñāna-janaka-hetu' (cognitive productive cause), which is the wisdom of the proponent's speech that produces 'Hetu', hence it is called 'Janaka-hetu', and it also refers to what can indirectly produce the understanding of others is also called 'Janaka-hetu'. The third is 'Artha-janaka-hetu' (meaning productive cause), which is the meaning interpreted by the proponent's words that produces 'Hetu', because of the interpretation it is called 'Janaka-hetu', and also because as an object it can produce the opponent's understanding, it is also called 'Janaka-hetu'. Since this explanation takes the opponent's wisdom of understanding the thesis as the result, it says that words are the correct 'Hetu', and wisdom and meaning can be called 'Hetu' through interpretation. Therefore, the treatise only says that due to the exposition of various words such as thesis, etc., the questioner is enlightened, and it does not say that wisdom and meaning can produce the understanding of others. However, the text says that 'Hetu' has three aspects, which is to explain that the meaning of the three aspects interpreted by speech is the correct 'Hetu', so it is listed together.",
"There are also three types of 'Jñāpaka-hetu': one is 'Jñāna-jñāpaka-hetu' (cognitive illuminative cause), which refers to the fact that the opponent has the wisdom to understand things such as actions, so they can clearly understand the meaning of impermanence, etc., so it is 'Jñāpaka-hetu'. Therefore, the *Nyāyamukha* says that the meaning of what is said is understood only by the power of wisdom. The second is 'Śabda-jñāpaka-hetu' (verbal illuminative cause), which refers to understanding the meaning of what is said through the words of 'Hetu', so it is called 'Jñāpaka-hetu'. It also refers to the fact that the opponent's wisdom of understanding the thesis is the 'Jñāpaka-hetu', and the proponent's speech can produce this wisdom, as the 'cause' of 'Jñāpaka-hetu', it is also called 'Jñāpaka-hetu'. Therefore, the *Nyāyamukha* says, if so, since wisdom is selected as 'Jñāpaka-hetu', then the words lose the nature of being able to establish. This is also not right, because it can make the opponent recall the originally established principle. The third is 'Artha-jñāpaka-hetu' (meaning illuminative cause), which refers to the fact that by means of meanings such as actions, the thesis of impermanence can be clearly understood. Therefore, the *Nyāyamukha* says, as the previous two 'Hetus' are established for meaning. It also refers to the fact that the opponent's wisdom is the 'Jñāpaka-hetu', and the meaning of what is done is the object of 'Jñāpaka-hetu', and is also called 'Jñāpaka-hetu'. Since this explanation takes the meaning of impermanence as the thesis to be understood, the opponent's wisdom is the 'Jñāpaka-hetu', and words and meanings as the object of 'Hetu' can be called 'Hetu'. Question: The *Nyāyamukha* says that the property of the thesis only takes what is recognized by both the proponent and the opponent, and recognition means that both the proponent and the opponent understand, why does it only take the opponent's wisdom here? Answer: What is said there that the proponent and the opponent both recognize, etc., means taking the wisdom that the opponent understands the meaning of 'Hetu' and recognizes it, not saying that what is known is recognized by both the proponent and the opponent is 'Jñāpaka-hetu'. If both recognize it is the direct 'Jñāpaka-hetu', how can the proponent recognize what is done by himself, and the opponent can understand the thesis of impermanence? Therefore, the opponent's wisdom is taken as the direct 'Jñāpaka-hetu'.",
"Although there are six meanings of 'Janaka' and 'Jñāpaka' above, the main point is 'Janaka', and the words understand that wisdom is produced by the proponent's words, so the opponent."
]
}
論未生之智得生由敵者智了因故本隱真實之理今著故正取此二餘四相從。
有三相者是義相即一所作性望本聲宗及同異品有三相也。
何等為三。
述曰此依數徴也既云三相何者為三。
謂遍是宗法性。
述曰此下隨徴答三相為三此即初相也。
宗法者若持業釋宗即是法名為宗法即無常是若依士釋宗家法故名為宗法即所作是今既明因唯取依士釋法也。
性者即宗法是性也問宗體是何言宗家法答法及有法和合名宗廣如上釋今言宗者唯取有法何以爾者有法聲上有二種法一不成法謂無常二極成法謂所作以極成法在聲上故證其聲上不成無常亦令極成若所作法在無常上者其無常法既不極成何待所作在無常上又若所作依無常者即應凡所立因皆有所依不成過失以彼無常不極成故又法但屬有法不可法法自相攝屬故約有法宗釋宗法也問法有法合方得為宗何故今言宗唯有法答宗是總稱別亦名宗如見城之一面亦名見城問言是宗法即應是因何故言遍答因有四種一是遍非宗法如薩婆多等立云眼識非見因云以四相故其四相體遍眼識上故是其遍以體別故非宗法也二是宗法非遍如立內外聲是無常因云勤勇無間所發性故此望內聲得是宗法外聲無故而非遍也三亦遍亦宗法如立內外聲是無常因云所作性故俱緣起故得名遍由義別故是宗法四非遍非宗法如下四種不成是也謂兩俱不成元來非有隨一不成互有無猶豫有無非決定所依既無無所遍故四不成俱非遍也由不成故亦非宗法若唯言是宗法即不遍濫初相故以遍言簡若唯言遍即非宗法亂真因故以
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"論未生之智得生,由敵者智了因故,本隱真實之理,今著故,正取此二,餘四相從。",
"有三相者,是義相即一所作性,望本聲宗及同異品,有三相也。",
"何等為三?",
"述曰:此依數徴也,既云三相,何者為三?",
"謂遍是宗法性。",
"述曰:此下隨徴答三相為三,此即初相也。",
"宗法者,若持業釋,『宗』即是『法』,名為宗法,即『無常』是;若依士釋,宗家法故,名為宗法,即『所作』是。今既明因,唯取依士釋法也。",
"性者,即宗法是性也。問:宗體是何?言宗家法。答:法及有法和合名宗,廣如上釋。今言宗者,唯取有法。何以爾者?有法聲上有二種法:一、不成法,謂無常;二、極成法,謂所作。以極成法在聲上故,證其聲上不成無常,亦令極成。若所作法在無常上者,其無常法既不極成,何待所作在無常上?又若所作依無常者,即應凡所立因,皆有所依不成過失,以彼無常不極成故。又法但屬有法,不可法法自相攝屬,故約有法宗釋宗法也。問:法有法合方得為宗,何故今言宗唯有法?答:宗是總稱,別亦名宗,如見城之一面亦名見城。問:言是宗法,即應是因,何故言遍?答:因有四種:一是遍非宗法,如薩婆多(Sarvāstivāda,一切有部)等立云:『眼識非見』,因云:『以四相故』,其四相體遍眼識上,故是其遍,以體別故非宗法也;二是宗法非遍,如立內外聲是無常,因云:『勤勇無間所發性故』,此望內聲得是宗法,外聲無故而非遍也;三是亦遍亦宗法,如立內外聲是無常,因云:『所作性故』、『俱緣起故』,得名遍,由義別故是宗法;四是非遍非宗法,如下四種不成是也。謂兩俱不成,元來非有,隨一不成,互有無猶豫,有無非決定。所依既無,無所遍故,四不成俱非遍也。由不成故,亦非宗法。若唯言是宗法,即不遍濫初相故,以遍言簡。若唯言遍,即非宗法亂真因故,以"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"On the arising of unarisen wisdom, it is due to the wisdom of the opponent understanding the cause. The originally hidden truth is now manifested, hence these two are rightly taken, and the remaining four aspects follow.",
"Having three characteristics means that the meaning is identical to the nature of being produced, looking at the original sound basis (宗, zōng) and similar and dissimilar categories, there are three characteristics.",
"What are the three?",
"Commentary: This is a numerical inquiry. Since it is said to have three characteristics, what are the three?",
"Namely, pervasiveness is the property of the subject (宗法性, zōng fǎ xìng).",
"Commentary: Below, the three characteristics are answered according to the inquiry. This is the first characteristic.",
"The property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ): If explained as a possessive compound, 'subject (宗, zōng)' is 'property (法, fǎ),' named the property of the subject, which is 'impermanence (無常, wúcháng)'; if explained as an agentive compound, it is the property of the subject's family, named the property of the subject, which is 'produced (所作, suǒ zuò).' Now that the cause is clarified, only the agentive explanation of property is taken.",
"The nature (性, xìng) is the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ). Question: What is the substance of the subject (宗, zōng)? It is said to be the property of the subject's family. Answer: Property and that which possesses property together are called the subject (宗, zōng), as explained extensively above. Now, when speaking of the subject (宗, zōng), only that which possesses property is taken. Why is that? On the sound that possesses property, there are two kinds of property: first, unestablished property, namely impermanence (無常, wúcháng); second, fully established property, namely being produced (所作, suǒ zuò). Because the fully established property is on the sound, it proves that the impermanence (無常, wúcháng) on the sound is not established, and it also makes it fully established. If the property of being produced (所作, suǒ zuò) were on impermanence (無常, wúcháng), then the impermanence (無常, wúcháng), being not fully established, would not need being produced (所作, suǒ zuò) to be on it. Moreover, if being produced (所作, suǒ zuò) depended on impermanence (無常, wúcháng), then every established cause would have something to depend on, resulting in the fault of being unestablished, because that impermanence (無常, wúcháng) is not fully established. Furthermore, property only belongs to that which possesses property; property cannot mutually include property. Therefore, the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ) is explained in terms of the subject (宗, zōng) that possesses property. Question: Property and that which possesses property must combine to form the subject (宗, zōng), so why is it now said that the subject (宗, zōng) is only that which possesses property? Answer: The subject (宗, zōng) is a general term, and a part can also be called the subject (宗, zōng), just as seeing one side of a city can be called seeing the city. Question: Saying it is the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ) should mean it is the cause, so why is it said to be pervasive? Answer: There are four kinds of cause: first, pervasive but not the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ), such as the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多, Sà pó duō) school establishing that 'eye-consciousness is not seeing,' the cause being 'because of the four characteristics.' The substance of the four characteristics pervades eye-consciousness, so it is pervasive, but because the substance is different, it is not the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ). Second, the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ) but not pervasive, such as establishing that internal and external sounds are impermanent (無常, wúcháng), the cause being 'produced by continuous effort.' This is the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ) with respect to internal sound, but it is not pervasive because it is absent in external sound. Third, both pervasive and the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ), such as establishing that internal and external sounds are impermanent (無常, wúcháng), the cause being 'because of being produced (所作性, suǒ zuò xìng)' and 'because of arising together.' It is named pervasive, and because the meaning is different, it is the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ). Fourth, neither pervasive nor the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ), such as the following four kinds of unestablished causes. Namely, both are unestablished, originally non-existent; one is unestablished, mutually existing and non-existent, hesitant about existence and non-existence, not decisive. Since the basis is absent, there is nothing to pervade, so all four unestablished causes are not pervasive. Because they are unestablished, they are also not the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ). If it is only said to be the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ), it is not pervasive and confuses the first characteristic, so the word 'pervasive' is used to distinguish it. If it is only said to be pervasive, it is not the property of the subject (宗法, zōng fǎ) and confuses the true cause, so"
]
}
是宗法言簡故言遍是宗法性也此唯取第三俱句為其初相又釋此宗法性是因初相以不遍濫故故以遍言簡去不遍是宗法性其遍名唯為簡去不遍非因正相不可以是宗法性言簡去非宗法性遍也若作此釋即無初句遍非宗法此之初句即是第四俱非句攝以宗因別體不可言遍故。
同品定有性。
述曰此第二相也。
同品者即瓶等如下釋定有性者其遍是宗法所作性因於同品瓶中定有其性方是因相此即正取所作兼取無常問所作性因是宗家法何故乃言瓶上亦有答猶如一縷貫黃赤華貫黃華縷實非貫赤華縷相同故言貫黃赤華此亦如是一所作性因通貫聲瓶聲之所作實不生瓶所作同故說瓶有性故掌珍等論云因義不應分別也問聲瓶齊所作二相併為因無常貫聲瓶說宗通兩處答所作兩處俱成就故此二相併為因無常瓶成聲不成何得言宗通兩處。
異品遍無性。
述曰此第三相也。
異品者即空等如下釋遍無性者其遍是宗法所作性因於異品空中遍無其性為第三相此亦正取所無所作兼取能無之常問何故同有唯言定異無說遍也答順成立同有但定有即順成止濫立異無非遍濫不止故同言定異言遍也問何故唯立此三相也答無餘相可立故又初相為主正為能立藉伴助成故須第二雖有主伴其濫未除故須第三異品無相主伴止濫其義既周足能顯宗何假余相陳那已前諸師亦有立三相者然釋言相者體也三體不同故言三相初相不異陳那后之二相俱以有法為體謂瓶等上所作無常俱以瓶等為體故即以瓶等為第二相虛空等上常非所作俱以空等為體故即以空等為第三相故世親所造
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"『是宗法言簡故言遍』,是宗法性(Hetu-cakra,因輪)的特點。這裡只取第三『俱句』(ubhayapaksa,同品定有性、異品遍無性)作為它的初始相(paksadharmatva,宗法性)。又解釋這種宗法性,是因為初始相存在不周遍和氾濫的缺點,所以用『遍』來簡化去除不周遍性,這才是宗法性。而這個『遍』的名稱,只是爲了簡化去除不周遍性,並非是因(hetu,理由、原因)的正相(svarupa-hetu,自性因),所以不可以用它來作為宗法性。用『簡』來去除的,是非宗法性中的周遍性。如果這樣解釋,就沒有初始句的周遍性不是宗法性的說法了。這個初始句就屬於第四『俱非句』(ubhayavyavrtti,同品異品皆無)所包含的,因為宗(paksa,論題)和因是不同的實體,不能說周遍。",
"『同品定有性』。",
"述曰:這是第二個相(rupa,形式)也。",
"『同品』,就是瓶子等,如下文解釋。『定有性』,指的是周遍性是宗法(paksadharmatva,宗法性)的特點,所作性(krtakatva,有為性)的因在同品(sapaksa,同類)的瓶子中一定具有這種性質,才是因的相(rupa,形式)。這裡是主要取『所作』,兼取『無常』。問:所作性因是宗家的法(dharma,法),為什麼說瓶子上也有?答:就像用一根線穿起黃色和紅色的花,穿起黃花的線實際上並沒有穿起紅花,但線是相同的,所以說穿起黃色和紅色的花。這裡也是如此,一個所作性因貫穿了聲音和瓶子,聲音的所作性實際上並沒有產生瓶子的所作性,但它們是相同的,所以說瓶子具有這種性質。所以《掌珍論》等論典說,因的意義不應該分別。問:聲音和瓶子都具有所作性,這兩個相(rupa,形式)合併起來作為因,無常貫穿聲音和瓶子,說明宗(paksa,論題)在兩處都成立?答:所作性在兩處都成立,所以這兩個相(rupa,形式)合併起來作為因,無常在瓶子上成立,在聲音上不成立,怎麼能說宗在兩處都成立呢?",
"『異品遍無性』。",
"述曰:這是第三個相(rupa,形式)也。",
"『異品』,就是虛空等,如下文解釋。『遍無性』,指的是周遍性是宗法(paksadharmatva,宗法性)的特點,所作性(krtakatva,有為性)的因在異品(vipaksa,異類)的虛空中普遍沒有這種性質,這是第三個相(rupa,形式)。這裡也是主要取『所無』,所作兼取『能無』的常。問:為什麼同品有隻說『定有』,而異品無要說『遍也』?答:順應成立同品有,只要確定有就可以順應成立,阻止氾濫;而確立異品無,如果不周遍就不能阻止氾濫,所以同品說『定』,異品說『遍』。問:為什麼只確立這三個相(rupa,形式)呢?答:沒有其餘的相(rupa,形式)可以確立了。而且第一個相(rupa,形式)是主要的,主要是爲了能立(sadhana,能立),藉助伴隨來幫助成就,所以需要第二個。雖然有主伴,但它的泛濫還沒有消除,所以需要第三個異品無相(rupa,形式),主伴阻止氾濫,它的意義已經周全,足以顯現宗(paksa,論題),為什麼還要假設其餘的相(rupa,形式)呢?陳那(Dignaga)菩薩以前的諸位論師也有確立三個相(rupa,形式)的,然而解釋相(rupa,形式)的含義是體(svabhava,自性),三個體(svabhava,自性)不同,所以說三個相(rupa,形式)。第一個相(rupa,形式)與陳那(Dignaga)菩薩之後的相(rupa,形式)不同,後面的兩個相(rupa,形式)都以有法(dharmin,有法)為體(svabhava,自性),比如瓶子等上面的所作、無常,都以瓶子等為體(svabhava,自性),所以就以瓶子等作為第二個相(rupa,形式),虛空等上面的常、非所作,都以虛空等為體(svabhava,自性),所以就以虛空等作為第三個相(rupa,形式)。所以世親(Vasubandhu)菩薩所造的...",
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"'To be a property of the subject, stated concisely and thus comprehensively,' is the characteristic of paksadharmatva (宗法性). Here, only the third 'both-included clause' (ubhayapaksa, 同品定有性、異品遍無性) is taken as its initial aspect (paksadharmatva, 宗法性). Furthermore, this characteristic of paksadharmatva (宗法性) is explained because the initial aspect has the defects of being non-pervasive and indiscriminate. Therefore, 'comprehensiveness' is used to simplify and remove non-pervasiveness, which is the characteristic of paksadharmatva (宗法性). The term 'comprehensiveness' is only used to simplify and remove non-pervasiveness, and it is not the true aspect (svarupa-hetu, 自性因) of the reason (hetu, 理由、原因). Therefore, it cannot be used as paksadharmatva (宗法性). What is removed by 'simplification' is the pervasiveness in non-paksadharmatva (宗法性). If this explanation is made, there is no statement that the comprehensiveness of the initial clause is not paksadharmatva (宗法性). This initial clause belongs to the fourth 'both-excluded clause' (ubhayavyavrtti, 同品異品皆無), because the subject (paksa, 論題) and the reason are different entities and cannot be said to be comprehensive.",
"'Definitely present in similar instances.'",
"Commentary: This is the second aspect (rupa, 形式).",
"'Similar instances' are like jars, as explained below. 'Definitely present' means that pervasiveness is a characteristic of paksadharmatva (宗法性). The reason of being produced (krtakatva, 有為性) is definitely present in jars, which are similar instances (sapaksa, 同類), and this is the aspect (rupa, 形式) of the reason. Here, 'being produced' is mainly taken, and 'impermanence' is also taken. Question: The reason of being produced is the dharma (法) of the proponent's school, so why is it said that it is also present on jars? Answer: It is like threading yellow and red flowers with a single thread. The thread that threads the yellow flowers does not actually thread the red flowers, but the thread is the same, so it is said that the yellow and red flowers are threaded. It is the same here. The reason of being produced penetrates sound and jars. The being produced of sound does not actually produce the being produced of jars, but they are the same, so it is said that jars have this characteristic. Therefore, the *Adornment of the Jewel Palm* and other treatises say that the meaning of the reason should not be distinguished. Question: Sound and jars both have the characteristic of being produced. These two aspects (rupa, 形式) are combined as the reason, and impermanence penetrates sound and jars, indicating that the subject (paksa, 論題) is established in both places? Answer: Being produced is established in both places, so these two aspects (rupa, 形式) are combined as the reason. Impermanence is established in jars but not in sound, so how can it be said that the subject is established in both places?",
"'Universally absent in dissimilar instances.'",
"Commentary: This is the third aspect (rupa, 形式).",
"'Dissimilar instances' are like space, as explained below. 'Universally absent' means that pervasiveness is a characteristic of paksadharmatva (宗法性). The reason of being produced (krtakatva, 有為性) is universally absent in space, which is a dissimilar instance (vipaksa, 異類). This is the third aspect (rupa, 形式). Here, 'being absent' is mainly taken, and 'being able to be absent' is also taken as a constant. Question: Why is it said that 'definitely present' only in similar instances, and 'universally' is not mentioned? Answer: To comply with the establishment of presence in similar instances, it is sufficient to determine presence to comply with the establishment and prevent indiscriminate application. However, if absence in dissimilar instances is established, it cannot prevent indiscriminate application if it is not pervasive. Therefore, 'definitely' is used for similar instances, and 'universally' is used for dissimilar instances. Question: Why are only these three aspects (rupa, 形式) established? Answer: There are no other aspects (rupa, 形式) that can be established. Moreover, the first aspect (rupa, 形式) is the main one, mainly for the proof (sadhana, 能立), and it needs the help of companions to achieve it, so the second one is needed. Although there are principal and accompanying factors, its indiscriminate application has not been eliminated, so the third aspect (rupa, 形式) of absence in dissimilar instances is needed. The principal and accompanying factors prevent indiscriminate application, and its meaning is complete, sufficient to reveal the subject (paksa, 論題). Why should other aspects (rupa, 形式) be assumed? The masters before Dignaga (陳那) also established three aspects (rupa, 形式). However, the meaning of explaining aspects (rupa, 形式) is essence (svabhava, 自性). The three essences (svabhava, 自性) are different, so it is said that there are three aspects (rupa, 形式). The first aspect (rupa, 形式) is different from the aspects (rupa, 形式) after Dignaga (陳那). The latter two aspects (rupa, 形式) both take the subject (dharmin, 有法) as the essence (svabhava, 自性), such as being produced and impermanence on jars, which both take jars as the essence (svabhava, 自性). Therefore, jars are taken as the second aspect (rupa, 形式). Constant and non-being produced on space take space as the essence (svabhava, 自性). Therefore, space is taken as the third aspect (rupa, 形式). Therefore, what was created by Vasubandhu (世親)..."
]
}
如實論云因有三謂是根本法同類所攝異類相離此論梁時真諦所翻比尋此論似同陳那立三相義同論式論而言陳那已前諸師者即是世親未學時所制論軌論義。
云何名為同品異品。
述曰此逐難解也有二初徴問后解釋此則徴問此問有二一問名二問體云何名者此問名云何為者此問體。
謂所立法均等義品。
述曰此下解釋有二初解同經解異解同中有二一解名二解體解名中初解后結此即解也。
所立法者宗中能別名之為法此法為因所成名所立法均等義品者除宗已外一切有法俱名義品不得名同若彼義品有所立法與宗所立法均等者如此義品方得名同故云所立法均等義品。
說名同品。
述曰此結也。
如立無常瓶等無常。
述曰此下解體初解后結此即解也如立聲是無常瓶等亦有無常以所有無常同故能有瓶等說同品也若言聲瓶無常法法相似即瓶上無常為同品者不然豈可彼因於無常上定有性耶故瓶等有法為同品體若言聲上無常不極成非是因依處瓶上無常兩共許故得是因依者便違比量謂瓶上無常非因依處宗是所立法故因如聲上無常喻。
是名同品。
述曰此結也。
異品者。
述曰此解異也有二初牒后解此即牒也。
謂於是處無其所立。
述曰此下解也有二初解名后解體此即解名也。
所立者即宗中能別法也處者除宗已外一切有法皆名為處處即是品若於是有法品處但無所立宗中能別即名異品。
若有是常見非所作如虛空等。
述曰此解體也
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"《如實論》說,因有三種,即根本法所攝的同類,以及與異類相離。這部論是梁朝(502-557)時期真諦翻譯的。比對這部論,它似乎與陳那所立的三相義相同,也與論式論相同。論中提到的陳那以前的諸師,指的是世親未學習時的論軌論義。",
"什麼是同品和異品?",
"答:這是爲了解決疑難而提出的問題,分為兩部分:首先是提問,然後是解釋。這裡是提問,問題有兩個:一是問名稱,二是問本體。『什麼是』是問名稱,『怎麼樣為』是問本體。",
"答:所謂同品,是指與所立法均等的義品。",
"答:下面是解釋,分為兩部分:先解釋同品,后解釋異品。解釋同品又分為兩部分:先解釋名稱,后解釋本體。這裡是解釋名稱。",
"『所立法』是指宗中能夠區別的,稱之為法。這個法是因所成的,稱為『所立法』。『均等義品』是指除了宗以外,一切有法都稱為義品,不能稱為同品。如果這個義品有所立法與宗的所立法均等,那麼這個義品才能稱為同品,所以說『所立法均等義品』。",
"這叫做同品。",
"答:這是總結。",
"例如,立『無常』,瓶子等也是無常的。",
"答:下面是解釋本體,分為兩部分:先解釋,后總結。這裡是解釋。例如,立『聲音是無常的』,瓶子等也有無常,因為所有的無常相同,所以能有瓶子等,這叫做同品。如果說聲音和瓶子的無常法相似,那麼瓶子上的無常作為同品是不對的,怎麼能說那個因在無常上一定有自性呢?所以瓶子等有法是同品的本體。如果說聲音上的無常不極成,不是因的依據之處,而瓶子上的無常是雙方都認可的,所以可以作為因的依據,那就違背了比量,因為瓶子上的無常不是因的依據之處,宗是所立法,所以因就像聲音上的無常一樣,是比喻。",
"這叫做同品。",
"答:這是總結。",
"異品是指:",
"答:這是解釋異品,分為兩部分:先引用,后解釋。這裡是引用。",
"答:在那個地方沒有所立之法。",
"答:下面是解釋,分為兩部分:先解釋名稱,后解釋本體。這裡是解釋名稱。",
"『所立』就是宗中能夠區別的法。『處』是指除了宗以外,一切有法都稱為處,處就是品。如果在那個有法品處,沒有所立的宗中能夠區別的法,就叫做異品。",
"如果有是常見,不是所作的,比如虛空等。",
"答:這是解釋本體。",
"English version:",
"According to the *Tattvartha-tika* (如實論), there are three aspects of a reason (因): it is included in the same category as the fundamental property (根本法), and it is separate from dissimilar categories (異類). This treatise was translated by Paramartha (真諦) during the Liang Dynasty (梁朝 502-557). Comparing this treatise, it seems to be the same as the three aspects established by Dignāga (陳那), and also the same as the *Nyaya-sutra* (論式論). The teachers before Dignāga mentioned in the treatise refer to the rules and meanings of treatises composed by Vasubandhu (世親) before he studied.",
"What are the *sapaksha* (同品) and *vipaksha* (異品)?",
"Answer: This is a question raised to resolve difficulties, divided into two parts: first, the question, and then the explanation. Here is the question, which has two parts: one asks about the name, and the other asks about the essence. 'What is called' asks about the name, and 'how is' asks about the essence.",
"Answer: The *sapaksha* is the category of things that are equal to the property to be established (所立法).",
"Answer: Below is the explanation, divided into two parts: first, explain the *sapaksha*, and then explain the *vipaksha*. The explanation of the *sapaksha* is further divided into two parts: first, explain the name, and then explain the essence. Here is the explanation of the name.",
"'The property to be established' refers to what can be distinguished in the thesis (宗), which is called a property (法). This property is formed by the reason (因), and is called 'the property to be established'. 'Equal category of things' refers to all existing things except the thesis, which are all called categories of things (義品), and cannot be called *sapaksha*. If this category of things has a property to be established that is equal to the property to be established of the thesis, then this category of things can be called *sapaksha*, so it is said 'equal category of things with the property to be established'.",
"This is called *sapaksha*.",
"Answer: This is the conclusion.",
"For example, establishing 'impermanence', pots and so on are also impermanent.",
"Answer: Below is the explanation of the essence, divided into two parts: first, the explanation, and then the conclusion. Here is the explanation. For example, establishing 'sound is impermanent', pots and so on also have impermanence, because all impermanence is the same, so there can be pots and so on, which is called *sapaksha*. If it is said that the impermanence of sound and pots is similar, then the impermanence on pots as *sapaksha* is not correct. How can it be said that that reason must have its own nature on impermanence? Therefore, existing things such as pots are the essence of *sapaksha*. If it is said that the impermanence on sound is not well-established, and is not the basis of the reason, while the impermanence on pots is recognized by both parties, so it can be used as the basis of the reason, then it violates the inference, because the impermanence on pots is not the basis of the reason, and the thesis is the property to be established, so the reason is like the impermanence on sound, which is a metaphor.",
"This is called *sapaksha*.",
"Answer: This is the conclusion.",
"The *vipaksha* refers to:",
"Answer: This is the explanation of *vipaksha*, divided into two parts: first, the citation, and then the explanation. Here is the citation.",
"Answer: In that place, there is no property to be established.",
"Answer: Below is the explanation, divided into two parts: first, explain the name, and then explain the essence. Here is the explanation of the name.",
"'The property to be established' is the property that can be distinguished in the thesis. 'Place' refers to all existing things except the thesis, which are all called places, and a place is a category. If in that category of existing things there is no property to be established that can be distinguished in the thesis, it is called *vipaksha*.",
"If there is something that is permanent and not created, such as space, etc.",
"Answer: This is the explanation of the essence."
]
}
若有有法無其所立無常即名為常如此常法所依有法謂虛空等是異品體也此中正明異品而言見非所作者此兼釋遍無性也陳那已前一師釋云如立聲無常其空上常能害聲上無常常與無常正相違故名為異品陳那破云若如此釋即令因有非真似過何者如立虛空是常因云非所作故同喻云諸非所作者皆悉是常猶如涅槃異喻云若是無常即是所作如瓶盆等瓶上無常正能違害空上常故得名異品然龜毛等非無常故不能害常即非異品復非常故不名同品此非作因於彼亦轉此即具三相故不可說為似簡濫不盡故不可說為真謂此虛空為如涅槃非所作故即是常耶為如龜毛非所作故非常非無常耶若如此我釋但所立無處名為異品龜毛既無所立常法亦是異品此非所作因既于異品一分轉故是似因也又若常法害無常故名異品者龜毛不能害彼無常即非異品后非無常不名同品若爾應立非同異品其因亦須立有四相不唯三也更一師云如立聲是無常但異無常即是異品陳那破云若如此釋即有畢竟無正因過何者如立聲是無常即聲上無我與無常宗異即是異品其所作因既于異品無我中有便成似因如此隨一有法悉有別義其因皆于別義中轉此即畢竟無正因也如我釋所立無處名為異品則聲等上雖有無我由所立有故非異品因於彼轉得成正因。
此中所作性或勤勇無間所發性。
述曰此下辨體有三一正指體性二約相明體三舉果顯性此即初也。
聲從眾緣所作故曰所作性勤勇者或云是精進或云是作意。
無間所發者從勤勇起心從心起尋伺從尋伺起內風由內風乃至擊唇口等為聲故云或勤勇無間所發性
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"若有一個法,沒有常法可以依附,那麼無常就可以被錯誤地認為是常。這種常法所依附的法,比如虛空等,是與所立宗不同的類別。這裡主要說明異品,認為『見非所作』這句話也解釋了『遍無性』。陳那(Dignāga,約公元480-540年)之前的一位論師解釋說,比如立論『聲音是無常的』,那麼虛空上的常就能否定聲音上的無常,因為常與無常是完全相反的,所以稱為異品。陳那反駁說,如果這樣解釋,就會導致因有『非真似』的過失。比如立論『虛空是常』,理由是『非所作故』,同喻是『凡非所作者,都是常的,比如涅槃』,異喻是『如果是有為無常的,就是所作的,比如瓶盆等』,瓶子上的無常就能否定虛空上的常,所以可以稱為異品。然而,龜毛等不是無常的,所以不能否定常,因此不是異品;又因為不是常,所以不稱為同品。這個『非所作』的因,在彼(龜毛)也成立,這就具備了三相,所以不能說是似因,因為簡別不徹底,所以不能說是真因。也就是說,這個虛空,是像涅槃一樣『非所作故』就是常的呢?還是像龜毛一樣『非所作故』,既不是常也不是無常呢?如果按照我的解釋,只要所立宗沒有常法依附的地方,就稱為異品。龜毛既然沒有所立的常法,也是異品。這個『非所作』的因,既然在異品的一部分上成立,就是似因。另外,如果常法能否定無常,所以稱為異品,那麼龜毛不能否定那個無常,就不是異品;後來因為不是無常,所以不稱為同品。如果這樣,就應該立『非同異品』,那麼因也需要立有四相,不只是三相。還有一位論師說,比如立論『聲音是無常的』,只要與無常不同的,就是異品。陳那反駁說,如果這樣解釋,就會有『畢竟無正因』的過失。比如立論『聲音是無常的』,那麼聲音上的無我與無常的宗義不同,就是異品。這個『所作』的因,既然在異品『無我』中成立,就成了似因。這樣,隨便在一個有法上,都有不同的意義,這個因都在不同的意義中成立,這就是『畢竟無正因』。如果按照我的解釋,所立宗沒有常法依附的地方,就稱為異品,那麼聲音等上面雖然有無我,因為所立宗存在,所以不是異品,因在彼成立,就能成為正因。",
"這裡所說的『所作性』,或者『勤勇無間所發性』。",
"下面解釋體性,有三個方面:一是直接指出體性,二是根據相來闡明體,三是舉出結果來顯示性。這裡是第一個方面。",
"聲音是從眾多因緣所產生的,所以說是『所作性』。『勤勇』,或者說是精進,或者說是作意。",
"『無間所發』,是從勤勇產生心,從心產生尋伺,從尋伺產生內風,由內風乃至衝擊唇口等,才產生聲音,所以說是『或勤勇無間所發性』。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"If there is a dharma (phenomenon, 法) that has no permanent dharma (常法) to rely on, then impermanence (無常) can be mistakenly regarded as permanence (常). The dharma that such a permanent dharma relies on, such as space (虛空), is a different category from the established proposition (所立宗). Here, the focus is on explaining the dissimilar class (異品), considering that the statement 'seeing is not created' also explains 'pervasive non-existence' (遍無性). A teacher before Dignāga (陳那, c. 480-540 CE) explained that, for example, when establishing the proposition 'sound is impermanent,' the permanence in space can negate the impermanence in sound, because permanence and impermanence are completely opposite, hence it is called the dissimilar class. Dignāga refuted that if explained in this way, it would lead to the fault of the reason being a 'non-genuine semblance' (非真似). For example, when establishing the proposition 'space is permanent,' the reason is 'because it is not created' (非所作故), the similar example (同喻) is 'whatever is not created is permanent, like Nirvana (涅槃),' and the dissimilar example (異喻) is 'if it is conditioned and impermanent, then it is created, like pots and pans,' the impermanence on the pot can negate the permanence in space, so it can be called the dissimilar class. However, turtle hair (龜毛) etc. are not impermanent, so they cannot negate permanence, therefore they are not the dissimilar class; and because they are not permanent, they are not called the similar class. This reason of 'not created' also applies to it (turtle hair), which possesses the three characteristics, so it cannot be said to be a semblance of a reason, because the distinction is not thorough, so it cannot be said to be a genuine reason. That is to say, is this space, like Nirvana, 'not created' and therefore permanent? Or is it like turtle hair, 'not created,' and therefore neither permanent nor impermanent? According to my explanation, wherever the established proposition has no permanent dharma to rely on, it is called the dissimilar class. Since turtle hair has no established permanent dharma, it is also the dissimilar class. This reason of 'not created,' since it applies to a part of the dissimilar class, is a semblance of a reason. Furthermore, if permanent dharma can negate impermanence, hence it is called the dissimilar class, then turtle hair cannot negate that impermanence, so it is not the dissimilar class; and later, because it is not impermanent, it is not called the similar class. If so, one should establish a 'non-similar dissimilar class,' then the reason also needs to be established with four characteristics, not just three. Another teacher said that, for example, when establishing the proposition 'sound is impermanent,' whatever is different from impermanence is the dissimilar class. Dignāga refuted that if explained in this way, there would be the fault of 'ultimately no valid reason' (畢竟無正因). For example, when establishing the proposition 'sound is impermanent,' then the non-self (無我) on sound is different from the meaning of impermanence, which is the dissimilar class. This reason of 'created,' since it applies to the non-self in the dissimilar class, becomes a semblance of a reason. In this way, any dharma has different meanings, and this reason applies to different meanings, which is 'ultimately no valid reason.' According to my explanation, wherever the established proposition has no permanent dharma to rely on, it is called the dissimilar class, then although there is non-self on sound etc., because the established proposition exists, it is not the dissimilar class, and the reason applies to it, which can become a valid reason.",
"Here, 'createdness' (所作性), or 'produced without interval by effort' (勤勇無間所發性) is discussed.",
"Below, the nature of the entity is explained in three aspects: first, directly pointing out the nature; second, clarifying the entity based on characteristics; and third, illustrating the nature by citing the result. This is the first aspect.",
"Sound is produced from numerous causes and conditions, so it is said to be 'createdness.' 'Effort' (勤勇) is sometimes said to be diligence (精進) or attention (作意).",
"'Produced without interval' (無間所發) means that from effort arises mind, from mind arises seeking and investigation (尋伺), from seeking and investigation arises inner wind, and from inner wind, even striking the lips and mouth, sound is produced, so it is said to be 'produced without interval by effort.'"
]
}
問宗既是一因何二耶答宗亦有二一寬謂立內外聲是無常此即唯以所作為因二狹謂立內聲無常即是勤勇所發為因其所作性望此狹宗雖亦成因以太寬故但取勤勇發以為因也以釋但約遍是宗法又釋今此亦望同品有遍不遍故有二也謂所作性因同品遍有勤勇發因同品不遍此二隨一俱得為因故宗雖一因說二也因此略辨同異二品遍不遍義若總攝之可為四句一同有異無謂第二第八兩句二同無異有謂第四第六兩句三同有異有謂餘四句四同無異無謂第五句此有九句一同品有異品有如立聲常因云所量性故二同品有異品非有如立聲是無常因云所作性故三同品有異品有非有如立聲是勤勇無間所發因云無常性故四同品非有異品有如立聲常因云所作性故五同品非有異品非有如立聲常因云所聞性故六同品非有異品有非有如立聲常因云勤勇無間所發性故七同品有非有異品有如立聲非勤勇無間所發因云無常性故八同品有非有異品非有如立聲無常因云勤勇無間所發性故九同品有非有異品有非有如立聲常因云無質礙故此九句中第二第八是正因第四第六是相違因余之五句並不定今此中言所作性者即第二句勤勇無間所發性者即第八句其所作因既以無常為宗即以瓶等為同品于彼遍有以空等為異品于彼遍無故是第二同品有異品非有句其勤勇發因宗既同前亦以電瓶為其同品于瓶等有于電等無以空等為異品于彼遍無故是第八同品有非有異品非有句也。
余不定相違至文自釋。
遍是宗法于同品定有于異品遍無。
述曰此約相明體也如此二因若具三相為正因體若𨷂一相即非正因故
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"問:既然『宗』(Sādhyavākya,論題)是一個,為什麼『因』(Hetu,理由)會有兩種呢?",
"答:『因』也有兩種:一是寬泛的『因』,即認為內外之『聲』(Śabda,聲音)是無常的,這僅僅以『所作性』(Kṛtakatva,被製造的性質)作為『因』。二是狹義的『因』,即認為內在的『聲』是無常的,這是由『勤勇』(Prayatna,努力)所引發的作為『因』。『所作性』相對於這個狹義的『宗』來說,雖然也能成為『因』,但因為它過於寬泛,所以只取『勤勇』引發作為『因』。這是爲了解釋只就周遍性而言才是『宗法』(Pakṣadharmatva,宗的性質)。",
"又解釋說,現在這個『因』相對於『同品』(Sapakṣa,相似例子)來說,有周遍和不周遍兩種情況,所以說『因』有兩種。即『所作性』這個『因』在『同品』中是周遍的,而『勤勇』引發這個『因』在『同品』中是不周遍的。這兩種情況都可以作為『因』,所以『宗』雖然只有一個,但『因』卻說了兩種。",
"因此,簡略地辨別『同品』和『異品』(Vipakṣa,相異例子)的周遍和不周遍的意義,如果總括起來,可以分為四句:一是『同』有『異』無,如第二句和第八句;二是『同』無『異』有,如第四句和第六句;三是『同』有『異』有,如其餘四句;四是『同』無『異』無,如第五句。這裡有九句:一是『同品』有,『異品』有,如立『聲常』,『因』是『所量性』;二是『同品』有,『異品』非有,如立『聲是無常』,『因』是『所作性』;三是『同品』有,『異品』有非有,如立『聲是勤勇無間所發』,『因』是『無常性』;四是『同品』非有,『異品』有,如立『聲常』,『因』是『所作性』;五是『同品』非有,『異品』非有,如立『聲常』,『因』是『所聞性』;六是『同品』非有,『異品』有非有,如立『聲常』,『因』是『勤勇無間所發性』;七是『同品』有非有,『異品』有,如立『聲非勤勇無間所發』,『因』是『無常性』;八是『同品』有非有,『異品』非有,如立『聲無常』,『因』是『勤勇無間所發性』;九是『同品』有非有,『異品』有非有,如立『聲常』,『因』是『無質礙』。",
"這九句中,第二句和第八句是正『因』,第四句和第六句是相違『因』,其餘五句是不定『因』。現在這裡所說的『所作性』,就是第二句;『勤勇無間所發性』,就是第八句。『所作』之『因』既然以『無常』為『宗』,就以瓶子等為『同品』,在瓶子等中是周遍存在的;以虛空等為『異品』,在虛空等中是周遍不存在的,所以是第二句『同品』有,『異品』非有。『勤勇』引發之『因』,『宗』既然與前面相同,也以電和瓶子作為它的『同品』,在瓶子等中存在,在閃電等中不存在;以虛空等作為『異品』,在虛空等中是周遍不存在的,所以是第八句『同品』有非有,『異品』非有。",
"其餘不定和相違的特徵,到經文時會自行解釋。",
"周遍性是『宗法』,在『同品』中必定存在,在『異品』中周遍不存在。",
"述曰:這是從相上來闡明它的體性。像這兩種『因』,如果具備三種特徵,就是正『因』的體性;如果缺少一種特徵,就不是正『因』。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"Question: Since the 'Sādhyavākya' (thesis, the proposition to be proved) is one, why are there two types of 'Hetu' (reason, the ground for the inference)?",
"Answer: There are also two types of 'Hetu': one is the broad 'Hetu', which considers that the internal and external 'Śabda' (sound) is impermanent, and this takes only 'Kṛtakatva' (the property of being produced, being made) as the 'Hetu'. The second is the narrow 'Hetu', which considers that the internal 'Śabda' is impermanent, and this takes 'Prayatna' (effort, exertion) as the cause. Although 'Kṛtakatva' can also be a 'Hetu' in relation to this narrow 'Sādhyavākya', it is too broad, so only 'Prayatna' is taken as the 'Hetu'. This is to explain that only in terms of pervasiveness is it 'Pakṣadharmatva' (the property of being present in the subject).",
"It is also explained that the current 'Hetu' has two situations in relation to 'Sapakṣa' (similar instances): pervasive and non-pervasive, so it is said that there are two types of 'Hetu'. That is, the 'Hetu' of 'Kṛtakatva' is pervasive in 'Sapakṣa', while the 'Hetu' of 'Prayatna' is not pervasive in 'Sapakṣa'. Both of these situations can be taken as 'Hetu', so although there is only one 'Sādhyavākya', two types of 'Hetu' are mentioned.",
"Therefore, briefly distinguish the meanings of pervasiveness and non-pervasiveness of 'Sapakṣa' and 'Vipakṣa' (dissimilar instances). If summarized, it can be divided into four sentences: first, 'same' has, 'different' does not have, such as the second and eighth sentences; second, 'same' does not have, 'different' has, such as the fourth and sixth sentences; third, 'same' has, 'different' has, such as the remaining four sentences; fourth, 'same' does not have, 'different' does not have, such as the fifth sentence. There are nine sentences here: first, 'Sapakṣa' has, 'Vipakṣa' has, such as establishing 'sound is eternal', the 'Hetu' is 'measurability'; second, 'Sapakṣa' has, 'Vipakṣa' does not have, such as establishing 'sound is impermanent', the 'Hetu' is 'Kṛtakatva'; third, 'Sapakṣa' has, 'Vipakṣa' has and does not have, such as establishing 'sound is produced without interval by effort', the 'Hetu' is 'impermanence'; fourth, 'Sapakṣa' does not have, 'Vipakṣa' has, such as establishing 'sound is eternal', the 'Hetu' is 'Kṛtakatva'; fifth, 'Sapakṣa' does not have, 'Vipakṣa' does not have, such as establishing 'sound is eternal', the 'Hetu' is 'audibility'; sixth, 'Sapakṣa' does not have, 'Vipakṣa' has and does not have, such as establishing 'sound is eternal', the 'Hetu' is 'being produced without interval by effort'; seventh, 'Sapakṣa' has and does not have, 'Vipakṣa' has, such as establishing 'sound is not produced without interval by effort', the 'Hetu' is 'impermanence'; eighth, 'Sapakṣa' has and does not have, 'Vipakṣa' does not have, such as establishing 'sound is impermanent', the 'Hetu' is 'being produced without interval by effort'; ninth, 'Sapakṣa' has and does not have, 'Vipakṣa' has and does not have, such as establishing 'sound is eternal', the 'Hetu' is 'non-obstruction'.",
"Among these nine sentences, the second and eighth sentences are the correct 'Hetu', the fourth and sixth sentences are the contradictory 'Hetu', and the remaining five sentences are the uncertain 'Hetu'. The 'Kṛtakatva' mentioned here is the second sentence; 'being produced without interval by effort' is the eighth sentence. Since the 'Hetu' of 'being produced' takes 'impermanence' as the 'Sādhyavākya', it takes pots, etc., as 'Sapakṣa', which are pervasive in pots, etc.; it takes space, etc., as 'Vipakṣa', which are pervasive in not existing in space, etc., so it is the second sentence 'Sapakṣa' has, 'Vipakṣa' does not have. Since the 'Sādhyavākya' of the 'Hetu' of 'Prayatna' is the same as before, it also takes lightning and pots as its 'Sapakṣa', which exists in pots, etc., and does not exist in lightning, etc.; it takes space, etc., as 'Vipakṣa', which is pervasive in not existing in space, etc., so it is the eighth sentence 'Sapakṣa' has and does not have, 'Vipakṣa' does not have.",
"The remaining characteristics of uncertainty and contradiction will be explained in the text itself.",
"Pervasiveness is 'Pakṣadharmatva', which must exist in 'Sapakṣa' and is pervasive in not existing in 'Vipakṣa'.",
"Commentary: This is to clarify its nature from the aspect. Like these two types of 'Hetu', if they have three characteristics, they are the nature of the correct 'Hetu'; if they lack one characteristic, they are not the correct 'Hetu'."
]
}
約三相明因體也。
是無常等因。
述曰此舉果顯性也此之二因能成無常等者等取無我苦空也既能成立無常等故顯是正因問宗但無常非無我等何故所作亦是彼因答正成無常兼立無我故所作性亦是彼因何者其無常宗言中正顯其無我等唯自意許然順無常以無常者必無我故又與所作性不相違故所作性正成無常傍成無我及苦空也謂聲亦無我苦空所作性故猶如瓶等。
喻有二種。
述曰此下解喻有三一舉數二列名三別釋此即舉數也本音云達利瑟吒案多此云見邊謂比度之心為見宗義究竟名邊吒因顯宗未極立喻令義至邊故曰見邊今依舊譯故云喻問所作三相顯義已周何須因外別申兩喻答所作性正因唯能詮顯初相后二未了故以兩喻明之論其體性即前因也。
一者同法二者異法。
述曰此列名也。
同法者。
述曰此下別解有二一解同法二解異法解同法中初牒章后解釋此即牒章也。
若於是處顯因同品決定有性。
述曰此下解釋有二初懸解后指體此即懸解也。
處謂有法顯謂顯說。
因者謂即遍是宗法因。
同品謂與此因相似非謂宗同名同品也。
決定有性者謂決定有所立法性也此謂隨有有法處有與因法相似之法複決定有所立法性是同法喻此則同有因法宗法名同法喻若同有因法宗法不同有者雖名同法而非喻也故下論云此因以樂以空為同法故亦是不定。
謂若所作見彼無常。
述曰此下指體初正指體后舉所依此即正指體也謂若所作即前顯因同品也。
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"約略來說,『三相』(Trilakṣaṇa)的明因(Hetu)是本體。",
"也就是無常(Anitya)等因。",
"註釋:這裡所說是揭示結果的性質。這兩種因能夠成立無常等,『等』字包括無我(Anātman)、苦(Duḥkha)、空(Śūnyatā)。既然能夠成立無常等,就顯示這是正因。問:宗(Pakṣa)只是無常,不是無我等,為什麼『所作』(Kṛta)也是那些的因?答:正是成立無常,兼立無我,所以『所作性』(Kṛtatva)也是那些的因。什麼意思呢?那無常宗的言語中,正是顯示其無我等,只是自己意許。然而順應無常,以無常者必定無我。又與『所作性』不相違,所以『所作性』正是成立無常,順帶成立無我以及苦空。例如聲音也是無我、苦、空,因為它具有『所作性』,就像瓶子等。",
"比喻有兩種。",
"註釋:下面解釋比喻有三個方面:一是舉出數量,二是列出名稱,三是分別解釋。這裡是舉出數量。本來的讀音是『達利瑟吒案多』(dṛṣṭānta),這裡叫做『見邊』,意思是比度的用心,爲了見到宗義的究竟,稱為『邊』。因顯示宗義還沒有達到極點,立比喻使意義達到邊際,所以叫做『見邊』。現在依舊翻譯,所以叫做『喻』。問:『所作』的三相顯示意義已經完備,為什麼需要在因之外另外闡述兩種比喻?答:『所作性』正因只能詮釋顯示初相,后兩相還沒有明瞭,所以用兩種比喻來說明。論其體性,就是前面的因。",
"一是同法(Sādharmya),二是異法(Vaidharmya)。",
"註釋:這裡是列出名稱。",
"同法是:",
"註釋:下面分別解釋,分為兩部分:一是解釋同法,二是解釋異法。解釋同法中,先是標出章節,然後是解釋。這裡是標出章節。",
"如果在某個地方顯示因與同品決定具有的性質。",
"註釋:下面解釋分為兩部分:一是懸空解釋,二是指出本體。這裡是懸空解釋。",
"『處』是指有法(Dharmin),『顯』是指顯說。",
"『因』是指周遍的宗法因(Hetu)。",
"『同品』是指與此因相似,不是指與宗相同,名稱相同,叫做同品。",
"『決定有性』是指決定具有所立法的性質。這是說,凡是有有法的地方,有與因法相似的法,並且決定具有所立法的性質,這就是同法喻。這裡是指共同具有因法和宗法的,叫做同法喻。如果共同具有因法,宗法不同有,即使叫做同法,也不是比喻。所以下面的論述說,這個因以樂(Sukha)和空(Śūnyatā)作為同法,也是不定。",
"例如凡是所作,可見其無常。",
"註釋:下面指出本體,先是正式指出本體,然後舉出所依據。這裡是正式指出本體。例如凡是所作,就是前面的顯因同品。",
""
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"Roughly speaking, the illuminating cause (Hetu) of the 'Three Marks' (Trilakṣaṇa) is the entity itself.",
"That is, causes such as impermanence (Anitya).",
"Commentary: This refers to revealing the nature of the result. These two causes can establish impermanence, etc. 'Etc.' includes selflessness (Anātman), suffering (Duḥkha), and emptiness (Śūnyatā). Since they can establish impermanence, etc., it shows that this is a valid cause. Question: The thesis (Pakṣa) is only impermanence, not selflessness, etc. Why is 'produced' (Kṛta) also the cause of those? Answer: It precisely establishes impermanence and concurrently establishes selflessness, so 'produceness' (Kṛtatva) is also the cause of those. What does this mean? In the statement of the impermanence thesis, it precisely reveals its selflessness, etc., only with one's own intention. However, conforming to impermanence, that which is impermanent must be selfless. Moreover, it does not contradict 'produceness,' so 'produceness' precisely establishes impermanence and incidentally establishes selflessness, as well as suffering and emptiness. For example, sound is also selfless, suffering, and empty because it has 'produceness,' like a pot, etc.",
"There are two types of analogy (Upamā).",
"Commentary: The following explains analogy in three aspects: first, stating the number; second, listing the names; and third, explaining them separately. Here, it states the number. The original pronunciation is 'dṛṣṭānta,' which is called 'seeing the edge' here, meaning the mind of comparison, in order to see the ultimate meaning of the thesis, it is called 'edge.' Because the cause showing the thesis has not reached the extreme, establishing an analogy makes the meaning reach the edge, so it is called 'seeing the edge.' Now, it is translated as before, so it is called 'analogy.' Question: The three aspects of 'produced' have already fully shown the meaning, why is it necessary to separately elaborate on two types of analogy outside of the cause? Answer: The 'produceness' valid cause can only interpret and show the initial aspect, the latter two aspects are not yet clear, so two types of analogy are used to explain it. Discussing its entity, it is the previous cause.",
"One is similarity (Sādharmya), and the other is difference (Vaidharmya).",
"Commentary: Here, it lists the names.",
"Similarity is:",
"Commentary: The following explains them separately, divided into two parts: first, explaining similarity; second, explaining difference. In explaining similarity, first, the chapter is marked, and then it is explained. Here, the chapter is marked.",
"If in a certain place, it shows the nature that the cause and similar instances definitely possess.",
"Commentary: The following explanation is divided into two parts: first, a suspended explanation; second, pointing out the entity. Here is the suspended explanation.",
"'Place' refers to the subject (Dharmin), 'show' refers to explicit statement.",
"'Cause' refers to the pervasive cause of the thesis (Hetu).",
"'Similar instances' refers to those similar to this cause, not those that are the same as the thesis or have the same name, called similar instances.",
"'Definitely possessing nature' refers to definitely possessing the nature of the established dharma. This means that wherever there is a subject, there is a dharma similar to the cause, and it definitely possesses the nature of the established dharma, this is the analogy of similarity. This refers to jointly possessing the cause and the thesis, called the analogy of similarity. If they jointly possess the cause, but the thesis is not possessed, even if it is called similarity, it is not an analogy. Therefore, the following discussion says that this cause uses happiness (Sukha) and emptiness (Śūnyatā) as similarity, and it is also uncertain.",
"For example, whatever is produced can be seen as impermanent.",
"Commentary: The following points out the entity, first formally pointing out the entity, and then citing the basis. Here is the formal pointing out of the entity. For example, whatever is produced is the previous illuminating cause similar instance."
]
}
見彼無常即前決定有性也謂所作性去處世間愚智同知無常必定隨去猶如母牛去處犢子必隨逐也。
譬如瓶等。
述曰此舉所依也即懸解中若舍是處也此喻意云所作去至瓶等上其無常性即在瓶故知所作至聲上其無常性亦在聲問所譬之因體唯所作何故能喻乃取無常答因體正是所作故言即兼無常引喻若闕無常何得名為同喻故正取所作兼取無常為同法喻問故言含無常因外立宗分同喻有二立何故合為支答夫立論先須有宗故言雖含支別同喻雖有兩齊助因故同支有釋世親等云瓶上所作聲上所作二因法合名為同法陳那破云若以瓶所作是無常故類聲所作亦無常者亦應瓶是所作可見可燒聲是所作可燒見燒見既不類瓶何得無常類聲陳那解云聲上所作顯無常同瓶上所作顯無常以此同彼故名同法但取能同不取所同者此恐不然若世親等以瓶所作故無常類聲所作亦無常即難云瓶是所作可見燒聲是所作可燒見者陳那既以聲上所作顯無常同瓶上所作顯無常何可聲有所作可見燒同瓶所作可燒見若言世親等以外瓶所作無常類內聲所作亦無常故以外瓶可燒見類聲亦爾者陳那既以內聲所作無常類外瓶所作亦無常何不以內聲所作可見燒類瓶亦爾也若言燒見是外瓶不可以聲類燒見亦應無常是外瓶何得以聲類無常此則陳那過同舊釋雖分內外終不能異又集量論中陳那云論軌論中以瓶有法為同喻者其論非是世親所造或是世親未學時造學成已后造論式論即以所作無常為同喻體不異我義集量論中既有此說何得云世親以瓶所作無常向內類聲即有類瓶可燒等過今釋可燒等過但破論軌論等以瓶有
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"見到那無常之物,就應該預先決定它具有生滅的本性。也就是說,『所作性』(一切由因緣和合而生的事物所具有的性質)無論在世間愚人還是智者看來,都知道無常必定會隨之而去,就像母牛走到哪裡,小牛必定會跟隨一樣。",
"譬如瓶子等。",
"解釋:這裡舉出所依之物。也就是懸解中所說的『如果捨棄這個處所』。這個比喻的意思是,所作之物如果去到瓶子上,那麼它的無常性就在瓶子上;因此可知,所作之物如果去到聲音上,那麼它的無常性也在聲音上。問:作為比喻的原因,本體只是『所作』,為什麼能夠作為比喻呢?乃至於要取『無常』?答:原因的本體正是『所作』,所以說『即』也兼有『無常』的含義,用來引申比喻。如果缺少『無常』,怎麼能稱作『同喻』呢?所以正是取『所作』,兼取『無常』作為『同法喻』。問:所以說包含『無常』,在原因之外又建立了宗分,『同喻』有兩部分,為什麼合為一個支分呢?答:確立論點首先必須有宗,所以說雖然包含支分的區別,『同喻』雖然有兩方面,但都是爲了輔助原因,所以同爲一個支分。有解釋說世親等人認為,瓶子上的『所作』和聲音上的『所作』,這兩種原因法合在一起稱為『同法』。陳那反駁說,如果因為瓶子的『所作』是無常的,所以類比聲音的『所作』也是無常的,那麼也應該瓶子是『所作』,可以看見可以燒燬,聲音是『所作』,可以燒燬可以看見燒燬。既然燒燬和看見燒燬不像瓶子,怎麼能用無常來類比聲音呢?陳那解釋說,聲音上的『所作』顯示無常,與瓶子上的『所作』顯示無常,以此相同,所以稱為『同法』。只是取能相同的,不取所相同的,恐怕不對。如果世親等人認為,外在的瓶子的『所作』是無常的,類比內在的聲音的『所作』也是無常的,那麼就難以用外在的瓶子可以燒燬可以看見,來類比聲音也是如此。陳那既然以內在的聲音的『所作』無常,來類比外在的瓶子的『所作』也是無常,為什麼不用內在的聲音的『所作』可以看見可以燒燬,來類比瓶子也是如此呢?如果說燒燬和看見是外在的瓶子,不能用聲音來類比,那麼也應該無常是外在的瓶子,怎麼能用聲音來類比無常呢?那麼這就是陳那的過失,和舊的解釋相同,雖然區分內外,最終也不能區分。又在《集量論》中,陳那說,論軌論中以瓶子有法作為同喻的,那個論不是世親所造,或是世親未學習時所造,學習完成以後造論式論,即以所作無常為同喻體,不異我的義。集量論中既然有此說,怎麼能說世親以瓶子所作無常向內類比聲音,即有類比瓶子可以燒燬等的過失。現在的解釋可以燒燬等的過失,只是破論軌論等以瓶子有",
""
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Upon seeing impermanent things, one should predetermine that they possess the nature of arising and ceasing. That is to say, the 'nature of being made' (the quality possessed by all things that arise from the combination of causes and conditions), whether viewed by fools or the wise in the world, is known to be inevitably followed by impermanence, just as a calf inevitably follows wherever its mother cow goes.",
"For example, like a bottle, etc.",
"Explanation: This cites the object upon which it depends. That is, what is said in the suspended explanation, 'if this place is abandoned'. The meaning of this analogy is that if a made thing goes to a bottle, then its impermanence is in the bottle; therefore, it can be known that if a made thing goes to a sound, then its impermanence is also in the sound. Question: As the cause of the analogy, the substance is only 'made', why can it be used as an analogy? And why is 'impermanence' taken? Answer: The substance of the cause is precisely 'made', so it is said that 'is' also includes the meaning of 'impermanence', used to extend the analogy. If 'impermanence' is lacking, how can it be called 'homologous analogy'? Therefore, it is precisely taking 'made', and also taking 'impermanence' as 'homologous dharma analogy'. Question: Therefore, it is said to include 'impermanence', and a thesis division is established outside of the cause, 'homologous analogy' has two parts, why are they combined into one branch? Answer: Establishing a thesis must first have a proposition, so it is said that although it contains branch distinctions, 'homologous analogy' although it has two aspects, they are both to assist the cause, so they are the same branch. There are explanations that Vasubandhu and others believe that the 'made' on the bottle and the 'made' on the sound, these two causal dharmas combined are called 'homologous dharma'. Dignāga refuted, saying that if because the 'made' of the bottle is impermanent, so by analogy the 'made' of the sound is also impermanent, then it should also be that the bottle is 'made', can be seen and can be burned, the sound is 'made', can be burned and can be seen burned. Since burning and seeing burning are not like a bottle, how can impermanence be used to analogize sound? Dignāga explained that the 'made' on the sound shows impermanence, the same as the 'made' on the bottle shows impermanence, with this similarity, it is called 'homologous dharma'. It is only taking what can be the same, not taking what is the same, I am afraid it is not right. If Vasubandhu and others believe that the 'made' of the external bottle is impermanent, analogizing that the 'made' of the internal sound is also impermanent, then it is difficult to use the external bottle that can be burned and can be seen, to analogize that the sound is also like this. Since Dignāga uses the 'made' of the internal sound as impermanent, to analogize that the 'made' of the external bottle is also impermanent, why not use the 'made' of the internal sound that can be seen and can be burned, to analogize that the bottle is also like this? If it is said that burning and seeing are external bottles, and cannot be analogized with sound, then it should also be that impermanence is an external bottle, how can impermanence be analogized with sound? Then this is Dignāga's fault, and the old explanation is the same, although distinguishing inside and outside, it cannot be distinguished in the end. Also, in the *Compendium on Valid Cognition*, Dignāga said that in the *Treatise on Reasoning*, using the bottle having dharma as a homologous analogy, that treatise was not created by Vasubandhu, or was created by Vasubandhu when he had not yet learned, after completing his studies, he created the treatise on reasoning style, that is, taking made impermanence as the homologous analogy substance, not different from my meaning. Since there is this saying in the *Compendium on Valid Cognition*, how can it be said that Vasubandhu uses the made impermanence of the bottle to internally analogize sound, that is, there is the fault of analogizing the bottle that can be burned, etc. The current explanation can burn, etc., the fault is only breaking the *Treatise on Reasoning*, etc., using the bottle having"
]
}
法為同喻者此等師云瓶有無常同彼聲宗故名同法此即瓶體是同喻也此師立量云聲是無常因云所作性故同喻云如瓶謂如瓶是無常也陳那破云若直以瓶為同法喻以瓶體是無常故類聲亦是無常者亦應瓶是四塵可見燒聲亦四塵可燒見若如我釋諸所作者皆是無常以為喻體瓶等非喻是所依即無此過問瓶是所作故無常即類聲有所作亦無常亦應瓶有所作可燒可見聲有所作可燒見此則過同古師陳那何故倒破答陳那但取所作無常以為喻體不取四塵不可難言聲類瓶等可見可燒若彼強於喻體之外作此難者此即自違古師既取瓶等為喻體瓶具四塵可燒可見故得難云瓶可燒可見聲亦應爾問若作此難豈不自違答夫喻況法法必似喻古師既以瓶喻于聲此則古師理合自許可燒可見非見難者強難類瓶故作此難無自違過問如實論中既明因有三相何故同喻不即第二相耶答其第二相以合支顯謂瓶是所作瓶即無常當知聲既所作亦是無常故同法喻但取瓶等余破者在理門此中略不繁述。
異法者。
述曰此解異喻也有二初牒章后解釋此即牒章也。
若於是處說所立無因遍非有。
述曰此下解釋有三一懸解二指體三通難此即初也處謂有法處說所立無者說所立宗法無也因遍非有者能立因法遍非有也此則正取所無因法兼取能無宗法名異法喻若但無因法即名異法者同品非有應是異喻。
謂若是常見非所作。
述曰此下指體也初正指體后舉所依此即初也謂若是常者即前說所立無也見非所作者即前因遍非有。
如虛空等。
述曰此舉所依也等者等取擇滅非擇
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『法為同喻』,這些老師說,『瓶子是無常的』,與『聲音』的宗義相同,所以稱為『同法』。這裡,『瓶子』的本體就是『同喻』。這位老師立論說:『聲音是無常的,因為它是被製造出來的』。同喻是:『如瓶子』,意思是『如瓶子是無常的』。陳那(Dignāga)駁斥說:『如果直接以瓶子作為同法喻,因為瓶子的本體是無常的,所以類比聲音也是無常的,那麼也應該瓶子是四大塵可見的,燒瓶子聲音也應該是四大塵可燒可見的。如果像我解釋的那樣,所有被製造出來的都是無常的,以此作為喻體,瓶子等不是喻體,而是所依,就沒有這個過失。』問:『瓶子是被製造出來的,所以是無常的,類比聲音是被製造出來的,也是無常的,也應該瓶子是被製造出來的,可以燒,可以見,聲音是被製造出來的,可以燒,可以見。』這就有和古師一樣的過失。陳那為什麼反過來駁斥呢?答:陳那只是取『所作』、『無常』作為喻體,不取四大塵,所以不能用『聲音類比瓶子等可見可燒』來責難。如果他們強行在喻體之外提出這個責難,這就是自己違背了古師。古師既然取瓶子等作為喻體,瓶子具有四大塵,可以燒,可以見,所以可以責難說『瓶子可以燒可以見,聲音也應該如此』。問:『如果這樣責難,豈不是自己違背了自己?』答:比喻的法,法必然相似於比喻。古師既然用瓶子比喻聲音,那麼古師在理上就應該允許可以燒可以見,責難者強行類比瓶子,所以才這樣責難,沒有自己違背自己的過失。問:『《如實論》中已經明確因有三相,為什麼同喻不是第二相呢?』答:第二相用合支來顯示,意思是『瓶子是被製造出來的,瓶子就是無常的,應當知道聲音是被製造出來的,也是無常的』,所以同法喻只是取瓶子等,其餘的駁斥在理門中,這裡略去不詳細敘述。",
"『異法』。",
"述曰:這解釋的是異喻,有二,首先是標出章節,然後是解釋,這裡是標出章節。",
"『如果在這個地方說所立的宗沒有,因也普遍沒有。』",
"述曰:下面是解釋,有三,一是懸解,二是指出體性,三是通難,這裡是第一個。『處』是指有法之處,『說所立無』是指說所立的宗法沒有。『因遍非有』是指能立的因法普遍沒有。這裡是正式取沒有的因法,兼取能沒有的宗法,稱為異法喻。如果只是沒有因法,就稱為異法,那麼同品非有就應該是異喻。",
"『如果說是常,就不是所作。』",
"述曰:下面是指體性,首先是正式指出體性,然後是舉出所依,這裡是第一個。『如果說是常』,就是前面說的『所立無』。『見非所作』,就是前面說的『因遍非有』。",
"『如虛空等。』",
"述曰:這是舉出所依。『等』字,等同於取擇滅、非擇滅。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'The law is a similar example (法為同喻)' These teachers say, 'A pot is impermanent (瓶有無常),' which is the same as the tenet of 'sound (聲)' therefore it is called 'same law (同法).' Here, the substance of 'pot (瓶)' is the 'similar example (同喻).' This teacher establishes the argument: 'Sound is impermanent, because it is produced (所作性).' The similar example is: 'Like a pot (如瓶),' meaning 'like a pot is impermanent.' Dignāga (陳那) refutes: 'If you directly take a pot as a similar example of the same law, because the substance of the pot is impermanent, therefore, by analogy, sound is also impermanent, then it should also be that the pot is visible as the four elements (四大塵), and burning the pot, the sound should also be visible and burnable as the four elements. If, as I explain, all that is produced is impermanent, and this is taken as the example, then pots, etc., are not the example but the support (所依), then there is no fault.' Question: 'A pot is produced, therefore it is impermanent, by analogy, sound is produced, and is also impermanent, it should also be that a pot is produced, can be burned, and can be seen, and sound is produced, can be burned, and can be seen.' This has the same fault as the ancient teachers. Why does Dignāga refute it in reverse? Answer: Dignāga only takes 'produced (所作)' and 'impermanent (無常)' as the example, and does not take the four elements, so you cannot use 'sound is analogous to pots, etc., visible and burnable' to criticize. If they forcibly raise this criticism outside the example, then this is self-contradictory to the ancient teachers. Since the ancient teachers took pots, etc., as the example, and pots have the four elements, can be burned, and can be seen, therefore it can be criticized by saying 'pots can be burned and can be seen, and sound should also be like this.' Question: 'If you criticize in this way, wouldn't you be contradicting yourself?' Answer: The law of analogy must be similar to the example. Since the ancient teachers used pots to analogize sound, then the ancient teachers should logically allow it to be burnable and visible, the critic forcibly analogizes pots, so that's why they criticize in this way, there is no self-contradiction. Question: 'The *Nyāyapraveśa* (如實論) has already clarified that the reason has three characteristics, why isn't the similar example of the same law the second characteristic?' Answer: The second characteristic is shown by the *sapakṣa* (合支), meaning 'a pot is produced, a pot is impermanent, it should be known that sound is produced, and is also impermanent,' therefore the similar example of the same law only takes pots, etc., the rest of the refutations are in the *Hetuvidya* (理門), which will not be described in detail here.",
"'Different law (異法)'",
"Commentary: This explains the dissimilar example, there are two, first is to state the chapter, then is to explain, here is stating the chapter.",
"'If in this place it is said that the proposition to be established is absent, and the reason is also universally absent.'",
"Commentary: Below is the explanation, there are three, one is the preliminary explanation, two is to point out the substance, three is to resolve the difficulty, here is the first one. 'Place (處)' refers to the place where the subject exists, 'say the proposition to be established is absent (說所立無)' refers to saying that the proposition to be established is absent. 'The reason is universally absent (因遍非有)' refers to the reason to be established is universally absent. Here, it is formally taking the absent reason, and also taking the absent proposition, which is called the dissimilar example. If it is only the absent reason, it is called the dissimilar law, then the *sapakṣa* (同品) being absent should be the dissimilar example.",
"'If it is said to be permanent, then it is not produced.'",
"Commentary: Below is pointing out the substance, first is formally pointing out the substance, then is giving the support, here is the first one. 'If it is said to be permanent (若是常),' is what was said earlier, 'the proposition to be established is absent (所立無).' 'Seeing that it is not produced (見非所作),' is what was said earlier, 'the reason is universally absent (因遍非有).'",
"'Like space (虛空) etc.'",
"Commentary: This is giving the support. 'Etc. (等),' is equivalent to taking *nirodha* (擇滅), *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* (非擇滅)."
]
}
滅隨共許者皆等取之即懸解中若於是處也此喻意云虛空等上無有所立無常宗義即無能立所作性因聲上既有所作性因故知定有所立無常宗也。
此中常言表非無常非所作言表無所作。
述曰此通難也初正通難理引例證此即初也此中應有難云虛空一切立可得說如空有宗言體無應無異法喻故今通云此中常言表非無常而已不欲詮常非所作言表無所作而已不欲詮非所作故雖對不立虛空論者亦得以空為異法喻以無體空亦遮無常故名常遮所作故說非所作乃至龜毛得言常非所作也。
如有非有說名非有。
述曰此引例證也此舉勝論義例勝論有六句義一實二德三業四有五同異六和合今言有者即第四有也非有者即餘五句及五句外所不攝法謂龜毛等說名非有者此對有之非有以遮有句故說名非有非有名下不必即有非有體性今言常等亦同此說又釋如有者有句也非有者非第四有也說名非有者非第四有句故說名非有不立非有句體上言常等亦同此說不詮常住及非作體也問異喻但言遮不別詮有體同法詮有體此名應不遮答諸法皆有二相一自相二共相如青自相唯眼識得青之共相即意識知名言但詮青之共相不詮自相以青自相離名言故若詮青共相要遮黃等方顯此青謂非非青故名之為青若不遮非青喚青應目黃等故一切名欲取諸法要遮余詮此無有不遮而顯法也然有名言但遮余法無別所詮如言無青無別所顯無青體也今同法喻本為助因證成宗義言諸所作者必須詮顯所作詮必遮故即遮非所作皆無常者必須詮顯無常詮必遮故即遮常住故同法喻詮而即遮其異法喻本為止濫言常
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"滅隨共許者皆等取之,即懸解中若於是處也。此喻意云:虛空等上無有所立。無常宗義即無能立,所作性因聲上既有所作性因,故知定有所立無常宗也。",
"此中常言表非無常,非所作言表無所作。",
"述曰:此通難也。初正通難理,引例證此即初也。此中應有難云:虛空一切立可得說,如空有宗言體無應無異法喻故。今通云:此中常言表非無常而已,不欲詮常;非所作言表無所作而已,不欲詮非所作。故雖對不立虛空論者,亦得以空為異法喻,以無體空亦遮無常故名常,遮所作故說非所作,乃至龜毛得言常非所作也。",
"如有非有,說名非有。",
"述曰:此引例證也。此舉勝論(Vaisheshika)義例。勝論有六句義:一、實(dravya),二、德(guna),三、業(karma),四、有(samanya),五、同異(vishesha),六、和合(samavaya)。今言有者,即第四有也。非有者,即餘五句及五句外所不攝法,謂龜毛等,說名非有者,此對有之非有以遮有句故說名非有,非有名下不必即有非有體性。今言常等亦同此說,又釋如有者,有句也;非有者,非第四有也;說名非有者,非第四有句故說名非有,不立非有句體上言常等亦同此說,不詮常住及非作體也。問:異喻但言遮,不別詮有體,同法詮有體,此名應不遮?答:諸法皆有二相,一自相,二共相。如青自相唯眼識得,青之共相即意識知名言,但詮青之共相,不詮自相,以青自相離名言故。若詮青共相,要遮黃等方顯此青,謂非非青故名之為青,若不遮非青,喚青應目黃等。故一切名欲取諸法,要遮余詮,此無有不遮而顯法也。然有名言但遮余法,無別所詮,如言無青,無別所顯無青體也。今同法喻本為助因證成宗義,言諸所作者必須詮顯所作,詮必遮故,即遮非所作;皆無常者,必須詮顯無常,詮必遮故,即遮常住。故同法喻詮而即遮其異法喻本為止濫言常。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Those who are destroyed and universally accepted are all equally taken, which is in the immediate understanding, if it is in that place. The meaning of this metaphor is that nothing is established on emptiness, etc. The doctrine of impermanence is that there is no establisher. Since the characteristic of being produced is on sound, it is known that the doctrine of impermanence is definitely established.",
"Here, 'permanent' expresses 'not impermanent,' and 'not produced' expresses 'not produced.'",
"Commentary: This is a general difficulty. First, it directly addresses the difficulty in principle, citing examples as proof. This is the first part. Here, there should be a difficulty raised: that everything established in emptiness can be said, just as the school that posits existence and emptiness says that the substance is without the need for a dissimilar example. Now, the general response is: here, 'permanent' expresses 'not impermanent' only, not intending to define permanence; 'not produced' expresses 'not produced' only, not intending to define 'not produced.' Therefore, even if addressing those who do not establish emptiness, one can still use emptiness as a dissimilar example, because emptiness without substance also negates impermanence, hence it is called 'permanent.' Because it negates being produced, it is said to be 'not produced,' even to the point that one can say that turtle hair is 'permanent' and 'not produced.'",
"If there is 'non-existence,' it is called 'non-existence.'",
"Commentary: This cites an example as proof. This cites the example of the Vaisheshika school's doctrines. The Vaisheshika school has six categories: 1. substance (dravya), 2. quality (guna), 3. activity (karma), 4. generality (samanya), 5. particularity (vishesha), and 6. inherence (samavaya). When we speak of 'existence,' it refers to the fourth category, generality. 'Non-existence' refers to the remaining five categories and things not included within those five categories, such as turtle hair. Saying it is called 'non-existence' means that this 'non-existence' in relation to 'existence' negates the category of 'existence,' hence it is called 'non-existence.' The term 'non-existence' does not necessarily imply the existence of a 'non-existence' entity. Now, the terms 'permanent,' etc., are similar to this. Furthermore, explaining 'if there is,' it refers to the category of 'existence'; 'non-existence' refers to not being the fourth category, generality; saying it is called 'non-existence' means that it is not the category of generality, hence it is called 'non-existence.' The terms 'permanent,' etc., are similar to this, not defining permanence or the nature of 'not produced.' Question: The dissimilar example only speaks of negation, not separately defining an existing entity, while the similar example defines an existing entity. Shouldn't this name not negate? Answer: All dharmas have two aspects: 1. self-characteristic, and 2. shared characteristic. For example, the self-characteristic of blue is only perceived by eye consciousness, while the shared characteristic of blue is known by conceptual consciousness and language. Language only defines the shared characteristic of blue, not the self-characteristic, because the self-characteristic of blue is beyond language. If one defines the shared characteristic of blue, one must negate yellow, etc., to reveal this blue, meaning it is 'not non-blue,' hence it is called 'blue.' If one does not negate non-blue, calling blue should also refer to yellow, etc. Therefore, all names that seek to grasp dharmas must negate other definitions. There is no dharma that is not revealed through negation. However, names and words only negate other dharmas, without separately defining anything. For example, saying 'no blue' does not separately reveal a 'no blue' entity. Now, the similar example is originally to assist the reason in proving the doctrine. Saying that all produced things must define and reveal being produced, and definition must negate, which is to negate 'not produced'; all impermanent things must define and reveal impermanence, and definition must negate, which is to negate permanence. Therefore, the similar example defines and immediately negates, while the dissimilar example is originally to stop the abuse of the term 'permanent.'"
]
}
住者但遮無常不欲詮常言非所作但遮所作不欲別詮非所作體故異法喻但遮不詮陳那已前諸師皆以空等有法為異法喻體彼立量云聲是無常因云所作性故同喻云如瓶謂如瓶是無常也異喻云非如空謂非如空是常住也陳那破云如第三句云聲是勤勇無間所發因云無常性故同喻云如瓶如瓶是勤勇所發也異喻云非如空非如空非勤勇所發又如第九句云聲常因云無障礙故同喻云如空異喻云非如瓶若汝指空為異喻者如此二因應是正因既以異品一分轉故成不定因何得但指有法為體若如我立但總相云謂若是常見非所作如虛空等即簡異品一分轉因彼二既于異品轉故非正因也問何故同品先說其因宗后隨逐其異法喻先說宗無因方非有何不反此耶答因云所作性故者其意云由所作故故是無常其同法喻既助此因證無常義故須先標所作後述無常其異法喻本為止濫故先對宗明異後方辨因非有又釋若反此者所作性因勤勇發因各有二過所作性因二過者一別成異宗過二重立己成過何者若以同喻類異喻云諸無常者皆是所作又以異喻類同喻云諸非作者皆是常者此則別以無常為因立所作宗非所作為因立常住宗不證根本無常宗義此即別成異宗過也又瓶等所作空等常住本已極成何因成立此即重立己成過也問瓶上所作本極成則是重成己立過即瓶無常兩俱許何用所作因重成答瓶是所作故無常即證聲是所作亦無常故瓶所作性不別成無常瓶是無常故所作不證聲是無常亦所作故瓶上無常重成所作性勤勇發因二過者一別成異宗過二成非所愛過何者若以同喻類異喻云諸無常者皆是勤勇所發又以異喻類同喻云諸非勤勇所
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"住者但遮無常,不欲詮常,言非所作,但遮所作,不欲別詮非所作體。故異法喻但遮不詮。陳那(Dignāga,約480-540)已前諸師皆以空等有法為異法喻體。彼立量云:『聲是無常,因云:所作性故,同喻云:如瓶』,謂如瓶是無常也。『異喻云:非如空』,謂非如空是常住也。陳那破云:如第三句云:『聲是勤勇無間所發,因云:無常性故,同喻云:如瓶』,如瓶是勤勇所發也。『異喻云:非如空』,非如空非勤勇所發。又如第九句云:『聲常,因云:無障礙故,同喻云:如空,異喻云:非如瓶』。若汝指空為異喻者,如此二因應是正因,既以異品一分轉故,成不定因,何得但指有法為體?若如我立,但總相云:『若是常見非所作,如虛空等』,即簡異品一分轉因,彼二既于異品轉故,非正因也。",
"問:何故同品先說其因,宗后隨逐其異法喻,先說宗無因方非有,何不反此耶?答:因云『所作性故』者,其意云由所作故,故是無常。其同法喻既助此因證無常義,故須先標所作,後述無常。其異法喻本為止濫,故先對宗明異,後方辨因非有。又釋:若反此者,所作性因、勤勇發因各有二過。所作性因二過者:一、別成異宗過;二、重立己成過。何者?若以同喻類異喻云:『諸無常者皆是所作』,又以異喻類同喻云:『諸非作者皆是常者』,此則別以無常為因立所作宗,非所作為因立常住宗,不證根本無常宗義,此即別成異宗過也。又瓶等所作,空等常住本已極成,何因成立?此即重立己成過也。",
"問:瓶上所作本極成,則是重成己立過,即瓶無常兩俱許,何用所作因重成?答:瓶是所作故無常,即證聲是所作亦無常,故瓶所作性不別成無常。瓶是無常故所作,不證聲是無常亦所作,故瓶上無常重成所作性。勤勇發因二過者:一、別成異宗過;二、成非所愛過。何者?若以同喻類異喻云:『諸無常者皆是勤勇所發』,又以異喻類同喻云:『諸非勤勇所』"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'The one who abides only negates impermanence, not intending to express permanence. Saying 'not made' only negates 'made,' not intending to separately express the nature of 'not made.' Therefore, the dissimilar example only negates and does not express. Teachers before Dignāga (Dignāga, c. 480-540) all took entities like space as the substance of the dissimilar example. They established the inference: 'Sound is impermanent, because it has the property of being made; the similar example is like a pot,' meaning that a pot is impermanent. 'The dissimilar example is not like space,' meaning that space is permanent.' Dignāga refutes this, as in the third statement: 'Sound is produced without interruption by effort, because it has the property of impermanence; the similar example is like a pot,' a pot is produced by effort. 'The dissimilar example is not like space,' space is not produced by effort. Also, as in the ninth statement: 'Sound is permanent, because it is unobstructed; the similar example is like space, the dissimilar example is not like a pot.' If you point to space as the dissimilar example, then these two reasons should be valid reasons. Since they occur in a portion of the dissimilar class, they become inconclusive reasons. How can you only point to the entity as the substance? If I establish it, I only say in general: 'If it is permanent and not made, like space, etc.,' then it excludes the reason that occurs in a portion of the dissimilar class. Since these two occur in the dissimilar class, they are not valid reasons.'",
"'Question: Why is the reason first stated in the similar class, and the thesis follows its dissimilar example? The thesis is first stated, and the reason is not present, why not reverse this? Answer: The reason 'because it has the property of being made' means that because it is made, it is impermanent. Since the similar example helps this reason to prove the meaning of impermanence, it is necessary to first state 'made' and then describe 'impermanent.' The dissimilar example is originally to prevent confusion, so first clarify the difference in relation to the thesis, and then distinguish that the reason is not present. Also, if this is reversed, the reason of 'having the property of being made' and the reason of 'being produced by effort' each have two faults. The two faults of the reason of 'having the property of being made' are: 1. The fault of separately establishing a different thesis; 2. The fault of re-establishing what has already been established. What are they? If the similar example is used to classify the dissimilar example, saying: 'All impermanent things are made,' and the dissimilar example is used to classify the similar example, saying: 'All non-made things are permanent,' then this separately establishes the thesis of 'made' with impermanence as the reason, and establishes the thesis of 'permanent' with 'not made' as the reason, without proving the fundamental meaning of the thesis of impermanence. This is the fault of separately establishing a different thesis. Also, the 'made' of pots, etc., and the 'permanent' of space, etc., are already extremely established. What reason is there to establish them? This is the fault of re-establishing what has already been established.'",
"'Question: The 'made' of pots is already extremely established, which is the fault of re-establishing what has already been established. That is, both the pot and impermanence are admitted. Why use the reason of 'made' to re-establish it? Answer: The pot is made, therefore it is impermanent, which proves that sound is made and also impermanent. Therefore, the 'made' of the pot does not separately establish impermanence. The pot is impermanent, therefore it is made, which does not prove that sound is impermanent and also made. Therefore, the impermanence of the pot re-establishes the property of being made. The two faults of the reason of 'being produced by effort' are: 1. The fault of separately establishing a different thesis; 2. The fault of establishing what is not desired. What are they? If the similar example is used to classify the dissimilar example, saying: 'All impermanent things are produced by effort,' and the dissimilar example is used to classify the similar example, saying: 'All non-effort'"
]
}
發皆是常者此即自以無常為因成立勤勇所發宗以非勤勇無間所發因立常住宗不證根本無常宗義此即別成異宗過也又瓶等無常而是勤勇所發電等無常而非勤勇所發何得以同類異云諸無常者皆是勤發又空非勤發而是其常電非勤發而是無常何得以異類同云諸非勤發皆是常住如此二因俱異品有汝今成立即是成立非自所愛電等體是勤發及是常住以為宗也此即成非所愛過也。
已說宗等。
述曰此下第三結定也有三一總結二別結三遮計此即總結謂上來已說宗等能立名及體也。
如是多言開示他時說名能立。
述曰此下別結有二一結名二結體此即結名也。
如說聲無常者是立宗言。
述曰此下結體有四一結宗二結因三結同喻四結異喻此即結宗也。
所作性故者是宗法言。
述曰此結因也所作性者體是因法而言宗法言者此就依士聲釋宗家法故名宗法也。
若是所作見彼無常如瓶等者是隨同品言。
述曰此結同喻也瓶上所作與聲所作同故名同品瓶上無常隨此同品故云隨同品由瓶無常隨同品故即顯聲無常亦隨所作因也或可聲上所作無常隨瓶上所作無常故名隨同品也。
若是其常見非所作如虛空等是遠離言。
述曰此結異喻也無所立無常宗處遠離能立所作因也。
唯此三分說名能立。
述曰此遮計也宗是所立為立此宗唯因分同喻分異喻分名為能立既云唯此即遮古師宗及合結為能立支亦遮外道立審察支古師以宗為能立支如前廣辨今陳那云宗是能立家所須之具何得即是能立支
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"『如果一切事物都是常住的,那麼這就是以無常為因,來成立勤奮努力所引發的宗義,並且以非勤奮努力無間斷引發為因,來成立常住的宗義。』這沒有證實根本的無常宗義,這實際上是另外成立一個不同的宗義的過失。此外,瓶子等是無常的,而且是勤奮努力所引發的;閃電等是無常的,但不是勤奮努力所引發的。怎麼能以同類事物之間的差異,說『凡是無常的事物,都是勤奮努力所引發的』呢?另外,虛空不是勤奮努力所引發的,而且是常住的;閃電不是勤奮努力所引發的,而且是無常的。怎麼能以不同類事物之間的相同點,說『凡不是勤奮努力所引發的事物,都是常住的』呢?像這樣,兩個原因都在異品中存在。你現在所成立的,就是成立你所不贊同的觀點,即閃電等本體是勤奮努力所引發的,而且是常住的,以此作為宗義。這就是成立非自所愛觀點的過失。",
"以上已經說了宗等。",
"述曰:下面第三部分是結論,有三點:一是總結,二是分別總結,三是遮止其他觀點。這裡是總結,即上面已經說了宗等能立的名和體。",
"像這樣,用很多語言來開示他人時,就叫做能立。",
"述曰:下面是分別總結,有兩點:一是總結名,二是總結體。這裡是總結名。",
"像說『聲音是無常的』,這是立宗的言論。",
"述曰:下面是總結體,有四點:一是總結宗,二是總結因,三是總結同喻,四是總結異喻。這裡是總結宗。",
"『因為是所作性』,這是宗法的言論。",
"述曰:這是總結因。『所作性』的本體是因法,而說『宗法言』,這是就依主釋(Tatpurusa)的角度,宗家的法,所以叫做宗法。",
"『如果是所作的,就看到它是無常的,如瓶子等』,這是隨同品而言。",
"述曰:這是總結同喻。瓶子上的『所作』與聲音的『所作』相同,所以叫做同品。瓶子上的無常隨同于這個同品,所以說『隨同品』。由於瓶子的無常隨同于同品,就顯示出聲音的無常也隨同于『所作』這個因。或者可以說,聲音上的『所作無常』隨同于瓶子上的『所作無常』,所以叫做『隨同品』。",
"『如果它是常住的,就看到它不是所作的,如虛空等』,這是遠離而言。",
"述曰:這是總結異喻。在沒有所立的無常宗的地方,遠離能立的『所作』這個因。",
"只有這三個部分才叫做能立。",
"述曰:這是遮止其他觀點。宗是所立,爲了成立這個宗,只有因、同喻、異喻這三個部分才叫做能立。既然說『只有這三個』,就是遮止古代論師將宗和合結作為能立支,也遮止外道建立審察支。古代論師以宗為能立支,如前面廣泛辨析的那樣。現在陳那(Dignāga)說,宗是能立家所需要的工具,怎麼能說是能立支呢?"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"'If all things are permanent, then this is using impermanence as the cause to establish the tenet that is brought about by diligent effort, and using non-diligent effort without interruption as the cause to establish the tenet of permanence.' This does not prove the fundamental tenet of impermanence; this is actually the fault of establishing a different tenet. Moreover, pots and the like are impermanent and are brought about by diligent effort; lightning and the like are impermanent but are not brought about by diligent effort. How can one say, based on the differences between similar things, 'All impermanent things are brought about by diligent effort'? Furthermore, space is not brought about by diligent effort and is permanent; lightning is not brought about by diligent effort and is impermanent. How can one say, based on the similarities between dissimilar things, 'All things not brought about by diligent effort are permanent'? Like this, both reasons exist in the dissimilar class. What you are now establishing is establishing a view that you do not agree with, namely, that the essence of lightning and the like is brought about by diligent effort and is permanent, taking this as the tenet. This is the fault of establishing a view that is not self-approved.",
"The above has already discussed the tenet (宗, zōng) and so on.",
"Commentary: The third part below is the conclusion, with three points: first, a summary; second, separate summaries; and third, refuting other views. This is the summary, that is, the name and essence of the means of proof (能立, nénglì) such as the tenet have been discussed above.",
"Like this, when using many words to enlighten others, it is called the means of proof (能立, nénglì).",
"Commentary: Below are separate summaries, with two points: first, summarizing the name; and second, summarizing the essence. This is summarizing the name.",
"Like saying 'Sound is impermanent,' this is the statement of establishing the tenet (立宗言, lìzōng yán).",
"Commentary: Below is summarizing the essence, with four points: first, summarizing the tenet; second, summarizing the reason; third, summarizing the example in the similar class; and fourth, summarizing the example in the dissimilar class. This is summarizing the tenet.",
"'Because it is produced (所作性, suǒzuò xìng),' this is the statement of the property of the tenet (宗法言, zōngfǎ yán).",
"Commentary: This is summarizing the reason. The essence of 'produced' is the reason, and saying 'statement of the property of the tenet' is from the perspective of a Tatpurusa compound, the property of the tenet, so it is called 'property of the tenet'.",
"'If it is produced, then it is seen to be impermanent, like a pot and so on,' this is said with respect to the similar class (隨同品言, suítóngpǐn yán).",
"Commentary: This is summarizing the example in the similar class. The 'produced' on the pot is the same as the 'produced' on the sound, so it is called the similar class. The impermanence on the pot follows this similar class, so it is said 'follows the similar class.' Because the impermanence of the pot follows the similar class, it shows that the impermanence of the sound also follows the reason 'produced.' Or it can be said that the 'produced impermanence' on the sound follows the 'produced impermanence' on the pot, so it is called 'follows the similar class.'",
"'If it is permanent, then it is seen not to be produced, like space and so on,' this is said with respect to separation (遠離言, yuǎnlí yán).",
"Commentary: This is summarizing the example in the dissimilar class. In the place where there is no the established tenet of impermanence, it is separated from the reason 'produced' of the means of proof.",
"Only these three parts are called the means of proof (能立, nénglì).",
"Commentary: This is refuting other views. The tenet is what is to be established. In order to establish this tenet, only the reason, the example in the similar class, and the example in the dissimilar class are called the means of proof. Since it is said 'only these three,' it refutes the ancient teachers who considered the tenet and the conclusion as branches of the means of proof, and it also refutes the outsiders who establish the branch of examination. The ancient teachers considered the tenet as a branch of the means of proof, as discussed extensively earlier. Now Dignāga says that the tenet is a tool needed by the one who establishes the means of proof; how can it be a branch of the means of proof?"
]
}
耶其猶能射但是弓矢人等其所射垛但是能射所須之具非能射也古師合云聲既無常當知亦是無我此即合是類義以無常者必無我故陳那云此是自意所許傍顯論宗言中不立何須言宗之外別更合顯所許義耶此既太繁故我不敢為能立支又古師及小乘等合云瓶是所作瓶即無常當知聲是所作亦是無常陳那云同喻應言諸所作者皆是無常此即已顯聲是無常何須別更立合支耶古師等結云是故聲無常陳那云本立無常以三支證足知無常何須結云聲是無常設不結者豈即為常故我不立第五結支外道云欲立義時須定宗趣方可興論立審察支陳那破云由有挫杌乃至由有證義人故方得立論豈可並是能立支耶故唯三分即能成立聲無常義此則陳那意存省略顯義即是何假繁詞故能立支唯有三分若立論時立合結者亦無過失但別立支數此即不可問如立色為空以緣生故猶如幻事此無異品何故乃言三分能立答今言唯者但遮四等非謂能立要具此三問此緣生因應不顯宗無三相故如一相等因答為遮異品立異法喻既無異品因不濫行故無異喻宗義得立前所立量有相違決定過謂緣生故因定能顯宗具初二相不于異品行故如所作因問唯三能立無異義成能立唯三無同宗立答同喻順成無同𨷂助異法止濫無異濫除故不類也外道亦有唯立異喻以三義證斥破此計如廣百論此不繁述。
雖樂成立由與現量等相違故名似立宗。
述曰此下大文第二解似立文有二初別解后總結前中有三一解似宗二解似因三解似喻今先解似宗有三一總明二別解三結定此即總明也樂所成立義該真似雖復樂為所立之宗然與現量等九義相違故似
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"耶其猶能射,但是弓矢人等,其所射之垛,但是能射所須之具,非能射也。古師合云:『聲既無常,當知亦是無我。』此即合是類義,以無常者必無我故。陳那(Dignāga,印度佛教邏輯學家)云:『此是自意所許,傍顯論宗言中不立,何須言宗之外別更合顯所許義耶?』此既太繁,故我不敢為能立支。又古師及小乘等合云:『瓶是所作,瓶即無常,當知聲是所作,亦是無常。』陳那云:『同喻應言諸所作者皆是無常。』此即已顯聲是無常,何須別更立合支耶?古師等結云:『是故聲無常。』陳那云:『本立無常,以三支證足知無常,何須結云聲是無常?設不結者,豈即為常?』故我不立第五結支。外道云:『欲立義時,須定宗趣,方可興論立審察支。』陳那破云:『由有挫杌,乃至由有證義人故,方得立論,豈可並是能立支耶?』故唯三分即能成立聲無常義。此則陳那意存省略顯義,即是何假繁詞?故能立支唯有三分。若立論時,立合結者,亦無過失,但別立支數,此即不可。問:如立色為空,以緣生故,猶如幻事,此無異品,何故乃言三分能立?答:今言唯者,但遮四等,非謂能立要具此三。問:此緣生因應不顯宗無三相故,如一相等因?答:為遮異品,立異法喻,既無異品,因不濫行,故無異喻,宗義得立。前所立量有相違決定過,謂緣生故,因定能顯宗具初二相,不于異品行故,如所作因。問:唯三能立無異義成,能立唯三無同宗立?答:同喻順成無同𨷂助,異法止濫無異濫除,故不類也。外道亦有唯立異喻,以三義證斥破此計,如廣百論,此不繁述。",
"雖樂成立,由與現量等相違故,名似立宗。",
"述曰:此下大文第二解似立文,有二:初別解,后總結。前中有三:一解似宗,二解似因,三解似喻。今先解似宗,有三:一總明,二別解,三結定。此即總明也。樂所成立義該真似,雖復樂為所立之宗,然與現量等九義相違故,似。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Even if someone is skilled in archery, the bows, arrows, and people involved, and the target they shoot at, are merely the tools needed for archery, not the archery itself. An ancient teacher stated: 'Since sound is impermanent, it should be understood that it is also without self.' This aligns with the principle that whatever is impermanent must be without self. Dignāga (Dignāga, Indian Buddhist logician) said: 'This is what is accepted by one's own intention, indirectly revealing that it is not established within the statements of the philosophical school. Why is it necessary to separately combine and reveal the accepted meaning outside of the statements of the philosophical school?' Since this is too verbose, I dare not make it a constituent of proof. Furthermore, ancient teachers and adherents of the Hinayana tradition stated: 'A pot is made, and a pot is impermanent. It should be understood that sound is made, and therefore sound is also impermanent.' Dignāga said: 'The example should state that whatever is made is impermanent.' This already reveals that sound is impermanent. Why is it necessary to separately establish a constituent of application? Ancient teachers concluded: 'Therefore, sound is impermanent.' Dignāga said: 'The impermanence is originally established, and the three constituents are sufficient to prove that it is impermanent. Why is it necessary to conclude that sound is impermanent? If it is not concluded, would it then be permanent?' Therefore, I do not establish a fifth constituent of conclusion. An outsider said: 'When establishing a meaning, it is necessary to determine the thesis and direction before one can initiate a debate and establish a constituent of examination.' Dignāga refuted: 'Because there are obstacles and even people who can prove the meaning, one can establish a debate. How can all of these be constituents of proof?' Therefore, only three constituents can establish the meaning that sound is impermanent. Dignāga intends to simplify and reveal the meaning. Why use verbose words? Therefore, there are only three constituents of proof. If one establishes the constituents of application and conclusion when establishing a thesis, there is no fault, but separately establishing the number of constituents is unacceptable. Question: If one establishes form as empty because it arises from conditions, like an illusion, and there is no dissimilar instance, why is it said that three constituents can establish it? Answer: The word 'only' here only excludes four others, not that the three are necessary for proof. Question: Should this cause arising from conditions not reveal the thesis because it lacks the three characteristics, like a cause with one characteristic? Answer: To exclude dissimilar instances, a dissimilar example is established. Since there is no dissimilar instance, the cause does not run rampant, so there is no dissimilar example, and the meaning of the thesis can be established. The previously established inference has the fault of being contradictory and definitive, meaning that because it arises from conditions, the cause can definitely reveal the thesis with the first two characteristics, and it does not operate in dissimilar instances, like the cause of being made. Question: Only three constituents can establish the meaning without dissimilar instances, and only three constituents can establish the thesis without similar instances? Answer: The similar example smoothly establishes without similar assistance, and the dissimilar method stops the abuse without dissimilar abuse, so it is not analogous. Outsiders also only establish dissimilar examples, using three meanings to refute and break this view, as in the Extensive Treatise on One Hundred Verses. This will not be elaborated upon.",
"Although one delights in establishing, it is called a pseudo-thesis because it contradicts things like direct perception.",
"Commentary: Below is the second major section explaining pseudo-establishments, with two parts: first, individual explanations, and second, a summary. The first part has three sections: first, explaining pseudo-thesis; second, explaining pseudo-cause; and third, explaining pseudo-example. Now, first explaining pseudo-thesis, with three parts: first, a general explanation; second, individual explanations; and third, a conclusion. This is the general explanation. The meaning of delighting in establishing encompasses both truth and falsehood. Although one delights in making it the thesis to be established, it is similar because it contradicts nine meanings such as direct perception."
]
}
非真也。
謂現量相違比量相違自教相違世間相違自語相違能別不極成所別不極成俱不極成相符極成。
述曰此下別解有三一列名二辨體三釋義此即列名也。
此中現量相違者如說聲是非所聞。
述曰此下辨體九過為九一一過中皆初牒章后舉法此即初過現量有三一自二他三共或有立宗違自現量非他非共如勝論者對佛法立義云地水火實非眼所見因云異青等故同喻云如香味等以勝論自宗計色所依地水火實亦可見故此雖亦是違自教過今此且取違現量義餘者列然或有立宗違他現量非自非共即如佛法立此比量唯違他也或有立宗違共現量非他非自如勝論師對佛弟子立義云色非眼見以變壞故猶如香等以勝論師及佛弟子俱許色塵為故眼見若違自共是此過收若唯違他非宗過攝此違他量如凈眼人說眩翳者所見不實故無過也今此文中但舉違共略無違自聲是有法非所聞是法法及有法總性為宗聲是耳根耳識現量所聞之境言非所聞便違耳聞聲現量故成宗過現量名義可準下釋。
比量相違者如說瓶等是常。
述曰此第二過比量亦有自他及共如小乘對大乘立義云現在諸法獨有力用取等流果如此立宗違自比量違自比量者現在諸法定無力用取等流果有實體故如過未等即此宗義違他比量違他比量者現在諸法定無力用取等流果非實有故猶如過未等即此宗義違共比量違共比量者現在諸法定無力用取等流果世所攝故猶如通未等此違自及共是宗過攝違他非過今此但舉違共比量瓶等是有法常是法法及有法總相為宗如此立宗違共初無後無比量謂瓶等定是無
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"'非真也',指的是不真實的宗(命題)。",
"所謂『現量相違』(pratyakṣa-viruddha,與現量相矛盾)、『比量相違』(anumāna-viruddha,與比量相矛盾)、『自教相違』(svāgama-viruddha,與自宗教義相矛盾)、『世間相違』(lokaviruddha,與世間常識相矛盾)、『自語相違』(svavacana-viruddha,與自己所說的話相矛盾)、『能別不極成』(viśeṣaṇa-asiddha,能區別的特徵未被證實)、『所別不極成』(viśeṣya-asiddha,被區別的事物未被證實)、『俱不極成』(ubhayāsiddha,能區別的特徵和被區別的事物都未被證實)、『相符極成』(prasiddha,與普遍接受的事實相符)。",
"述曰:下面分別解釋這三種內容:一是列出名稱,二是辨別本體,三是解釋含義。這裡是列出名稱。",
"這裡,『現量相違』,例如說『聲音不是所能聽到的』。",
"述曰:下面辨別本體,九種過失分為九個部分,每一個過失都首先引用章節,然後舉出法則。這裡是第一個過失,『現量』有三種:一是自現量,二是他現量,三是共現量。或者有立宗違背自現量,既不是他現量也不是共現量,例如勝論派(Vaiśeṣika)的人針對佛法(Buddha-dharma)設立論點說:『地、水、火的實體不是眼睛所能看到的』,理由是『因為它們與青色等不同』,同喻是『如同香味等』。因為勝論派自己的宗義認為,作為色的所依的地、水、火的實體也是可以被看到的。因此,雖然這也是違背自教的過失,但這裡只取違背現量的含義,其餘的列出。或者有立宗違揹他現量,既不是自現量也不是共現量,例如佛法設立這樣的比量,僅僅違揹他人。或者有立宗違背共現量,既不是他現量也不是自現量,例如勝論師針對佛弟子設立論點說:『色不是眼睛所能看到的』,理由是『因為它會變壞』,如同香味等。因為勝論師和佛弟子都承認色塵是眼睛所能看到的。如果違背自現量和共現量,就屬於這個過失的範圍;如果僅僅違揹他現量,就不屬於宗的過失範圍。這種違揹他現量的情況,如同視力正常的人說眩暈的人所見是不真實的,因此沒有過失。現在這篇文章中,只是舉出違背共現量的情況,省略了違背自現量的情況。『聲音』是有法,『不是所能聽到的』是法,法和有法的總性作為宗。聲音是耳根、耳識現量所能聽到的對象,說『不是所能聽到的』就違背了耳朵聽聞聲音的現量,因此構成宗的過失。現量的名稱和含義可以參照下面的解釋。",
"『比量相違』,例如說『瓶子等是常』。",
"述曰:這是第二個過失,比量也有自、他、共三種。例如小乘(Hīnayāna)針對大乘(Mahāyāna)設立論點說:『現在的諸法只有力量取等等流果』,如此立宗違背自比量。違背自比量的情況是,現在的諸法一定沒有力量取等等流果,因為它們有實體,如同過去和未來等。即這個宗義違揹他比量。違揹他比量的情況是,現在的諸法一定沒有力量取等等流果,因為它們不是實有的,如同過去和未來等。即這個宗義違背共比量。違背共比量的情況是,現在的諸法一定沒有力量取等等流果,因為它們是被世間所攝的,如同通和未等。這種違背自比量和共比量的情況屬於宗的過失範圍,違揹他比量則不是過失。現在這裡只是舉出違背共比量的情況。『瓶子等』是有法,『常』是法,法和有法的總相作為宗。如此立宗違背共初無後無比量,即瓶子等一定是無常的。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'Non-true' refers to a proposition that is not true.",
"The so-called 'pratyakṣa-viruddha' (contradictory to direct perception), 'anumāna-viruddha' (contradictory to inference), 'svāgama-viruddha' (contradictory to one's own doctrine), 'lokaviruddha' (contradictory to worldly knowledge), 'svavacana-viruddha' (contradictory to one's own words), 'viśeṣaṇa-asiddha' (the distinguishing characteristic is unproven), 'viśeṣya-asiddha' (the distinguished object is unproven), 'ubhayāsiddha' (both the distinguishing characteristic and the distinguished object are unproven), 'prasiddha' (conforms to universally accepted facts).",
"Statement: The following separately explains these three contents: first, listing the names; second, distinguishing the essence; and third, explaining the meanings. This is listing the names.",
"Here, 'pratyakṣa-viruddha' (contradictory to direct perception), for example, saying 'sound is not something that can be heard'.",
"Statement: The following distinguishes the essence. The nine faults are divided into nine parts. Each fault first quotes the chapter and then cites the rule. This is the first fault. 'Direct perception' has three types: first, self-perception; second, other-perception; and third, common perception. Or there is a proposition that contradicts self-perception, which is neither other-perception nor common perception. For example, the Vaiśeṣika school, in response to Buddha-dharma, establishes the argument that 'the substance of earth, water, and fire is not visible to the eyes', because 'they are different from blue, etc.', with the example being 'like fragrance, etc.'. Because the Vaiśeṣika school's own doctrine believes that the substance of earth, water, and fire, which are the basis of color, can also be seen. Therefore, although this is also a fault of contradicting one's own doctrine, here we only take the meaning of contradicting direct perception, and the rest are listed. Or there is a proposition that contradicts other-perception, which is neither self-perception nor common perception, such as when Buddha-dharma establishes such an inference, which only contradicts others. Or there is a proposition that contradicts common perception, which is neither other-perception nor self-perception, such as when a Vaiśeṣika teacher establishes the argument against a Buddhist disciple that 'color is not visible to the eyes', because 'it changes', like fragrance, etc. Because both the Vaiśeṣika teacher and the Buddhist disciple acknowledge that color dust is visible to the eyes. If it contradicts self-perception and common perception, it falls within the scope of this fault; if it only contradicts other-perception, it does not fall within the scope of the fault of the proposition. This kind of contradiction to other-perception is like a person with normal vision saying that what a dizzy person sees is not real, so there is no fault. Now in this article, only the case of contradicting common perception is given, and the case of contradicting self-perception is omitted. 'Sound' is the subject, 'not something that can be heard' is the predicate, and the totality of the predicate and the subject is taken as the proposition. Sound is the object that can be heard by the ear root and ear consciousness through direct perception. Saying 'not something that can be heard' contradicts the direct perception of hearing sound, thus constituting a fault of the proposition. The name and meaning of direct perception can be referred to the explanation below.",
"'Contradictory to inference', for example, saying 'pots, etc., are permanent'.",
"Statement: This is the second fault. Inference also has three types: self, other, and common. For example, the Hīnayāna school, in response to the Mahāyāna school, establishes the argument that 'present dharmas only have the power to take equal-flowing results, etc.', thus establishing a proposition that contradicts self-inference. The case of contradicting self-inference is that present dharmas certainly do not have the power to take equal-flowing results, etc., because they have substance, like the past and future, etc. That is, this proposition contradicts other-inference. The case of contradicting other-inference is that present dharmas certainly do not have the power to take equal-flowing results, etc., because they are not real, like the past and future, etc. That is, this proposition contradicts common inference. The case of contradicting common inference is that present dharmas certainly do not have the power to take equal-flowing results, etc., because they are included in the world, like the general and the not-yet, etc. This kind of contradiction to self-inference and common inference falls within the scope of the fault of the proposition, while contradiction to other-inference is not a fault. Now here, only the case of contradicting common inference is given. 'Pots, etc.' are the subject, 'permanent' is the predicate, and the totality of the predicate and the subject is taken as the proposition. Establishing such a proposition contradicts the common inference that there is no beginning and no end, that is, pots, etc., are certainly impermanent."
]
}
常初無後無故如燈焰等準相違因亦有法差別比量相違等思之其比量義亦準下釋。
自教相違者如勝論師立聲為常。
述曰此第三過自教亦有三謂自他共即如勝論師宗立聲是德句攝體是無常若對聲論立云聲常此違自教若對佛弟子等立此義者即違共教若對聲論立聲無常即違他教此亦違宗及共是其宗過若違他教非宗過也問立義違自教即是宗過證宗引自教何不成因答此猶對他自毀父即成惡人引父顯自能不可依信故違自教是過引自教非證。
世間相違者如說懷菟非月有故又如說言人頂骨凈眾生分故猶如螺貝。
述曰此第四過世間有二一學者世間二非學者世間由學方知名學者不由學知名非學者各多人共許故名世間學者世間有三一自如佛弟子望自同學無我義等二他如佛弟子望鵂鹠子所習我等三共如佛弟子與鵂鹠子更互相望俱習粗色是無常等若立義違自如佛弟子立有我等此但望自所宗名違自教違世義徴非違世間若立義違他知佛弟子對鵂鹠子立無我等此即非過以論之興為破他故若立義違共如佛弟子等立粗色是常等唯此是違世間過攝非學者世間者謂牧牛人等皆共了知有色等性若隨眾情就世俗諦立眼色等體性是空違俗情故是宗過攝若以勝義簡別立宗雖違俗情而非宗過以勝義諦非俗知故今此文中但舉違非學者世間以懷菟是月人頂骨穢不由習學而了知故若有立云懷兔非月為宗有故為因如日為喻又結鬘外道以人頂骨貫以嚴身謂之為凈便成立言人頂骨凈為宗眾生分故為因猶如螺貝為喻此二立宗法及有法雖不相離然違世俗情故是過也以世間人皆號月
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『常』(nitya,永恒)初無後無,『故』(hetu,原因)如燈焰等,準此,『相違因』(viruddha hetu,相違之因)亦有『法差別比量相違』(dharma bheda anumana viruddha,以法差別推論相違)等,思之,其比量之義亦準下文解釋。",
"『自教相違』(svasiddhānta viruddha,與自宗教義相違背)者,如勝論師(Vaiśeṣika,印度哲學流派之一)立『聲』(śabda,聲音)為『常』(nitya,永恒)。",
"述曰:此第三過,『自教』亦有三,謂『自』、『他』、『共』。即如勝論師宗立『聲』是『德句』(guṇavākya,屬性範疇)所攝,體是『無常』(anitya,無常)。若對『聲論』(śabdaśāstra,聲論學派)立云『聲常』,此違『自教』。若對佛弟子等立此義者,即違『共教』(sādhāraṇa siddhānta viruddha,與共同認可的教義相違背)。若對聲論立『聲無常』,即違『他教』(parasiddhānta viruddha,與他宗教義相違背)。此亦違『宗』(pakṣa,宗義)及『共』,是其『宗過』(pakṣadoṣa,宗義過失)。若違『他教』,非『宗過』也。問:立義違『自教』,即是『宗過』,證『宗』引『自教』,何不成『因』(hetu,理由)?答:此猶對他自毀父,即成惡人,引父顯自能,不可依信故。違『自教』是過,引『自教』非證。",
"『世間相違』(lokaviruddha,與世俗常識相違背)者,如說懷菟(huáitú,懷有兔子的)非月(candra,月亮)有故,又如說言人頂骨凈,眾生分故,猶如螺貝。",
"述曰:此第四過,『世間』有二,一『學者世間』(vidvaj-loka,學者群體),二『非學者世間』(avidvaj-loka,非學者群體)。由學方知名,『學者』;不由學知名,『非學者』。各多人共許故名『世間』。『學者世間』有三:一『自』,如佛弟子望自同學『無我義』(anātman,無我)等;二『他』,如佛弟子望鵂鹠子(梟,貓頭鷹)所習『我』(ātman,我)等;三『共』,如佛弟子與鵂鹠子更互相望,俱習『粗色』(sthūlarūpa,粗顯的色法)是『無常』(anitya,無常)等。若立義違『自』,如佛弟子立『有我』等,此但望自所宗名違『自教』,違世義徴,非違『世間』。若立義違『他』,知佛弟子對鵂鹠子立『無我』等,此即非過,以論之興為破他故。若立義違『共』,如佛弟子等立『粗色』是『常』等,唯此是違『世間』過攝。『非學者世間』者,謂牧牛人等,皆共了知有色等性。若隨眾情,就『世俗諦』(saṃvṛti-satya,世俗諦)立眼色等體性是空,違俗情故,是『宗過』攝。若以『勝義諦』(paramārtha-satya,勝義諦)簡別立宗,雖違俗情,而非『宗過』,以『勝義諦』非俗知故。今此文中但舉違『非學者世間』,以懷菟是月,人頂骨穢,不由習學而了知故。若有立云懷兔非月為宗,有故為因,如日為喻。又結鬘外道(eka-mālā,一種外道)以人頂骨貫以嚴身,謂之為凈,便成立言人頂骨凈為宗,眾生分故為因,猶如螺貝為喻。此二立宗法及有法雖不相離,然違世俗情故是過也。以世間人皆號月",
""
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'Permanent' (nitya, eternal) has no beginning and no end, 'cause' (hetu, reason) is like a lamp flame, etc. Accordingly, 'contradictory reason' (viruddha hetu, contradictory reason) also includes 'contradiction through inference based on difference in characteristics' (dharma bheda anumana viruddha, contradiction through inference based on difference in characteristics), etc. Consider this, and the meaning of the inference will be explained below.",
"'Contradiction with one's own doctrine' (svasiddhānta viruddha, contradiction with one's own doctrine) is like the Vaiśeṣika (one of the schools of Indian philosophy) asserting that 'sound' (śabda, sound) is 'permanent' (nitya, eternal).",
"Commentary: This third fault, 'contradiction with one's own doctrine', also has three aspects: 'self', 'other', and 'common'. For example, the Vaiśeṣika school asserts that 'sound' is included in the category of 'quality statements' (guṇavākya, attribute category) and its nature is 'impermanent' (anitya, impermanent). If one asserts 'sound is permanent' against the 'school of sound' (śabdaśāstra, school of phonetics), this contradicts 'one's own doctrine'. If one asserts this meaning against Buddhist disciples, it contradicts the 'common doctrine' (sādhāraṇa siddhānta viruddha, contradiction with commonly accepted doctrine). If one asserts 'sound is impermanent' against the school of sound, it contradicts 'another's doctrine' (parasiddhānta viruddha, contradiction with another's doctrine). This also contradicts the 'thesis' (pakṣa, proposition) and the 'common', which are faults of the 'thesis' (pakṣadoṣa, fault of the thesis). Contradicting 'another's doctrine' is not a fault of the 'thesis'. Question: Asserting a meaning that contradicts 'one's own doctrine' is a fault of the 'thesis'. Why doesn't citing 'one's own doctrine' to prove the 'thesis' become a 'reason' (hetu, reason)? Answer: This is like someone destroying their own father, which makes them a bad person. Citing the father to show one's own ability is not reliable. Contradicting 'one's own doctrine' is a fault, but citing 'one's own doctrine' is not proof.",
"'Contradiction with worldly knowledge' (lokaviruddha, contradiction with worldly knowledge) is like saying that the hare in the moon (huáitú, having a hare) is not in the moon (candra, moon) because it exists. Or like saying that a human skull is pure because it is part of a living being, like a conch shell.",
"Commentary: This fourth fault, 'worldly knowledge', has two aspects: 'worldly knowledge of scholars' (vidvaj-loka, group of scholars) and 'worldly knowledge of non-scholars' (avidvaj-loka, group of non-scholars). 'Scholars' are those who know through learning; 'non-scholars' are those who know without learning. Because many people commonly accept them, they are called 'worldly knowledge'. 'Worldly knowledge of scholars' has three aspects: 'self', such as Buddhist disciples viewing the 'doctrine of no-self' (anātman, no-self) with their fellow students; 'other', such as Buddhist disciples viewing the 'self' (ātman, self) learned by the owlet (owl) ; 'common', such as Buddhist disciples and owlets mutually viewing each other, both learning that 'coarse matter' (sthūlarūpa, coarse form) is 'impermanent' (anitya, impermanent). If asserting a meaning contradicts 'self', such as Buddhist disciples asserting 'there is a self', this only contradicts 'one's own doctrine' in relation to one's own school, and is a violation of the meaning of the world, not a violation of 'worldly knowledge'. If asserting a meaning contradicts 'other', knowing that Buddhist disciples assert 'no-self' to the owlet, this is not a fault, because the purpose of debate is to refute others. If asserting a meaning contradicts 'common', such as Buddhist disciples asserting that 'coarse matter' is 'permanent', only this is included in the fault of contradicting 'worldly knowledge'. 'Worldly knowledge of non-scholars' refers to cowherds, etc., who all commonly know that there are characteristics such as color. If, following popular sentiment, one establishes the nature of eye-consciousness, color, etc., as empty based on 'conventional truth' (saṃvṛti-satya, conventional truth), this contradicts popular sentiment and is included in the 'fault of the thesis'. If one establishes a thesis based on 'ultimate truth' (paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth), although it contradicts popular sentiment, it is not a 'fault of the thesis', because 'ultimate truth' is not known by ordinary people. In this text, only contradiction with 'worldly knowledge of non-scholars' is mentioned, because the hare in the moon and the impurity of human skulls are known without learning. If one asserts that the hare in the moon is not in the moon as the thesis, because it exists as the reason, like the sun as the example. Also, the Eka-mālā (a type of heretic) strings human skulls to adorn themselves, considering them pure, and then establishes the thesis that human skulls are pure, because they are part of a living being as the reason, like a conch shell as the example. Although these two established thesis-properties and subjects are not separate, they are faults because they contradict worldly sentiment. Because people in the world all call the moon",
""
]
}
為懷菟說頂骨為穢故問此與現量相違何異答應作四句或違世間非違現量即此所立懷菟非月等但反世俗共所傳名不以立言非月便違眼見義故或違現量非違世間如言眼等五根非阿賴耶境等以世俗人不知別有阿賴耶故或有俱違如言聲非所聞等以違耳等聞義故復違世間共知聲可聞故或俱不違此非二過問若違現量即違世間何須說二答自在別違一者故開二也。
自語相違者如言我母是其石女。
述曰此第五過依梵本正翻應云虛女以無產子之功虛沾女稱故名虛女不改舊翻且雲石女也我母是有法石女是法法及有法和合為宗然有法之言即違其法法言復反有法若言我母即知非虛既言石女明非我母更相反故故名相違又如外道立言一切言論是有法皆是妄語是法此立宗之言意許非妄有法中攝若言一切言論即意許一分非妄何得云皆是妄語若云皆是妄語何得言一切言論以一切之言攝此宗意許非妄故彼若救言除我言外餘一切言皆悉是妄者更有一人聞汝所說便言汝語非妄諦實彼所發言為妄為實若言是妄語則汝語虛若言是實即違自語若復救云除我言及說我言實者余言妄者若爾此即與比量相違謂餘一切言不必是妄是語性故如汝所言。
能別不極成者如佛弟子對數論師立聲滅壞。
述曰此第六過僧伽此云數論即慧能數度諸法故名為數從數起論故名數論論能生數亦名數論造數論師名劫比羅此云黃以頭面黃世號為黃仙人也舊云迦毗羅者訛也此師廣有二十五諦謂自性大我慢五唯量五大五知根五作業根心根知者中則有四一本非變即自效能生大等非他生故二變非本即五
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"問:如果說頂骨是污穢的,這與現量(Pratyaksa,直接感知)相違背,有什麼不同?",
"答:可以作四句解釋:",
"或者違背世間共識,但不違背現量。例如,這裡所說的『懷菟』(Rāhu,羅睺,印度神話中的阿修羅,常被認為是造成日食和月食的原因)並非指月亮等天體,只是顛倒了世俗共識的名稱。雖然說『懷菟』不是月亮,但這並不違背眼睛所見的事實。",
"或者違背現量,但不違背世間共識。例如,說眼等五根不是阿賴耶識(Ālaya-vijñāna,藏識)的境界等,因為世俗之人不知道還有阿賴耶識的存在。",
"或者兩者都違背。例如,說聲音不是所能聽到的,這既違背了耳朵等根的聽覺功能,也違背了世間共知的聲音可以被聽到的常識。",
"或者兩者都不違背。這種情況不存在以上兩種過失。",
"問:如果違背現量,那就一定違背世間共識,為什麼還要說兩種違背呢?",
"答:因為自在(獨立)地分別違背其中一種,所以才分開說明兩種情況。",
"自語相違,例如說『我的母親是石女』。",
"述曰:這第五種過失,按照梵文字的正確翻譯,應該叫做『虛女』,因為沒有生育子女的功用,虛假地沾染了女人的稱謂,所以叫做『虛女』。不改變舊的翻譯,暫且叫做『石女』。『我的母親』是有法,『石女』是法,法和有法合在一起作為宗(論題)。然而,說『我的母親』,就違背了『石女』這個法;說『石女』,又反駁了『我的母親』這個有法。如果說『我的母親』,就知道不是虛假的;既然說是『石女』,就明顯不是『我的母親』,兩者互相矛盾,所以叫做相違。又如外道立論說:『一切言論』是有法,『都是妄語』是法。這個立宗的言論,意許不是妄語,包含在有法之中。如果說『一切言論』,就意許一部分不是妄語,怎麼能說『都是妄語』呢?如果說『都是妄語』,怎麼能說『一切言論』呢?因為『一切』這個詞包含了這個宗所意許的不是妄語的部分。如果他們辯解說,除了我的言論之外,其餘一切言論都是虛妄的,那麼另一個人聽到你所說的話,就會說你的話不是虛妄的,是真實可靠的。他所說的話是虛妄的還是真實的?如果說是虛妄的,那麼你的話就是虛假的;如果說是真實的,就違背了你自己的話。如果又辯解說,除了我的言論以及關於我的言論是真實的之外,其餘的言論都是虛妄的,那麼這就與比量(Anumāṇa,推理)相違背,因為其餘一切言論不一定都是虛妄的,因為它是言語的性質,就像你所說的話一樣。",
"能別不極成,例如佛弟子對數論師(Sāṃkhya,印度古代哲學流派)立論說聲音是滅壞的。",
"述曰:這第六種過失,僧伽(Saṃgha),這裡叫做數論,就是慧能計算度量諸法,所以叫做數論,從數產生論,所以叫做數論。創造數論的老師叫做劫比羅(Kapila),這裡叫做黃,因為頭面是黃色的,世人號稱為黃仙人。舊譯迦毗羅是訛傳。這位老師廣泛地有二十五諦,所謂自性(Prakṛti,原質)、大(Mahat,覺)、我慢(Ahaṃkāra,自我意識)、五唯(Tanmātra,五種感覺的本原)、量(Buddhi,理智)、五大(Mahābhūta,五大元素)、五知根(Jñānendriya,五種感覺器官)、五作業根(Karmendriya,五種行動器官)、心根(Manas,心)。知者之中則有四種,一種是本非變,就是自性,能生大等,不是其他所生;二是變非本,就是五"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"Question: How is saying that the skull is impure different from contradicting direct perception (Pratyaksa)?",
"Answer: Four possibilities can be stated:",
"It may contradict common worldly understanding but not direct perception. For example, the 'Hare in the Sky' (Rāhu, an Asura in Indian mythology, often considered the cause of eclipses) is not the moon or other celestial bodies; it is merely a reversal of the name in common worldly understanding. Although saying 'Hare in the Sky' is not the moon, it does not contradict what is seen by the eyes.",
"It may contradict direct perception but not common worldly understanding. For example, saying that the five sense organs, such as the eyes, are not the realm of Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), because ordinary people do not know that there is a separate Ālaya-vijñāna.",
"It may contradict both. For example, saying that sound is not something that can be heard, which contradicts both the hearing function of the ears and the common worldly knowledge that sound can be heard.",
"It may contradict neither. In this case, the above two faults do not exist.",
"Question: If it contradicts direct perception, then it must contradict common worldly understanding. Why is it necessary to state two kinds of contradiction?",
"Answer: Because it independently and separately contradicts one of them, so the two situations are explained separately.",
"Self-contradiction, such as saying 'My mother is a barren woman'.",
"Commentary: This fifth fault, according to the correct translation of the Sanskrit text, should be called 'empty woman', because she has no function of producing children, falsely taking on the title of woman, so it is called 'empty woman'. Without changing the old translation, it is temporarily called 'barren woman'. 'My mother' is the subject (dharmin), 'barren woman' is the predicate (dharma), and the subject and predicate together form the thesis (paksa). However, saying 'my mother' contradicts the predicate 'barren woman'; saying 'barren woman' refutes the subject 'my mother'. If you say 'my mother', you know it is not false; since you say 'barren woman', it is clear that it is not 'my mother'. The two contradict each other, so it is called contradiction. Another example is when a non-Buddhist establishes the thesis: 'All statements' are the subject, 'are false' is the predicate. This statement of establishing the thesis implicitly allows that it is not false, included in the subject. If you say 'all statements', you implicitly allow that a part is not false, how can you say 'all are false'? If you say 'all are false', how can you say 'all statements'? Because the word 'all' includes the part that the thesis implicitly allows is not false. If they argue that, except for my statements, all other statements are false, then another person hearing what you say will say that your words are not false, but true and reliable. Is what he says false or true? If it is false, then your words are false; if it is true, then it contradicts your own words. If they further argue that, except for my statements and statements about my statements being true, all other statements are false, then this contradicts inference (Anumāṇa), because not all other statements are necessarily false, because it is the nature of speech, just like what you said.",
"The qualifier is not well-established, for example, when a Buddhist disciple establishes the thesis to a Sāṃkhya (an ancient school of Indian philosophy) that sound is destructible.",
"Commentary: This sixth fault, Saṃgha, here called Sāṃkhya, means that wisdom can calculate and measure all dharmas, so it is called Sāṃkhya, from number arises theory, so it is called Sāṃkhya. The teacher who created Sāṃkhya is called Kapila, here called Yellow, because his head and face are yellow, and the world calls him Yellow Immortal. The old translation Kāpilā is a corruption. This teacher extensively has twenty-five truths, namely Prakṛti (primordial matter), Mahat (intellect), Ahaṃkāra (ego), Tanmātra (five subtle elements), Buddhi (reason), Mahābhūta (five gross elements), Jñānendriya (five sense organs), Karmendriya (five action organs), Manas (mind). Among the knowers, there are four kinds, one is the origin that does not change, that is, Prakṛti, which can produce Mahat, etc., and is not produced by others; the second is the change that is not the origin, that is, the five"
]
}
大十一根唯從他生不生他故三亦本亦變即大我慢五唯量此從他生亦生他故四非本非變即神我諦不從他生不生他故略則為三謂自性即初諦變異即中間二十三諦神我即最後諦聲是五唯量攝遠從自性而起后變還歸自性故名無常論其體性恒不失壞今佛弟子對此論師立聲滅壞聲是所別此則共許滅壞能別數論不成以數論宗無滅壞法故此但是他能別不成若佛弟子對數論師立眼必為神我受用聞此即是自能別不成若對數論立聲體為大有同異二句所依此即是共能別不成文中略故但舉他也。
所別不極成者如數論師對佛弟子立我是思。
述曰此第七過問此所別不成非宗過攝闕所依故如所依不成答所別不成定是宗過以九攝故猶如餘八或猶如餘五數論師宗心及心法但是覺慧而非思處思處唯是神我之用故對佛法立宗義云神我是思我是有法思是法然思是能別兩宗共許我是所別佛法不容故是所別不極成也問如以勝義簡宗即無違世間過今以自所許言簡我所別得極成不答能別所別極成可以勝義簡過謂就勝義眼等體空其所別我他不共許設云自許他終不成故不例也此我許言但簡共比量顯自比量無不成過此即是他能別不成若自若共皆過此攝類思可解。
俱不極微者如勝論師立我以為和合因緣。
述曰此第八過吠世史迦此譯云勝其論廣以因明申六句義諸論罕匹故云勝也舊云衛世師或云鞞世師皆訛也造此論師名嗢露迦廣如下敘此勝論宗有六句義我是初句和合是第六句諸法共聚即有和合性生然和合性起賴我為緣彼對佛法立此義云我為和合因緣我是有法為和合因緣是法
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"大十一根(eleven organs)唯有從『他』(prakriti,自性)而生,不生『他』,所以三者(五知根、五作根、意根)既是本源又是變異,即『大』(mahat,覺)和『我慢』(ahamkara,我執)。五唯(tanmatra,五種感覺的潛在形式)的量(measure)也是從『他』而生,也生『他』。四者(地、水、火、風四大)既非本源也非變異,即『神我』(purusha,精神)的『諦』(tattva,真實),不從『他』而生,也不生『他』。簡略來說就是三者:『自性』(prakriti)即最初的『諦』,變異即中間的二十三『諦』,『神我』即最後的『諦』。聲是五唯的量所攝,從『自性』而起,最終變異還歸『自性』,所以名為無常。論其體性,恒常不失壞。現在佛弟子針對數論師(Samkhya)立論說聲是滅壞的,聲是所別(subject),這是雙方都認可的。滅壞是能別(predicate),數論不能成立,因為數論宗沒有滅壞的法。因此這只是他能別不成。如果佛弟子對數論師立論說眼必定為『神我』所受用,聽到這個就是自能別不成。如果對數論立論說聲的體性為『大』,有同異二句所依,這就是共能別不成。文中因為簡略,所以只舉了他能別。",
"所別不極成(subject unestablished)的例子,如數論師對佛弟子立論說『我是思』(I am thought)。",
"解釋:這是第七種過失。這裡所別不成,不是宗過(thesis fallacy)所攝,因為缺少所依(basis)。如果像所依不成一樣回答所別不成,必定是宗過,因為九種過失都包含在內,就像其餘八種或其餘五種一樣。數論師的宗義認為心和心法只是覺慧,而不是思處,思處只是『神我』的作用。因此,對佛法立宗義說『神我是思』,『我』是有法,『思』是法,然而『思』是能別,兩宗都認可『我』是所別,佛法不容許,所以是所別不極成。問:如果用勝義(ultimate truth)來簡別宗,就沒有違背世間(conventional truth)的過失。現在用『自所許』(self-admitted)的言語來簡別『我』的所別,可以得到極成嗎?答:能別和所別極成,可以用勝義來簡別過失,即就勝義而言,眼等體性是空的,其所別『我』他人不共許,假設說自己許,他人最終也不會成立,所以不能類比。這個『我許』的言語,只是簡別共同比量,顯示自比量沒有不成過的。這即是他能別不成,無論是自能別還是共能別,都是過失。這個攝類思可以這樣理解。",
"俱不極微(both subject and predicate unestablished)的例子,如勝論師(Vaisheshika)立論說『我以為和合因緣』(I am the cause of conjunction)。",
"解釋:這是第八種過失。吠世史迦,翻譯為『勝』,其論廣博,用因明來闡述六句義,諸論很少能匹敵,所以稱為『勝』。舊譯為衛世師或鞞世師,都是訛誤。造此論的論師名叫嗢露迦,詳細情況如下敘述。這個勝論宗有六句義,『我』是第一句,『和合』是第六句。諸法共同聚集就有和合性產生,然而和合性的產生依賴『我』為因緣。他們對佛法立此義說『我為和合因緣』,『我』是有法,『為和合因緣』是法。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"The great eleven organs arise only from 'that' (prakriti, nature), and do not give rise to 'that'. Therefore, the three (five sense organs, five action organs, and the mind organ) are both the origin and the transformation, namely 'mahat' (intellect) and 'ahamkara' (ego). The measure of the five tanmatras (subtle elements) also arises from 'that' and gives rise to 'that'. The four (earth, water, fire, and wind) are neither the origin nor the transformation, namely the 'tattva' (truth) of 'purusha' (spirit), which does not arise from 'that' and does not give rise to 'that'. Briefly speaking, there are three: 'prakriti' is the initial 'tattva', transformation is the middle twenty-three 'tattvas', and 'purusha' is the final 'tattva'. Sound is included in the measure of the five tanmatras, arising from 'prakriti' and ultimately returning to 'prakriti' after transformation, hence it is called impermanent. Regarding its essence, it is eternally not lost or destroyed. Now, Buddhist disciples argue against the Samkhya (enumeration school) philosophers, stating that sound is destructible, and sound is the subject. This is mutually acknowledged. Destruction is the predicate, but the Samkhya cannot establish this, because the Samkhya school does not have the dharma of destruction. Therefore, this is only an unestablished predicate for the other side. If Buddhist disciples argue against the Samkhya philosophers, stating that the eye must be used by 'purusha', hearing this is an unestablished predicate for oneself. If one argues against the Samkhya that the nature of sound is 'great', relying on the two statements of similarity and difference, this is an unestablished predicate for both sides. Because the text is brief, it only mentions the unestablished predicate for the other side.",
"An example of 'subject unestablished' is when the Samkhya philosopher argues against Buddhist disciples, stating 'I am thought'.",
"Explanation: This is the seventh fallacy. Here, the subject is unestablished, not included in the thesis fallacy, because it lacks a basis. If one answers that the subject is unestablished, like the basis is unestablished, it must be a thesis fallacy, because all nine fallacies are included, just like the remaining eight or the remaining five. The Samkhya philosopher's thesis holds that the mind and mental phenomena are only intellect, not the place of thought; the place of thought is only the function of 'purusha'. Therefore, arguing against Buddhism, stating 'purusha is thought', 'I' is the subject, 'thought' is the predicate, but 'thought' is the predicate. Both schools acknowledge that 'I' is the subject, but Buddhism does not allow this, so it is a subject unestablished. Question: If one uses ultimate truth to distinguish the thesis, there will be no fallacy of contradicting conventional truth. Now, can one use the words 'self-admitted' to distinguish the subject of 'I' to achieve establishment? Answer: The established predicate and subject can be distinguished with ultimate truth to avoid fallacies, that is, in terms of ultimate truth, the nature of the eye and so on is empty, and the subject 'I' is not mutually acknowledged by others. Suppose one says that oneself admits it, others will ultimately not establish it, so it cannot be analogized. The words 'I admit' only distinguish the common inference, showing that the self-inference has no unestablished fallacy. This is the unestablished predicate for the other side, whether it is the self-predicate or the common predicate, both are fallacies. This category of thinking can be understood in this way.",
"An example of 'both subject and predicate unestablished' is when the Vaisheshika (particularity school) philosopher argues, stating 'I am the cause of conjunction'.",
"Explanation: This is the eighth fallacy. Vaisheshika, translated as 'superior', its treatise is broad, using logic to explain the six categories, and few treatises can match it, so it is called 'superior'. The old translations as Wei Shi Shi or Bi Shi Shi are both errors. The philosopher who created this treatise is named Uluka, as described in detail below. This Vaisheshika school has six categories, 'I' is the first category, and 'conjunction' is the sixth category. When all dharmas gather together, the property of conjunction arises, but the arising of the property of conjunction relies on 'I' as the cause. They argue against Buddhism, stating 'I am the cause of conjunction', 'I' is the subject, and 'being the cause of conjunction' is the predicate."
]
}
佛法宗中既不許我又無和合故此二別俱不成也問此中能別為取因緣為取和合若爾何失若取因緣此則極成佛法許故若取和合即非能別以異體故答今此以和合標取因緣故因緣亦不成也此亦但是他俱不成若自若共亦此過收準類可解。
相符極成者如說聲是所聞。
述曰此第九過夫論之興為摧邪義擬破異宗聲之所聞主賓咸許所見既一豈藉言成故此立宗有符同過問天主既承陳那作論何故別立后四過耶答此據義別理亦無乖陳那不立能別不成過者以此同是似因喻中所立不成過故謂數論宗我性是常余但轉變無滅壞法今立宗云聲是滅壞因云以所作故同喻云諸所作者皆悉滅壞如燈焰等其燈焰上但有能立立所作住因所立滅壞數論不許又不立所別不成者以是因中所依不成過故論立宗云神我是有因云德所依故此德所依因無所依故因是其過我本是無今立為有故宗無過其俱不成全同此二又不立相符極成者夫所立宗互相乖反聲是所聞元來同許本自非宗不可論過故宗過中無此四種然天主以理具陳故加四過能別不成雖是似同喻中所立不成過何廢復是宗中過若言數論不信有滅壞今立滅壞正是宗故非宗過者此義以無同喻終不立今加宗過有何失若言既是喻中過何須別立宗過者是宗既取不相離性既無能別誰不離故能別不成立為宗過其所別不成雖是所依不成過何廢復是宗中過若言即是因中過不須別立宗過者宗法因法齊無所依何故一過一非過若言佛法不許我立我是有正順宗者不相離性方成宗既無所別誰不離故所別不成是宗過也其俱不成即同此二為欲破他而立宗義若符他立故是過收
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"佛法宗中既然不允許我這樣做,又沒有調和融合的可能,因此這兩種區別都不能成立。有人問:『這裡所說的「能別」是取因緣(hetu,原因)呢,還是取和合(sāmagrī,條件聚合)呢?』如果取因緣,那這已經是極成(prasiddha,公認的事實),因為佛法是允許的;如果取和合,那就不是「能別」,因為它們是不同的實體。答:現在這裡是以和合來標示取因緣,所以因緣也不能成立。這僅僅是他宗(外道)的「俱不成」(ubhayāsiddha,雙方不承認),如果是自宗(svasiddha,自己不承認)或共宗(sādhāraṇa,雙方都承認),也可用這個過失來類推解釋。",
"『相符極成』(prasiddha-viruddha,與公認的事實相矛盾)的例子,比如主張『聲音是所聞』。",
"解釋:這是第九種過失。立論的興起是爲了摧毀邪說,旨在駁斥其他宗派。『聲音是所聞』,主張者和對方都承認,所見既然一致,又何必用言語來證明呢?因此,這種立宗存在『相符同』的過失。有人問:『天主(Īśvara,自在天)既然繼承了陳那(Dignāga)的論述,為什麼還要另外設立後面的四種過失呢?』答:這是根據義理上的區別,在道理上也沒有衝突。陳那不設立『能別不成』的過失,是因為這同樣是似因(hetvābhāsa,似是而非的理由)和比喻(dṛṣṭānta,例子)中所設立的『不成』過失。比如,數論派(Sāṃkhya)主張『自性(Prakṛti)是常住的,其餘的都只是轉變,沒有滅壞的法』。現在立宗說『聲音是滅壞的』,理由是『因為它是所作的』,同喻是『凡是所作的,都是滅壞的,比如燈焰等』。這燈焰上只有能立(sādhyasiddhi,能證明的),立『所作』為因,所立(sādhya,所要證明的)是『滅壞』,數論派是不承認的。又不設立『所別不成』,因為這是理由中所依的『不成』過失。論中立宗說『神我(Ātman)是存在的』,理由是『因為它是德(guṇa,屬性)所依』。這『德所依』的理由沒有所依,所以理由是過失。我本來是沒有的,現在立為有,所以立宗沒有過失。其『俱不成』完全同於這兩種情況。又不設立『相符極成』,因為所立的宗互相矛盾,『聲音是所聞』,本來就都承認,本來就不是宗,不可論過失,所以宗的過失中沒有這四種。然而,天主用道理詳細陳述,所以加上這四種過失。『能別不成』雖然是似同喻(sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta,相似的例子)中所立的『不成』過失,為什麼不能又是宗中的過失呢?如果說數論派不相信有滅壞,現在立『滅壞』正是宗,不是宗的過失,這種說法是因為沒有同喻,始終不能成立。現在加上宗的過失有什麼損失呢?如果說既然是比喻中的過失,何必另外設立宗的過失呢?宗既然取不相離的性質,既然沒有能別,誰不相離呢?所以能別不成立,是宗的過失。其『所別不成』雖然是所依的『不成』過失,為什麼不能又是宗的過失呢?如果說這就是理由中的過失,不必另外設立宗的過失,宗法(pakṣa-dharma,宗的性質)和因法(hetu-dharma,理由的性質)同樣沒有所依,為什麼一個是過失,一個不是過失呢?如果說佛法不允許我立『我是有』,這正是順宗,不相離的性質才能成為宗,既然沒有所別,誰不相離呢?所以所別不成是宗的過失。其『俱不成』就同於這兩種情況。爲了駁斥他人而立宗義,如果符合他人的主張,就是過失。收錄。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Since the Buddhist doctrine does not allow me to do this, and there is no possibility of reconciliation or integration, these two distinctions cannot be established. Someone asks: 'Here, does '能別' (nengbie, differentiator) refer to taking 因緣 (hetu, cause) or taking 和合 (sāmagrī, aggregation of conditions)?' If it takes 因緣 (hetu, cause), then this is already 極成 (prasiddha, an established fact), because the Buddhist doctrine allows it; if it takes 和合 (sāmagrī, aggregation of conditions), then it is not a '能別' (nengbie, differentiator), because they are different entities. Answer: Now, here, taking 因緣 (hetu, cause) is indicated by 和合 (sāmagrī, aggregation of conditions), so 因緣 (hetu, cause) cannot be established either. This is merely 他宗 (paravādin, opponent's) '俱不成' (ubhayāsiddha, unestablished for both parties). If it is 自宗 (svavādin, proponent's own) or 共宗 (sādhāraṇa, common ground), this fault can also be explained by analogy.",
"An example of '相符極成' (prasiddha-viruddha, contradicting an established fact) is asserting that 'sound is audible'.",
"Explanation: This is the ninth fault. The rise of argumentation is to destroy heresy, aiming to refute other schools. 'Sound is audible' is acknowledged by both the proponent and the opponent. Since the view is the same, why bother proving it with words? Therefore, establishing this thesis has the fault of 'agreement'. Someone asks: 'Since Īśvara (自在天, the Lord) inherited Dignāga's (陳那) arguments, why did he additionally establish the latter four faults?' Answer: This is based on the difference in meaning, and there is no conflict in principle. Dignāga (陳那) did not establish the fault of '能別不成' (nengbiebucheng, unestablished differentiator) because this is the same as the 'unestablished' fault established in the pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa, fallacious reason) and example (dṛṣṭānta, illustration). For example, the Sāṃkhya (數論派) school asserts that 'Prakṛti (自性, nature) is permanent, and the rest are just transformations, without any destructible dharmas'. Now, the thesis is established as 'sound is destructible', the reason is 'because it is produced', and the example is 'whatever is produced is destructible, such as the flame of a lamp'. On this lamp flame, there is only the sādhyasiddhi (能立, that which can prove), establishing 'produced' as the reason, and the sādhya (所立, that which is to be proven) is 'destructible', which the Sāṃkhya (數論派) school does not acknowledge. Also, '所別不成' (suobiebucheng, unestablished differentiatum) is not established because this is the 'unestablished' fault relied upon in the reason. In the argument, the thesis is established as 'the Ātman (神我, self) exists', the reason is 'because it is the basis of qualities (guṇa, 德)'. This reason of 'basis of qualities' has no basis, so the reason is a fault. The self originally did not exist, but now it is established as existing, so there is no fault in the thesis. Its '俱不成' (ubhayāsiddha, unestablished for both parties) is completely the same as these two situations. Also, '相符極成' (prasiddha-viruddha, contradicting an established fact) is not established because the established theses contradict each other. 'Sound is audible' is originally acknowledged by everyone, and it is originally not a thesis, so it is impossible to argue about faults. Therefore, there are not these four types in the faults of the thesis. However, Īśvara (自在天) elaborates in detail with reason, so he adds these four faults. Although '能別不成' (nengbiebucheng, unestablished differentiator) is the 'unestablished' fault established in the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta (似同喻, similar example), why can't it also be a fault in the thesis? If it is said that the Sāṃkhya (數論派) school does not believe in destructibility, and now establishing 'destructibility' is precisely the thesis, not a fault of the thesis, this statement is because there is no similar example, and it can never be established. What is the loss in adding the fault of the thesis now? If it is said that since it is a fault in the example, why separately establish the fault of the thesis? Since the thesis takes the inseparable nature, and since there is no differentiator, who is not inseparable? Therefore, the unestablished differentiator is a fault of the thesis. Although '所別不成' (suobiebucheng, unestablished differentiatum) is the 'unestablished' fault of the basis, why can't it also be a fault of the thesis? If it is said that this is the fault in the reason, and there is no need to separately establish the fault of the thesis, the pakṣa-dharma (宗法, property of the thesis) and the hetu-dharma (因法, property of the reason) equally have no basis, why is one a fault and the other not a fault? If it is said that the Buddhist doctrine does not allow me to establish 'I exist', this is precisely in accordance with the thesis. The inseparable nature can become the thesis. Since there is no differentiatum, who is not inseparable? Therefore, the unestablished differentiatum is a fault of the thesis. Its '俱不成' (ubhayāsiddha, unestablished for both parties) is the same as these two situations. Establishing a thesis to refute others, if it conforms to the claims of others, it is a fault. Recorded."
]
}
若言相符本非宗不可說過者兩俱不成本非因應非是因過故天主解宗有九過也。
如是多言是遣諸法自相門故。
述曰此下第三釋義有三一釋初五過二釋中三過三釋后一過此即釋前五過也牒前九過故云如是多言何故違彼現量等五是宗過者以此五宗是遣諸法自相門故謂聲是諸法自相其聲自相為耳等所聞通生耳識即所聞義名之為門今言聲非所聞者不失聲之自相但遣所聞之門故成過也餘四種過類此可知。
不容成故。
述曰此釋中三過何故所別不成等三是過失者以不容成故夫宗得立要攬法有法成所攬立敵不容宗義無所依據故此三種是宗過失。
立無果故。
述曰此釋后一過何故相符是過者以立無果故夫立宗者為除舊疑登起新解聲所聞義有識皆知對眾重申此無果利故是過也。
名似立宗過。
述曰此第三結定也。
已說似宗當說似因。
述曰此下第二解似因有二一結前許說二正辨似因此即初也。
不成不定及與相違是名似因。
述曰此下正辨似因有二一總明二別解此即初也具三相因方證宗義若不善解初相有不成過若不善解后之二相有不定相違過何故名不成等者若所立因於其宗上俱不許有或隨一不許或復猶預或無宗所依如此之因名為不成如宗過中俱不成等此即因體名不成也若言因體不能成宗名不成者不然如所聞性因不能成宗然非四種不成所攝何得言不成宗故名不成耶若所立因同有異有或同無異無或雖同有異無仍為敵量乖反今自樂宗性不決定故名不定若所立因同無異有或雖同
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"若說『相符』本身並非正確的『宗』(Siddhanta,宗義),那麼不可說之過和兩者都不成立之過,就不是因為應成論式(Prasanga,因應)而產生的過失。因此,天主派(Tirthika,外道)對『宗』的解釋有九種過失。",
"像這樣多說,是爲了遣除諸法各自的自相之門。",
"解釋:下面第三部分解釋意義,分為三個部分:一是解釋前五個過失,二是解釋中間三個過失,三是解釋后一個過失。這裡解釋的是前五個過失。因為前面提到了九個過失,所以說『像這樣多說』。為什麼違背現量等五種是『宗』的過失呢?因為這五種『宗』是遣除諸法自相之門。例如,聲音是諸法的自相,聲音的自相被耳朵等聽到,產生耳識,這就是所聞的意義,稱之為『門』。現在說聲音不是所聞的,並沒有失去聲音的自相,只是遣除了所聞之門,所以構成過失。其餘四種過失可以依此類推。",
"因為不容許成立的緣故。",
"解釋:這裡解釋中間三個過失。為什麼所別不成等三種是過失呢?因為不容許成立的緣故。『宗』的成立,需要抓住法和有法,才能成立所要建立的。如果對方不容許,『宗』的意義就沒有依據,所以這三種是『宗』的過失。",
"因為建立沒有結果的緣故。",
"解釋:這裡解釋后一個過失。為什麼『相符』是過失呢?因為建立沒有結果的緣故。建立『宗』是爲了消除舊的疑惑,開啟新的理解。聲音是所聞的意義,有意識的人都知道,對大眾重複申明,沒有結果利益,所以是過失。",
"名為相似立『宗』的過失。",
"解釋:這是第三部分,總結確定。",
"已經說了相似的『宗』,應當說相似的『因』(Hetu,理由)。",
"解釋:下面第二部分解釋相似的『因』,分為兩個部分:一是總結前面,允許接下來說明;二是正式辨析相似的『因』。這裡是第一部分。",
"不成、不定以及相違,這被稱為相似的『因』。",
"解釋:下面正式辨析相似的『因』,分為兩個部分:一是總的說明,二是分別解釋。這裡是第一部分。具備三種相的『因』才能證明『宗』的意義。如果不善於理解第一個相,就會有不成的過失;如果不善於理解後面的兩個相,就會有不定和相違的過失。為什麼稱為不成等呢?如果所立的『因』,對於所立的『宗』,全部不承認有,或者隨一個不承認有,或者又猶豫不決,或者沒有『宗』所依賴的,這樣的『因』稱為不成,就像『宗』的過失中全部不成立等。這指的是『因』的本體,稱為不成。如果說『因』的本體不能成立『宗』,稱為不成,那就錯了。例如,所聞性這個『因』不能成立『宗』,但不是四種不成所包含的,怎麼能說因為不能成立『宗』就稱為不成呢?如果所立的『因』,在相同的地方有,在不同的地方也有;或者在相同的地方沒有,在不同的地方也沒有;或者雖然在相同的地方有,但在不同的地方沒有,仍然與對方的觀點相反,現在自己所樂於的『宗』的性質不確定,所以稱為不定。如果所立的『因』,在相同的地方沒有,在不同的地方有;或者雖然在相同的地方有,",
"English version",
"If it is said that 'correspondence' itself is not a correct 'Siddhanta' (宗義, tenet), then the faults of 'unspeakable' and 'both are not established' are not faults arising from 'Prasanga' (因應, consequence). Therefore, the Tirthikas' (天主派, non-Buddhist) explanation of 'Siddhanta' has nine faults.",
"Speaking so much is to eliminate the gates of the self-characteristics of all dharmas.",
"Explanation: The third part below explains the meaning, divided into three parts: first, explaining the first five faults; second, explaining the middle three faults; and third, explaining the last fault. This explains the first five faults. Because the nine faults were mentioned earlier, it is said 'speaking so much'. Why are violating the five, such as perception, faults of 'Siddhanta'? Because these five 'Siddhantas' are the gates to eliminate the self-characteristics of all dharmas. For example, sound is the self-characteristic of all dharmas, and the self-characteristic of sound is heard by the ears, etc., producing ear consciousness, which is the meaning of what is heard, called the 'gate'. Now, saying that sound is not what is heard does not lose the self-characteristic of sound, but eliminates the gate of what is heard, thus constituting a fault. The other four faults can be inferred by analogy.",
"Because it is not allowed to be established.",
"Explanation: This explains the middle three faults. Why are the three, such as 'the particular is not established', faults? Because it is not allowed to be established. The establishment of 'Siddhanta' requires grasping the dharma and the subject of the dharma to establish what is to be established. If the opponent does not allow it, the meaning of 'Siddhanta' has no basis, so these three are faults of 'Siddhanta'.",
"Because the establishment has no result.",
"Explanation: This explains the last fault. Why is 'correspondence' a fault? Because the establishment has no result. The establishment of 'Siddhanta' is to eliminate old doubts and open up new understanding. The meaning of sound being what is heard is known to all conscious beings, and repeating it to the public has no beneficial result, so it is a fault.",
"It is called a fault of seemingly establishing 'Siddhanta'.",
"Explanation: This is the third part, summarizing and determining.",
"Having spoken of the similar 'Siddhanta', one should speak of the similar 'Hetu' (因, reason).",
"Explanation: The second part below explains the similar 'Hetu', divided into two parts: first, summarizing the previous and allowing the following explanation; second, formally distinguishing the similar 'Hetu'. This is the first part.",
"'Unestablished', 'uncertain', and 'contradictory' are called similar 'Hetus'.",
"Explanation: The following formally distinguishes the similar 'Hetu', divided into two parts: first, a general explanation; second, a separate explanation. This is the first part. A 'Hetu' with three characteristics can prove the meaning of 'Siddhanta'. If one is not good at understanding the first characteristic, there will be the fault of being 'unestablished'; if one is not good at understanding the latter two characteristics, there will be the faults of being 'uncertain' and 'contradictory'. Why are they called 'unestablished', etc.? If the established 'Hetu', in relation to the established 'Siddhanta', is not admitted to exist at all, or one of them is not admitted to exist, or is hesitant, or has no reliance on 'Siddhanta', such a 'Hetu' is called 'unestablished', just like the 'Siddhanta' faults of 'all are not established', etc. This refers to the substance of the 'Hetu', called 'unestablished'. If it is said that the substance of the 'Hetu' cannot establish 'Siddhanta', called 'unestablished', then that is wrong. For example, the 'Hetu' of 'audibility' cannot establish 'Siddhanta', but it is not included in the four types of 'unestablished', so how can it be said that it is called 'unestablished' because it cannot establish 'Siddhanta'? If the established 'Hetu' exists in the same place and also exists in different places; or does not exist in the same place and also does not exist in different places; or although it exists in the same place, it does not exist in different places, it still contradicts the opponent's view, and now the nature of the 'Siddhanta' that one enjoys is uncertain, so it is called 'uncertain'. If the established 'Hetu' does not exist in the same place but exists in different places; or although it exists in the same place,"
]
}
有異無仍違自宗所許之宗成非所樂故名相違。
不成有四。
述曰此下別解有三一解不成二解不定三解相違不成中有三一舉數二列名三辨體此即舉數。
一兩俱不成二隨一不成三猶預不成四所依不成。
述曰此列名也。
如成立聲為無常等若言是眼所見性故兩俱不成。
述曰此下辨體四不成為四就初不成有三初兩句舉宗次兩句明體后一句結成可知此有二種一全分二一分全分者即如此中聲是有法無常是法為無常等者等取常等也立因云是眼所見性故此因雖于同品無常色等上有異品常住空等上無而遍於所立聲宗之上若自若他並不許有故是全分兩俱不成一分者如立內外聲是無常因云勤勇所發性故此因但于內聲之上立敵俱有于外聲上他自並無故是一分兩俱不成問今言聲是眼見此即違彼世間現量比量自語自教何故但云兩俱不成答立宗既違敵論不可一切皆違故宗約以違世等過立因但為令違成順因不共許即墮過門立因不欲成其已順世間等宗設違世等非因過也。
所作性故對聲顯論隨一不成。
述曰此第二不成有二初兩句辨體后一句結成宗同前舉略不重申此亦有二一全分二一分全分者即此是也舊云四毗陀論訛也應云吠陀此云明也諸婆羅門計四明論聲是常住雖梵王等隨說而是誦者非是造者自余內聲即非常住今聲論等附此宗而起異計謂但是內聲皆是常住待咽喉等緣顯方聞故名聲顯論又有一師亦計外聲體是常住相擊發顯亦是聲顯論也今鵂鹠子等對聲顯論立量云聲是無常因云所作性故彼聲顯論雖計聲從緣顯其若太虛
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:\n\n『有異無仍違自宗所許之宗成非所樂故名相違。』\n\n如果存在差異,即使沒有改變,但如果所立的宗義與自己宗派所認可的觀點相違背,因為不是自己所期望的,這就叫做相違。\n\n『不成有四。』\n\n不成有四種情況。\n\n『述曰此下別解有三一解不成二解不定三解相違不成中有三一舉數二列名三辨體此即舉數。』\n\n解釋說:下面分別解釋這三種情況:一是解釋不成,二是解釋不定,三是解釋相違。不成之中有三種:一是列舉數量,二是列出名稱,三是辨別體性。這裡就是列舉數量。\n\n『一兩俱不成二隨一不成三猶預不成四所依不成。』\n\n一是兩方都不認可,二是隨一方不認可,三是猶豫不決,四是所依賴的基礎不成立。\n\n『述曰此列名也。』\n\n解釋說:這裡是列出名稱。\n\n『如成立聲為無常等若言是眼所見性故兩俱不成。』\n\n例如,如果立論說聲音是無常的等等,如果說原因是『因為是眼睛所能見到的性質』,那麼立論雙方都不會認可。\n\n『述曰此下辨體四不成為四就初不成有三初兩句舉宗次兩句明體后一句結成可知此有二種一全分二一分全分者即如此中聲是有法無常是法為無常等者等取常等也立因云是眼所見性故此因雖于同品無常色等上有異品常住空等上無而遍於所立聲宗之上若自若他並不許有故是全分兩俱不成一分者如立內外聲是無常因云勤勇所發性故此因但于內聲之上立敵俱有于外聲上他自並無故是一分兩俱不成問今言聲是眼見此即違彼世間現量比量自語自教何故但云兩俱不成答立宗既違敵論不可一切皆違故宗約以違世等過立因但為令違成順因不共許即墮過門立因不欲成其已順世間等宗設違世等非因過也。』\n\n解釋說:下面辨別體性。四種不成,就第一種『兩俱不成』有三種情況。開始兩句是提出宗義,接著兩句是說明體性,后一句是總結。這種情況有兩種:一是全分,二是部分。全分的情況就像這裡,聲音是有法,無常是法,『為無常等』的『等』字包括常等。立因說『因為是眼睛所能見到的性質』,這個因雖然在同品(無常的色等)上有,在異品(常住的空等)上沒有,但是遍及所立的聲宗之上,無論是自己還是對方都不認可,所以是全分的兩俱不成。部分的情況,比如立內外聲是無常的,原因是『因為是勤奮努力所發出的性質』,這個因只在內聲之上,立論者和對方都認可,但在外聲上,自己和對方都不認可,所以是部分的兩俱不成。問:現在說聲音是眼睛能見到的,這違背了世間的現量、比量、自語和自教,為什麼只說是兩俱不成?答:立宗既然違背了對方的論點,不可能一切都違背,所以宗義是用來指出違背世間等過失的。立因只是爲了使違背變成順從,如果因不被共同認可,就落入了過失之門。立因不是爲了成就已經順應世間等的宗義,即使違背了世間等,也不是因的過失。\n\n『所作性故對聲顯論隨一不成。』\n\n因為是所作性,對於聲顯論來說,是隨一方不認可。\n\n『述曰此第二不成有二初兩句辨體后一句結成宗同前舉略不重申此亦有二一全分二一分全分者即此是也舊云四毗陀論訛也應云吠陀此云明也諸婆羅門計四明論聲是常住雖梵王等隨說而是誦者非是造者自余內聲即非常住今聲論等附此宗而起異計謂但是內聲皆是常住待咽喉等緣顯方聞故名聲顯論又有一師亦計外聲體是常住相擊發顯亦是聲顯論也今鵂鹠子等對聲顯論立量云聲是無常因云所作性故彼聲顯論雖計聲從緣顯其若太虛",
"English version:\n\n'If there is a difference, even if it remains unchanged, but if the established proposition contradicts the views accepted by one's own school, because it is not what one desires, it is called contradictory.'\n\n'There are four types of unestablished.'\n\nThere are four cases of unestablished.\n\n'Explanation: Below, there are three separate explanations: one explains unestablished, two explains uncertain, and three explains contradictory. Among the unestablished, there are three: one lists the number, two lists the names, and three distinguishes the nature. This is listing the number.'\n\n'One, both parties do not agree; two, one party does not agree; three, hesitation; four, the basis is not established.'\n\nOne is that both parties do not agree, two is that one party does not agree, three is hesitation, and four is that the basis on which it relies is not established.\n\n'Explanation: This lists the names.'\n\nExplanation: This is listing the names.\n\n'For example, if establishing sound as impermanent, etc., if saying it is because of the nature of being seen by the eye, then both parties will not agree.'\n\nFor example, if arguing that sound is impermanent, etc., and if the reason given is 'because it is the nature of being seen by the eye,' then neither party will accept it.\n\n'Explanation: Below, distinguish the nature. The four types of unestablished, focusing on the first type of unestablished, have three situations. The first two sentences introduce the proposition, the next two sentences explain the nature, and the last sentence concludes. There are two types of situations: one is complete division, and the other is partial division. The complete division is like this: sound is the subject, impermanence is the predicate, 'being impermanent, etc.' includes permanence, etc. The reason given is 'because it is the nature of being seen by the eye.' Although this reason exists in the similar class (impermanent colors, etc.) and does not exist in the dissimilar class (permanent space, etc.), it pervades the established sound proposition, but neither oneself nor the other party accepts it, so it is a complete division of both parties not agreeing. The partial division is like establishing inner and outer sounds as impermanent, with the reason being 'because it is the nature of being produced by effort.' This reason exists only for inner sounds, and both the proponent and opponent agree, but for outer sounds, neither oneself nor the other party agrees, so it is a partial division of both parties not agreeing. Question: Now saying that sound is seen by the eye contradicts worldly perception, inference, self-speech, and self-teaching, so why only say that both parties do not agree? Answer: Since establishing the proposition contradicts the opponent's argument, it is impossible for everything to contradict, so the proposition is used to point out the faults of contradicting the world, etc. Establishing the reason is only to make contradiction turn into agreement. If the reason is not commonly accepted, it falls into the gate of faults. Establishing the reason is not to achieve a proposition that already conforms to the world, etc., so even if it contradicts the world, etc., it is not a fault of the reason.\n\n'Because it is produced, it is unestablished for either party regarding the Sound Manifestation Theory.'\n\nBecause it is produced, it is unestablished for either party regarding the Shabda-Vyakti-vada (Sound Manifestation Theory).\n\n'Explanation: This second type of unestablished has two aspects. The first two sentences distinguish the nature, and the last sentence concludes. The proposition is the same as before, so it is omitted. This also has two types: one is complete division, and the other is partial division. The complete division is like this. The old saying 'Four Vedas' is wrong; it should be 'Veda,' which means 'knowledge.' The Brahmins believe that the sound in the four Vedas is permanent, although Brahma (梵王) and others speak it, they are reciters, not creators. The remaining inner sounds are not permanent. Now, the Sound Theory, etc., follows this school and raises different views, saying that only inner sounds are permanent, waiting for the conditions of the throat, etc., to manifest before they can be heard, hence the name Sound Manifestation Theory. There is also a teacher who believes that the substance of outer sounds is permanent, and striking and manifesting is also the Sound Manifestation Theory. Now, the Owl Sons (鵂鹠子) and others establish a measure against the Sound Manifestation Theory, saying that sound is impermanent, with the reason being 'because it is produced.' Although the Sound Manifestation Theory believes that sound manifests from conditions, if it is like empty space..."
]
}
無所作義今鵂鹠等云所作性者但是自許聲有此義他聲顯論不許聲有此則自成他不成也言隨一者此不成中含其三種或有因唯自不成非他或有因唯他不成非自或有因或自或他更互不成今此中但是唯他不成非自不成是此不成攝故名隨一不成非謂此之一因即有自他互不成也又釋其所作因有生有顯生即鵂鹠等許顯即聲顯論許今鵂鹠等對聲顯論言所作者彼便破云汝言所作性者為生為顯若生即自成他不成若顯即他成自不成故言隨一若唯他非自若唯自非他亦是此中攝也問如雲所作性故不可分別為咽喉等所作為杖輪等所作若咽喉等所作即無同喻若杖輪等所作則兩俱不成此既不可但總相云所作即具三相是其正因何故此中而不總言所作性故通含生顯是正因耶答若自他俱許聲上有咽喉等所作后俱許瓶上有杖輪等所作以別許故可總為因今生所作自許他不許顯所作他許自不許別不俱許不可總成故是隨一不成過也問如前所作對聲論立即正因收何故此中是似因攝答聲論自有二計一云聲體及用俱常二云體常其用無常用不離體體有所作此中但對體用俱常是似因攝前對體常用無常者是正因收又釋此中且據未更成立是似因收前據重成是真因攝謂更成立聲是所作又聲是生所作宗隨緣變故因如燈焰等喻又釋聲論更有一計云聲從緣生生已即常若對此立因即是正因若對聲顯即是似因一分者如聲論中有計內聲有詮常無所作外聲無詮無常有作對彼立量云一切內外聲是無常宗所作性故因此因於外聲上自他併成但于內聲他自互許故是一分隨一不成。
于霧等性起疑惑時為成大種和合火有而有所說
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"關於『有所作』的意義,現在的鵂鹠(Nyāya,正理論派)等學派認為『所作性』只是他們自己承認的,在聲音顯現論(Śabdavāda)中並不承認這個意義。如果聲音顯現論不承認聲音具有『所作性』,那麼這個因對於鵂鹠等學派來說是成立的,但對於聲音顯現論來說是不成立的。說『隨一』,是因為這個『不成』中包含了三種情況:或者有的因只是自己不成立,而不是對方不成立;或者有的因只是對方不成立,而不是自己不成立;或者有的因自己和對方都互相不成立。現在這裡只是對方不成立,而不是自己不成立,所以這個『不成』屬於『隨一不成』,而不是說這個『一』個因就包含了自己和對方互相不成立的情況。",
"又解釋說,『所作』這個因,有『生』和『顯』兩種含義。『生』是鵂鹠等學派承認的,『顯』是聲音顯現論承認的。現在鵂鹠等學派針對聲音顯現論說『所作』,聲音顯現論就會反駁說:『你說的『所作性』,是『生』還是『顯』?如果是『生』,那麼對於你們自己是成立的,但對於我們是不成立的;如果是『顯』,那麼對於我們是成立的,但對於你們是不成立的。』所以說是『隨一』。如果只是對方不成立,而不是自己不成立;或者只是自己不成立,而不是對方不成立,也屬於這種情況。",
"問:如果說『因為是所作性,所以不可分別』,就像咽喉等所作是聲音,就像手杖、輪子等所作是瓶子。如果咽喉等所作是聲音,那麼就沒有同喻;如果手杖、輪子等所作是瓶子,那麼雙方都不成立。既然這樣不可以,但總的來說『所作』就具備三種特性,是其正因,為什麼這裡不總的說『所作性』,從而普遍包含『生』和『顯』,作為正因呢?",
"答:如果自己和對方都承認聲音上有咽喉等所作,後來又都承認瓶子上有手杖、輪子等所作,因為分別承認,所以可以總的作為因。現在『生所作』是自己承認但對方不承認,『顯所作』是對方承認但自己不承認,分別承認但不都承認,所以不可以總的成立,因此是『隨一不成』的過失。",
"問:像前面所說的『所作』,針對聲音論來說立即就是正因的範疇,為什麼這裡是似因的範疇呢?",
"答:聲音論自己有兩種觀點:一種認為聲音的本體和作用都是常恒的,一種認為本體是常恒的,但作用是無常的,作用不離本體,本體有所作。這裡只是針對本體和作用都是常恒的觀點,所以是似因的範疇。前面針對本體常恒但作用無常的觀點,是正因的範疇。又解釋說,這裡且根據未進一步成立的情況,是似因的範疇。前面根據重新成立的情況,是真因的範疇。所謂重新成立,就是說聲音是所作,又說聲音是生所作,原因是隨緣變化,比如燈焰等作為比喻。",
"又解釋說,聲音論還有一種觀點,認為聲音是從緣而生的,生了之後就是常恒的。如果針對這種觀點立因,那就是正因;如果針對聲音顯現論,那就是似因。",
"『一分』是指,比如聲音論中有人認為內在的聲音是有意義的、常恒的、無所作的,外在的聲音是沒有意義的、無常的、有所作的。針對他們立量說:『一切內外聲都是無常的』,原因是『所作性』。這個因在外在的聲音上自己和對方都成立,但在內在的聲音上,對方和自己互相承認,所以是『一分隨一不成』。",
"在對霧等性質產生疑惑的時候,爲了成立地、水、火、風(四大種)和合而有火的存在,所作的論述。",
"English version:",
"Regarding the meaning of 'what is made' (kṛta), the present-day Nyāya school, etc., consider 'the property of being made' (kṛtakatva) as something they themselves acknowledge, but it is not acknowledged in Śabdavāda (the doctrine of sound). If Śabdavāda does not acknowledge that sound possesses 'the property of being made,' then this reason (hetu) is established for the Nyāya school, but it is not established for Śabdavāda. Saying 'one of' (ekatara) is because this 'non-establishment' (asiddha) includes three situations: either a reason is only not established for oneself, but not for the other party; or a reason is only not established for the other party, but not for oneself; or a reason is mutually not established for both oneself and the other party. Now, here it is only not established for the other party, but not for oneself, so this 'non-establishment' belongs to 'non-establishment of one of' (ekatara-asiddha), and it is not saying that this 'one' reason includes the situation where oneself and the other party mutually do not establish it.",
"Furthermore, it is explained that the reason 'what is made' has two meanings: 'produced' (janya) and 'manifested' (vyangya). 'Produced' is acknowledged by the Nyāya school, etc., and 'manifested' is acknowledged by Śabdavāda. Now, when the Nyāya school, etc., say 'what is made' to Śabdavāda, Śabdavāda will retort: 'What you say as 'the property of being made,' is it 'produced' or 'manifested'? If it is 'produced,' then it is established for yourselves, but not established for us; if it is 'manifested,' then it is established for us, but not established for yourselves.' Therefore, it is said to be 'one of.' If it is only not established for the other party, but not for oneself; or if it is only not established for oneself, but not for the other party, it also belongs to this situation.",
"Question: If it is said that 'because it is the property of being made, it cannot be distinguished,' just as the production of the throat, etc., is sound, just as the production of a staff, wheel, etc., is a pot. If the production of the throat, etc., is sound, then there is no similar example (sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta); if the production of a staff, wheel, etc., is a pot, then both parties do not establish it. Since this is not possible, but generally speaking, 'what is made' possesses three characteristics and is its correct reason (samyak-hetu), why is it not generally said here that 'the property of being made' universally includes 'produced' and 'manifested' as the correct reason?",
"Answer: If oneself and the other party both acknowledge that there is the production of the throat, etc., on sound, and later both acknowledge that there is the production of a staff, wheel, etc., on a pot, because they acknowledge them separately, they can be generally taken as the reason. Now, 'produced what is made' is acknowledged by oneself but not acknowledged by the other party, and 'manifested what is made' is acknowledged by the other party but not acknowledged by oneself. They acknowledge them separately but do not all acknowledge them, so it cannot be generally established, therefore it is the fault of 'non-establishment of one of.'",
"Question: Like the previously mentioned 'what is made,' in relation to the doctrine of sound, it immediately falls under the category of correct reason, why is it in the category of fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa) here?",
"Answer: The doctrine of sound itself has two views: one view is that the essence (dravya) and function (kārya) of sound are both permanent (nitya), and one view is that the essence is permanent, but the function is impermanent (anitya), and the function is inseparable from the essence, and the essence is what is made. Here, it is only in relation to the view that the essence and function are both permanent, so it is in the category of fallacious reason. Previously, in relation to the view that the essence is permanent but the function is impermanent, it was in the category of correct reason. Furthermore, it is explained that here it is based on the situation where it has not been further established, so it is in the category of fallacious reason. Previously, it was based on the situation where it has been re-established, so it is in the category of true reason (sat-hetu). What is called re-establishment is that sound is what is made, and it is also said that sound is produced what is made, because it changes according to conditions (pratyaya), like the flame of a lamp, etc., as an example.",
"Furthermore, it is explained that the doctrine of sound also has a view that sound is produced from conditions, and after it is produced, it is permanent. If a reason is established in relation to this view, then it is a correct reason; if it is in relation to Śabdavāda, then it is a fallacious reason.",
"'A part' (ekadeśa) refers to, for example, in the doctrine of sound, some people believe that internal sound (antar-śabda) is meaningful (sārtha), permanent, and not made, and external sound (bahir-śabda) is meaningless (nirartha), impermanent, and made. In relation to them, a syllogism (anumāna) is established: 'All internal and external sounds are impermanent,' because of 'the property of being made.' This reason is established for oneself and the other party on external sound, but on internal sound, the other party and oneself mutually acknowledge it, so it is 'non-establishment of one of in a part' (ekadeśa-ekatara-asiddha).",
"When doubt arises about the nature of mist, etc., in order to establish the existence of fire through the combination of earth, water, fire, and wind (mahābhūta), a statement is made."
]
}
猶預不成。
述曰此第三猶預不成有三初四句舉宗次一句辨體后一句結成此有二種一兩俱猶預二隨一猶預兩俱猶預有二一全分如立宗云未種解脫分凡夫有情必定作佛因云有大乘種姓故同喻云如種菩薩解脫分有情立之與敵並全不知有之與無遍宗皆疑故是全分猶預不成二一分如立宗云已種菩薩解脫分及未種有情必定作佛立因云有大乘種姓故同喻云如地上菩薩此因於已種菩薩解脫分有情立之與敵齊許定有于未種有情並皆猶豫疑不遍宗故是一分猶豫不成隨一亦二一全分如立者知未種菩薩解脫分有情具種姓相敵者不知便立宗云此之有情必定作佛立因云有種姓故同喻如前此因立者決定知有敵者猶豫或即反此立者不知敵者知有此皆遍宗有疑故是全分猶豫不成二一分即以全分所立更取已種菩薩解脫分合之為宗因喻同前此疑不遍宗故是一分猶豫不成今此文中但明兩俱全分猶豫略不論余霧等性者等取塵等大種和合者河水為水大河岸為地大於中有風為風大又山等中若有河無河之處有性四大故云大種和合也有人遠矚山澤等中霧等似煙意欲成立彼處有火遂立宗云彼處有火立因云以現相故同喻云如廚等處立之與敵並不審知彼處有煙而言以現煙故此遍宗皆疑故是兩俱全分猶豫。
虛空實有德所依故對無空論所依不成。
述曰此第四所依不成有三初一句舉宗次兩句辨體后一句結成此有三種一兩俱所依不成二隨一所依不成三猶緣所依不成兩俱有二一全分如小乘對聲論等立宗云他方佛聲定是無常立因云所作性故同喻云如瓶盆等此他方佛聲立之與敵俱不許有此所
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"猶豫不成。",
"述曰:此第三種『猶豫不成』有三種情況。首先四句是總的概括,接著一句是辨析其體性,最後一句是總結。這裡有兩種情況:一是『兩俱猶豫』,二是『隨一猶豫』。『兩俱猶豫』又有兩種:一是『全分』,例如,立宗者說:『未種下解脫分的凡夫有情,必定能成佛』,立因說:『因為他們有大乘種姓』,同喻說:『如同種下菩薩解脫分的有情』。這種情況下,立論者和對方都完全不瞭解『有大乘種姓』這件事的存在與否,遍及整個論宗都存在疑問,所以是『全分猶豫不成』。二是『一分』,例如,立宗者說:『已種下菩薩解脫分的和未種下菩薩解脫分的有情,必定能成佛』,立因說:『因為他們有大乘種姓』,同喻說:『如同地上菩薩』。這個『因』對於已種下菩薩解脫分的有情,立論者和對方都承認是確定的;但對於未種下菩薩解脫分的有情,雙方都猶豫不決。因為疑問沒有遍及整個論宗,所以是『一分猶豫不成』。『隨一』也有兩種:一是『全分』,例如,立論者知道未種下菩薩解脫分的有情具有種姓的相狀,而對方不知道,於是立宗說:『這些有情必定能成佛』,立因說:『因為他們有種姓』,同喻如前所述。這個『因』,立論者確定知道有,而對方猶豫不決。或者相反,立論者不知道,而對方知道有。這些情況都遍及整個論宗存在疑問,所以是『全分猶豫不成』。二是『一分』,就是用『全分』所立的宗,再加上已種下菩薩解脫分,合在一起作為宗,因和喻與前面相同。因為疑問沒有遍及整個論宗,所以是『一分猶豫不成』。現在這段文字中,只說明瞭『兩俱全分猶豫』,略去了其他的。霧等性質,如同灰塵等。『大種和合』,例如河水是水大,河岸是地大,大風中有風大。又如山等之中,無論有沒有河流的地方,都有地、水、火、風四大種的性質,所以說是『大種和合』。有人遠遠地看到山澤等地方有霧等,看起來像煙,就想成立那裡有火,於是立宗說:『那個地方有火』,立因說:『因為有煙的現象』,同喻說:『如同廚房等地方』。立論者和對方都不確定那裡是否有煙,卻說『因為有煙的現象』,這遍及整個論宗都存在疑問,所以是『兩俱全分猶豫』。",
"虛空實有,因為是德所依之處。對於不承認虛空存在的論者,『所依不成』。",
"述曰:這第四種是『所依不成』,有三種情況。首先一句是總的概括,接著兩句是辨析其體性,最後一句是總結。這裡有三種情況:一是『兩俱所依不成』,二是『隨一所依不成』,三是『猶緣所依不成』。『兩俱』有兩種:一是『全分』,例如小乘對聲論等立宗說:『他方佛(Tathāgata)的聲音一定是無常的』,立因說:『因為是所作性』,同喻說:『如同瓶子、盆子等』。這個『他方佛』的聲音,立論者和對方都不承認有,這屬於『所依不成』。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"『Hesitation』 is not established.",
"Commentary: This third type, 『Hesitation is not established,』 has three situations. The first four sentences provide a general overview, followed by a sentence analyzing its nature, and the last sentence summarizes. There are two cases here: one is 『Both sides hesitate,』 and the other is 『One side hesitates.』 『Both sides hesitate』 has two types: one is 『Complete division,』 for example, the proponent says: 『Sentient beings who have not planted the seeds of liberation are certain to become Buddhas,』 the reason given is: 『Because they have the lineage of Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle),』 the example is: 『Like sentient beings who have planted the seeds of Bodhisattva liberation.』 In this case, both the proponent and the opponent are completely unaware of whether 『having the lineage of Mahāyāna』 exists or not, and there is doubt throughout the entire thesis, so it is 『Complete division hesitation is not established.』 The second is 『Partial division,』 for example, the proponent says: 『Sentient beings who have planted the seeds of Bodhisattva liberation and those who have not planted them are certain to become Buddhas,』 the reason given is: 『Because they have the lineage of Mahāyāna,』 the example is: 『Like Bodhisattvas on the ground.』 This 『reason,』 for sentient beings who have planted the seeds of Bodhisattva liberation, is acknowledged as certain by both the proponent and the opponent; but for sentient beings who have not planted the seeds of Bodhisattva liberation, both sides hesitate. Because the doubt does not pervade the entire thesis, it is 『Partial division hesitation is not established.』 『One side』 also has two types: one is 『Complete division,』 for example, the proponent knows that sentient beings who have not planted the seeds of Bodhisattva liberation have the characteristics of lineage, while the opponent does not know, so the proponent establishes the thesis: 『These sentient beings are certain to become Buddhas,』 the reason given is: 『Because they have lineage,』 the example is as before. This 『reason,』 the proponent certainly knows exists, while the opponent hesitates. Or vice versa, the proponent does not know, while the opponent knows it exists. These situations all pervade the entire thesis with doubt, so it is 『Complete division hesitation is not established.』 The second is 『Partial division,』 which is to take the thesis established by 『Complete division』 and add those who have planted the seeds of Bodhisattva liberation, combining them as the thesis, with the reason and example being the same as before. Because the doubt does not pervade the entire thesis, it is 『Partial division hesitation is not established.』 In this passage, only 『Both sides complete division hesitation』 is explained, omitting the others. The nature of fog, etc., is like dust, etc. 『The aggregation of great elements,』 for example, river water is the water element, the riverbank is the earth element, and there is wind element in the great wind. Also, in mountains, etc., whether there are rivers or not, there are the natures of the four great elements of earth, water, fire, and wind, so it is said to be 『The aggregation of great elements.』 Someone far away sees fog, etc., in mountains and marshes, which looks like smoke, and wants to establish that there is fire there, so they establish the thesis: 『There is fire in that place,』 the reason given is: 『Because there is the appearance of smoke,』 the example is: 『Like in kitchens, etc.』 The proponent and the opponent are not sure whether there is smoke there, but they say 『Because there is the appearance of smoke,』 which is doubtful throughout the entire thesis, so it is 『Both sides complete division hesitation.』",
"Space truly exists because it is the basis of qualities. For those who do not acknowledge the existence of space, 『The basis is not established.』",
"Commentary: This fourth type is 『The basis is not established,』 which has three situations. The first sentence provides a general overview, followed by two sentences analyzing its nature, and the last sentence summarizes. There are three cases here: one is 『Both sides the basis is not established,』 the second is 『One side the basis is not established,』 and the third is 『Hesitation regarding the basis is not established.』 『Both sides』 has two types: one is 『Complete division,』 for example, the Theravada (Small Vehicle) sect establishes the thesis against the sound theorists: 『The sound of the Tathāgata (佛) in other realms is certainly impermanent,』 the reason given is: 『Because it is produced,』 the example is: 『Like pots, basins, etc.』 This sound of the Tathāgata in other realms is not acknowledged by either the proponent or the opponent, which belongs to 『The basis is not established.』"
]
}
作因遍無依處故是全分所依不成二一分即以前所立更取共許音聲為宗因喻同前以共許聲為因作依他方佛聲因無依處故是一分所依不成隨一亦二一全分如小乘對大乘立宗云釋伽菩薩實不善聲去來世有立因云以世攝故同喻云如現在聲或大乘對小乘立此聲云不離耳識立因云第二三所攝耳所不攝故同喻云如耳識若大乘或小乘以他方佛聲為宗因喻同前此釋迦菩薩實不善聲及他方佛聲立者敵論互不許有此世攝等因遍互無依故是全分所依不成二一分即前所立更以共許音聲為宗因喻同前共許之聲為因作依不共許聲因無依處故是一分所依不成猶豫有二一兩俱猶豫所依不成二隨一猶豫所依不成兩俱有二一全分如大乘對小乘立宗云佛于其處或應說法如此之聲定不離識因喻同前此有法聲立敵俱疑其處時日為說法不而立為宗其因所依遍不決定故是全分猶豫所依不成二一分即以前所立更以共許音聲為宗因喻同前以決定聲為因作依猶豫之聲為依不定故是一分猶豫所依不成隨一亦二一全分如大乘知佛于其處決定說法小乘敵者不決定知或大乘立者不知小乘敵者知定說法而立此云定不離識因喻同前此宗立敵互不決定許其因遍互無決定依故是全分豫猶所依不成二一分即以前所立更以決定音聲為宗因喻同前以決定聲為因作依互不定聲因依不定故是一分猶豫所依不成今此中文但明隨一分所依不成略不論余如勝論義空是實句攝聲是德句攝依其空實方有聲德經部師等不立空體故對經部立宗云虛空實有立因云德所依故同喻云如火大等火大等為色等德依火等即實有故空為聲德依亦是實有此空經部
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"'作因遍無依處故是全分所依不成',意思是說,如果作為原因的特性普遍缺乏依存之處,那麼它就不能完全作為所立宗的依據。如果只是部分依存(二一分),那麼就以前面所建立的論點,重新選取雙方都認可的聲音作為宗,原因和比喻與之前相同。以雙方都認可的聲音作為原因,因為作為原因的特性依存之處,在不被認可的聲音中缺乏依存之處,所以只是部分依存,不能成立。隨一的情況也是如此。",
"二一全分,例如小乘對大乘立宗說:『釋迦菩薩(Śākyamuni Bodhisattva)實際上是不善的聲音,在過去和未來世存在。』立因說:『因為被世所攝。』同喻說:『如同現在的聲音。』或者大乘對小乘立宗說:『此聲不離耳識。』立因說:『因為被第二和第三所攝,而不被耳朵所攝。』同喻說:『如同耳識。』如果大乘或小乘以他方佛的聲音為宗,原因和比喻與之前相同。如果以『釋迦菩薩實際上是不善的聲音』以及『他方佛的聲音』立宗,敵論雙方互不認可,因為『被世所攝』等原因普遍缺乏相互依存之處,所以是全分所依不成。",
"二一分,即以前面所立的論點,重新以雙方都認可的聲音作為宗,原因和比喻與之前相同。以雙方都認可的聲音作為原因,因為作為原因的特性依存之處,在不被認可的聲音中缺乏依存之處,所以只是部分依存,不能成立。",
"猶豫有二:一是兩方都猶豫,所依不成;二是隨一方猶豫,所依不成。兩方都猶豫又有兩種情況:一是全分,例如大乘對小乘立宗說:『佛(Buddha)在那個地方或者應該說法,如此的聲音一定不離識。』原因和比喻與之前相同。如果對此有法之聲,立論者和敵論者都懷疑那個地方在那個時日是否說法,因此而立為宗,那麼原因的所依普遍不確定,所以是全分猶豫所依不成。",
"二是部分,即以前面所立的論點,重新以雙方都認可的聲音作為宗,原因和比喻與之前相同。以確定的聲音作為原因,因為作為原因的特性依存之處,在猶豫的聲音中依存不定,所以是部分猶豫所依不成。隨一的情況也是如此。",
"二一全分,例如大乘知道佛在那個地方決定說法,小乘敵論者不確定知道;或者大乘立論者不知道,小乘敵論者知道決定說法,而立此宗說:『一定不離識。』原因和比喻與之前相同。此宗的立論者和敵論者互相不確定認可,因為原因普遍缺乏互相確定的依存之處,所以是全分猶豫所依不成。",
"二是部分,即以前面所立的論點,重新以確定的聲音作為宗,原因和比喻與之前相同。以確定的聲音作為原因,因為作為原因的特性依存之處,在互相不確定的聲音中依存不定,所以是部分猶豫所依不成。現在這段中文只說明瞭隨一部分所依不成,略去了其他情況。",
"例如勝論認為空是實體句所攝,聲音是德句所攝,依靠空實體才有聲音的德性。經部師等不立空實體,所以對經部立宗說:『虛空是實有。』立因說:『因為是德所依。』同喻說:『如火大等。』火大等是色等德的所依,火等就是實有,所以空是聲音的德所依,也是實有。此空經部..."
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'作因遍無依處故是全分所依不成' means that if the characteristic that serves as the cause universally lacks a place of dependence, then it cannot fully serve as the basis for the proposition being established. If it is only partially dependent (二一分), then based on the previously established argument, re-select a sound that is mutually acknowledged as the subject (宗), with the reason and analogy being the same as before. Using the mutually acknowledged sound as the cause, because the characteristic that serves as the cause lacks a place of dependence in sounds that are not acknowledged, it is only partially dependent and cannot be established. The same applies to the case of '隨一'.",
"二一全分, for example, the Sarvastivadins establish a proposition against the Mahayanists, saying: 'Śākyamuni Bodhisattva is actually an unwholesome sound, existing in the past and future.' Establishing the reason: 'Because it is included by the world.' The same analogy: 'Like the present sound.' Or the Mahayanists establish a proposition against the Sarvastivadins, saying: 'This sound is inseparable from ear consciousness.' Establishing the reason: 'Because it is included by the second and third, and not included by the ear.' The same analogy: 'Like ear consciousness.' If the Mahayanists or Sarvastivadins use the sound of a Buddha in another realm as the subject, the reason and analogy are the same as before. If the proposition is established with 'Śākyamuni Bodhisattva is actually an unwholesome sound' and 'the sound of a Buddha in another realm,' the opposing sides do not mutually acknowledge it, because the reasons such as 'being included by the world' universally lack mutual dependence, so it is a case of '全分所依不成'.",
"二一分, that is, based on the previously established argument, re-establish the mutually acknowledged sound as the subject, with the reason and analogy being the same as before. Using the mutually acknowledged sound as the cause, because the characteristic that serves as the cause lacks a place of dependence in sounds that are not acknowledged, it is only partially dependent and cannot be established.",
"There are two types of hesitation: one is that both sides hesitate, so the basis is not established; the other is that one side hesitates, so the basis is not established. There are two situations where both sides hesitate: one is '全分', for example, the Mahayanists establish a proposition against the Sarvastivadins, saying: 'The Buddha (Buddha) in that place should be teaching the Dharma, such a sound must be inseparable from consciousness.' The reason and analogy are the same as before. If, regarding this sound with a property, both the proponent and the opponent doubt whether that place is teaching the Dharma on that day, and thus establish it as the subject, then the basis of the reason is universally uncertain, so it is a case of '全分猶豫所依不成'.",
"The second is '部分', that is, based on the previously established argument, re-establish the mutually acknowledged sound as the subject, with the reason and analogy being the same as before. Using the certain sound as the cause, because the characteristic that serves as the cause depends uncertainly in the hesitant sound, it is a case of '部分猶豫所依不成'. The same applies to the case of '隨一'.",
"二一全分, for example, the Mahayanists know that the Buddha is definitely teaching the Dharma in that place, but the Sarvastivadin opponent does not know for sure; or the Mahayanist proponent does not know, but the Sarvastivadin opponent knows for sure that the Dharma is being taught, and thus establishes this proposition: 'It must be inseparable from consciousness.' The reason and analogy are the same as before. The proponent and opponent of this proposition do not mutually acknowledge it with certainty, because the reason universally lacks mutually certain dependence, so it is a case of '全分豫猶所依不成'.",
"The second is '部分', that is, based on the previously established argument, re-establish the certain sound as the subject, with the reason and analogy being the same as before. Using the certain sound as the cause, because the characteristic that serves as the cause depends uncertainly in the mutually uncertain sound, it is a case of '部分猶豫所依不成'. This Chinese text only explains the case where '隨一部分' the basis is not established, omitting other situations.",
"For example, the Vaisheshika school believes that space is included in the category of substance, and sound is included in the category of quality, relying on the substance of space for the quality of sound to exist. The Sautrantika school does not establish the substance of space, so they establish a proposition against the Sautrantikas, saying: 'Space is real.' Establishing the reason: 'Because it is the basis of quality.' The same analogy: 'Like fire, etc.' Fire, etc., are the basis of qualities such as color, etc., and fire, etc., are real, so space is the basis of the quality of sound and is also real. This space, the Sautrantikas..."
]
}
不許有體而言德所依故者便無依處故因不成問經部既無虛空勝論立云虛空實有豈非所別不極成過耶答世間共許有虛空名然各不知實非實有故得成宗無所別過立因無依故成因過雖共說我我即不遍一切有智無智故是所別不極成過又釋若有因中所依不成過者必有宗中所別不成過此且許宗標其因過非謂宗無過也故理門論所依不成云我體周遍因云於一切處生樂等故此既以我為所依不成我不共許當知亦即所別不極成過問立空為實有德所依故說不成立空為實無以非作故非成熟答不然因有三種一有義因二無義因三通二因若有義因要有所依依無不立若無義因不藉所依依無無成熟若通二因通依二法今立空無非作為因此是無義故空雖無因得成也問對無空論有義因無所依對有空論無義因非成熟答如薩婆多敵論之人評非作名下有遮有表大乘立者但許有遮今但取遮為因故因無依所不成過也問兩俱隨一皆有猶豫所依不成即但二種何故明四答古因明中亦但立二然陳那以太隱故開為四也問內道破外道云我非常住宗以動作故因如燈焰等喻然動作因內道不許於我上有我又是無何故非即所依隨一不成過收答今此文中但約立敵共許比量有此分別若自比量或他比量但有不成無有隨一及兩俱過今動作因是他比量故無所依不成過也問如立宗云我所許我是實有即所別不成亦應因云我許德所依故因非極成答此我許言唯顯自許敵論雖許彼自許我為德所依望敵論者因無依處亦不成也如此之例但是自比量耳問如立宗云真故極成色非定離眼識因云自許初三攝根所不攝故同喻云如眼識此因既云自許應非極成答
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『不許有體而言德所依故者便無依處故因不成』:如果說虛空是實體,並且是功德所依賴之處,那麼虛空就應該有其依賴之處,否則這個『因』(hetu,理由)就不能成立。問:經部(Sautrāntika)既然不承認虛空的存在,勝論(Vaiśeṣika)卻立論說虛空是真實存在的,這難道不是『所別不極成過』(asiddha-bheda,有差別不成)嗎?答:世間普遍承認有『虛空』這個名稱,然而各自並不知道虛空是真實存在還是不存在,因此可以成立宗義,沒有『所別』的過失。立『因』沒有所依之處,就成了『因過』。雖然大家都說『我』,但『我』並不普遍存在於一切有智慧和沒有智慧的眾生中,因此這是『所別不極成過』。又解釋說,如果『因』中所依賴的(asraya,基礎)不成立,那麼必然有『宗』中所區別的(pakṣa,主題)不成立。這裡只是允許『宗』標出『因』的過失,並非說『宗』沒有過失。所以《理門論》(Nyāyamukha)中說,『所依不成』,例如:『我』的本體周遍一切處,『因』是:『在一切處產生快樂等』。這裡既然以『我』為所依而不成立,要知道這也正是『所別不極成過』。問:立論說『虛空是實有』,因為『虛空是功德所依賴之處』,這說明不成立。立論說『虛空是實無』,因為『虛空不是被創造出來的』,這說明不成熟。答:不是這樣的。『因』有三種:一、有義因(bhāvahetu,肯定因);二、無義因(abhāvahetu,否定因);三、通二因(ubhayahetu,肯定否定因)。如果有義因,就必須有所依賴,沒有所依賴就不能成立。如果無義因,就不需要依賴,沒有依賴也不會不成熟。如果是通二因,就通用於依賴和不依賴兩種情況。現在立論說『虛空是無』,因為『虛空不是被創造出來的』,因此這是無義因,所以虛空即使沒有『因』也可以成立。問:對於否定虛空的論者來說,有義因沒有所依;對於肯定虛空的論者來說,無義因不成熟。答:就像薩婆多(Sarvāstivāda)敵論之人評論『非作』這個名稱,既有遮詮又有表詮。大乘(Mahāyāna)的立論者只承認有遮詮,現在只取遮詮作為『因』,因此『因』沒有所依,沒有不成立的過失。問:兩種情況都可能,都有猶豫,所依不成只有兩種,為什麼說明四種?答:古因明中也隻立兩種,然而陳那(Dignāga)因為太隱晦,所以開為四種。問:內道(佛教)破斥外道(非佛教)說:『我非常住』(anitya,無常)是『宗』,因為『有動作』是『因』,就像燈焰等是『喻』。然而『動作』這個『因』,內道不承認在我上面有,而且『我』又是無,為什麼不是『即所依隨一不成過』(anyatarāsiddha,隨一不成)所包含的呢?答:現在這篇文章中,只是就立論者和敵論者都認可的比量(anumāna,推理)來說明這些區別,如果是自比量(svārthānumāna,自證比量)或者他比量(parārthānumāna,他證比量),只有不成,沒有隨一和兩俱的過失。現在『動作』這個『因』是他比量,因此沒有所依不成過。問:例如立『宗』說:『我所承認的我是實有』,這『所別』不成立,也應該『因』說:『我承認是功德所依賴之處』,『因』不是極成(prasiddha,已成立)。答:這裡『我承認』只是顯示自己承認,敵論者雖然承認他自己承認的『我』是功德所依賴之處,對於敵論者來說,『因』沒有所依之處,也不成立。如此的例子,都只是自比量罷了。問:例如立『宗』說:『真實成立的色不是一定離開眼識的』,『因』是:『自己承認最初三個所攝的根所不攝』,同喻是:『如眼識』,這個『因』既然說是『自己承認』,應該不是極成。",
"English version",
"'It is not allowed to say that because it is a substance and the basis of virtues, it has no basis, therefore the reason is not established': If space is said to be a substance and the place where virtues rely, then space should have its reliance, otherwise this 'reason' (hetu) cannot be established. Question: Since the Sautrāntika school does not acknowledge the existence of space, but the Vaiśeṣika school establishes that space is real, isn't this a case of 'asiddha-bheda' (unestablished difference)? Answer: The world universally acknowledges the name 'space', but each does not know whether space is real or unreal, therefore the proposition can be established, and there is no fault of 'difference'. Establishing that the 'reason' has no basis becomes a 'fault of reason'. Although everyone speaks of 'self', 'self' is not universally present in all sentient beings with and without wisdom, therefore this is a case of 'asiddha-bheda'. It is also explained that if the reliance (asraya) in the 'reason' is not established, then there must be an unestablished distinction (pakṣa) in the 'subject'. Here, it is only allowed that the 'subject' points out the fault of the 'reason', not that the 'subject' has no fault. Therefore, in the Nyāyamukha, 'reliance is not established' is said, for example: 'The essence of 'self' pervades everywhere, the 'reason' is: 'pleasure etc. arise everywhere'. Since 'self' is taken as the reliance here and is not established, know that this is precisely the fault of 'asiddha-bheda'. Question: Establishing that 'space is real' because 'space is the basis of virtues' shows that it is not established. Establishing that 'space is unreal' because 'space is not created' shows that it is not mature. Answer: It is not like this. There are three types of 'reason': 1. bhāvahetu (affirmative reason); 2. abhāvahetu (negative reason); 3. ubhayahetu (both affirmative and negative reason). If it is an affirmative reason, there must be a reliance, and without reliance, it cannot be established. If it is a negative reason, it does not need reliance, and without reliance, it will not be immature. If it is both affirmative and negative, it applies to both reliance and non-reliance. Now establishing that 'space is non-existent' because 'space is not created', therefore this is a negative reason, so space can be established even without a 'reason'. Question: For those who deny space, the affirmative reason has no reliance; for those who affirm space, the negative reason is not mature. Answer: Just like the Sarvāstivāda opponent comments on the name 'non-creation', it has both exclusion and affirmation. The Mahāyāna proponent only acknowledges exclusion, and now only takes exclusion as the 'reason', therefore the 'reason' has no reliance, and there is no fault of non-establishment. Question: Both situations are possible, there is hesitation, and the non-establishment of reliance is only two types, why are four types explained? Answer: In ancient logic, only two types were established, but Dignāga opened it into four types because it was too obscure. Question: The Inner Path (Buddhism) refutes the Outer Path (non-Buddhism) by saying: 'Self is impermanent' (anitya) is the 'subject', because 'there is action' is the 'reason', just like the flame of a lamp etc. is the 'example'. However, the Inner Path does not acknowledge that the 'reason' of 'action' exists on the self, and the 'self' is also non-existent, why isn't it included in the 'anyatarāsiddha' (one-sidedly unestablished) fault? Answer: In this article, these distinctions are only explained in terms of the inference (anumāna) that is recognized by both the proponent and the opponent. If it is a svārthānumāna (inference for oneself) or a parārthānumāna (inference for others), there is only non-establishment, and there is no fault of one-sidedness or both-sidedness. Now the 'reason' of 'action' is an inference for others, therefore there is no fault of non-establishment of reliance. Question: For example, establishing the 'subject' as: 'The self that I acknowledge is real', this 'distinction' is not established, and the 'reason' should also be: 'I acknowledge that it is the basis of virtues', the 'reason' is not prasiddha (established). Answer: Here, 'I acknowledge' only shows self-acknowledgment. Although the opponent acknowledges that the 'self' that he himself acknowledges is the basis of virtues, for the opponent, the 'reason' has no basis and is not established. Such examples are only inferences for oneself. Question: For example, establishing the 'subject' as: 'Truly established form is not necessarily separate from eye-consciousness', the 'reason' is: 'It is acknowledged that it is not included in the roots included in the first three', the example is: 'like eye-consciousness', since this 'reason' is said to be 'self-acknowledged', it should not be established."
]
}
此云自許不簡他許以他亦許極成之色初三所攝眼所不攝故彼云自許即簡他許以他不許我為德所依故故不例也問既不簡他許何須自許言耶答此為遮相違故須自許言謂他作相違難云極成之色應非即識之色自許初三攝眼所不攝故如眼識今遮此難云此極成色為如眼識自許初三攝眼所不攝故非即識之色耶為如我宗所許他方佛色自許初三攝眼所不攝故是即識之色耶若不云自許即不得與他作不定過遮相違難問但云初三所攝眼所不攝亦得作不定過何須自許耶答若不言自許者即有他不定過謂他作不定過云極成之色為如眼識初三所攝眼所不攝非定離眼識耶為如我宗釋迦菩薩實不善色初三所攝眼所不攝定離眼識耶為避此過故云自許若為避此過言極成初三攝眼所不攝者即不得與他相違難作不定故唯言自許也。
因明入正理論疏卷第一
No. 848-A
寬政十戊午春洛陽智積院前頰席潭影師于泉州界天神社講因明大疏彼寺者覺洲之舊地也影師撿覺洲所持書目錄有因明論文軌疏三卷因而求覓之寺主但得卷第一則在覺洲之朱判餘二冊者散不見(云云)予昔日撿閑因明見新疏多違軌義論旨尋求古疏不得之由是以理伸因明正統排斥其邪記之以著于因明詳定記三冊鼓攻三冊矣今年幸聞有文軌疏慇勤求請件本于影師所令凈土真宗越中慧了寫之訖。
寬政十戊午年九月七日記于京都因幡藥師西之坊
豐山總持院沙門 快道 林常 記
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"有人說,『自己承認』是爲了區別『他人承認』,因為他人也可能承認『極成之色』(Pariniṣpanna-rūpa,圓成實性之色)是初三(指前三種受(Vedanā,感受)、想(Saṃjñā,概念)、行(Saṃskāra,意志))所攝,但眼識(Cakṣur-vijñāna)所不攝。』這是因為『自己承認』是爲了區別『他人承認』,因為他人不承認『我』是功德所依。所以不能用這個例子來反駁。問:既然不區別『他人承認』,為何還要說『自己承認』呢?答:這是爲了遮止相違的過失,所以需要說『自己承認』。意思是,他人可能會提出相違的詰難,說:『極成之色應該不是即識之色,因為它自己承認是初三所攝,眼識所不攝,就像眼識一樣。』現在遮止這種詰難,說:『這種極成之色,是像眼識一樣,自己承認是初三所攝,眼識所不攝,所以不是即識之色呢?還是像我宗所承認的,他方佛的色,自己承認是初三所攝,眼識所不攝,所以是即識之色呢?』如果不說『自己承認』,就不能用不定過來遮止相違的詰難。問:只說『初三所攝,眼識所不攝』,也可以構成不定過,為何還要說『自己承認』呢?答:如果不說『自己承認』,就會有他不定過的過失。意思是,他人可能會提出不定過,說:『極成之色,是像眼識一樣,初三所攝,眼識所不攝,所以一定遠離眼識呢?還是像我宗釋迦菩薩(Śākyamuni-bodhisattva)的實不善色,初三所攝,眼識所不攝,所以一定遠離眼識呢?』爲了避免這種過失,所以說『自己承認』。如果爲了避免這種過失,只說『極成之色是初三所攝,眼識所不攝』,就不能用相違的詰難來構成不定過,所以只能說『自己承認』。",
"《因明入正理論疏》卷第一",
"No. 848-A",
"寬政十戊午年(1798)春,洛陽智積院前頰席潭影師在泉州界天神社講解《因明大疏》。該寺是覺洲的舊地。影師檢查覺洲所持書籍目錄,有《因明論文軌疏》三卷,於是尋找,寺主只找到第一卷,上面有覺洲的硃筆批註,其餘兩冊已經散失不見(云云)。我過去閑暇時翻閱因明,發現新疏很多地方違背了軌義的論旨,尋找古疏而不得。因此,我以理來闡明因明的正統,排斥其邪說,並將其記錄在《因明詳定記》三冊和《鼓攻》三冊中。今年有幸聽說有《文軌疏》,於是慇勤地向影師請求借閱,讓凈土真宗越中慧了抄寫完畢。",
"寬政十戊午年(1798)九月七日記于京都因幡藥師西之坊",
"豐山總持院沙門 快道 林常 記"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Someone says, 'Self-admission' is to distinguish 'others' admission,' because others might also admit that 'Pariniṣpanna-rūpa (perfected color)' is included in the initial three (referring to the first three: Vedanā (feeling), Saṃjñā (cognition), Saṃskāra (volition)), but not included in eye-consciousness (Cakṣur-vijñāna).' This is because 'self-admission' is to distinguish 'others' admission,' because others do not admit that 'I' am the basis of merit. Therefore, this example cannot be used to refute. Question: Since it does not distinguish 'others' admission,' why is it necessary to say 'self-admission'? Answer: This is to prevent the fault of contradiction, so it is necessary to say 'self-admission.' It means that others may raise a contradictory objection, saying: 'Perfected color should not be the color of consciousness, because it admits itself to be included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness, just like eye-consciousness.' Now, to prevent this objection, we say: 'Is this perfected color like eye-consciousness, admitting itself to be included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness, so it is not the color of consciousness? Or is it like the color of the Buddhas in other lands, which our school admits, admitting itself to be included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness, so it is the color of consciousness?' If 'self-admission' is not mentioned, then the contradictory objection cannot be prevented with the fallacy of uncertainty. Question: Saying only 'included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness' can also constitute the fallacy of uncertainty, so why is it necessary to say 'self-admission'? Answer: If 'self-admission' is not mentioned, there will be the fault of other's uncertainty. It means that others may raise the fallacy of uncertainty, saying: 'Is perfected color, like eye-consciousness, included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness, so it is definitely separate from eye-consciousness? Or is it like the real non-virtuous color of Śākyamuni-bodhisattva, which our school admits, included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness, so it is definitely separate from eye-consciousness?' To avoid this fault, 'self-admission' is mentioned. If, to avoid this fault, it is only said that 'perfected color is included in the initial three, not included in eye-consciousness,' then the contradictory objection cannot be used to constitute the fallacy of uncertainty, so only 'self-admission' can be said.",
"Commentary on the Introduction to the Science of Reasoning, Volume 1",
"No. 848-A",
"In the spring of the tenth year of Kansei, the year of Earth Horse (1798), the former cheek-seat Tan'ei-sensei of Chishaku-in in Kyoto lectured on the Great Commentary on the Science of Reasoning at the Kaiten Shrine in the province of Izumi. That temple is the old site of Kakushu. Tan'ei-sensei examined the catalog of books held by Kakushu and found three volumes of Commentary on the Treatise on the Science of Reasoning, so he searched for them. The head priest only found the first volume, which had Kakushu's red-ink annotations. The other two volumes were scattered and lost (etc.). In the past, when I had leisure, I perused the Science of Reasoning and found that many places in the new commentaries violated the meaning of the established doctrine. I searched for the old commentaries but could not find them. Therefore, I used reason to clarify the orthodoxy of the Science of Reasoning, rejected its heretical views, and recorded it in three volumes of Detailed Notes on the Science of Reasoning and three volumes of Drumming Attacks. This year, I was fortunate to hear that there was a Commentary on the Treatise, so I earnestly requested to borrow the original from Tan'ei-sensei and had Echu Eryo of the Jodo Shinshu sect in Ecchu copy it completely.",
"Recorded on the seventh day of the ninth month of the tenth year of Kansei, the year of Earth Horse (1798), at the West Temple of Inaba Yakushi in Kyoto.",
"Shamon Kaido and Hayashi Tsune of Buzan Soji-in record."
]
}
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