X53n0852_因明入正理論續疏
卍新續藏第 53 冊 No. 0852 因明入正理論續疏
No. 852
因明入正理論疏下
正等寺沙門 慧沼 續
能立法不成者至猶如極微。
述曰。下別釋中。初同。后異。同中有二。初別解五。后總結成。初別解五即為五段。由第二相。正顯于因。順成所立。故先明之。所立隨因。故次後辨。解初不成有二。初牒前舉后。約計釋成。此即初也。能立法不成者牒前。餘者舉體。猶如極微。正舉能立不成體。舉宗因者。顯喻過故。如聲論師對於勝論。立聲是常宗。兩俱許聲體無質礙。以勝論師聲是德句。德句無礙。聲論雖無德句。然以其聲隔障等聞。故知無礙。若據合顯。亦是因過。以心心所。為因同法。無礙因轉。前已明因。今辨喻過。故不言因。
然彼極微所成立法常性是有。
述曰。此下釋不成中有二。初明所立有。后辨能立無。此初也。以聲勝論。俱計極微體常住故。準釋能立無。此處應言。以諸極微常住性故。以互意存影顯。故略無也。
能成立法無質礙無以諸極微質礙性故。
述曰。此釋能立無。此聲勝論。計微質礙。故無能立。問因為成宗。因有兩俱隨一等過。喻亦成宗。何故名能立不成。不明余耶。答因親成宗。故有四過。喻是助成。故無四過。又解。因是初相。據初辨四。顯第二相亦有四種。彼開此合。義實相似。以喻唯因亦有四種。一兩俱不成。即論說是隨一不成。彼聲論師。對薩婆多。立聲常宗。無質礙因。舉喻如業。佛法不許。即是
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"能立(Sādhanā,推理的能成立部分)法不成,例如極微(paramāṇu,物質的最小單位)。",
"述曰:下面分別解釋,先同后異。相同之處有二,先分別解釋五種不成,后總結。分別解釋五種不成,分為五段。由於第二相(pakṣa-dharma,遍是宗法性),正能顯示因(hetu,理由),順成所立(sādhya,待證的結論),所以先說明它。所立隨著因,所以其次辨別。解釋初不成有二,先照錄前文,舉出後文,約略計算解釋完成。這就是最初的。『能立法不成者』照錄前文,其餘是舉出本體。『猶如極微』,正是舉出能立不成之體。舉出宗(pakṣa,論題)、因,是爲了顯示比喻(dṛṣṭānta,例子)的過失。例如聲明論師(Śabdika)對於勝論師(Vaiśeṣika),立論『聲是常』這個宗,兩方都承認聲體沒有質礙。因為勝論師認為聲是德句(guṇa-vākya),德句沒有障礙。聲明論師雖然沒有德句的說法,但是因為他們的聲音能隔開障礙等而被聽到,所以知道聲沒有質礙。如果根據合顯(hetu-dṛṣṭānta-aikatva,因和喻的統一性),這也是因的過失。因為心心所(citta-caitta,心和心所)作為因的同法(sapakṣa,同品),沒有障礙的因轉變。前面已經說明因,現在辨別比喻的過失,所以不談因。",
"然而,他們所說的極微所成立的常性是存在的。",
"述曰:下面解釋不成,有二,先說明所立有,后辨別能立無。這是最初的。因為聲論和勝論,都認為極微的本體是常住的。準此解釋能立無。這裡應該說:『因為諸極微具有常住的性質』。因為互相意存影顯,所以省略了。",
"能成立法沒有質礙,因為諸極微具有質礙的性質。",
"述曰:這是解釋能立無。聲論和勝論,都認為極微有質礙,所以沒有能立。問:因為能成立宗,因有兩俱、隨一等過失,比喻也能成立宗,為什麼只說能立不成,而不說明其餘的呢?答:因為因親近能成立宗,所以有四種過失。比喻是輔助成立,所以沒有四種過失。又解釋說,因是初相,根據最初來辨別四種過失,顯示第二相也有四種。彼開此合,意義實際上相似。因為比喻唯有因也有四種,一是兩俱不成,就是論中所說的隨一不成。彼聲明論師,對於薩婆多部(Sarvāstivāda),立論『聲常』這個宗,以『無質礙』為因,舉例如果業(karma)。佛法不認可,這就是……"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"The 'sādhanā' (means of proof) that establishes the proposition is unestablished, for example, like 'paramāṇu' (ultimate atom).",
"Commentary: Below are separate explanations, first similarities, then differences. There are two aspects of similarity: first, a separate explanation of the five types of unestablishedness; second, a summary. The separate explanation of the five types of unestablishedness is divided into five sections. Because the second characteristic ('pakṣa-dharma', presence in the subject) directly reveals the 'hetu' (reason), which smoothly establishes the 'sādhya' (proposition to be proven), it is explained first. The 'sādhya' follows the 'hetu', so it is distinguished next. There are two aspects to explaining the initial unestablishedness: first, quoting the previous text and presenting the following text; second, roughly calculating and explaining its completion. This is the first. 'The 'sādhanā' that establishes the proposition is unestablished' quotes the previous text, and the rest presents the substance. 'Like 'paramāṇu'' precisely presents the substance of the unestablished 'sādhanā'. Presenting the 'pakṣa' (thesis) and 'hetu' is to reveal the fault of the 'dṛṣṭānta' (example). For example, the Śabdika (grammarian) argues to the Vaiśeṣika (atomist) that 'sound is eternal' as the thesis, and both sides acknowledge that the substance of sound has no obstruction. Because the Vaiśeṣika considers sound to be a 'guṇa-vākya' (quality-sentence), and a quality-sentence has no obstruction. Although the Śabdika does not have the concept of a quality-sentence, their sounds can be heard even through obstructions, so it is known that sound has no obstruction. If based on the unity of 'hetu' and 'dṛṣṭānta', this is also a fault of the 'hetu'. Because 'citta-caitta' (mind and mental factors) are the 'sapakṣa' (similar instances) of the 'hetu', the 'hetu' of no obstruction transforms. The 'hetu' has already been explained earlier, and now the fault of the 'dṛṣṭānta' is distinguished, so the 'hetu' is not discussed.",
"However, the eternity established by the 'paramāṇu' they speak of exists.",
"Commentary: Below, there are two aspects to explaining unestablishedness: first, explaining that the 'sādhya' exists; second, distinguishing that the 'sādhanā' does not exist. This is the first. Because both the Śabdika and Vaiśeṣika consider the substance of 'paramāṇu' to be permanent. Based on this, explain that the 'sādhanā' does not exist. Here it should be said: 'Because all 'paramāṇu' have the nature of permanence.' Because they mutually intend to reveal each other, it is omitted.",
"The 'sādhanā' that establishes the proposition has no obstruction, because all 'paramāṇu' have the nature of obstruction.",
"Commentary: This explains that the 'sādhanā' does not exist. Both the Śabdika and Vaiśeṣika consider 'paramāṇu' to have obstruction, so there is no 'sādhanā'. Question: Because the 'hetu' can establish the 'pakṣa', there are faults such as both being unestablished or one being unestablished. The 'dṛṣṭānta' can also establish the 'pakṣa', so why only say that the 'sādhanā' is unestablished and not explain the rest? Answer: Because the 'hetu' is close to establishing the 'pakṣa', there are four faults. The 'dṛṣṭānta' assists in establishing, so there are no four faults. Another explanation is that the 'hetu' is the initial characteristic, and the four faults are distinguished based on the initial one, showing that the second characteristic also has four types. They open this and combine it, and the meaning is actually similar. Because the 'dṛṣṭānta' only has the 'hetu', there are also four types, one being both unestablished, which is what the treatise says is one being unestablished. The Śabdika argues to the Sarvāstivāda that 'sound is eternal' as the thesis, using 'no obstruction' as the 'hetu', and giving the example of 'karma'. Buddhism does not recognize this, which is..."
]
}
隨一。雖俱所立無。且辨能隨一猶豫不成。準理有二。一宗。二因。前已具顯。今喻亦二。于中綺互。或因猶豫非喻能立。或喻能立非因猶豫。或俱猶豫。或俱不猶豫。前三是過。第四非過。且因猶豫非喻能立者。如於霧等性。起疑惑時。為煙為霧。即立彼處定應有火。以現煙故。如廚舍等處。或指如余。疑或同喻。舉一例余。即可思準。問因是宗法。有法猶豫。因可成過。如廚等喻。立敵俱決知定是煙。何成猶豫。答舉喻成因。又解。因有三相。二喻即因。既第二相。何非猶豫。因既致惑。喻成不決。故亦成過。
能立所依不成者。不同於因。有第二三相。無宗有法。但𨷂初相。此所依無。能立亦無。然亦得名無能立所依不成。如數論師。對佛弟子。立思受用諸法宗。以是神我故。如眼等根。若言假我。因喻無過。今言以是神我故因。佛法不許。故隨一無。此因既無。故喻無依。此約依因。或喻所依無。名所依不成。且約依因。如下更解。然有說言。若所依無。即無俱不成。此未必爾。如清辨師。立聲是空。以所作性故。如空華等。此所作性。依俗兩有。空華並無。雖有所立。可非能立所依不成。又有云。謂所立既成。必有所依。故無第四不成之過。今謂不爾。為依于彼所立之宗。為喻依上所立無常。若依所立因喻相似。喻依因不依。故知不可。若依喻上所立無常者。是非喻依。依極微故。亦復不可。又縱有所立。不立第四過。或若所立無。第四豈不立。設雙依彼有法及法。如俱不成。豈無此過。若言即依因。如闕宗因。豈無此過
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"其次,雖然能成立的理由都已不成立。但要辨別能成立的理由,如果其中一個猶豫不定,就無法成立。按照道理,能成立的理由有二:一是宗(要證明的論點),二是因(證明論點的理由)。前面已經詳細說明。現在比喻也有兩種情況,其中錯綜複雜。或者因為猶豫不決,比喻無法成立;或者比喻可以成立,但理由猶豫不決;或者兩者都猶豫不決;或者兩者都不猶豫不決。前三種情況是過失,第四種情況不是過失。比如,理由猶豫不決,比喻無法成立的情況,比如對於霧等性質產生疑惑時,是煙還是霧,就立論說那個地方一定有火,因為有煙出現,就像廚房等地方。或者指像其他事物,懷疑是否是相同的比喻。舉一個例子,其餘的可以類推。有人問:理由是宗法的依據,有法猶豫不定,理由就可能成為過失。比如廚房等比喻,立論者和對方都明確知道一定是煙,怎麼會猶豫不定呢?回答說:舉比喻是爲了成立理由。又解釋說:理由有三個方面,兩個比喻就是理由。既然是第二個方面,怎麼不是猶豫不定呢?理由既然導致迷惑,比喻也變得不確定,所以也成為過失。",
"能成立的依據不成立,不同於理由有第二、第三個方面,沒有宗的依據,只是缺少第一個方面。這個依據不成立,能成立的理由也不成立。但這也可以稱為能成立的理由的依據不成立。比如數論師對佛弟子立論說,思、受用等諸法是宗(要證明的論點),因為它們是神我(ātman)的緣故,就像眼等根。如果說是假我,理由和比喻就沒有過失。現在說因為它們是神我的緣故作為理由,佛法不認可,所以其中一個不成立。這個理由既然不成立,所以比喻就沒有依據。這是就依據理由而言。或者比喻的依據不成立,稱為依據不成立。而且是就依據理由而言,如下面會進一步解釋。然而有人說,如果依據不成立,就沒有兩者都不成立的情況。這不一定。比如清辨論師立論說,聲音是空(śūnya),因為它是所作性(kṛtakatva)的緣故,就像空華(ākāśa-puṣpa)等。這個所作性,在世俗諦上是有的,空華則完全沒有。雖然有所立的論點,但可能不是能成立的理由的依據不成立。還有人說,如果所立的論點已經成立,必然有所依據,所以沒有第四種不成立的過失。現在我認為不是這樣。是依據于那個所立的宗,還是比喻依據于所立的無常?如果依據所立的論點,理由和比喻相似,比喻依據理由但不依據宗,所以可知不可行。如果依據比喻上所立的無常,就不是比喻的依據,因為依據極微(paramāṇu)的緣故,也是不可行的。又即使有所立的論點,也不成立第四種過失。或者如果所立的論點不成立,第四種過失難道不成立嗎?假設同時依據有法和法,就像兩者都不成立一樣,難道沒有這種過失嗎?如果說是依據理由,就像缺少宗和理由一樣,難道沒有這種過失嗎?",
"English version:",
"Next, although all the reasons for establishing something are not valid, it is necessary to distinguish the reasons for establishing something. If one of them is uncertain, it cannot be established. According to reason, there are two reasons for establishing something: first, the proposition (the point to be proven), and second, the reason (the reason for proving the point). This has been explained in detail before. Now there are also two situations for metaphors, which are intricate. Either because of uncertainty, the metaphor cannot be established; or the metaphor can be established, but the reason is uncertain; or both are uncertain; or both are not uncertain. The first three situations are faults, and the fourth situation is not a fault. For example, in the case where the reason is uncertain and the metaphor cannot be established, such as when there is doubt about the nature of fog, whether it is smoke or fog, the argument is made that there must be fire in that place because there is smoke, just like in kitchens and other places. Or it may refer to other things, suspecting whether they are the same metaphor. Take one example, and the rest can be inferred. Someone asks: The reason is based on the proposition, and if the subject of the proposition is uncertain, the reason may become a fault. For example, in the metaphor of the kitchen, both the proponent and the opponent clearly know that it must be smoke, so how can it be uncertain? The answer is: The metaphor is used to establish the reason. It is also explained that the reason has three aspects, and the two metaphors are the reason. Since it is the second aspect, how can it not be uncertain? Since the reason leads to confusion, the metaphor also becomes uncertain, so it also becomes a fault.",
"The basis for establishing something is not valid, which is different from the reason having the second and third aspects. There is no basis for the proposition, only lacking the first aspect. This basis is not valid, and the reason for establishing something is also not valid. But this can also be called the basis for the reason for establishing something is not valid. For example, a Samkhya philosopher argues to a Buddhist disciple that thought, enjoyment, and other dharmas are the proposition (the point to be proven) because they are ātman, like the sense organs such as the eyes. If it is said to be a false self, the reason and metaphor would have no faults. Now, saying that they are ātman is used as the reason, which is not recognized by Buddhism, so one of them is not valid. Since this reason is not valid, the metaphor has no basis. This is in terms of relying on the reason. Or the basis of the metaphor is not valid, which is called the basis not being valid. And it is in terms of relying on the reason, as will be further explained below. However, some say that if the basis is not valid, there is no situation where both are not valid. This is not necessarily the case. For example, Bhāviveka argues that sound is empty (śūnya) because it is produced (kṛtakatva), like sky-flowers (ākāśa-puṣpa). This producedness exists in conventional truth, but sky-flowers do not exist at all. Although there is a proposition, it may not be that the basis for the reason for establishing something is not valid. Others say that if the proposition has been established, there must be a basis, so there is no fault of the fourth type of invalidity. Now I think this is not the case. Is it based on that established proposition, or does the metaphor rely on the established impermanence? If based on the established proposition, the reason and metaphor are similar, and the metaphor relies on the reason but not on the proposition, so it is known to be unfeasible. If based on the impermanence established on the metaphor, it is not the basis of the metaphor, because it is based on atoms (paramāṇu), which is also unfeasible. Furthermore, even if there is an established proposition, the fourth type of fault is not established. Or if the proposition is not established, is the fourth type of fault not established? Suppose that both rely on the subject and the property, just like both are not established, is there no such fault? If it is said to be based on the reason, just like lacking the proposition and the reason, is there no such fault?"
]
}
。問若喻上能立。不依所立。能立依何。答二解。一云。以依因故。因無依無。問若因無依。喻是何過。答若因依無。即不成因。因體非有。即是喻中所依不成。問若言因無依故。即因不成。故喻能立亦無。所依不成者。即無無宗有因喻等諸缺滅句。若言無能別故。為無宗者。豈無所別。不無宗耶。若言無所別即宗因無者。因有三相。彼但無初。后二相有。何不名因。若言過故不名因者。即十四因總名不成。皆有過故。何須別說。然準道理。言因之時。唯取初相。有法無故。闕無初相。即是無因。此即應言無有法宗。因亦不成。言無宗有因者。約無能別宗。亦復無妨。問喻上能立。何不依宗有法。而依因耶。答以隔因故。問若隔因故。應不成宗。答助因有力。故說成宗。問喻既依因。舉彼瓶等。欲何所用。答所依有二。一自體依。二所助依。瓶自體依。因所助依。一云。盡理而言。準論但約自體辨依。據兩俱隨一。但望喻依。不可說言。無礙因上。兩俱隨一。不許無礙。但于喻依許不許故。此說為善。順論又故。問何以得知有此四過。答準因可有。喻既助因。因既無已。喻何所助。如因成宗。有法無故。因何所成。故併爲過。此中細準有自他共全分一分有體無體。恐繁且止。
所立法不成者謂說如覺。
述曰。解所立不成有二。初牒前舉體。后約計釋成。此初也。牒前總列宗因同前。但別舉喻。謂說如覺覺者。即心心法之總名也。
然一初覺能成立法無質礙有。
述曰。下釋成。初能立有。后所立無。此初也。以
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"問:如果比喻(喻)能夠成立,它不依賴於所要證明的宗(所立),那麼它依賴於什麼(能立)?",
"答:有兩種解釋。一種說法是,比喻依賴於因(hetu),因為因沒有所依賴的,比喻也就沒有所依賴的。",
"問:如果因沒有所依賴的,那麼比喻有什麼過失?",
"答:如果因依賴的(有法)不存在,那麼因就不能成立。因的本體如果不存在,那就是比喻中所依賴的(有法)不成。",
"問:如果說因為因沒有所依賴的,所以因不能成立,那麼比喻的能立也就沒有了,所依賴的(有法)不成,那麼就缺少了無宗、有因、有喻等各種缺滅句。如果說因為沒有能區別的(宗),所以是無宗,難道沒有所區別的(有法)嗎?如果說沒有所區別的,那麼宗和因就沒有了,因有三種體相,它只是沒有最初的體相(有法),後面兩種體相(同品定有性、異品遍無性)是有的,為什麼不能稱為因?如果說因為有過失所以不能稱為因,那麼十四種因的總稱(不成因)都因為有過失,何須另外說明?然而按照道理,說因的時候,只取最初的體相(有法),因為有法不存在,缺少最初的體相,就是無因。這就可以說沒有有法宗,因也不能成立。說無宗有因,從沒有能區別的宗來說,也沒有妨礙。",
"問:比喻的能立,為什麼不依賴於宗的有法,而依賴於因呢?",
"答:因為隔著因的緣故。",
"問:如果隔著因的緣故,就應該不能成立宗。",
"答:幫助因的力量很大,所以說能成立宗。",
"問:比喻既然依賴於因,那麼舉出瓶子等事物,想要用來做什麼呢?",
"答:所依賴的有兩種,一是自體依賴,二是所助依賴。瓶子是自體依賴,因是所助依賴。一種說法是,完全按照道理來說,按照論典只從自體來辨別依賴,根據兩者都隨順其中之一。只是希望比喻依賴,不能說沒有妨礙因。兩者都隨順其中之一,不允許沒有妨礙,只是對於比喻的依賴允許不允許的緣故。這種說法是好的,順應論典的緣故。",
"問:怎麼知道有這四種過失?",
"答:按照因可以有(過失),比喻既然幫助因,因既然沒有了,比喻幫助什麼?如同因成立宗,因為有法不存在,因成立什麼?所以都成為過失。這裡面仔細衡量有自他共全分一分有體無體,恐怕繁瑣就停止了。",
"所立法不成,是指說如覺(vijñāna)。(覺:心識)",
"述曰:解釋所立不成有兩種,首先照抄前面舉出的例子,然後根據推論來解釋成立。這是最初的。照抄前面總列的宗因同前面一樣,只是另外舉出比喻,說如覺,覺就是心和心法的總稱。",
"然而最初的覺(vijñāna)能夠成立法是無質礙的。",
"述曰:下面解釋成立。先說能立有,后說所立無。這是最初的。以……"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Question: If the example (dṛṣṭānta) can establish (the thesis), and it does not rely on the thesis to be proven (sādhya), then what does it rely on (sādhana)?",
"Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the example relies on the reason (hetu), because if the reason has nothing to rely on, the example also has nothing to rely on.",
"Question: If the reason has nothing to rely on, what is the fault of the example?",
"Answer: If what the reason relies on (pakṣa) does not exist, then the reason cannot be established. If the essence of the reason does not exist, then it is that what the example relies on (pakṣa) is not established.",
"Question: If it is said that because the reason has nothing to rely on, the reason cannot be established, then the establishing power of the example is also gone, and what it relies on (pakṣa) is not established, then there is a lack of various defective statements such as the absence of a thesis (pakṣa), the presence of a reason (hetu), and the presence of an example (dṛṣṭānta). If it is said that because there is nothing to distinguish (the thesis), it is the absence of a thesis, is there nothing to be distinguished (pakṣa)? If it is said that if there is nothing to be distinguished, then the thesis and the reason are gone, the reason has three characteristics, it only lacks the initial characteristic (pakṣadharmatva), the latter two characteristics (sapakṣe sattvam, vipakṣe cāsattvam) are present, why can't it be called a reason? If it is said that because of the fault it cannot be called a reason, then the general term for the fourteen kinds of reasons (hetvābhāsa) all have faults, why is it necessary to explain them separately? However, according to reason, when speaking of the reason, only the initial characteristic (pakṣadharmatva) is taken, because the subject (pakṣa) does not exist, lacking the initial characteristic, it is the absence of a reason. This can be said to be the absence of a subject with a subject (pakṣadharmatva), and the reason cannot be established. Saying that there is a reason without a thesis, from the perspective of a thesis that cannot be distinguished, there is no harm.",
"Question: Why does the establishing power of the example not rely on the subject (pakṣa) of the thesis, but rely on the reason?",
"Answer: Because it is separated by the reason.",
"Question: If it is separated by the reason, then the thesis should not be established.",
"Answer: The power of helping the reason is great, so it is said that it can establish the thesis.",
"Question: Since the example relies on the reason, what is the purpose of citing things like pots?",
"Answer: There are two kinds of reliance, one is self-reliance, and the other is assisted reliance. The pot is self-reliance, and the reason is assisted reliance. One explanation is that, completely according to reason, according to the scriptures, only self-reliance is distinguished, according to both following one of them. It is only hoped that the example relies, and it cannot be said that there is no hindrance to the reason. Both follow one of them, not allowing no hindrance, only allowing or disallowing the reliance of the example. This explanation is good, because it follows the scriptures.",
"Question: How do you know that there are these four faults?",
"Answer: According to the reason, there can be (faults), since the example helps the reason, and since the reason is gone, what does the example help? Just as the reason establishes the thesis, because the subject (pakṣa) does not exist, what does the reason establish? Therefore, they all become faults. Here, carefully measure whether there is self, other, common, whole part, one part, existence, non-existence, fearing complexity, I will stop.",
"The thesis to be established is not established, which refers to saying 'like consciousness' (vijñāna). (vijñāna: consciousness)",
"Statement: There are two explanations for the thesis not being established. First, copy the examples given earlier, and then explain the establishment based on inference. This is the first. Copying the general list of thesis and reason from before is the same, but additionally citing the example, saying 'like consciousness', consciousness is the general term for mind and mental factors.",
"However, the initial consciousness (vijñāna) can establish that the dharma is without obstruction.",
"Statement: The following explains the establishment. First, say that the establishing power exists, and then say that the thesis does not exist. This is the first. With..."
]
}
心心法皆無礙故。文準於前。
所成立法常住性無以一切覺皆無常故。
述曰。釋所立無。喻上常住。實非所立。即同於彼。所立能立。二種法者。即是其喻。從所同爲名。故名所立。準前能立亦有四種。即文所辨兩俱不成。若舉方時。對大乘立隨一不成。外道立常而無質礙。佛法無常亦同無礙。法上假故。
猶豫所立不成者。猶豫亦二。綺互亦四。準前能立。如大乘人。對薩婆多。立預流等。定有大乘種姓。然不定知此預流等。有大乘姓不。故懷猶豫。因云。有性攝故。如余有情。亦懷猶豫。不知定有大乘姓不。此俱猶豫。餘者類思。所依不成者。且約依宗為喻所依。如數論師對佛法者。立眼等根為神我受用。同喻如色等。此即能別不極成故。喻無所立。亦無所依。由無所依。喻上所立。亦不得成。有云。既有能立。故無第四。今難。若二立無。豈無此過。故定為四。問喻上所立。為依何法。若依能立。不應說因獨依有法。以因喻二俱能立故。若依所立。如前已難。答有二解。一云。依因雖俱能立。不同於因。依于有法以隔因故。一云。依宗所立。若爾即有隨一所依不成。宗中所立。敵不許故。答既云諸皆方舉于喻。即兼合己證彼極成。故得為依。不同舉因未極成故。若爾有舉因已。即解宗者。依所立不。答亦不得同喻。先以不合故。又或舉因。有未解故。若爾舉喻未解如何。一云。依喻所依。諸說但舉瓶空等法。為喻依故。此解為正。若據后解。所依不成。彼聲論師對大乘立。舉極微為喻。此闕所依。所依既無。所
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『心心法皆無礙故』。文義與前文相符。",
"所成立的法若是常住不變的,那麼一切覺悟都應是無常的,因為常住之法無法被覺悟所改變。",
"述曰:解釋『所立無』,是比喻前文的『常住』。實際上,『常住』並非我們所要建立的,它與『所立無』相同。『所立』和『能立』這兩種法,就是比喻。從它們相同之處來命名,所以稱為『所立』。與前文類似,『能立』也有四種情況。這段文字辨析了『兩俱不成』。如果從時間和空間的角度來看,對於大乘佛教來說,會成立『隨一不成』。外道所立的『常』是具有實體且無阻礙的,而佛法所說的『無常』也是無阻礙的,因為法是建立在假象之上的。",
"『猶豫所立不成』的情況,猶豫也有兩種,綺互有四種。參照前文的『能立』。例如,大乘佛教徒對薩婆多部(Sarvastivada,一切有部)的人說,預流果(Srotaapanna,須陀洹)等果位的人,一定具有大乘種姓(Mahayana gotra)。然而,不能確定這些預流果位的人是否具有大乘種姓,因此心懷猶豫。理由是:『因為他們被種姓所攝持,就像其他有情眾生一樣。』同樣心懷猶豫,不知道他們是否一定具有大乘種姓。這是『俱猶豫』的情況,其餘情況可以類推。『所依不成』的情況,暫且以宗義的依據作為比喻。例如,數論師(Samkhya)對佛教徒說,眼等根是神我(Atman)所受用的,如同色等。這就是『能別不極成』,因此比喻沒有所要建立的。也沒有所依據的。由於沒有所依據的,比喻之上的『所立』,也無法成立。有人說,既然有『能立』,就沒有第四種情況。現在反駁說,如果兩個『立』都沒有,難道就沒有這種過失嗎?所以確定有四種情況。問:比喻之上的『所立』,是依據什麼法?如果依據『能立』,不應該說『因』只依據有法,因為『因』和『喻』都是『能立』。如果依據『所立』,就像前面已經反駁過的那樣。答:有兩種解釋。一種解釋是:雖然依據『因』,『因』也是『能立』,但與『因』不同,因為它通過有法來隔離『因』。另一種解釋是:依據宗義的『所立』。如果這樣,就存在『隨一所依不成』的情況,因為宗義中所立的,對方不認可。答:既然說『諸皆方舉于喻』,就兼顧結合自己的觀點來證明對方的極成,所以可以作為依據,不同於舉『因』尚未極成的情況。如果這樣,有人舉『因』已經解釋了宗義,那麼依據『所立』嗎?答:也不能與比喻相同,因為首先就不符合。又或者舉『因』,有人尚未理解。如果舉『喻』尚未理解怎麼辦?一種解釋是:依據比喻的所依,各種說法只是舉瓶子的空性等法,作為比喻的依據。這種解釋是正確的。如果根據後面的解釋,『所依不成』,聲論師(Sabda)對大乘佛教徒說,舉極微(Paramanu)作為比喻,這就缺少所依。所依既然沒有,那麼所要"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"'Since the mind-mind dharmas are all unobstructed.' The meaning of the text aligns with the preceding passage.",
"If the established dharma is permanent, then all enlightenments should be impermanent, because a permanent dharma cannot be changed by enlightenment.",
"Commentary: Explaining 'what is to be established is non-existent' is analogous to the 'permanent' mentioned earlier. In reality, 'permanent' is not what we aim to establish; it is the same as 'what is to be established is non-existent.' The two dharmas, 'what is to be established' and 'what is capable of establishing,' are the analogy. It is named 'what is to be established' based on their similarity. Similar to the previous passage, 'what is capable of establishing' also has four situations. This text analyzes the 'both are unestablished.' If viewed from the perspective of time and space, 'one of them is unestablished' would be established for Mahayana Buddhism. The 'permanent' established by externalists is substantial and unobstructed, while the 'impermanent' spoken of in Buddhism is also unobstructed, because dharma is established on illusion.",
"Regarding the situation of 'hesitation in what is to be established being unestablished,' there are two types of hesitation and four types of mutual entanglement. Refer to the previous 'what is capable of establishing.' For example, Mahayana Buddhists say to the Sarvastivadins (those who believe in the existence of everything), those who have attained the stream-enterer (Srotaapanna) fruit, etc., certainly possess the Mahayana gotra (Mahayana lineage). However, it cannot be determined whether these stream-enterers possess the Mahayana gotra, so there is hesitation. The reason is: 'Because they are encompassed by the gotra, just like other sentient beings.' Similarly, there is hesitation, not knowing whether they certainly possess the Mahayana gotra. This is the situation of 'both hesitate,' and the remaining situations can be inferred. Regarding the situation of 'the basis being unestablished,' let's temporarily use the basis of the doctrine as an analogy. For example, Samkhya philosophers say to Buddhists that the sense organs such as the eyes are enjoyed by the Atman (Self), just like form, etc. This is 'the qualifier is not extremely established,' therefore the analogy has nothing to establish. Nor is there anything to base it on. Since there is nothing to base it on, 'what is to be established' above the analogy cannot be established either. Some say that since there is 'what is capable of establishing,' there is no fourth situation. Now, it is refuted that if both 'establishments' are absent, wouldn't there be this fault? Therefore, it is determined that there are four situations. Question: What dharma is 'what is to be established' above the analogy based on? If based on 'what is capable of establishing,' it should not be said that 'the cause' only relies on existing dharmas, because both 'the cause' and 'the analogy' are 'what is capable of establishing.' If based on 'what is to be established,' it is as refuted earlier. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is: Although based on 'the cause,' 'the cause' is also 'what is capable of establishing,' but it is different from 'the cause' because it separates 'the cause' through existing dharmas. Another explanation is: based on 'what is to be established' in the doctrine. If so, there is a situation of 'one of the bases being unestablished,' because what is established in the doctrine is not recognized by the opponent. Answer: Since it is said that 'all exemplify the analogy,' it combines one's own views to prove the opponent's extreme establishment, so it can be used as a basis, unlike citing 'the cause' which is not yet extremely established. If so, someone cites 'the cause' and has already explained the doctrine, then is it based on 'what is to be established'? Answer: It cannot be the same as the analogy, because it does not conform in the first place. Or someone cites 'the cause,' and someone has not yet understood. What if citing 'the analogy' is not yet understood? One explanation is: based on the basis of the analogy, various statements only cite the emptiness of the jar, etc., as the basis of the analogy. This explanation is correct. If based on the latter explanation, 'the basis is unestablished,' the grammarian (Sabda) says to Mahayana Buddhists, citing the Paramanu (atom) as an analogy, this lacks a basis. Since the basis is absent, then what is to be"
]
}
立亦關。以大乘宗不立微故。細準而言。有自他共全分一分有體無體。思之可悉。恐繁不述。
俱不成者。
述曰。下解第三過。文分為三。初總牒彰。次別開列。後重釋成。此初也。
復有二種有及非有。
述曰。此別開列也。初開后列。此二文也。有謂有彼喻依。無即無彼喻依。俱不成者。即謂二立兩非有也。
若言如瓶有俱不成若說如空對無空論無俱不成。
述曰。此重釋成。以立聲常無質礙因。瓶體雖有。常無礙無。虛空體無。二亦不立。有無雖二。皆是俱無。同無二立故。問虛空體無。常可不有。空體非有。無礙寧無。答立常住宗。無質礙因。宗因俱表虛空不有。常與無礙。二表俱無。故成過也。理門但舉有喻所依。然兩俱隨一猶豫所依。及喻無依。皆略不明。準此有無。有即初二。無即第四。或有或無即第三過。此有四句。一宗因俱有體無俱不成。即對無空論是。此中細分有三十六。且共宗因有體為首。對共自他。無俱不成。綺互有三四句。自他宗因有體對亦各三。合九四句。下三句中。亦各準此。即合三十六種四句。更以分全相對綺互。恐繁不述。今且約總為此四句。二宗因無體有俱不成。如數論師對薩婆多。立思是我。以受用二十三諦故。如瓶盆等。三宗因有體有俱不成。即論所說有俱不成是。四宗因無體無俱不俱。即前第二。對佛法中無空論者。然此亦有兩俱隨一猶豫。及所依俱不成。初三各二。有及非有。且依有俱不成。兩俱有俱不成。如論說是。隨一有二。一自隨一有俱不成
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"立亦關。因為大乘宗不成立微細之物。仔細衡量而言,有自體、他體、共同體、全分、一分,有體、無體等差別。仔細思考可以明白。恐怕過於繁瑣,所以不詳細敘述。",
"俱不成者。",
"述曰:下面解釋第三種過失。文分為三部分。首先總括說明,其次分別開列,最後重新解釋成立。這是第一部分。",
"復有二種有及非有。",
"述曰:這是分別開列。先開后列,這是兩段文字。『有』是指有彼喻依,『無』是指無彼喻依。『俱不成者』,就是指二者都立,但兩種情況都不存在。",
"若言如瓶有俱不成,若說如空對無空論無俱不成。",
"述曰:這是重新解釋成立。以立『聲常無質礙』為因。瓶子的本體雖然存在,但常、無礙都不存在。虛空的本體不存在,二者也都不能成立。有和無雖然是兩種情況,但都是『俱無』,都不能成立兩種觀點。問:虛空的本體不存在,常難道不成立嗎?空體非有,無礙難道不存在嗎?答:立『常住』宗,『無質礙』為因,宗和因都表明虛空不存在,常和無礙都表明不存在,所以構成過失。理門只舉了有喻所依,然而兩俱隨一猶豫所依,以及喻無依,都略而不談。按照這種有無的思路,有就是前兩種情況,無就是第四種情況,或有或無就是第三種過失。這裡有四句:一、宗因都有體,無俱不成,就是對無空論的情況。這裡細分有三十六種情況。且以共宗因有體為首,對共自他,無俱不成,相互交錯有三四句。自他宗因有體對也各有三種,合起來是九種四句。下面三句中,也各自按照這個準則,總共是三十六種四句。再以分全相對相互交錯,恐怕過於繁瑣,所以不詳細敘述。現在且總括為這四句。二、宗因無體,有俱不成,如數論師對薩婆多(一切有部,Sarvastivadins),立『思是我』,以受用二十三諦故,如瓶盆等。三、宗因有體,有俱不成,就是論中所說的『有俱不成』。四、宗因無體,無俱不俱,就是前面第二種情況,對佛法中無空論者。然而這裡也有兩俱隨一猶豫,以及所依俱不成。前三種情況各有兩種,有及非有。且依據有俱不成,兩俱有俱不成,如論中所說。隨一有二,一自隨一有俱不成。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"The establishment is also relevant. Because the Mahayana school does not establish the subtle. Considering it carefully, there are self-entity, other-entity, common-entity, whole-part, one-part, with-entity, without-entity, and so on. Thinking about it can make it clear. Fearing it would be too cumbersome, it is not described in detail.",
"'Both unestablished'.",
"Commentary: Below explains the third fault. The text is divided into three parts. First, a general summary and clarification; second, separate listings; and third, re-explanation and establishment. This is the first part.",
"'Again, there are two kinds: existence and non-existence'.",
"Commentary: This is the separate listing. First opening, then listing, these are two passages. 'Existence' refers to having that example's basis; 'non-existence' refers to not having that example's basis. 'Both unestablished' means that both are established, but neither situation exists.",
"'If it is said that like a pot, existence is both unestablished; if it is said that like emptiness, arguing against non-emptiness, non-existence is both unestablished'.",
"Commentary: This is re-explanation and establishment. Taking the establishment of 'sound is permanent and without physical obstruction' as the reason. Although the pot's substance exists, permanence and non-obstruction do not. The substance of emptiness does not exist, and neither can be established. Although existence and non-existence are two situations, both are 'both non-existent', and neither can establish both viewpoints. Question: If the substance of emptiness does not exist, doesn't permanence hold? If the nature of emptiness is non-existent, how can non-obstruction not exist? Answer: Establishing the 'permanent' tenet, 'without physical obstruction' as the reason, both the tenet and the reason indicate that emptiness does not exist, and both permanence and non-obstruction indicate non-existence, thus constituting a fault. The 'Logic Gate' only cites the basis of an existing example, but the basis of doubt where both are followed, as well as the example without a basis, are all omitted. According to this line of thought of existence and non-existence, existence is the first two situations, non-existence is the fourth situation, and either existence or non-existence is the third fault. Here there are four sentences: 1. Both the tenet and the reason have substance, and non-existence is both unestablished, which is the case of arguing against non-emptiness. Here there are thirty-six kinds of situations when subdivided. And taking the common tenet and reason with substance as the head, against the common, self, and other, non-existence is both unestablished, and there are three sets of four sentences intertwined. The self and other tenets and reasons with substance also each have three kinds, totaling nine sets of four sentences. In the following three sentences, each also follows this principle, totaling thirty-six kinds of four sentences. Furthermore, they are intertwined with relative division and wholeness, fearing it would be too cumbersome, it is not described in detail. Now, let's summarize it into these four sentences. 2. The tenet and reason have no substance, and existence is both unestablished, such as the Samkhya (Sāṃkhya) philosopher against the Sarvastivadins (Sarvāstivādins), establishing 'thought is me', because of experiencing the twenty-three principles, like pots and basins, etc. 3. The tenet and reason have substance, and existence is both unestablished, which is what the treatise says 'existence is both unestablished'. 4. The tenet and reason have no substance, and non-existence is both unestablished and not unestablished, which is the second situation mentioned earlier, against those who argue for non-emptiness in Buddhism. However, here there is also doubt where both are followed, as well as the basis being both unestablished. The first three situations each have two kinds, existence and non-existence. And based on existence being both unestablished, both existences are both unestablished, as the treatise says. Following one has two, one's own following one existence is both unestablished."
]
}
者。如外道立我能受苦樂。以作業故。對佛法中無空論者。取為同喻。二他隨一有俱不成。如說聲常。無質礙故。對佛法者。同喻如語業。猶豫有俱不成者。如說彼廚等中定有火。以現煙故。如山等處。于霧等性。既懷猶豫。火有不決。山處是有。故成猶豫。有俱不成所依不成者。喻依既有。𨷂無此句。若說依因宗。即有此句。前四句中。第二句是宗因無故。前之四種。隨其所應。亦有共及自他。有體無體。全分一分。思準可知。無俱不成。亦可準此。恐繁不述。問前二偏無。何故不開有無二即。答有可互𨷂。無並不成。故但合明。不開二種。又雙無既開。顯偏亦爾。偏既不立。俱無亦然。以影略故。前解為正。無俱不成。俱有兩俱。隨一無猶豫。及所依不成兩俱。無俱不成。如聲論師。對勝論師。立聲常宗。所聞性因。如第八識。二俱不立。有第八識故。隨一無俱不成者。如聲論師對大乘者。立此比量。彼自不許有第八識故。是自隨一。若聲論立此。對佛弟子。舉聲性喻。即他隨一。何故無猶豫。無俱不成者。既無喻依。決無二立。疑決既異。故𨷂此句。所依不成。若說依喻。即向說是。皆無喻依。故說依宗因。即前宗因望喻四句中第四句是。于中復有全分一分。恐繁不述。問真如常有。故說為常。虛空恒無。設對無空。常何非有。又虛空無。何非無礙。答夫立宗法。略有二種。一者但遮而無有表。如言我無。但欲遮我。不欲立無。喻亦但遮而不取表。二遮亦表。如說我常。非但遮無常。亦表有常。體喻即具遮表。依前喻無體有遮。亦得
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『者』,例如外道(佛教以外的其他宗教或哲學派別)主張『我』(ātman,個體靈魂)能夠感受苦樂,因為『我』造作了業。這可以用來比喻佛法中不承認『空』(śūnyatā,空性)的論者。『二他隨一有俱不成』,例如有人說『聲音是常住的』,理由是『沒有物質阻礙』。對於佛法修行者來說,這類似於『語業』(vākkamma,語言行為)的比喻。『猶豫有俱不成』,例如有人說『那個廚房裡一定有火』,因為『現在有煙』,就像在山裡等地方,對於霧等的性質,既懷有猶豫,對火的存在也不確定。山的存在是確定的,所以構成『猶豫』。『有俱不成所依不成者』,比喻的所依已經存在,但缺少這句話。如果說是依據『因』(hetu,原因)和『宗』(pakṣa,論題)的,那麼就有這句話。前面四句話中,第二句是『宗』和『因』都不成立。前面的四種情況,根據其相應的情況,也有共同的、自己和他人的、有實體的、無實體的、全部的、部分的、一部分的,可以思考推斷得知。『無俱不成』,也可以根據這個來推斷,恐怕繁瑣就不敘述了。問:前面兩種『偏無』,為什麼不分開說明『有無二即』?答:『有』可以互相包含,『無』則完全不能成立,所以只合並說明,不分開說明兩種。又因為『雙無』已經分開說明,就顯示了『偏無』也是這樣。『偏無』既然不能成立,『俱無』也是這樣,因為已經概括省略了。前面的解釋是正確的。『無俱不成』,包括『俱有』、『兩俱』、『隨一無猶豫』,以及『所依不成』這兩種情況。『兩俱無俱不成』,例如聲論師(Śabdika,研究語言的學派)針對勝論師(Vaiśeṣika,古印度哲學流派)立『聲音是常住的』這個宗,理由是『所聞性』,就像『第八識』(ālayavijñāna,阿賴耶識)。二者都不成立,因為有第八識的緣故。『隨一無俱不成者』,例如聲論師針對大乘佛教徒立這個比量,因為對方不承認有第八識,這是自己一方的『隨一』。如果聲論師立這個,針對佛弟子,舉『聲性』作為比喻,那就是他人的『隨一』。為什麼沒有『猶豫』?『無俱不成者』,既然沒有比喻的所依,就絕對沒有二者都成立的情況。懷疑和確定既然不同,所以省略這句話。『所依不成』,如果說是依據比喻的,就像前面所說的,都沒有比喻的所依。所以說是依據『宗』和『因』的,就是前面『宗因望喻』四句中的第四句。其中又有全部、部分、一部分,恐怕繁瑣就不敘述了。問:真如(tathatā,事物的真實如是狀態)是常有的,所以說是『常』。虛空(ākāśa,空間)恒常是『無』,假設針對不承認『空』的,『常』為什麼不是『有』?又虛空是『無』,為什麼不是『無礙』?答:確立宗法,大概有兩種。一種是隻遮遣而不表達肯定,例如說『我無』,只是想要遮遣『我』,不想要確立『無』。比喻也只是遮遣而不取肯定。另一種是遮遣也表達肯定,例如說『我常』,不只是遮遣『無常』,也表達有『常』。體喻就具備遮遣和表達肯定。依據前面的比喻,『無體有遮』,也可以成立。",
"English version",
"『者』 (者): For example, externalists (those outside of Buddhism) posit that the 『self』 (ātman) is capable of experiencing pleasure and pain because it performs actions (karma). This can be used as an analogy against those in Buddhist teachings who do not accept 『emptiness』 (śūnyatā). 『Two, one of the others exists, both do not hold』 (二他隨一有俱不成): For example, saying 『sound is permanent』 because 『it has no material obstruction.』 For practitioners of the Dharma, this is analogous to 『verbal action』 (vākkamma). 『Doubtful existence, both do not hold』 (猶豫有俱不成): For example, saying 『there must be fire in that kitchen』 because 『there is smoke present,』 like in the mountains where one doubts the nature of mist, etc., and is uncertain about the existence of fire. The existence of the mountain is certain, thus creating 『doubt.』 『Existence of both not holding, the basis does not hold』 (有俱不成所依不成者): The basis of the analogy exists, but this phrase is missing. If it is said to be based on 『cause』 (hetu) and 『thesis』 (pakṣa), then this phrase is present. Among the previous four phrases, the second phrase is where both the 『thesis』 and 『cause』 do not hold. The previous four situations, according to their respective cases, can be common, self and other, substantial, insubstantial, whole, partial, and a part, which can be understood through contemplation. 『Neither existing, both do not hold』 (無俱不成) can also be inferred from this; I will not elaborate for fear of being verbose. Question: Why are the previous two 『partial non-existences』 not explained separately as 『existence and non-existence being identical』 (有無二即)? Answer: 『Existence』 can mutually contain each other, while 『non-existence』 cannot be established at all, so they are only explained together, not separately. Furthermore, since 『double non-existence』 has been explained separately, it shows that 『partial non-existence』 is also the same. Since 『partial non-existence』 cannot be established, 『both non-existence』 is also the same, because it has been summarized and omitted. The previous explanation is correct. 『Neither existing, both do not hold』 includes 『both existing,』 『both,』 『one without doubt,』 and the two cases where 『the basis does not hold.』 『Both not existing, both do not hold』 (兩俱無俱不成): For example, a grammarian (Śabdika) establishes the thesis 『sound is permanent』 against a Vaiśeṣika (Vaiśeṣika), with the reason being 『audibility,』 like the 『eighth consciousness』 (ālayavijñāna). Neither holds because there is an eighth consciousness. 『One without, both do not hold』 (隨一無俱不成者): For example, a grammarian establishes this inference against a Mahayana Buddhist, because the other party does not accept the existence of the eighth consciousness; this is 『one』s own.』 If the grammarian establishes this against a Buddhist disciple, citing 『sound nature』 as an analogy, then it is 『the other』s.』 Why is there no 『doubt』? 『Neither existing, both do not hold』 (無俱不成者): Since there is no basis for the analogy, there is absolutely no case where both hold. Since doubt and certainty are different, this phrase is omitted. 『The basis does not hold』 (所依不成): If it is said to be based on the analogy, as mentioned earlier, there is no basis for the analogy. Therefore, if it is said to be based on 『thesis』 and 『cause,』 it is the fourth phrase among the four phrases of 『thesis and cause looking at the analogy.』 Among them, there are whole, partial, and a part; I will not elaborate for fear of being verbose. Question: 『Suchness』 (tathatā) is always existent, so it is said to be 『permanent.』 『Space』 (ākāśa) is always 『non-existent,』 assuming it is against those who do not accept 『emptiness,』 why is 『permanence』 not 『existence』? Furthermore, space is 『non-existent,』 why is it not 『unobstructed』? Answer: Establishing a thesis roughly has two types. One is only negating without expressing affirmation, for example, saying 『I am not,』 only wanting to negate 『I,』 not wanting to establish 『non-existence.』 The analogy also only negates without taking affirmation. The other is negating and also expressing affirmation, for example, saying 『I am permanent,』 not only negating 『impermanence』 but also expressing 『permanence.』 The entity and analogy possess both negation and affirmation. Based on the previous analogy, 『non-substantial existence negates』 can also be established."
]
}
成依。后但有遮無表。二立𨷂。今立聲常。是有遮表。對無空論。但有其遮。而無其表。故是喻過。有云。聲宗上遮表。虛空喻上遮別。既兩俱成總非。能立𨷂彼自答。若聲論師。作此立者。即是所立不成過者。今謂不然。虛空之上。但有遮無常。無所表常。即所立不成。既但遮礙。無所表礙。何非能立𨷂。古敘他救聲云。無礙有遮有表。喻遮非表。喻不似因。亦不得成。即自破云。如咽等所作。杖等所作。雖不相似。所作義同。亦得成喻者。今謂此亦不爾。同有所作。即遮表同。故得為因。彼遮無表。不與此例。古又云。聲宗無礙。但取其遮。故空同喻能立得有。又敘難云。宗喻具二。取遮非表。亦無能立者。即自破云。亦應小乘對大乘。立虛空是常。以非作故。立者許具遮表。敵者即唯有遮。望自應有隨一不成過。故知能立不成者。不約具遮表。此意以立對敵。敵但許有遮。亦得成喻。全不許者。方是喻過。故將此量為決定相違過者。此量亦非。誰言無過。對大乘立。即無空論。所別不成。宗無簡故。因有隨一。並𨷂所依及不定過。為如擇滅。為類龜毛。彼立空常。具有遮表。龜毛無表。故成亦有有法自相相違。意立離如別體是空。彼此共許。擇滅無為。非是虛空。空是所諍。故成相違。又擇滅喻。常與非作。共許遮表。非是不成。故所引非。又有云。設若救言。聲空俱取于遮。不取于表。可非能立。𨷂不成過。然有破云。若聲取遮不取表者。因喻亦爾。即有二過。違理及教。以陳那菩薩理門論云。前是遮詮。后唯止濫。同唯取遮。故
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"成依:如果後來的論者只承認遮詮(*apoha,否定性的排除*)而沒有表詮(*vidhi,肯定性的表述*),那麼就犯了能立過(*sādhanābhāsa,似能立*)的第二種過失。現在我們主張聲是常住的,它既有遮詮也有表詮,這與認為虛空沒有表詮的觀點相反。因為虛空只有遮詮而沒有表詮,所以是喻過(*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa,似喻*)。",
"有人說,聲宗(*Śabdika,聲論學派*)的喻體是遮詮表詮,虛空的喻體是遮詮別詮,既然兩者都成立,那就不是總非(*sādhāraṇa,共同的*)。能立過,他們自己回答說,如果聲論師這樣立論,那就是所立不成過(*sādhyāsiddha,所立不成就*)。",
"現在我認為不是這樣。虛空之上,只有遮詮無常,沒有表詮常住,即所立不成。既然只有遮礙,沒有表詮遮礙,為什麼不是能立過?",
"古人敘述他人辯解聲常時說,『無礙』既有遮詮也有表詮,而虛空的喻體是遮詮非表詮,喻體不像因,也不能成立。』然後自己反駁說,『比如咽喉等所作,手杖等所作,雖然不相似,但『所作』的意義相同,也可以成立為喻體。』",
"現在我認為這也不對。同有所作,即遮詮和表詮相同,所以可以作為因。而虛空的遮詮沒有表詮,不能與此相比。",
"古人又說,聲宗的『無礙』,只取其遮詮,所以虛空作為能立的喻體是可以成立的。又敘述對方的詰難說,『宗和喻都具備遮詮,只取遮詮而非表詮,也不能成立能立。』然後自己反駁說,『小乘對大乘立論虛空是常住的,以『非作』(*akṛtakatva,非造作性*)為因,立論者允許宗和喻都具備遮詮和表詮,而對方只承認遮詮,從立論者自身來看,就應有隨一不成過(*ekatarāsiddha,一方不成就*)。』由此可知,能立不成過不是針對具備遮詮和表詮而言的。這個意思是,以立論者對抗辯者,抗辯者只允許有遮詮,也可以成立為喻體。完全不承認遮詮的,才是喻過。所以將此量(*anumāna,推論*)作為決定相違過(*viruddhāvyabhicāra,決定性的相違*)是不對的。誰說沒有過失?對大乘立論,就沒有虛空論,所別不成(*viśeṣyāsiddha,所別不成就*),因為宗沒有簡別。因有隨一(*ekatara,隨一性*),以及能立所依(*āśrayāsiddha,所依不成就*)和不定過(*anaikāntika,不定*)。",
"比如擇滅(*nirodha-satya,滅諦*),或者像龜毛一樣。他們立論虛空是常住的,具有遮詮和表詮,而龜毛沒有表詮,所以成立也有有法自相相違(*svabhāva-viruddha,自體相違*)。意思是立論離開『如』(*tathatā,如如*)的別體是空,這是彼此都認可的。擇滅無為(*asaṃskṛta,無為法*),不是虛空,虛空是所爭論的對象,所以成立相違。",
"又,擇滅的喻體,常住和非作,共同認可遮詮和表詮,不是不成就,所以所引用的例子不對。",
"還有人說,假設辯解說,聲和虛空都取遮詮,不取表詮,可以避免能立過和不成過。然而有人反駁說,如果聲取遮詮不取表詮,那麼因和喻也是如此,即有二過:違背道理和教義。因為陳那(*Dignāga*)菩薩的《理門論》(*Hetucakraḍamaru*)說,『前是遮詮,后唯止濫,同唯取遮』,所以……"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Aśraya: If later debaters only acknowledge apoha (negative exclusion) without vidhi (positive assertion), then they commit the second fault of sādhanābhāsa (fallacious reason). Now, we assert that sound is permanent, possessing both apoha and vidhi, contrary to the view that space lacks vidhi. Because space only has apoha and not vidhi, it is a dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacious example).",
"Some say that the example of the Śabdikas (the school of sound) is apoha and vidhi, while the example of space is apoha and viśeṣa (distinction). Since both are established, it is not sādhāraṇa (common). Regarding the fallacy of sādhanābhāsa, they themselves reply that if the Śabdikas were to establish this way, it would be sādhyāsiddha (unestablished thesis).",
"Now, I think it is not like this. Above space, there is only the apoha of impermanence, not the vidhi of permanence, which is sādhyāsiddha. Since there is only obstruction, not the vidhi of obstruction, why is it not a sādhanābhāsa?",
"The ancients, when describing others' defense of the permanence of sound, said, '「Unobstructed」 has both apoha and vidhi, while the example of space is apoha without vidhi; the example is not like the reason, and cannot be established.' Then they refuted themselves, saying, 'For example, what is done by the throat, what is done by the staff, although not similar, the meaning of 「what is done」 is the same, and can be established as an example.'",
"Now, I think this is also incorrect. Having the same 'what is done' means that apoha and vidhi are the same, so it can be used as a reason. But the apoha of space has no vidhi, and cannot be compared to this.",
"The ancients also said that the 'unobstructed' of the sound school only takes its apoha, so space as an example of the sādhanā can be established. They also described the opponent's refutation, saying, 'Both the thesis and the example have apoha, only taking apoha and not vidhi, and cannot establish the sādhanā.' Then they refuted themselves, saying, 'The Hīnayāna (small vehicle) should also establish that space is permanent against the Mahāyāna (great vehicle), using 'non-created' (akṛtakatva) as the reason. The establisher allows both the thesis and the example to have apoha and vidhi, while the opponent only acknowledges apoha. From the establisher's own perspective, there should be ekatarāsiddha (one-sided unestablished).' From this, it can be known that the fallacy of sādhanābhāsa is not aimed at those with both apoha and vidhi. The meaning of this is that the establisher confronts the debater, and the debater only allows apoha, which can also be established as an example. Only those who do not acknowledge apoha at all are fallacious examples. Therefore, it is incorrect to regard this inference (anumāna) as viruddhāvyabhicāra (decisive contradiction). Who says there is no fault? When establishing against the Mahāyāna, there is no theory of space, viśeṣyāsiddha (unestablished qualifier), because the thesis has no distinction. The reason has ekatara (one-sidedness), as well as āśrayāsiddha (unestablished substratum) and anaikāntika (uncertainty).",
"For example, nirodha-satya (cessation of suffering), or like turtle hair. They establish that space is permanent, possessing both apoha and vidhi, while turtle hair has no vidhi, so it is established that there is also svabhāva-viruddha (self-contradiction). The meaning is that establishing the separate entity of emptiness apart from tathatā (suchness) is something that both sides acknowledge. Asaṃskṛta (unconditioned) nirodha is not space, and space is the object of dispute, so it is established as contradictory.",
"Also, the example of nirodha, permanence and non-createdness, commonly acknowledges apoha and vidhi, and is not unestablished, so the cited example is incorrect.",
"Some also say that if they defend themselves by saying that sound and space both take apoha and do not take vidhi, they can avoid the fallacy of sādhanābhāsa and the fallacy of unestablishedness. However, some refute that if sound takes apoha and does not take vidhi, then the reason and the example are also like this, which has two faults: violating reason and doctrine. Because Dignāga Bodhisattva's Hetucakraḍamaru (Wheel of Reason) says, 'The former is apoha, the latter only stops abuse, and the same only takes apoha', so..."
]
}
違于教。此難亦非。以彼外道。不以理門為定量故。今者解云。此約虛空辨無二立者。據彼本計言常。無礙具有遮表。不唯取遮。故是喻過。若唯取遮。可違理失。宗因喻三俱有義故。或可違彼定因所造本因明論。世共許故。可名違教。
無合者。
述曰。下解第四過有四。一牒章。二標體。三釋義。四示法。此初也。
謂於是處無有配合。
述曰。標無合體。謂於是喻處。言配合者。相屬著義。若不言諸所作者。皆是無常。猶如瓶等。即便不證有所作處。無常必隨。即所作無常。不相屬著。是無合義。由此無合。縱使聲上見有所作。不能成立聲是無常。故若無合。即是喻過。若云諸所作者。皆是無常。猶如瓶等。即能證彼無常。必隨所作性聲。既有所作。亦必無常隨。即相屬著。是有合義。問諸所作者皆是無常。合宗因不。有云不合。以聲無常他不許故。但合宗外。余有所作及無常。猶此相屬。能顯聲上有所作故。無常必隨。今謂不爾。立喻本欲成宗合。既不合于宗。立喻何關宗事。故云諸所作者即苞瓶等。一切所作。及聲上所作。皆是無常者。即瓶等一切所作。及聲上所作。皆是無常者。即瓶等一切無常。並聲無常。即以無常。合屬所作。不欲以瓶所作合聲所作。瓶無常合聲無常。若不無常合屬所作。如何解同喻云。說因宗所隨。若云聲無常他不許不合者。不爾。若彼許者。即立己成。以彼不許。故須合顯云諸所作皆是無常。猶如瓶等。故集論云。以未所見邊。與所見邊和合。正說名之為喻。又設難云。異喻
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"『違于教』這種過失也不成立,因為那些外道不以理性的論證作為衡量標準。現在解釋如下:這裡是針對那些認為『虛空』(Akasa,佛教術語,指空無一物的空間)是無二(沒有對立面)的人。根據他們的根本觀點,『虛空』是常恒不變的,並且具有無礙的遮詮和表詮兩種作用,不僅僅是遮詮。因此,這是一種『比喻不當』的過失。如果僅僅是遮詮,可能會犯『違背道理』的過失,因為宗、因、喻三者都具有意義。或者,也可以說違背了他們自己所建立的因明論(Hetuvidya,古印度邏輯學),因為這種論述是世人普遍認可的,所以可以稱之為『違于教』。",
"『無合』(Ananvaya,不相應)者:",
"以下解釋第四種過失,分為四個部分:一、重複章節;二、標明體性;三、解釋含義;四、揭示法則。這是第一部分。",
"指的是在比喻中沒有配合(關聯)。",
"標明『無合』的體性。指的是在比喻的例子中,『配合』指的是相互關聯的意義。如果不說『凡是所造作的事物,都是無常的,例如瓶子等』,就無法證明『有所造作』的地方,必然伴隨著『無常』。也就是說,『所造作』和『無常』沒有相互關聯。這就是『無合』的含義。因為這種『無合』,即使在聲音上看到『有所造作』,也不能成立『聲音是無常的』。因此,如果『無合』,就是比喻的過失。如果說『凡是所造作的事物,都是無常的,例如瓶子等』,就能證明『無常』必然伴隨著『所造作』的性質。聲音既然『有所造作』,也必然伴隨著『無常』。這就是相互關聯,也就是『有合』的含義。有人問:『凡是所造作的事物,都是無常的』,是否符合宗和因?有人說不符合,因為對方不承認『聲音是無常的』,只是符合宗之外的『有所造作』和『無常』。就像這種相互關聯,能夠顯示聲音上『有所造作』,因此『無常』必然伴隨。現在我認為不是這樣。建立比喻本來是爲了成就宗的符合,既然不符合于宗,建立比喻與宗有什麼關係?所以說『凡是所造作的』就包括瓶子等一切所造作的事物,以及聲音上的所造作。『凡是所造作的,都是無常的』,就包括瓶子等一切無常,以及聲音的無常。也就是說,用『無常』來關聯『所造作』,而不是用瓶子的『所造作』來關聯聲音的『所造作』,用瓶子的『無常』來關聯聲音的『無常』。如果不以『無常』來關聯『所造作』,如何解釋同喻說『因』(Hetu,原因)是『宗』(Paksha,論題)所隨順的?如果說對方不承認『聲音是無常的』,所以不符合,那是不對的。如果對方承認,那就已經成立了。因為對方不承認,所以需要通過符合來顯示,說『凡是所造作的都是無常的,例如瓶子等』。所以《集論》(Abhidharmasamuccaya)說,用未見的一邊與已見的一邊結合,正確地陳述,就叫做『比喻』。又假設提問說:異喻(Vaidharmya,反例)呢?"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"The fallacy of 'contradicting the doctrine' is also not established because those non-Buddhist schools do not take rational arguments as a standard of measurement. Now, the explanation is as follows: This addresses those who consider 'Akasa' (space, in Buddhist terminology) to be non-dual (without opposites). According to their fundamental view, 'Akasa' is constant and unchanging, possessing both unobstructed negation and affirmation, not just negation. Therefore, this is a fallacy of 'inappropriate analogy'. If it were only negation, it might commit the fallacy of 'contradicting reason' because the subject, reason, and example all have meaning. Alternatively, it could be said to contradict their own established treatise on logic (Hetuvidya), because this kind of discourse is universally recognized, so it can be called 'contradicting the doctrine'.",
"'Ananvaya' (non-concomitance):",
"The following explains the fourth fallacy, divided into four parts: 1. Repeating the chapter; 2. Identifying the nature; 3. Explaining the meaning; 4. Revealing the principle. This is the first part.",
"Refers to the absence of association (correlation) in the analogy.",
"Identifying the nature of 'non-concomitance'. It refers to the example in the analogy, where 'association' refers to the meaning of mutual connection. If it is not said that 'all things that are produced are impermanent, such as pots, etc.', it cannot be proven that where there is 'production', there must be 'impermanence' accompanying it. That is to say, 'production' and 'impermanence' are not mutually related. This is the meaning of 'non-concomitance'. Because of this 'non-concomitance', even if 'production' is seen in sound, it cannot establish that 'sound is impermanent'. Therefore, if there is 'non-concomitance', it is a fallacy of analogy. If it is said that 'all things that are produced are impermanent, such as pots, etc.', it can prove that 'impermanence' necessarily accompanies the nature of 'production'. Since sound is 'produced', it must also be accompanied by 'impermanence'. This is mutual connection, which is the meaning of 'concomitance'. Someone asks: 'All things that are produced are impermanent', does it conform to the subject and reason? Some say it does not conform because the opponent does not admit that 'sound is impermanent', it only conforms to 'production' and 'impermanence' outside the subject. Just like this mutual connection, it can show that there is 'production' in sound, therefore 'impermanence' necessarily accompanies it. Now I think it is not like this. Establishing the analogy is originally to achieve the conformity of the subject, since it does not conform to the subject, what does establishing the analogy have to do with the subject? Therefore, it is said that 'all things that are produced' include all things that are produced, such as pots, etc., and the production in sound. 'All things that are produced are impermanent' includes all impermanence, such as pots, etc., and the impermanence of sound. That is to say, 'impermanence' is used to associate with 'production', not using the 'production' of pots to associate with the 'production' of sound, using the 'impermanence' of pots to associate with the 'impermanence' of sound. If 'impermanence' is not used to associate with 'production', how to explain the similar example saying that the 'reason' (Hetu) is followed by the 'subject' (Paksha)? If it is said that the opponent does not admit that 'sound is impermanent', so it does not conform, that is not correct. If the opponent admits it, then it is already established. Because the opponent does not admit it, it needs to be shown through conformity, saying 'all things that are produced are impermanent, such as pots, etc.'. Therefore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says that combining the unseen side with the seen side, and stating it correctly, is called 'analogy'. And suppose the question is asked: What about the dissimilar example (Vaidharmya)?"
]
}
亦言諸皆。豈欲籠括宗因邪。答不例。異喻本欲離彼宗因。顯無宗處。因定不有。如何得合。返顯順成諸皆之言。定合聲上所作。與彼無常。令屬著因。問若爾喻合併說初相。云何理門云同喻等顯第二相。答同喻體正顯第二。若說合言喻上別義。是故古師于能立中。別立合結。又于同喻。不說唯顯第二相言。故亦無失。
但于瓶等雙現能立所立二法。
述曰。此釋義也。謂但言譬如瓶等有所作性。及無常性。不以所作成無常。但于瓶上。雙現所作及無常性。不云諸所作者皆是無常。此釋前也。
言如於瓶見所作性及無常性。
述曰。此示法也。但舉喻云。如瓶見有所作。及於無常。不言諸所作者皆無常。故是無合。若如古師。立聲無常。以所作故。猶若於瓶。即別合云。瓶有所作。瓶即無常。當知聲有所作。聲亦無常。故因喻外別立合支。陳那菩薩云。諸所作者皆是無常。即以瓶等所作。並苞聲上所作之性。定是無常。猶如瓶等。瓶等所作有作有無常。即顯聲有所作非常住。即于喻上。義立合言。何須別立於合支也。由此準知。喻上諸皆。具合宗喻。若不如是。豈得廢舊所立合支。
倒合者。
述曰。下解第五過。文有其二。初牒。后釋。此初也。
謂應說言諸所作者皆是無常。
述曰。下釋。釋中有二。初舉正合。后正顯倒。此初也。宗因可知。
而倒說言諸無常者皆是所作。
述曰。正顯倒也。謂正應以所作證無常。今翻無常證所作。故是喻過。即成非所立。有違自宗
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"也說了『諸皆』(一切、所有)這樣的詞。難道是想要把宗(命題)、因(理由)都籠罩概括進去嗎?回答說:不是這樣的。異喻(反例)本來就是要離開對方的宗和因,來顯示沒有宗的地方,因就確定不存在。這樣怎麼能合在一起呢?反過來就顯現出順成『諸皆』(一切、所有)這樣的說法,一定是和聲上所作(聲音是製造出來的)的性質相符合,讓它和無常(事物變化不停的狀態)聯繫起來,歸屬於因。問:如果這樣,比喻合併來說明最初的相狀,為什麼理門(正理之門)說同喻等能夠顯示第二相狀呢?回答說:同喻的本體正是爲了顯示第二相狀。如果說『合』這個詞在比喻上還有別的意義,所以古代的論師在能立(論證)中,另外設立『合』這個論支(論證的組成部分)。而且在同喻中,不說僅僅顯示第二相狀,所以也沒有過失。",
"只是在瓶子等事物上,同時顯現能立(論證)和所立(被論證)的兩種法。",
"解釋:這是解釋前面的意思。意思是說,只是說『譬如瓶子等有被製造出來的性質』以及『無常的性質』,而不是用『被製造出來』來證明『無常』。只是在瓶子上,同時顯現『被製造出來』和『無常』這兩種性質,而不是說『所有被製造出來的東西都是無常的』。這是解釋前面的內容。",
"說『比如在瓶子上看到被製造出來的性質以及無常的性質』。",
"解釋:這是展示法則。只是舉例說:『比如在瓶子上看到被製造出來的性質』以及『無常的性質』,而不是說『所有被製造出來的東西都是無常的』,所以這是沒有『合』。如果像古代論師那樣,立論說『聲音是無常的,因為它是被製造出來的,就像瓶子一樣』,就另外設立『合』這個論支,說『瓶子是被製造出來的,瓶子就是無常的,應當知道聲音是被製造出來的,聲音也是無常的』。所以在因喻之外,另外設立『合』這個論支。陳那菩薩(Dignāga)說:『所有被製造出來的東西都是無常的』,就是用瓶子等被製造出來的性質,來包含聲音上被製造出來的性質,確定聲音是無常的,就像瓶子等一樣。瓶子等被製造出來的性質,既有被製造的性質,也有無常的性質,就顯示出聲音是被製造出來的,不是常住不變的。就在比喻上,通過意義來設立『合』這個說法,何必另外設立『合』這個論支呢?由此可以推知,比喻上的『諸皆』(一切、所有),就具備了『合』的宗(命題)和喻(比喻)。如果不是這樣,怎麼能廢除舊的所設立的『合』這個論支呢?",
"倒合(顛倒的合)",
"解釋:下面解釋第五種過失。文句分為兩個部分,先是標出,后是解釋。這是第一部分。",
"意思是說,應該說『所有被製造出來的東西都是無常的』。",
"解釋:下面是解釋。解釋分為兩個部分,先是舉出正確的『合』,后是正式顯現『倒』。這是第一部分。宗(命題)和因(理由)可以知道。",
"卻顛倒過來說『所有無常的東西都是被製造出來的』。",
"解釋:這是正式顯現『倒』。意思是說,本來應該用『被製造出來』來證明『無常』,現在反而用『無常』來證明『被製造出來』,所以這是比喻的過失,就變成了非所立(不能成立的),有違背自己的宗(命題)。",
"English version",
"It also speaks of 'all' (everything, all) such words. Is it intended to encompass the proposition and the reason? The answer is no. The dissimilar example (negative example) is originally intended to depart from the other party's proposition and reason, to show that where there is no proposition, the reason is certainly non-existent. How can this be combined? Conversely, it reveals that the statement 'all' (everything, all) is certainly in accordance with the nature of what is made on the sound, so that it is related to impermanence (the state of things changing constantly) and belongs to the reason. Question: If so, the metaphor combines to explain the initial appearance, why does the gate of reason (the gate of correct reasoning) say that similar metaphors can show the second appearance? The answer is that the essence of the similar metaphor is to show the second appearance. If the word 'combination' has other meanings on the metaphor, the ancient masters separately established the 'combination' as a limb of the argument in the proof. Moreover, in the similar metaphor, it is not said that only the second appearance is shown, so there is no fault.",
"It is only on things such as bottles that both the proof and the proven are manifested simultaneously.",
"Explanation: This is an explanation of the previous meaning. It means that it is only said that 'for example, bottles have the nature of being made' and 'the nature of impermanence', rather than using 'being made' to prove 'impermanence'. It is only on the bottle that both 'being made' and 'impermanence' are manifested simultaneously, rather than saying 'all things that are made are impermanent'. This is an explanation of the previous content.",
"It says 'for example, seeing the nature of being made and the nature of impermanence on a bottle'.",
"Explanation: This is a demonstration of the law. It only gives an example saying: 'For example, seeing the nature of being made on a bottle' and 'the nature of impermanence', rather than saying 'all things that are made are impermanent', so this is without 'combination'. If, like the ancient masters, the proposition is established that 'sound is impermanent because it is made, like a bottle', then the 'combination' limb is separately established, saying 'the bottle is made, the bottle is impermanent, it should be known that the sound is made, the sound is also impermanent'. Therefore, outside the reason and metaphor, the 'combination' limb is separately established. Dignāga Bodhisattva said: 'All things that are made are impermanent', that is, using the nature of being made of bottles, etc., to include the nature of being made on the sound, it is certain that the sound is impermanent, just like bottles, etc. The nature of being made of bottles, etc., has both the nature of being made and the nature of impermanence, which shows that the sound is made and is not permanent. On the metaphor, the statement of 'combination' is established through meaning, why is it necessary to separately establish the 'combination' limb? From this, it can be inferred that the 'all' (everything, all) on the metaphor has the proposition and metaphor of 'combination'. If it is not like this, how can the old established 'combination' limb be abolished?",
"Inverted combination",
"Explanation: The following explains the fifth fault. The sentences are divided into two parts, first marking and then explaining. This is the first part.",
"It means that it should be said 'all things that are made are impermanent'.",
"Explanation: The following is the explanation. The explanation is divided into two parts, first giving the correct 'combination', and then formally showing the 'inversion'. This is the first part. The proposition and the reason can be known.",
"But it is reversed to say 'all impermanent things are made'.",
"Explanation: This is a formal display of 'inversion'. It means that originally 'being made' should be used to prove 'impermanence', but now 'impermanence' is used to prove 'being made', so this is a fault of metaphor, which becomes non-established and violates one's own proposition."
]
}
及相符等。故理門云。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。此二名譬喻。余皆此相似。又云。應以所作證無常。翻以無常成所作。若爾應成非所樂不遍非樂等合離。如正喻中。已廣分別。前之三過。皆有自他共分全等。此後二過。但有共全。無所餘也。或可分他自共。以隨立量。有自等三故。總計似同。初二各四。第三有六。以有有四。無中有二。成其十四。兼后二過。總有十六。分自他共。有四十八。于中細分。有體無體。全分一分。復以似因。問似喻過數乃無量。恐繁且止。
如是名似同法喻品。
述曰。第二總結可知。
似異法中所立不遣。
述曰。下解似異。五過為五。此即第一。于中有三。初簡牒。次指體。后釋成。此初也。簡有二重。一簡似同。云似異法中。二簡自五。以似異中過有五種。先明所立不遣。故云似異法中所立不遣者。即牒也。
且如有言諸無常者見彼質礙譬如極微。
述曰。第二指體。宗因同前。此中不舉。但標似異所立不遣。此類非一。隨明於一。故云且也。或不具詞。似五明一。故亦云且。
由於極微所成立法常性不遣彼立極微是常住故。
述曰。下釋成有二。初所立有。后能立無。此初也。初三句依指正釋。下兩句牒計顯成。聲勝二論。俱計極微常故。不遣所立。
能成立法無質礙無。
述曰。下明能立無。準所立有。亦應言彼立極微有質礙故。文影略爾。此中亦有兩俱隨一猶豫無依不遣。或無第四過。以異喻體。但遮非表。依無非過。但有前三
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"以及相符等等。所以理門中說:『所說的因,宗(pakṣa,論題)會隨之成立。如果宗沒有因,就不會存在。這兩者被稱為譬喻(dṛṣṭānta,例子)。其餘的都與此相似。』又說:『應該用所作來證明無常,反過來用無常來成立所作。』如果這樣,就應該成為非所樂、不遍非樂等等的合離。正如正喻中已經廣泛分別的那樣。前面的三種過失,都有自、他、共分全等。後面的兩種過失,只有共全,沒有其餘的。或者可以分他、自、共,以隨立量,有自等三種緣故。總計相似的同法喻,最初兩種各有四種過失,第三種有六種過失,因為有中有四種,無中有兩種,總共十四種。加上後面的兩種過失,總共有十六種。如果分自、他、共,就有四十八種。在其中細分,有體無體,全分一分。再用相似的因來問,相似的喻的過失數量就無窮無盡了,恐怕繁瑣,就此停止。",
"這是名為相似的同法喻品。",
"述曰:第二總結,可以知道。",
"相似的異法喻中所立不排除。",
"述曰:下面解釋相似的異法喻。五種過失分為五類。這是第一種。其中有三個部分。首先是簡要說明,其次是指明本體,最後是解釋成立。這是第一個部分。簡要說明有兩重含義。一是簡要說明相似的同法喻,說『相似的異法喻中』。二是簡要說明自身五種過失,因為相似的異法喻中有五種過失。首先說明所立不排除,所以說『相似的異法喻中所立不排除』,這就是簡要說明。",
"例如有人說:『凡是無常的事物,都可見其質礙,譬如極微(paramāṇu,最小的物質單位)。』",
"述曰:第二是指明本體。宗(pakṣa,論題)和因(hetu,理由)與前面相同。這裡不舉出,只是標明相似的異法喻中所立不排除。這類情況並非只有一種,隨便說明一種。所以說『且』。或者是不完整地表達,相似於五種只說明一種。所以也說『且』。",
"由於極微所成立的法常性不排除,因為他們認為極微是常住的。",
"述曰:下面解釋成立,分為兩個部分。首先是所立存在,然後是能立不存在。這是第一個部分。最初三句是根據指明進行正確的解釋。下面兩句是引用他們的觀點來顯明成立。勝論(Vaiśeṣika)和聲論(Śabda)都認為極微是常住的,所以不排除所立。",
"能成立的法沒有質礙不存在。",
"述曰:下面說明能立不存在。按照所立存在,也應該說他們認為極微有質礙。文中省略了。這裡也有兩俱隨一、猶豫無依不排除。或者沒有第四種過失,因為異法喻的本體只是遮止,不是表述。根據無非過,只有前三種。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version:",
"And corresponding things, and so on. Therefore, the Treatise on Reasoning states: 'The stated reason follows the thesis (pakṣa). If the thesis lacks a reason, it will not exist. These two are called example (dṛṣṭānta). The rest are similar to these.' It also states: 'One should use impermanence to prove what is made, and conversely, use what is made to establish impermanence.' If so, it should become non-desirable, non-pervasive of non-pleasure, and so on, in terms of combination and separation. As already extensively distinguished in the correct example. The first three faults all have self, other, common division, and completeness. The latter two faults only have common completeness, and nothing else. Or one can divide other, self, and common, based on the established measure, because there are three kinds of self, etc. In total, similar examples of the same dharma initially have four faults each for the first two, and the third has six faults, because there are four in existence and two in non-existence, making fourteen in total. Adding the latter two faults, there are sixteen in total. If divided into self, other, and common, there are forty-eight. Within this, if further subdivided, there are with-substance and without-substance, complete division and partial division. Furthermore, if one asks with a similar reason, the number of faults in similar examples is immeasurable. Fearing complexity, I will stop here.",
"This is the section called Similar Examples of the Same Dharma.",
"Commentary: The second summary is knowable.",
"In similar examples of different dharma, what is established is not excluded.",
"Commentary: The following explains similar examples of different dharma. The five faults are divided into five categories. This is the first. Within this, there are three parts. First, a brief explanation; second, pointing out the substance; and third, explaining the establishment. This is the first part. The brief explanation has two meanings. One is to briefly explain similar examples of the same dharma, saying 'in similar examples of different dharma.' The second is to briefly explain the five faults themselves, because there are five faults in similar examples of different dharma. First, it explains that what is established is not excluded, so it says 'in similar examples of different dharma, what is established is not excluded,' which is the brief explanation.",
"For example, someone says: 'Whatever is impermanent, its material obstruction can be seen, like an atom (paramāṇu).'",
"Commentary: The second is pointing out the substance. The thesis (pakṣa) and reason (hetu) are the same as before. Here, it is not mentioned, but only indicates that what is established in similar examples of different dharma is not excluded. This kind of situation is not unique, and one is explained at random. Therefore, it says 'moreover.' Or it is an incomplete expression, similar to explaining one out of five. Therefore, it also says 'moreover.'",
"Because the nature of permanence established by the atom is not excluded, because they believe that the atom is permanent.",
"Commentary: The following explains the establishment, divided into two parts. First, what is established exists, and then what can establish does not exist. This is the first part. The first three sentences are based on pointing out the correct explanation. The following two sentences quote their views to clarify the establishment. The Vaiśeṣika and Śabda schools both believe that the atom is permanent, so what is established is not excluded.",
"The dharma that can establish does not exist without material obstruction.",
"Commentary: The following explains that what can establish does not exist. According to the existence of what is established, it should also be said that they believe that the atom has material obstruction. The text is abbreviated. Here, there are also both following one, hesitant and without reliance, not excluded. Or there is no fourth fault, because the substance of the different dharma example is only negation, not expression. According to the fault of non-existence, there are only the first three."
]
}
。或亦有之。如立我無。許諦攝故。異喻如空。對無空論雖無所依。亦不遣所立宗法。異喻亦無。俱同無故。然前解勝。此論所明聲。對勝論兩俱不遣。若對薩婆多。隨一不遣。薩婆多計微非常故。隨他準知。猶豫不遣者。如言彼山等處。定應有火。以現煙故。如余廚等處。異喻諸無火處。皆不現煙。如余處等。然有火處亦無有煙。故懷猶豫。不現煙。處火為有無。故猶豫不遣。維摩經說。如無煙火。如燋谷牙。今據顯相。故無違也。然隨所應。有自他共全分一分等。
能立不遣。
述曰。下解第二有三。初牒章。次指體。后釋成。此初也。
謂說如業。
述曰。指體也。
但遣所立。
述曰。釋成有二。此釋所立無。以彼計業是無常故。
不遣能立彼說諸業無質礙故。
述曰。辨能立有有二。初明能立有。以牒計顯成。準前應言。彼說諸業體是無常。無質礙故。牒計顯有。以影彰無。此對勝論。俱能立不遣。對薩婆多等。隨一不遣。餘思可悉。
俱不遣。
述曰。解第三過。文亦有三。此即牒也。
對彼有論說如虛空。
述曰。此指體也。即聲論師。對薩婆多等。立聲常無礙。異喻如空。
由彼虛空不遣常性無質礙性。
述曰。釋成有二。初明二立有。后約計釋成。此初也。
以說虛空是常性故無質礙故。
述曰。約計釋成也。兩宗俱計虛空實有。遍常無礙。所以二立不遣也。問似同不成俱中開二。似異不遣。何不別明。答同約遮
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"或者也有這樣的情況:雖然確立了『我』(ātman,靈魂)不存在,但由於許認了真諦的緣故,所以能立(hetu,因明術語,指論證的理由)並沒有被駁倒。反例就像虛空一樣,雖然針對『無』的論點,虛空似乎沒有什麼可以依靠的,但它並沒有否定所要建立的宗法(pakṣa-dharma,因明術語,指論證的主題所具有的性質)。反例也沒有,因為兩者都同樣是『無』。然而,之前的解釋更好。這個論證所說明的『聲』,對於勝論派(Vaiśeṣika)來說,兩方面都沒有被駁倒。如果針對薩婆多部(Sarvāstivāda),則其中一方面沒有被駁倒,因為薩婆多部認為極微(paramāṇu,最小的物質單位)不是常恒的。根據其他情況,可以推知猶豫不決的情況。例如,說『那座山等地方,一定有火,因為有煙出現』,就像在廚房等地方一樣。反例是那些沒有火的地方,都沒有煙出現,就像其他地方一樣。然而,有火的地方也可能沒有煙,所以會產生猶豫。沒有煙的地方,火是有還是沒有呢?因此,猶豫不決並沒有被駁倒。《維摩詰經》(Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra)說,『如無煙之火,如焦谷之芽』,現在根據顯現的現象來說,所以沒有衝突。然而,根據具體情況,有自、他、共同、全分、一部分等。",
"能立沒有被駁倒。",
"述曰:下面解釋第二種情況,有三個部分。首先是標明章節,其次是指出實體,最後是解釋完成。這是第一部分。",
"指的是像業(karma,行為)這樣的例子。",
"述曰:指出實體。",
"只是所立被駁倒。",
"述曰:解釋完成有兩個部分。這裡解釋的是所立的『無』,因為他們認為業是無常的。",
"沒有駁倒能立,因為他們說諸業沒有實體障礙。",
"述曰:辨別能立的存在有兩種方式。首先是說明能立的存在,通過引用他們的觀點來顯明。按照前面的說法,應該說:『他們說諸業的本體是無常的,沒有實體障礙。』引用他們的觀點來顯明存在,用影子來彰顯不存在。這是針對勝論派,兩方面的能立都沒有被駁倒。針對薩婆多部等,其中一方面沒有被駁倒。其餘的可以思考得知。",
"兩方面都沒有被駁倒。",
"述曰:解釋第三種過失。文章也有三個部分。這是標明。",
"針對那些有論者,例如說虛空。",
"述曰:這是指出實體。指的是聲論師(Śabdika)。針對薩婆多部等,確立『聲』是常恒的,沒有障礙,反例就像虛空。",
"由於他們認為虛空沒有駁倒常性和沒有實體障礙的性質。",
"述曰:解釋完成有兩個部分。首先是說明兩個能立的存在,然後是根據他們的觀點來解釋完成。這是第一部分。",
"因為他們說虛空是常恒的,沒有實體障礙。",
"述曰:根據他們的觀點來解釋完成。兩宗都認為虛空是真實存在的,普遍常恒,沒有障礙,所以兩個能立都沒有被駁倒。問:相似的『同』和『不成』中分出兩種,相似的『異』沒有被駁倒,為什麼不單獨說明?答:『同』是關於遮止的。",
"English version:",
"Or there are also cases where, although the 'self' (ātman, soul) is established as non-existent, the probans (hetu, term in logic, referring to the reason for the argument) is not refuted because the truth is acknowledged. A counter-example is like space, although space seems to have nothing to rely on against the argument of 'non-existence', it does not negate the property of the subject to be proven (pakṣa-dharma, term in logic, referring to the property possessed by the subject of the argument). There is also no counter-example, because both are equally 'non-existent'. However, the previous explanation is better. The 'sound' that this argument explains is not refuted in either aspect for the Vaiśeṣika school. If it is against the Sarvāstivāda, then one aspect is not refuted, because the Sarvāstivāda believes that the ultimate particle (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter) is not permanent. Based on other situations, one can infer the situation of hesitation. For example, saying 'There must be fire in that mountain, etc., because there is smoke appearing', just like in the kitchen, etc. The counter-example is those places without fire, where there is no smoke appearing, just like other places. However, there may be no smoke in places with fire, so hesitation arises. In places without smoke, is there fire or not? Therefore, hesitation is not refuted. The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra says, 'Like fire without smoke, like sprouts from scorched grains', now based on the apparent phenomena, so there is no conflict. However, depending on the specific situation, there are self, other, common, whole, part, etc.",
"The probans is not refuted.",
"Commentary: The following explains the second case, which has three parts. First, the chapter is indicated, second, the entity is pointed out, and third, the explanation is completed. This is the first part.",
"Referring to examples like karma (action).",
"Commentary: Pointing out the entity.",
"Only the thesis is refuted.",
"Commentary: There are two parts to completing the explanation. Here, the 'non-existence' of the thesis is explained, because they believe that karma is impermanent.",
"The probans is not refuted because they say that all karmas have no material obstruction.",
"Commentary: There are two ways to distinguish the existence of the probans. The first is to explain the existence of the probans by citing their views to clarify it. According to the previous statement, it should be said: 'They say that the essence of all karmas is impermanent and has no material obstruction.' Citing their views to clarify existence, using shadows to highlight non-existence. This is aimed at the Vaiśeṣika school, and the probans in both aspects is not refuted. For the Sarvāstivāda, etc., one aspect is not refuted. The rest can be understood through contemplation.",
"Both aspects are not refuted.",
"Commentary: Explaining the third fault. The text also has three parts. This is the indication.",
"For those who hold existence, such as saying space.",
"Commentary: This is pointing out the entity. Refers to the grammarians (Śabdika). Against the Sarvāstivāda, etc., it establishes that 'sound' is permanent and unobstructed, and the counter-example is like space.",
"Because they believe that space does not refute the nature of permanence and the nature of no material obstruction.",
"Commentary: There are two parts to completing the explanation. The first is to explain the existence of the two probans, and then to explain the completion according to their views. This is the first part.",
"Because they say that space is permanent and has no material obstruction.",
"Commentary: Explaining the completion according to their views. Both schools believe that space is real, universally permanent, and unobstructed, so the two probans are not refuted. Question: In the similar 'same' and 'unproven', two types are separated. The similar 'different' is not refuted, why not explain it separately? Answer: 'Same' is about negation."
]
}
表。無依成過。異遮非表。依無俱遣。故無非過。問異喻但遮異無非過。遮有立異。無豈非過。如立虛空。定應非有。以非作故。如龜毛等。諸常有者。皆必非作。如空華等。豈非無體俱不遣耶。答前望二宗。對立聲常。故同開二。此約別立。故合為一。立有異有。即有不遣。若無必遣。立無異無。即無不遣。異有必遣。故不開二。或可亦有以同影異。故略不論。何者。如數論師對勝論。立神我無作。以無礙故。如太虛空。異喻云。諸有作者。皆非無礙。猶如時實。即有俱下遣。以勝論師所計時實。無作無礙故。說如龜毛等。即無俱不遣。以于龜毛等。亦是非作。非有礙故。此中亦有兩俱不遣。隨一猶豫。及無所依。亦隨所應。有自他共分全等過。如理思準。
不離者。
述曰。解第四過。文分為二。初牒章。后示法。此初也。
謂說如瓶見無常性有質礙性。
述曰。此示法。離者不相屬著義。言諸無常者。即離常宗。見彼質礙。離無礙因。將彼無常屬著質礙。返顯無礙屬著常宗。故聲無礙。定是其常。今既但云見彼有無常性。有質礙性。不以無常屬有礙性。即不能明無宗之處。因定非有。何能返顯有無礙處。定有其常。不令常無礙。互相屬著。故為過也。合即先合聲上無礙。欲令無礙常住定隨離。即先離聲上常住。欲令無宗。因定不有。返顯無礙之所至處。定常住宗義隨逐。故理門云。說因宗所隨。宗無因不有。依第立顯喻。由合故知因。此意由依第五囀聲。從所作生故是無常。又由及依如正喻解。以顯于喻。
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"表。無所依而成過失。用『異喻』遮遣時,如果不是完全遮遣,就構成過失。如果完全遮遣,就沒有過失。問:『異喻』只是遮遣『異品』,如果沒有完全遮遣,就構成過失;如果遮遣『有』,而建立『異品』,『無』難道不是過失嗎?例如,如果立『虛空』(虛空,指沒有實體存在的空間)為『異品』,就必定應該『非有』,因為它『非作』(非作,指不是由造作產生的),就像『龜毛』(龜毛,指烏龜身上不可能存在的毛髮,比喻不存在的事物)等一樣。所有常有的事物,都必定『非作』,就像『空華』(空華,指虛空中出現的花朵,比喻虛幻的事物)等一樣,難道不是『無體』(無體,指沒有實體)而沒有完全遮遣嗎?答:前面是針對二宗,對立『聲常』(聲常,指聲音是常住不變的)的觀點,所以『同喻』和『異喻』都分開來說。這裡是針對單獨建立的情況,所以合併爲一。如果立『有』為『異品』,『有』就沒有完全遮遣;如果『無』必定完全遮遣,立『無』為『異品』,『無』就沒有完全遮遣;『異有』必定完全遮遣,所以不分開來說。或者也可以說,也有用『同喻』來影射『異喻』的情況,所以省略不談。什麼情況呢?例如,數論師(數論師,古印度哲學流派,主張二元論)針對勝論師(勝論師,古印度哲學流派,主張原子論),立『神我』(神我,數論哲學中的永恒不變的精神實體)『無作』(無作,指不是由造作產生的),因為『無礙』(無礙,指沒有阻礙),就像『太虛空』(太虛空,指廣闊無垠的虛空)一樣。『異喻』說:所有『有作』(有作,指由造作產生的),都『非無礙』(非無礙,指不是沒有阻礙),就像『時實』(時實,勝論哲學中的時間實體)一樣,這就『有』和『俱下』(俱下,指同喻和異喻都不能成立)都不能完全遮遣,因為勝論師所計量的『時實』,既『無作』又『無礙』。如果說像『龜毛』等,這就『無』和『俱不遣』(俱不遣,指同喻和異喻都成立)都不能完全遮遣,因為對於『龜毛』等,也是『非作』,『非有礙』。這裡面也有兩種『俱不遣』的情況,或者隨一種情況猶豫不定,以及『無所依』(無所依,指沒有依據),也隨其所應,有『自』(自,指自己的觀點)、『他』(他,指他人的觀點)、『共』(共,指共同的觀點)分『全等過』(全等過,指完全相同的過失),按照道理思考衡量。",
"不離者。",
"解釋:",
"述記說:解釋第四種過失。文章分為兩部分。首先是標出章節,然後是闡述方法。這是第一部分。",
"謂說如瓶見無常性有質礙性。",
"解釋:",
"述記說:這是闡述方法。『離』是不相屬著的意思。說諸法『無常』(無常,指事物變化無常,沒有永恒不變的性質),就是離開了『常宗』(常宗,指主張事物是常住不變的宗派)。見到『質礙』(質礙,指有形質的阻礙),就是離開了『無礙因』(無礙因,指沒有阻礙的原因)。將『無常』歸屬於『質礙』,反過來顯示『無礙』歸屬於『常宗』,所以聲音『無礙』,必定是『常』。現在只是說見到它有『無常性』,有『質礙性』,不以『無常』歸屬於『有礙性』,就不能夠說明『無宗』(無宗,指沒有宗派)之處,原因必定『非有』(非有,指不存在),怎麼能夠反過來顯示『無礙』的地方,必定有它的『常』呢?不讓『常』和『無礙』互相歸屬,所以是過失。『合』就是首先將聲音上的『無礙』合起來,想要讓『無礙』和『常住』(常住,指永恒不變)必定隨之分離,就是首先將聲音上的『常住』分離,想要讓『無宗』,原因必定不存在,反過來顯示『無礙』所到的地方,必定有『常住』的宗義隨之追逐。所以《理門》說:說明原因和宗派所隨順的,宗派沒有原因就不存在,依據第五種囀聲來顯示比喻,通過『合』就知道原因。這個意思是由依據第五種囀聲,從所作而生所以是無常,又由以及依據就像正喻一樣解釋,來顯示比喻。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Table. Becoming a fault due to lack of reliance. When using 'dissimilar example' (異喻) to negate, if the negation is not complete, it constitutes a fault. If the negation is complete, there is no fault. Question: 'Dissimilar example' only negates 'dissimilar class' (異品), if the negation is not complete, it constitutes a fault; if negating 'existence' (有) and establishing 'dissimilar class', isn't 'non-existence' (無) a fault? For example, if establishing 'space' (虛空, referring to space without substance) as 'dissimilar class', it should definitely be 'non-existent' (非有), because it is 'non-created' (非作, referring to not produced by fabrication), like 'turtle hair' (龜毛, referring to the impossible hair on a turtle, a metaphor for non-existent things) and so on. All permanent things must be 'non-created', like 'sky flowers' (空華, referring to flowers appearing in the sky, a metaphor for illusory things) and so on, isn't it 'without substance' (無體) and not completely negated? Answer: The previous was aimed at two schools, opposing the view of 'sound being permanent' (聲常, referring to the view that sound is permanent and unchanging), so both 'similar example' (同喻) and 'dissimilar example' were discussed separately. Here it is aimed at a single establishment, so they are combined into one. If establishing 'existence' as 'dissimilar class', 'existence' is not completely negated; if 'non-existence' must be completely negated, establishing 'non-existence' as 'dissimilar class', 'non-existence' is not completely negated; 'dissimilar existence' must be completely negated, so it is not discussed separately. Or it can also be said that there are cases of using 'similar example' to imply 'dissimilar example', so it is omitted. What situation? For example, the Samkhya school (數論師, an ancient Indian philosophical school, advocating dualism) against the Vaisheshika school (勝論師, an ancient Indian philosophical school, advocating atomism), establishes 'Self' (神我, the eternal and unchanging spiritual entity in Samkhya philosophy) as 'non-created', because it is 'unobstructed' (無礙, referring to without obstruction), like 'great void' (太虛空, referring to the vast and boundless void). The 'dissimilar example' says: All 'created' (有作, referring to produced by fabrication) are 'not unobstructed' (非無礙, referring to not without obstruction), like 'time substance' (時實, the time entity in Vaisheshika philosophy), which means that 'existence' and 'both down' (俱下, referring to both similar and dissimilar examples being untenable) are not completely negated, because the 'time substance' measured by the Vaisheshika school is both 'non-created' and 'unobstructed'. If saying like 'turtle hair' and so on, it means that 'non-existence' and 'both not negated' (俱不遣, referring to both similar and dissimilar examples being tenable) are not completely negated, because for 'turtle hair' and so on, it is also 'non-created' and 'not obstructed'. There are also two cases of 'both not negated' here, or hesitating about one situation, and 'without reliance' (無所依, referring to without basis), also according to the situation, there are 'self' (自, referring to one's own view), 'other' (他, referring to others' views), 'common' (共, referring to common views) dividing 'complete equality fault' (全等過, referring to the fault of being completely identical), think and measure according to reason.",
"Not separate.",
"Explanation:",
"The commentary says: Explaining the fourth fault. The article is divided into two parts. First, marking the chapter, then elaborating the method. This is the first part.",
"Saying that seeing impermanence and having material obstruction in a pot.",
"Explanation:",
"The commentary says: This is elaborating the method. 'Separate' means not belonging to each other. Saying that all dharmas are 'impermanent' (無常, referring to the impermanent nature of things, without eternal and unchanging properties) is to leave the 'permanent school' (常宗, referring to the school that advocates that things are permanent and unchanging). Seeing 'material obstruction' (質礙, referring to the obstruction of physical form) is to leave the 'unobstructed cause' (無礙因, referring to the cause without obstruction). Attributing 'impermanence' to 'material obstruction' conversely shows that 'unobstructed' belongs to the 'permanent school', so sound is 'unobstructed' and must be 'permanent'. Now it is only said that seeing it has 'impermanence', has 'material obstruction', not attributing 'impermanence' to 'having obstruction', it cannot explain the place of 'no school' (無宗, referring to without a school), the reason must be 'non-existent' (非有, referring to not existing), how can it conversely show that the place of 'unobstructed' must have its 'permanence'? Not letting 'permanence' and 'unobstructed' belong to each other, so it is a fault. 'Combine' is to first combine the 'unobstructed' on the sound, wanting to make 'unobstructed' and 'permanence' (常住, referring to eternal and unchanging) definitely follow it separately, is to first separate the 'permanence' on the sound, wanting to make 'no school', the reason must be non-existent, conversely showing that the place where 'unobstructed' arrives must have the meaning of 'permanence' following it. So the 'Logic Gate' says: Explaining the cause and what the school follows, the school does not exist without the cause, relying on the fifth inflection to show the metaphor, knowing the cause through 'combine'. This meaning is from relying on the fifth inflection, being born from what is made, so it is impermanent, and also from and relying on explaining like the correct metaphor, to show the metaphor."
]
}
因合方明。準此即是雙離宗因。合應返此。
倒離者。
述曰。下解第五過。文有二。如前科。此初也。
謂如說言諸質礙者皆是無常。
述曰。示法。宗因同喻。皆悉同前。異喻應言諸無常者。見彼質礙。即顯宗無。因定非有。返顯正因。除其不定及相違濫。返顯有因。宗必隨逐。此則顯彼宗因。今既倒云。諸有質礙。皆是無常。自以礙因。成非常宗。不簡因濫。返顯于常。此有二過。如正異辨。不離倒離。亦可有三。自他及共。無一分過。總計似異中。亦有五十四。如似同說。或減十二俱不遣中。或不開故。余細分別。亦準上知。
如是等似宗因喻言非正能立。
述曰。此解似中。大文第二結非真也。言如是者。即指法之詞。復言等者。顯有不盡。向辨三支。皆據中言。而有過故。未明缺減。非在言申分分單雙。此等諸過。故以等等。宗因喻三。皆有不盡。故牒前三總結非也。若爾何不言如是似宗因喻等。而言如是等似宗因喻耶。答喻下言等。恐有離前似宗因喻。別有似支。不唯於此三支辨過。顯離此三。更無有別似立支故。於前等也。
複次為自開悟當知唯有現比二量。
述曰。上已明真似立。次下第三明二真量。是真能立所須具。故次明之。文分為四。一明立意。二明遮執。三辨量體。四明量果。或除伏難。此即初二與頌先後次第不同。如前已辨。問若名立具。應名能立。即是悟他。如何說言為自開悟。答此造論者。欲顯文約義繁故也。明此二量。親能自悟。隱悟他名。及能立
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"因的結合才能顯明。按照這個原則,這就是雙離宗因。應該返回到這個原則上來。",
"倒離:",
"述曰:下面解釋第五種過失。文分兩部分,如同之前的科判。這是第一部分。",
"比如,如果說『所有有質礙的事物都是無常的』。",
"述曰:這是在展示法、宗、因、同喻,都和之前一樣。異喻應該說『所有無常的事物,都能看到它們具有質礙』。這就顯示了宗是空的,因不是必然存在的。反過來顯示了正因,排除了不確定性和互相矛盾的錯誤。反過來顯示了有因,宗必然跟隨。這就能顯明宗和因的關係。現在既然顛倒過來說『所有有質礙的事物,都是無常的』,就是用質礙這個因,來成立非常這個宗,沒有區分因的錯誤,反過來顯明瞭常。這裡面有兩個過失,如同在正異中辨別一樣。不離倒離,也可以有三種,自、他、共。沒有一分過失。總計相似異品中,也有五十四種。如同相似同品所說。或者減少十二種,在都不排除的情況下,或者因為沒有展開。其餘的詳細分別,也可以參照上面來理解。",
"像這樣等等的相似宗因喻,都不能成為正確的能立。",
"述曰:這是在解釋相似中的第二大段,總結不是真實的。說『像這樣』,是指法。又說『等等』,顯示還有沒有說完的。之前辨別的三支,都是根據中間的情況來說的,因為有過失。還沒有說明缺少減少的情況,不是在語言上分開單獨或成雙成對。這些過失,所以用『等等』。宗、因、喻三者,都有沒有說完的,所以引用前面的三者來總結說不是正確的。如果這樣,為什麼不說『像這樣相似宗因喻等等』,而是說『像這樣等等相似宗因喻』呢?回答說,在喻下面說『等等』,是恐怕有離開前面相似宗因喻,另外有相似的支分。不只是在這三支中辨別過失。顯示離開這三支,再沒有別的相似的立宗支分了,所以在前面用『等等』。",
"再次,爲了自己開悟,應當知道只有現量和比量這兩種量。",
"述曰:上面已經說明了真實和相似的立宗。接下來第三部分說明兩種真實的量,是真實的能立所需要的工具,所以接下來說明它。文分為四個部分:一、說明立宗的意圖;二、遮止執著;三、辨別量的本體;四、說明量的結果。或者排除潛在的疑問。這就是第一部分,和頌的先後次序不同,如同之前已經辨別過的。問:如果叫做立宗的工具,應該叫做能立,就是爲了開悟他人。為什麼說爲了自己開悟呢?答:這是因為造論者想要顯示文字簡略而意義繁多。說明這兩種量,親自能夠自己開悟,隱藏了開悟他人的名稱,以及能立。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"The combination of Hetu (reason) is necessary for clear understanding. According to this principle, this is the 'double separated' Hetu. It should return to this principle.",
"Reversed Separation:",
"Commentary: The following explains the fifth fault. The text is divided into two parts, as in the previous section. This is the first part.",
"For example, if it is said that 'all things with material obstruction are impermanent'.",
"Commentary: This demonstrates Dharma (doctrine), proposition, reason, and similar example, all of which are the same as before. The dissimilar example should say, 'All impermanent things are seen to have material obstruction.' This shows that the proposition is empty, and the reason is not necessarily existent. Conversely, it reveals the correct reason, excluding uncertainty and contradictory errors. Conversely, it reveals the existent reason, where the proposition necessarily follows. This clarifies the relationship between the proposition and the reason. Now, since it is reversed to say, 'All things with material obstruction are impermanent,' it uses the reason of obstruction to establish the proposition of impermanence, without distinguishing the errors of the reason, and conversely reveals permanence. There are two faults here, as distinguished in the correct and dissimilar. Non-separation and reversed separation can also have three types: self, other, and common. There is not a single fault. In total, there are fifty-four types in similar dissimilar. As said in similar similar. Or reduce twelve types, in the case of not excluding any, or because it is not expanded. The remaining detailed distinctions can also be understood by referring to the above.",
"Such similar proposition, reason, and example are not correct means of establishment.",
"Commentary: This explains the second major section in 'similar', concluding that it is not genuine. Saying 'such' refers to Dharma. Saying 'etc.' shows that there is still more to be said. The three branches previously distinguished are all based on the middle situation, because there are faults. It has not yet been explained the situation of lacking and reducing, not separating singly or in pairs in language. These faults, therefore, use 'etc.' The proposition, reason, and example all have things that have not been said, so they cite the previous three to conclude that they are not correct. If so, why not say 'such similar proposition, reason, example, etc.,' but say 'such etc. similar proposition, reason, example'? The answer is that saying 'etc.' below the example is afraid that there are similar branches separate from the previous similar proposition, reason, and example. It is not only in these three branches that faults are distinguished. It shows that apart from these three branches, there are no other similar branches of establishment, so 'etc.' is used before.",
"Furthermore, for one's own enlightenment, it should be known that there are only two valid means of cognition: perception (Pratyaksha) and inference (Anumana).",
"Commentary: The above has already explained the true and similar establishment. The next, the third part, explains the two true means of cognition, which are the tools needed for true establishment, so it explains them next. The text is divided into four parts: 1. Explaining the intention of establishment; 2. Obstructing attachment; 3. Distinguishing the essence of the means of cognition; 4. Explaining the result of the means of cognition. Or excluding potential doubts. This is the first part, and the order of the verses is different, as has been distinguished before. Question: If it is called the tool of establishment, it should be called the means of establishment, which is to enlighten others. Why say for one's own enlightenment? Answer: This is because the author wants to show that the text is concise and the meaning is abundant. Explaining these two means of cognition, one can personally enlighten oneself, hiding the name of enlightening others, and the means of establishment."
]
}
稱。次二立明顯亦他悟。疏亦能立。猶二燈炬互相影故理門論解二量已云。如是應知悟他比量。亦不離此得成能立。故知能立必藉於此。顯即悟他。明此二量親疏合說。通自他悟及以能立。此即兼明立量意訖。當知唯有現比二量者。明遮執也。唯言是遮。亦決定義。遮立教量。及譬喻等。決定有此現比二量。故言唯有。問古立有多。今何立二。答理門論云。由此能了自共相故。非離此二別有所量。爲了知彼。更立餘量。故依二相唯立二量。問陳那所造因明。意欲弘于本論解義。既相桙楯。何以能得順成。答古師從詮及義智開三量。以義詮從智。亦復開三。陳那已后。以智從理。唯開二量。若順古並詮。可開三量。廢詮從旨。古亦唯二。以聖教者。二量之具。或謂所𠗦。當知唯言但遮一向執。異二量外。別立至教及譬喻等。故不相違。廣此二量。如章具辨。有依於此唯二量文。遂立量云。似現比等。皆比量攝。如疏具述。有過不習。又傳立云。外道立宗現比量外有至教等。量云。非比極成。現所有量非現量攝。極成現量所不攝量所攝故。猶如比量。言非比簡二分相符。以佛法許比量是現所有。非現量攝。復欲取為同喻。即為顯因。具足三相。故言極成現量。簡不極成。以佛法許至教亦是現量攝故。言所有者。又簡自語相違。若直言極成現量非現量攝。既言極成現量。復非現量攝。故有相違。又若不言所有。不詮得至教量是現所有。然狹帶說。故云所有量。因中言極成簡隨一過。以大乘至教量。一分現量攝故。又量所攝。簡非量相符。以大乘許
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"稱。其次,建立『明顯』,也是爲了使他人領悟。疏中說,『能立』也同樣是爲了使他人領悟。就像兩盞燈互相輝映一樣。《理門論解》在解釋二量時已經說過:『由此可知,使他人領悟的比量,也離不開能立而得以成立。』所以知道,能立必定要依靠於此。『顯』就是使他人領悟。『明』,是指這兩種量,親疏結合起來說,貫通了自己領悟和使他人領悟,以及能立。這便是兼明瞭建立量式的意義完畢。應當知道只有現量和比量這兩種量,是爲了說明遮止執著。『唯』字是遮止,也是決定義。遮止了立教量,以及譬喻等。決定只有現量和比量這兩種量,所以說『唯有』。問:古人立有很多量,現在為何只立二量?答:《理門論》說:『由此能了知自相和共相的緣故,並非離開這二量之外,另有所量。』爲了了知彼,再建立其他的量。所以依據二相,隻立二量。問:陳那(約公元480-540年)所造的因明,意欲弘揚本論的解釋和意義,既然相互矛盾,如何能夠順成?答:古師從詮釋和義理、智慧,開立三量。以義理詮釋從智慧,也同樣開立三量。陳那以後,以智慧從理,只開立二量。如果順從古人並詮釋,可以開立三量。廢棄詮釋,從旨意來說,古人也只有二量。因為聖教,是二量的工具。或者說是所緣。應當知道『唯』字只是遮止一向的執著,在現量和比量之外,另立至教和譬喻等。所以不相違背。廣泛地闡述這二量,如各章節所詳細辨析的。有人依據這『唯二量』的文句,於是立量說:『似現量、似比量等,都屬於比量所攝。』如疏中詳細敘述的。有過失而不學習。又傳說立量說:『外道立宗,在現量、比量之外,有至教等。』量式說:『非比量所極成,現量所攝的所有量,不是現量所攝。』因為是比量所攝的緣故,猶如比量。說『非比量』,是爲了簡別二分相符。因為佛法允許比量是現量所有的,不是現量所攝。又想取為同喻,就成了顯因,具足三相。所以說『極成現量』,是爲了簡別不極成。因為大乘的至教量,一部分是現量所攝的緣故。又『量所攝』,是爲了簡別非量相符。因為大乘允許",
"English version",
"Called. Secondly, establishing 'Manifestation' is also for the purpose of enabling others to realize. The commentary states that 'Establishment' is also for the purpose of enabling others to realize. Just like two lamps reflecting each other. The *Nyayapravesa* commentary has already stated when explaining the two *pramanas* (means of knowledge): 'From this, it can be known that the inference (*anumana*) that enables others to realize is also inseparable from the establishment (*sadhana*) to be established.' Therefore, it is known that establishment must rely on this. 'Manifestation' is to enable others to realize. 'Clarity' refers to these two *pramanas*, spoken of in a close and distant manner, encompassing self-realization and enabling others to realize, as well as establishment. This is to explain the meaning of establishing *pramana* is complete. It should be known that only direct perception (*pratyaksha*) and inference (*anumana*) are the two *pramanas*, in order to explain the cessation of clinging. The word 'only' is a cessation and also a definite meaning. It ceases the establishment of scriptural authority (*agama*), as well as analogy (*upamana*), etc. It is determined that there are only these two *pramanas*: direct perception and inference, so it is said 'only'. Question: The ancients established many *pramanas*, why are only two established now? Answer: The *Nyayapravesa* says: 'Because from this, the self-characteristic (*svalaksana*) and the common characteristic (*samanya-laksana*) can be known, and there is nothing else to be measured apart from these two *pramanas*.' In order to know that, other *pramanas* are established. Therefore, based on the two characteristics, only two *pramanas* are established. Question: Dignaga's (c. 480-540 CE) *hetuvidya* (science of reasoning), intends to promote the explanation and meaning of the original treatise, since they contradict each other, how can they be successfully accomplished? Answer: Ancient teachers established three *pramanas* from explanation, meaning, and wisdom. Explanation and meaning from wisdom also establish three. After Dignaga, wisdom from reason only establishes two *pramanas*. If following the ancients and explaining, three *pramanas* can be established. Abandoning explanation, from the intention, the ancients also only had two *pramanas*. Because the sacred teachings are the tools of the two *pramanas*. Or it can be said to be the object. It should be known that the word 'only' only ceases the one-sided clinging, and establishes scriptural authority and analogy, etc., apart from direct perception and inference. Therefore, there is no contradiction. These two *pramanas* are widely explained, as detailed in each chapter. Some people rely on the sentence 'only two *pramanas*', and then establish the *pramana* saying: 'Pseudo-perception, pseudo-inference, etc., are all included in inference.' As detailed in the commentary. There is fault in not learning. It is also said that the *pramana* is established: 'The heretics establish the doctrine that, in addition to direct perception and inference, there is scriptural authority, etc.' The *pramana* says: 'What is not extremely established by inference, all that is included in direct perception, is not included in direct perception.' Because it is included in inference, like inference. Saying 'not inference' is to distinguish the two parts that are consistent. Because Buddhism allows inference to be all that is possessed by direct perception, not included in direct perception. Also wanting to take it as a similar example becomes a manifest reason, possessing the three characteristics. Therefore, saying 'extremely established direct perception' is to distinguish what is not extremely established. Because the scriptural authority of Mahayana, a part is included in direct perception. Also 'included in *pramana*' is to distinguish the non-*pramana* consistent. Because Mahayana allows"
]
}
非量現量所有非現量攝。又成立離比量外。更有喻等量者。以大乘許譬喻量等。非現量攝。故立量云。非現極成比所有量。非比量攝。極成比量所不攝量所攝故如現量。簡過如前。陳那菩薩。與作決定相違。初立現量之外。無別至教。取其一分。量云非現極成。比所有一分。不極成量。是現量攝。比量所不攝量所攝故。如現量。言一分者。取定心緣教。即現量攝。不取散心。散心緣教。是比量攝。后簡準此。又成離比量外無義準等。量云非比極成現所有一分不極成量是比量攝。現量所不攝量所攝故。如比量。簡過如前。又助難云。準外道量。能別之中。犯他一分不極成過。以至教許有餘不立故。是故陳那。依此二相。唯立二量。其二相體。今略明之。一切諸法。各附己體。所有別理。如於色等上苦無常等。不由安立本有自性。即名自相。不同經中所說自相。以分別心。假立一法。貫通諸法。如縷貫華。由智安立。方說為有。此名共相。與經中共相體別。如佛地論第六廣說。有說自相。如火熱相等。名為自相。若為名言所詮顯者。此名共相。此釋不然。違佛地論。若如火熱等。方名自相者。定心緣火。不得彼熱應名緣共。及定心緣教所詮之理。亦為言所詮。亦應名共相。若爾定心應名比量。不緣自相故。然外道等。計一切言。得法自相。如名召火。但取於火明。得火之自相。佛法名言但得共相。彼即難云。若得共相。喚火之時。應得於水。大乘解云。一切名言。有遮有表。言火遮非火。非得火自相。而得火來者。名言有表。故得於火。有助外
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"非量(非有效認知)包含現量(直接認知),所有非現量都被非量所包含。此外,爲了確立除了比量(推論認知)之外,還有譬喻等量(認知方式),因為大乘佛教承認譬喻量等。這些並非現量所能涵蓋。因此,可以建立論式:『非現量、被已確立的比量所包含的所有量,不是比量所包含的』,『因為它們被比量所不包含的量所包含,如同現量一樣』。避免過失的方式與之前相同。陳那菩薩(約480-540)的觀點與此決定相違背,他最初認為在現量之外,沒有其他的至教量(權威教證)。現在取他觀點的一部分,建立論式:『非現量、被已確立的比量所包含的一部分,不是已確立的量,而是現量所包含的』,『因為它被比量所不包含的量所包含,如同現量一樣』。這裡說的一部分,指的是以專注的心緣取教證,這屬於現量。不包括散亂的心,散亂的心緣取教證,屬於比量。後面的簡別可以參照這個例子。此外,爲了確立除了比量之外,沒有義準量(從意義推斷的認知方式)等,可以建立論式:『非比量、被已確立的現量所包含的一部分,不是已確立的量,而是比量所包含的』,『因為它被現量所不包含的量所包含,如同比量一樣』。避免過失的方式與之前相同。此外,還可以用輔助性的詰難說:『按照外道的量,在能區分的事物中,會犯他方一部分未確立的過失』,『因為至教允許有剩餘部分未被確立』。因此,陳那菩薩依據這兩種相,只確立了兩種量。現在簡要說明這兩種相的體性。一切諸法,各自附著于自身的體性,所有特殊的道理,例如在色等事物上的苦、無常等,不是通過人為安立而產生的,而是本有的自性,這就叫做自相。這與經中所說的自相不同,經中的自相是通過分別心,假立一個法,貫通諸法,如同用線串聯花朵一樣,通過智慧安立,才說它是存在的,這叫做共相。這與經中的共相體性不同,如同《佛地論》第六卷中廣泛說明的那樣。有人說自相,例如火的熱相等,叫做自相。如果被名言所詮釋顯現的,就叫做共相。這種解釋是不正確的,與《佛地論》相違背。如果像火的熱相等,才叫做自相,那麼專注的心緣取火,卻不能得到火的熱,應該叫做緣取共相。以及專注的心緣取教證所詮釋的道理,也是被言語所詮釋的,也應該叫做共相。如果是這樣,那麼專注的心應該叫做比量,因為它沒有緣取自相。然而外道等,認為一切言語,都能得到法的自相,例如稱呼火,只是取火的光明,就能得到火的自相。佛法的名言只能得到共相。他們就詰難說:『如果得到共相,那麼在呼喚火的時候,應該得到水』。大乘佛教解釋說:『一切名言,有遮詮和表詮兩種作用。說火是遮詮非火,不是得到火的自相,而是得到火的來處,名言有表詮的作用,所以得到的是火』。還有輔助外道的觀點。",
"English version",
"Non- ಪ್ರಮಾಣ (non-valid cognition) encompasses ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ (direct perception), and all non-ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ are included in non-ಪ್ರಮಾಣ. Furthermore, to establish that there are other ಪ್ರಮಾಣs (means of valid cognition) besides ಅನುಮಾನ (inference), such as ಉಪಮಾನ (analogy), because Mahayana Buddhism accepts ಪ್ರಮಾಣs like ಉಪಮಾನ. These cannot be encompassed by ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ. Therefore, one can establish the argument: 'That which is non-ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ, and all ಪ್ರಮಾಣs included by established ಅನುಮಾನ, are not included by ಅನುಮಾನ', 'because they are included by ಪ್ರಮಾಣs not included by ಅನುಮಾನ, just like ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ'. The method of avoiding fallacies is the same as before. Dignāga (c. 480-540 CE)'s view contradicts this determination; he initially held that there is no other ಆಗಮ (scriptural authority) besides ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ. Now, taking a part of his view, we establish the argument: 'That which is non-ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ, and a part included by established ಅನುಮಾನ, is not an established ಪ್ರಮಾಣ, but is included by ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ', 'because it is included by ಪ್ರಮಾಣs not included by ಅನುಮಾನ, just like ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ'. Here, 'a part' refers to focusing the mind on scripture, which belongs to ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ. It does not include a distracted mind; a distracted mind focusing on scripture belongs to ಅನುಮಾನ. Later distinctions can refer to this example. Furthermore, to establish that there are no ಅರ್ಥಾಪತ್ತಿ (implication) etc. besides ಅನುಮಾನ, one can establish the argument: 'That which is non-ಅನುಮಾನ, and a part included by established ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ, is not an established ಪ್ರಮಾಣ, but is included by ಅನುಮಾನ', 'because it is included by ಪ್ರಮಾಣs not included by ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷ, just like ಅನುಮಾನ'. The method of avoiding fallacies is the same as before. Furthermore, one can use an auxiliary objection: 'According to the ಪ್ರಮಾಣs of non-Buddhists, in the things that can be distinguished, one will commit the fallacy of the other party's part being unestablished', 'because ಆಗಮ allows for the remaining part to be unestablished'. Therefore, Dignāga established only two ಪ್ರಮಾಣs based on these two characteristics. Now, we will briefly explain the nature of these two characteristics. All Dharmas (phenomena) each adhere to their own nature, and all special principles, such as suffering and impermanence on form etc., are not produced through artificial establishment, but are inherent natures, which are called Svalakṣaṇa (own-characteristic). This is different from the Svalakṣaṇa spoken of in the scriptures, where Svalakṣaṇa is established through conceptual mind, falsely establishing a Dharma, connecting all Dharmas, just like stringing flowers with a thread, established through wisdom, and then said to exist, which is called Sāmānyalakṣaṇa (universal-characteristic). This is different from the nature of Sāmānyalakṣaṇa in the scriptures, as extensively explained in the sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Some say that Svalakṣaṇa, such as the heat of fire etc., is called Svalakṣaṇa. If it is manifested by words, it is called Sāmānyalakṣaṇa. This explanation is incorrect and contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. If only things like the heat of fire etc. are called Svalakṣaṇa, then a focused mind focusing on fire, but not obtaining the heat of the fire, should be called focusing on Sāmānyalakṣaṇa. And the principle explained by scripture that a focused mind focuses on is also explained by words, and should also be called Sāmānyalakṣaṇa. If that is the case, then a focused mind should be called ಅನುಮಾನ, because it does not focus on Svalakṣaṇa. However, non-Buddhists etc. believe that all words can obtain the Svalakṣaṇa of Dharma, for example, calling fire, only taking the brightness of fire, can obtain the Svalakṣaṇa of fire. Buddhist words can only obtain Sāmānyalakṣaṇa. They then object: 'If Sāmānyalakṣaṇa is obtained, then when calling fire, one should obtain water'. Mahayana Buddhism explains: 'All words have two functions: exclusion and expression. Saying fire excludes non-fire, it does not obtain the Svalakṣaṇa of fire, but obtains the origin of fire, words have the function of expression, so what is obtained is fire'. There are also auxiliary non-Buddhist views."
]
}
難云。汝若言得火自相。說及心緣。應燒心口。以得自相故。若他反難云。汝定心緣火。既得自相。應亦燒心。此既不燒。假智及詮。雖得自相。而不被燒。如何難我。即有解云。境有離合殊。緣合境者被燒。定心離取。故不被燒。由此前難。但應難他名言。名言依語表。語表即依身。是閤中知。若得自相。即合被燒。今問。此難為難因明自相。為經中自相耶。答云。依因明自相。若爾此難並不應理。因明自相。非要如火熱為自相。如何難彼令火燒心等。設縱依經自共相難。即不得言假智及詮得自相。救彼假智詮。論自誠說得共相故。若據外宗。彼非假智。得自相故。可依此智以難於彼。彼返難曰。定心得自相。應定心被燒。亦不得以離合取。救誰言定心。唯離取境。瑜伽說通離合取故。不許定中起五識者。可不通離合。既許起五識意與彼俱。故通離合。又若離取。即不被燒。亦應離取不得自相。火以熱觸為自相故。可通彼難云。心細色粗。礙不礙別。雖得自相。亦不彼燒。且如上界色。尚不許地獄粗火所燒。恐心色殊。寧得被燒。由此第八及身識等。雖取火自相。而皆不被燒故。不得以離合釋難。今解。且自共相。外道未必皆有此二。佛法之中。有此義故。彼外道等。但言火等。即得火體。火體為自相。而不立共相。不須分別經之與論。故總難之。若如說火得火自相。即應燒口。此據言火在於口中。言得自相。自相亦不離口中。故應燒口。或可抑難。非正難彼合口被燒。口是發語之緣。非正語故。正難於彼聲應被燒。同身扶塵俱有等故。
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"難陀(Nanda,人名)問道:『如果像你說的,火具有其自身固有的自性(自相,svalakshana,事物獨一無二的性質),那麼當人們談論到火,並且心中緣起火的形象時,應該燒灼他們的嘴和心,因為已經獲得了火的自性。』",
"對方反駁說:『你斷定心中緣起火的形象,就獲得了火的自性,那麼也應該燒灼你的心。既然心沒有被燒灼,即使憑藉虛假的智慧和言語表達,獲得了火的自性,也不會被燒灼。你憑什麼來反駁我呢?』",
"對此,可以解釋說:『境(vishaya,對像)有離合的差別,緣合於境的就會被燒灼,而定心(samadhi-citta,專注的心)是遠離取著的,所以不會被燒灼。』因此,之前的反駁,應該針對對方的名言(nama-vacana,語言表達)。名言依賴於語言的表達,語言的表達又依賴於身體,這是結合中的認知。如果獲得了火的自性,就應該被燒灼。現在的問題是,這個反駁是針對因明(hetu-vidya,因明學,邏輯學)中的自性,還是經文(sutra,佛經)中的自性呢?",
"回答說:『是依據因明中的自性。』如果是這樣,這個反駁根本不合理。因明中的自性,並非一定要像火的熱性那樣才是自性。怎麼能用火燒心等來反駁對方呢?假設是依據經文中的自共相(sva-samanya-lakshana,自相和共相)來反駁,就不能說憑藉虛假的智慧和言語表達獲得了自性,因為他們(指對方)的虛假智慧和言語表達,按照他們的理論,只能獲得共相(samanya-lakshana,事物普遍的性質)。如果按照外道(tirthika,佛教以外的宗教)的觀點,他們的智慧並非虛假,因為他們認為獲得了自性,所以可以用這種智慧來反駁他們。",
"對方反駁說:『斷定心中緣起火的形象,就獲得了火的自性,那麼斷定的心應該被燒灼。』也不能用離合來解釋,誰說斷定的心只是遠離取著境呢?《瑜伽師地論》(Yogacarabhumi-sastra)中說,通達離合取著。如果不允許禪定中生起五識(panca-vijnana,眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識),或許可以不通達離合。既然允許生起五識,意(manas,意識)與它們同時存在,所以是通達離合的。而且,如果遠離取著,就不會被燒灼,也應該遠離取著而無法獲得自性,因為火以熱觸為自性。",
"可以這樣通融地反駁:『心是微細的,色(rupa,物質)是粗糙的,有障礙和無障礙是有區別的。即使獲得了火的自性,也不會被火燒灼。』比如上界(rupa-dhatu,色界)的色,尚且不允許被地獄(kama-dhatu,欲界)的粗火所燒灼,何況心和色不同,怎麼會被燒灼呢?因此,第八識(alaya-vijnana,阿賴耶識)和身識(kaya-vijnana,身識)等,雖然取著了火的自性,但都不會被燒灼。所以不能用離合來解釋這個難題。",
"現在的解釋是:自相和共相,外道未必都有這兩種概念。佛法(Buddha-dharma,佛教)中才有這種說法。那些外道,只是說火等,就獲得了火的本體,火的本體就是自性,而不建立共相。不需要區分經文和論典,所以可以總括地反駁他們。如果像他們所說,說出火就獲得了火的自性,那麼就應該燒灼嘴,因為說火這個行為是在嘴裡進行的,說出的自性也不離開嘴。或者可以抑制這種反駁,不應該直接反駁他們說嘴被燒灼,因為嘴只是發出語言的工具,並非真正的語言。應該直接反駁他們說聲音應該被燒灼,因為它和身體的扶塵根(bhuta-rupa,四大所造的色)一樣,都是同時存在的。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Nanda asked: 'If, as you say, fire possesses its own inherent self-nature (svalakshana, the unique characteristic of a thing), then when people talk about fire and the image of fire arises in their minds, their mouths and hearts should be burned, because they have obtained the self-nature of fire.'",
"The other party retorted: 'You assert that by conceiving the image of fire in your mind, you obtain the self-nature of fire, so your heart should also be burned. Since the heart is not burned, even if you obtain the self-nature of fire through false wisdom and expression, you will not be burned. How can you refute me?'",
"To this, it can be explained: 'There is a difference between separation and combination of objects (vishaya). Those who combine with the object will be burned, while the concentrated mind (samadhi-citta) is detached from grasping, so it will not be burned.' Therefore, the previous refutation should be directed at the other party's verbal expression (nama-vacana). Verbal expression relies on linguistic expression, and linguistic expression relies on the body, which is cognition in combination. If the self-nature of fire is obtained, it should be burned. The question now is whether this refutation is directed at the self-nature in Hetu-vidya (the science of logic) or the self-nature in the sutras (Buddha's teachings)?'",
"The answer is: 'It is based on the self-nature in Hetu-vidya.' If so, this refutation is not reasonable at all. The self-nature in Hetu-vidya does not necessarily have to be like the heat of fire to be considered self-nature. How can you refute the other party by saying that fire burns the heart, etc.? Assuming that the refutation is based on the self-nature and common nature (sva-samanya-lakshana) in the sutras, then it cannot be said that the self-nature is obtained through false wisdom and expression, because their (referring to the other party) false wisdom and expression, according to their theory, can only obtain the common nature (samanya-lakshana). If according to the view of the outsiders (tirthika, non-Buddhists), their wisdom is not false, because they believe they have obtained the self-nature, so this wisdom can be used to refute them.",
"The other party retorted: 'Asserting that the image of fire arises in the mind, and thus obtaining the self-nature of fire, then the asserting mind should be burned.' It cannot be explained by separation and combination either. Who says that the asserting mind is only detached from grasping objects? The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that it understands separation and combination of grasping. If it is not allowed for the five consciousnesses (panca-vijnana, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) to arise in meditation, then perhaps it cannot understand separation and combination. Since it is allowed for the five consciousnesses to arise, and the mind (manas, consciousness) exists simultaneously with them, it understands separation and combination. Moreover, if it is detached from grasping, it will not be burned, and it should also be detached from grasping and unable to obtain the self-nature, because fire takes heat as its self-nature.",
"It can be reconciled by retorting: 'The mind is subtle, and matter (rupa) is coarse. There is a difference between obstruction and non-obstruction. Even if the self-nature of fire is obtained, it will not be burned by fire.' For example, the matter of the upper realm (rupa-dhatu, the realm of form) is not allowed to be burned by the coarse fire of the lower realm (kama-dhatu, the realm of desire), let alone that the mind and matter are different, how can it be burned? Therefore, the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) and the body consciousness (kaya-vijnana, body consciousness), etc., although they grasp the self-nature of fire, they will not be burned. So, this difficulty cannot be explained by separation and combination.",
"The current explanation is that outsiders may not have both the concepts of self-nature and common nature. Only in Buddhism (Buddha-dharma) is there such a saying. Those outsiders only say fire, etc., and obtain the essence of fire, which is the self-nature, and do not establish a common nature. There is no need to distinguish between sutras and treatises, so they can be refuted in general. If, as they say, speaking of fire obtains the self-nature of fire, then the mouth should be burned, because the act of speaking of fire takes place in the mouth, and the self-nature spoken of does not leave the mouth. Or, this refutation can be suppressed. They should not be directly refuted by saying that the mouth is burned, because the mouth is only a tool for uttering language, not the real language. They should be directly refuted by saying that the sound should be burned, because it is the same as the physical sense organs (bhuta-rupa, the material elements) of the body, which exist simultaneously."
]
}
或可難彼尋名取境之心。亦得自相。得自相者。心應覺熱。若他返難。今尋名緣火之心。亦應覺熱者。自是被屈。非預我宗。尋名假智。不得彼火之自相故。若覺熱觸。即非假智。稱境知故。設定心中尋名緣火等。亦是假智。不同比量。假立一法。貫在余法。名得自相。各附體故。名得自相。是現量收。不得熱等相。故假智攝。知假想定變水火等。身雖在中。而無燒濕等用。如上定心。緣地獄火。雖是現量。所帶相分。亦無熱濕等用。問若爾實變水火地等時。心覺有熱濕等不合。雖覺暖濕等。而不分別故。得火等自相。問因明自共相。有體無體耶。答現量心緣所得自相。可取有體。亦緣有體法。冥自體故。若比量緣有法及法。自共二種。緣因三相。此之共相。全無其體。設定心緣。因彼名言行解緣者。即是假智。依共相轉。然不計名。與所詮義。定相屬著。故云得自相然是假。智緣。得名為共相。作行解故。此亦共相。但于諸法。增益相狀故是無體。同名句詮所依共相。若諸現量所緣自相。即不帶名言。冥證法體。彼即有法即法性故。若佛心等。緣比量共相等。亦無有體。許體遍緣。故亦無失。問瑜伽云。聞謂比量。即緣名等。何得云現量。答彼約散心未自在位。定自在位。即許現緣。有說共相。亦是有體假。此定不然。以何為體。若有體者。百法何收。答言。法同分攝。許不相應。是有體假。此亦不然。誰言不相應。是有體假。瑜伽五十二云。緣去來生滅等。是緣無識。若許有體。不證緣無。問空無我等。此之共相。為有體無。有言有體
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"或可使對方難以尋覓以名取境之心。亦可獲得自相。若獲得自相,心應感到熱。若對方反駁說:『現在尋覓以名緣火之心,也應感到熱』,這便是被對方駁倒,不屬於我宗的觀點。因為尋名只是假智,無法獲得彼火的自相。如果覺到熱觸,那就不是假智,而是稱境知。設定心中尋名緣火等,也是假智,不同於比量。假立一種法,貫穿在其他法中,名為獲得自相。各自依附於自體,名為獲得自相,這是現量所攝。因為無法獲得熱等相,所以屬於假智所攝。知曉假想定變出的水火等,身體雖然在其中,卻沒有燒灼或潮濕等作用。如同上述定心,緣于地獄之火,雖然是現量,但所帶的相分,也沒有熱或濕等作用。",
"問:如果真實變出水火地等時,心覺有熱濕等,這不合理啊?答:雖然覺到暖濕等,但不分別,所以能獲得火等的自相。",
"問:因明中的自共相,是有體還是無體呢?答:現量心緣所得的自相,可以取有體,也緣有體法,冥合自體。若比量緣有法及法,自共二種,緣因三相,此之共相,全無有體。設定心緣,因彼名言行解緣者,即是假智,依共相轉,然不計名,與所詮義,定相屬著,故云得自相然是假。智緣。得名為共相,作行解故。此亦共相。但于諸法,增益相狀故是無體。同名句詮所依共相。若諸現量所緣自相,即不帶名言,冥證法體,彼即有法即法性故。若佛心等,緣比量共相等,亦無有體。許體遍緣,故亦無失。問:瑜伽說,聞謂比量,即緣名等,何得云現量?答:彼約散心未自在位。定自在位,即許現緣。有說共相,亦是有體假。此定不然,以何為體?若有體者,百法何收?答言:法同分攝。許不相應,是有體假。此亦不然,誰言不相應,是有體假?瑜伽五十二云:緣去來生滅等,是緣無識。若許有體,不證緣無。問:空無我等,此之共相,為有體無?有言有體。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"It may be difficult for the opponent to seek the mind that grasps objects through names. One can also attain the Svalakshana (self-characteristic). If one attains the Svalakshana, the mind should feel heat. If the opponent refutes, saying, 'Now, seeking the mind that relates to fire through names, it should also feel heat,' then they have been refuted and this does not belong to our doctrine. Because seeking names is merely conceptual knowledge (假智, jiǎ zhì), it cannot attain the Svalakshana of that fire. If one feels the touch of heat, then it is not conceptual knowledge, but rather knowledge that corresponds to the object. Establishing in the mind the seeking of names related to fire, etc., is also conceptual knowledge, different from inference (比量, bǐ liàng). Falsely establishing one dharma (法, dharma) that pervades other dharmas is called attaining the Svalakshana. Each relying on its own entity is called attaining the Svalakshana, which is included in direct perception (現量, xiàn liàng). Because it cannot attain the characteristics of heat, etc., it is included in conceptual knowledge. Knowing that water, fire, etc., are transformed by false samadhi (假想定, jiǎ xiǎng dìng), although the body is in it, there is no burning or dampness. Like the above samadhi mind, relating to the fire of the lower realm, although it is direct perception, the image-component (相分, xiàng fēn) it carries also has no heat or dampness.",
"Question: If one truly transforms water, fire, earth, etc., why is it unreasonable that the mind feels heat, dampness, etc.? Answer: Although one feels warmth, dampness, etc., one does not discriminate, so one can attain the Svalakshana of fire, etc.",
"Question: In Hetuvidya (因明, yīnmíng), are the Svalakshana and Samanyalakshana (共相, gòng xiàng) substantial or insubstantial? Answer: The Svalakshana attained by the direct perception mind can be taken as substantial, and it also relates to substantial dharmas, merging with its own entity. If inference relates to the subject (有法, yǒu fǎ) and the dharma, both Svalakshana and Samanyalakshana, and relates to the three aspects of the reason (因, yīn), then this Samanyalakshana is completely insubstantial. Establishing in the mind, relating to the verbal expressions and understanding based on them, is conceptual knowledge, which operates based on the Samanyalakshana, but does not fixate on the name and the meaning it signifies as being inherently connected. Therefore, it is said to attain the Svalakshana, but it is conceptual knowledge. Attaining the name is the Samanyalakshana, which creates understanding. This is also the Samanyalakshana, but it adds characteristics to all dharmas, so it is insubstantial, like the Samanyalakshana on which names and sentences rely. If the Svalakshana that all direct perceptions relate to does not carry verbal expressions, but directly realizes the entity of the dharma, then that is the substantial dharma, which is the nature of the dharma. If the mind of the Buddha, etc., relates to the Samanyalakshana of inference, etc., it is also insubstantial. Allowing the entity to pervade all relations, there is no fault. Question: The Yoga says that hearing is inference, which relates to names, etc., so how can it be said to be direct perception? Answer: That refers to the scattered mind that is not yet in a state of freedom. In the state of samadhi freedom, it is allowed to be direct perception. Some say that the Samanyalakshana is also a substantial fiction. This is definitely not the case. What would be its entity? If it were substantial, where would it be categorized in the Hundred Dharmas? Answer: It is included in the category of dharmas that are similar. Allowing non-correspondence is a substantial fiction. This is also not the case. Who says that non-correspondence is a substantial fiction? Yoga Fifty-Two says that relating to past, future, arising, and ceasing, etc., is relating to unconsciousness. If it is allowed to be substantial, it does not prove the absence of relation. Question: Are emptiness (空, kōng), non-self (無我, wú wǒ), etc., substantial or insubstantial? Some say they are substantial."
]
}
。即此色等非我我所。名空無我等。故此非無。故成唯識云。非異非不異。如無常等性。又云。若無體者。如何與行非一異耶。今謂不爾。若言即此色等非我我所。名空無我。故說非無。即應與色等。是一而非異。如何非一異。又違五十二五證緣無識。一緣無我觀智。二緣飲食。飲食即香等。離色香等。都無所有。三耶見緣無。四又諸行中無常無恒。不變共相觀。識非不緣。此五緣去來生滅等。既引證緣無。明知此無體。且止傍論。
此中現量謂無分別。
述曰。下辨體有二。初辨現量體。后明比量體。辨現量中。文復分四。一簡彰。二正辨。三釋義。四顯名。此即初二。言此中者。是簡持義。向標二量。簡去比量。持彰現量。故曰此中。言現量者。即正所持欲明之量。謂無分別者。第二正辨。言現量者。謂無分別。問以何智緣何境。離何分別。
若有正智於色等境。
述曰。第三釋義。文復分三。初簡邪。二定境。三所離。此初二也。若有正智簡彼邪智。謂如翳目見於毛輪第二月等。雖離名種等。所有分別。而非現量。故雜集云。現量者。自正明瞭無迷亂義。此中正智。即彼無迷亂。離旋火輪。於色等義者。此定境也。言色等者。等取香等。義謂境義。離諸映障。即當雜集明瞭。雖文不顯。義必如是。不爾。簡略過失不盡。如智雖正。亦無分別。緣彼障境。應名現量故。
離名種等所有分別。
述曰。此所離也。謂有於前色等境上。雖無映障。若有名種等諸分別。亦非現量。故須離此名言分別。種
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:\n\n。即此色等(組成物質的元素等)並非『我』或『我所擁有』。這被稱為『空』、『無我』等。因此,說它『無』是不對的。所以《成唯識論》說:『非異非不異,如無常等性。』又說:『若無體者,如何與行(事物)非一異耶?』現在我認為不是這樣。如果說『即此色等(組成物質的元素等)並非我或我所擁有,這被稱為空、無我』,因此說它『非無』,那麼就應該與色等(組成物質的元素等)是『一』而非『異』。如何能說『非一異』呢?又違背了五十二個和五個論證緣起無識的觀點。一、緣無我觀智。二、緣飲食。飲食即香等(氣味等)。離開色香等(組成物質的元素等、氣味等),就什麼都沒有了。三、邪見緣無。四、又在諸行(事物)中觀察無常、無恒、不變的共相,識並非不緣。這五個緣於過去、未來、生滅等。既然引用論證緣起『無』,就明確知道這是沒有實體的。且先停止旁論。\n\n 此中現量(直接感知)謂無分別。\n\n 述曰:下面辨析『體』的有無,分為兩部分。首先辨析現量(直接感知)的『體』,然後闡明比量(推論)的『體』。在辨析現量(直接感知)中,又分為四個部分。一、簡要說明。二、正式辨析。三、解釋含義。四、顯示名稱。這裡是前兩個部分。『此中』,是簡別和持取的意思。前面標出二量(兩種認知方式),簡別去除比量(推論),持取彰顯現量(直接感知),所以說『此中』。『現量』,就是正式持取想要闡明的量(認知方式)。『謂無分別者』,是第二部分正式辨析。『現量(直接感知)』,就是指沒有分別。問:用什麼智慧緣什麼境界?離開什麼分別?\n\n 若有正智於色等境。\n\n 述曰:第三部分解釋含義,又分為三個部分。一、簡別邪智。二、確定境界。三、所要離開的。這裡是前兩個部分。『若有正智』,簡別那些邪智,比如眼睛有翳的人看到毛輪、第二個月亮等。雖然離開了名稱、種類等所有的分別,但不是現量(直接感知)。所以《雜集論》說:『現量(直接感知),是自身正確、明瞭、沒有迷惑的意思。』這裡說的『正智』,就是指沒有迷惑,遠離旋轉的火輪。『於色等義者』,這是確定境界。『色等』,包括香等(氣味等)。『義』是指境界的意義。離開各種遮蔽,就是《雜集論》中說的『明瞭』。雖然文字沒有明確說明,但意思一定是這樣。否則,簡略的過失就不徹底。比如智慧雖然正確,也沒有分別,但緣于那些被遮蔽的境界,也應該被稱為現量(直接感知)了。\n\n 離名種等所有分別。\n\n 述曰:這是所要離開的。指在前面的色等(組成物質的元素等)境界上,雖然沒有遮蔽,但如果有名詞、種類等各種分別,也不是現量(直接感知)。所以必須離開這些名言分別,種類",
"English version:\n\n. That is, these *rupa* (material elements, etc.) are not 'I' or 'what belongs to me'. This is called 'emptiness', 'non-self', etc. Therefore, it is incorrect to say it is 'non-existent'. Hence, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states: 'Neither different nor not different, like impermanence and other characteristics.' It also says: 'If there is no substance, how can it be neither identical nor different from actions (phenomena)?' Now, I say it is not so. If it is said, 'These *rupa* (material elements, etc.) are not 'I' or 'what belongs to me', this is called emptiness, non-self,' therefore it is said to be 'not non-existent,' then it should be 'one' with *rupa* (material elements, etc.) and not 'different.' How can it be 'neither identical nor different'? It also contradicts the fifty-two and five arguments for the absence of consciousness in dependent origination. First, the wisdom of contemplating non-self. Second, dependent on food. Food is *gandha* (smell, etc.). Apart from *rupa*, *gandha* (material elements, smell, etc.), there is nothing at all. Third, wrong views are dependent on non-existence. Fourth, in all *samskaras* (phenomena), the contemplation of impermanence, non-constancy, and unchanging common characteristics, consciousness is not independent. These five are dependent on past, future, arising, and ceasing, etc. Since it is cited as evidence for the dependence on 'non-existence,' it is clear that this has no substance. Let us stop the digression.\n\n Here, *pratyaksa* (direct perception) means non-discrimination.\n\n Commentary: Below, the existence or non-existence of 'substance' is analyzed in two parts. First, the 'substance' of *pratyaksa* (direct perception) is analyzed, and then the 'substance' of *anumana* (inference) is explained. In the analysis of *pratyaksa* (direct perception), there are four parts. First, a brief explanation. Second, a formal analysis. Third, an explanation of meaning. Fourth, a display of names. This is the first two parts. 'Here' means to distinguish and hold. The two *pramanas* (means of knowledge) were marked earlier, distinguishing and removing *anumana* (inference), holding and highlighting *pratyaksa* (direct perception), so it is said 'here.' '*Pratyaksa*' is the *pramana* (means of knowledge) that is formally held and wants to be explained. 'Means non-discrimination' is the second part of the formal analysis. '*Pratyaksa*' means without discrimination. Question: With what wisdom does it cognize what realm? What discriminations does it leave behind?\n\n If there is correct wisdom regarding *rupa* (material elements, etc.) realms.\n\n Commentary: The third part explains the meaning, and is divided into three parts. First, distinguishing wrong wisdom. Second, determining the realm. Third, what needs to be left behind. Here are the first two parts. 'If there is correct wisdom' distinguishes those wrong wisdoms, such as a person with cataracts seeing hair-wheels, a second moon, etc. Although it leaves behind all discriminations of names, kinds, etc., it is not *pratyaksa* (direct perception). Therefore, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says: '*Pratyaksa* (direct perception) is the meaning of being correct, clear, and without delusion.' The 'correct wisdom' here refers to being without delusion, away from rotating fire wheels. 'Regarding *rupa* (material elements, etc.) meaning' is the determination of the realm. '*Rupa* (material elements, etc.)' includes *gandha* (smell, etc.). 'Meaning' refers to the meaning of the realm. Leaving behind all obscurations is what the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* calls 'clear.' Although the text does not explicitly state it, the meaning must be so. Otherwise, the fault of brevity would not be complete. For example, even if wisdom is correct and without discrimination, but is dependent on those obscured realms, it should also be called *pratyaksa* (direct perception).\n\n Leaving behind all discriminations such as names, kinds, etc.\n\n Commentary: This is what needs to be left behind. It refers to the fact that on the aforementioned *rupa* (material elements, etc.) realms, even if there are no obscurations, if there are various discriminations such as nouns, kinds, etc., it is not *pratyaksa* (direct perception). Therefore, these verbal discriminations, kinds, must be left behind."
]
}
類分別。等取諸門分別。故理門論云。遠離一切種類名言。假立無異諸門分別。言種類者。即勝論師。大有同異。及數論師。所有三德等名言。即目短為長等。皆非稱實。名為假立。依共相轉。名為無異。諸門者。二十三諦。及六句等。或離一切種類名言。名言非一。故名種類。即緣一切名言所詮定相計屬。依此名言假立一法。貫通諸法。名為無異。遍宗定有。異遍無等。名為諸門。此即簡盡。若唯簡外道。及假名言。不簡比量心之所緣。過亦不盡。故須離此所有分別。方為現量。若一往言。無二或三。所有分別。有太寬失。非彼二三。全非現量。準七攝三。意地唯除無分別智。餘位隨應。恒有破故。隨所應離。講者敘之。然離分別。略有四類。一五識身。二五俱意。三諸自證。四諸定心。此言於色等。即是五識。故理門論次引頌云。
有法非一相 根非一切行 唯內證離言 是色根境界
次言意地亦有離諸分別。準證行轉。又于貪等諸自證分。諸修定者。離教分別。皆是現量。問此入正理。為同於彼具明四類。為但五識。答有二解。一云同彼。於色等境。且明五識。以相顯故。此偏說之。彼論廣明。故具說四。二云具攝言也。等義不唯五境。彼之三種。亦離名種等所有分別。此略總合。彼廣別說。問別明於五。五根非一。各現取境。可名現現別轉。餘三如何名現別轉。答各附體緣。不貫多法。名為別轉。文同理門。義何妨別。若依初釋。即無此妨。問言修定者。離教分別。豈諸定內不緣教耶。答雖緣聖教。不同散心計名
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"類別的分別。等等,取自諸門的分別。所以《理門論》說:『遠離一切種類名言,假立無異諸門分別。』所說的『種類』,就是勝論師所說的大有同異,以及數論師所說的所有三德等名言。所說的『名言』,就是把短的看成長等,都不是真實的,稱為假立。依靠共相運轉,稱為『無異』。『諸門』,就是二十三諦,以及六句等。或者說,遠離一切種類名言,名言不是單一的,所以稱為『種類』。就是緣於一切名言所詮釋的定相計屬,依靠這個名言假立一法,貫通諸法,稱為『無異』。普遍存在於宗定,不同於普遍不存在等等,稱為『諸門』。這就可以簡要地概括了。如果僅僅是簡別外道和假名言,不簡別比量心之所緣,過失也不能完全消除,所以必須遠離這些所有的分別,才能成為現量。如果籠統地說,沒有二或三,所有的分別,就太寬泛了,因為彼二三並非完全不是現量。參照七攝三,意地唯獨排除無分別智,其餘位置都隨應地存在破斥。隨所應離,由講者敘述。然而,遠離分別,大致有四類:一、五識身;二、五俱意;三、諸自證;四、諸定心。這裡所說的對於色等,就是五識。所以《理門論》接著引用頌文說:",
"『有法非一相,根非一切行,唯內證離言,是色根境界。』",
"接著說意地也有遠離諸分別的,依據證行運轉。又對於貪等諸自證分,諸修定者,遠離教分別,都是現量。問:這進入正理,是等同於彼具明四類,還是僅僅是五識?答:有兩種解釋。一種說法是等同於彼,對於色等境,先說明五識,因為相明顯。這是偏重於說明這一點。彼論廣明,所以具說四類。另一種說法是具攝言也。『等』的含義不只是五境,彼之三種,也遠離名種等所有分別。這裡是簡略總合,彼論是廣而別說。問:分別說明於五,五根非一,各自顯現取境,可以稱為現現別轉,其餘三種如何稱為現別轉?答:各自依附體緣,不貫通多種法,稱為別轉。文同《理門》,意義為何不能區別?如果依據第一種解釋,就沒有這個妨礙。問:說修定者,遠離教分別,難道諸定內不緣教嗎?答:雖然緣聖教,不同於散心計名。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Categorical distinctions. And so forth, derived from the distinctions of the doors. Therefore, the *Hetuvidyā* states: 'Free from all kinds of names and expressions, falsely establishing the various distinctions of the doors without difference.' The term 'kinds' refers to the *Vaiśeṣika's* (School of Particulars) assertion of great similarity and difference, as well as the *Sāṃkhya's* (Enumeration School) enumeration of the three *guṇas* (qualities), and so on. The term 'expressions' refers to statements such as 'seeing short as long,' which are not in accordance with reality and are therefore called false establishments. Relying on the operation of common characteristics, it is called 'without difference.' The 'doors' refer to the twenty-three *tattvas* (truths) and the six categories, and so on. Alternatively, being free from all kinds of names and expressions, since expressions are not singular, they are called 'kinds.' That is, relying on the determination of characteristics expressed by all names and expressions, falsely establishing one dharma (phenomenon) based on this name and expression, which pervades all dharmas, is called 'without difference.' Universally existing in the subject of determination, differing from universally non-existent, and so on, are called 'doors.' This succinctly summarizes it. If only distinguishing non-Buddhist schools and false names and expressions, without distinguishing the objects of inference-mind, the fault cannot be completely eliminated. Therefore, it is necessary to be free from all these distinctions in order to become *pratyakṣa* (direct perception). If speaking generally, without two or three, all distinctions would be too broad, because those two or three are not entirely non-*pratyakṣa*. Referring to the seven *saṃgrahas* (collections) and three, the mind-ground only excludes non-conceptual wisdom; in other positions, refutations constantly exist accordingly. What should be abandoned accordingly is narrated by the lecturer. However, there are roughly four categories of being free from distinctions: first, the five *vijñāna-kāyas* (aggregates of consciousness); second, the *pañca-sahajāta-manas* (five co-arisen minds); third, all *svasaṃvedanas* (self-cognitions); fourth, all *samādhi-cittas* (meditative minds). What is said here regarding form, etc., refers to the five consciousnesses. Therefore, the *Hetuvidyā* then quotes the verse:",
"'A dharma is not a single characteristic, the root is not all-acting, only internally cognized, free from words, is the realm of the color-root.'",
"Next, it is said that the mind-ground also has freedom from all distinctions, based on the operation of the proof-practice. Furthermore, regarding the self-cognition portions of greed, etc., those who cultivate *samādhi* (meditative concentration), being free from doctrinal distinctions, are all *pratyakṣa*. Question: Does this entering into right reason equate to clearly explaining the four categories, or only the five consciousnesses? Answer: There are two interpretations. One says it is equivalent to that, regarding objects such as form, first explaining the five consciousnesses, because the characteristics are clear. This is focusing on explaining this point. That treatise explains broadly, so it fully explains the four categories. The other interpretation is that it comprehensively includes. The meaning of 'etc.' is not only the five objects; those three also are free from all distinctions such as names and kinds. Here it is a brief summary, that treatise is a broad and separate explanation. Question: Separately explaining the five, the five roots are not one, each manifesting and grasping objects, can be called *pratyakṣa-pratyakṣa-pravṛtti* (direct-direct activity), how are the other three called *pratyakṣa-pravṛtti* (direct activity)? Answer: Each relies on the body-condition, not pervading multiple dharmas, is called separate activity. The text is the same as the *Hetuvidyā*, why can't the meaning be distinguished? If based on the first interpretation, there is no such obstacle. Question: Saying that those who cultivate *samādhi* are free from doctrinal distinctions, doesn't *samādhi* rely on doctrine? Answer: Although it relies on sacred doctrine, it is different from the scattered mind calculating names."
]
}
屬義。或義屬名。但藉能詮。而悟所詮。然不分別定相屬義。故云離教分別。非全不緣。方名現量。若不爾者。應無漏心。皆不緣教。八地已去。何須佛說。
現現別轉故名現量。
述曰。此顯名也。此四類心。或唯五識。現體非一。名為現現。各附境體。親明而取。離貫通緣。名為別轉。由此現現各各別緣。故名現量故者。結上所以。是名現量。類定其名。文上雖無是字。準解比量。即合有之。彼文無故。𨷂結所以。影顯有故。文巧略也。或是為故。但為互文。其義相似。依理門論云。由不共緣現現別轉故名現量。五根各各明照自境。名之為現。識依於此。名為現現。各別取境。名為別轉。若爾互用豈亦別緣。答依未自在。且作是說。若依前解。即無此妨。或現之量五根非一名現現。識名為量。現唯屬根。準理門釋。理則無違。若通明四。意根非現。又𨷂其識自體現名。但隨所應。依主持業二種釋也。
言比量者。
述曰。下明比量。文分為四。一牒量名。二出總體。三重釋義。四結量名。此即初也。
謂藉眾相而觀于義。
述曰。此總出比體。初句出因。次句顯果。眾相謂因。藉謂待藉。謂若有智藉三相因。因相有三。故名為眾。或並言因。詮三相故。亦名為眾。又解。但義自比量故。現比二因。皆且三相。故皆云眾。若其言因。是前能立悟他門中。此自比量。疏亦悟他故。能立后說。故理門云。如是應知。悟他比量。亦不離此得成能立。即生因因。兼了果因。總名量故。謂待此因。而方觀彼所
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"或意義屬於名稱,但憑藉能夠詮釋的(教法),而領悟所詮釋的(真理)。然而不分別確定(名相)與意義的固定關係,所以說『離教分別』。並非完全不緣(教法),才叫做現量(pratyakṣa,直接認知)。如果不是這樣,那麼無漏心(anāsrava-citta,沒有煩惱的心)都應該不緣教法,八地(aṣṭamī-bhūmi,菩薩修行的第八個階段)以上,又何須佛陀說法?",
"『現現別轉』所以叫做現量。",
"(窺基法師)述曰:這是解釋名稱。這四類心,或者只有五識(pañca-vijñāna,眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識)是現量,現的自體不是單一的,名為『現現』。各自依附於境的自體,親切明瞭地取境,遠離貫通的緣,名為『別轉』。由此現現各自個別地緣取,所以叫做現量。『故』字,總結上面的原因,是名現量,確定其名稱。文句上面雖然沒有『是』字,參照解釋比量(anumāna,推論)的文句,就應該有這個『是』字。比量的文句沒有『故』字,是因為總結原因的意味已經隱含在其中,這是文句巧妙地省略了。或者『是』字就是『故』字,只是爲了互文見義,意義相似。依據《理門論》(Nyāyamukha)所說:『由於不共同地緣取,現現別轉,所以叫做現量。』五根(pañcendriya,眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根)各自明照自己的境界,稱之為『現』,識(vijñāna,意識)依於此,名為『現現』,各自個別地取境,名為『別轉』。如果這樣,(五根)互相作用難道也是個別緣取嗎?回答說:依據未得自在(avastha,狀態),暫且這樣說。如果依據前面的解釋,就沒有這個妨礙。或者『現』是五根,不是一個名稱『現現』,識名為量,『現』只屬於根,參照《理門論》的解釋,道理就沒有違背。如果通明四種(心識),意根(manas-indriya,意識的根源)不是現。又,(現)是識的自體顯現的名稱,只是隨所應,依據依主釋(tatpuruṣa,複合詞的一種)和持業釋(karmadhāraya,複合詞的一種)兩種方式來解釋。",
"『言比量者』。",
"(窺基法師)述曰:下面解釋比量,文句分為四部分:一、標出量的名稱;二、給出總體定義;三、詳細解釋意義;四、總結量的名稱。這裡是第一部分。",
"『謂藉眾相而觀于義』。",
"(窺基法師)述曰:這是總括地給出比量的體性。前一句說明因(hetu,原因),后一句顯示果(phala,結果)。『眾相』指因,『藉』指憑藉,意思是說,有智慧的人憑藉三相因(trairūpya-hetu,具有三種特徵的因),因相有三種,所以名為『眾』。或者連『言因』一起說,詮釋三種相,也名為『眾』。又解釋說,只是義(artha,意義)自己比量自己,所以現量和比量的因,都暫且說三種相,所以都說『眾』。如果說『言因』,是前面能立(sādhanā,論證)悟他門(parārthānumāna,為他人而進行的推論)中的,這個是自比量(svārthānumāna,為自己而進行的推論),疏鈔也說是悟他,所以能立在後面說。所以《理門論》說:『應當這樣知道,悟他比量,也不離開這個(自比量)才能成就能立。』即生因因(utpatti-hetu-hetu,產生原因的原因),兼了果因(phala-hetu,結果的原因),總名為量,意思是說,憑藉這個因,才能觀察那個所(推知的事物)。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Or the meaning belongs to the name, but relies on what can be expressed (the teachings) to understand what is expressed (the truth). However, it does not distinguish and determine the fixed relationship between (terms) and meanings, so it is said to be 'separate from doctrinal distinctions'. It is not that it does not relate to (the teachings) at all that it is called direct perception (pratyakṣa). If that were not the case, then undefiled minds (anāsrava-citta) should not relate to the teachings, and why would the Buddha need to speak above the eighth ground (aṣṭamī-bhūmi)?",
"'Appearing separately and distinctly' is why it is called direct perception.",
"(Kuei-ji) said: This explains the name. These four types of mind, or only the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna), are direct perception. The substance of appearance is not singular, so it is called 'appearing separately and distinctly'. Each relies on the substance of the object, directly and clearly grasping it, and is separate from pervasive conditions, so it is called 'distinctly turning'. Therefore, each appearance separately and distinctly grasps, so it is called direct perception. The word 'therefore' summarizes the above reason, and is called direct perception, determining its name. Although the word 'is' is not in the sentence above, referring to the explanation of inference (anumāna), it should have this word 'is'. The sentence of inference does not have the word 'therefore' because the meaning of summarizing the reason is already implied, which is a clever omission of the sentence. Or the word 'is' is the word 'therefore', just for mutual explanation, and the meaning is similar. According to the *Nyāyamukha* (Introduction to Logic), 'Because of the non-common condition of appearing separately and distinctly, it is called direct perception.' The five roots (pañcendriya) each clearly illuminate their own realm, which is called 'appearing'. Consciousness (vijñāna) relies on this, which is called 'appearing separately and distinctly', and each separately grasps the object, which is called 'distinctly turning'. If so, does the interaction (of the five roots) also grasp separately? The answer is: according to the state of not yet being free (avastha), let's say it this way for now. If based on the previous explanation, there is no such obstacle. Or 'appearing' is the five roots, not a single name 'appearing separately and distinctly', consciousness is called the measure, and 'appearing' only belongs to the roots. Referring to the explanation of the *Nyāyamukha*, the principle is not contradictory. If generally explaining the four (types of consciousness), the mind-root (manas-indriya) is not appearing. Also, (appearing) is the name of the manifestation of the self-substance of consciousness, only according to what is appropriate, based on the possessive compound (tatpuruṣa) and the descriptive compound (karmadhāraya) two ways to explain.",
"'Speaking of inference'.",
"(Kuei-ji) said: The following explains inference, and the sentence is divided into four parts: First, state the name of the measure; second, give the overall definition; third, explain the meaning in detail; fourth, summarize the name of the measure. This is the first part.",
"'It means relying on various characteristics to observe the meaning'.",
"(Kuei-ji) said: This gives the nature of inference in general. The first sentence explains the reason (hetu), and the second sentence shows the result (phala). 'Various characteristics' refers to the reason, and 'relying' refers to depending on. It means that a wise person relies on the three-aspect reason (trairūpya-hetu), and the reason has three aspects, so it is called 'various'. Or speaking of 'reason' together, explaining the three aspects, it is also called 'various'. It is also explained that it is just the meaning (artha) itself inferring itself, so the reasons for direct perception and inference are temporarily said to have three aspects, so they are all called 'various'. If saying 'speaking of reason', it is in the previous proof (sādhanā) of the door of understanding others (parārthānumāna), and this is self-inference (svārthānumāna). The commentary also says it is understanding others, so the proof is said later. Therefore, the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'It should be known that the inference of understanding others cannot be separated from this (self-inference) to achieve the proof.' That is, the cause of the cause of production (utpatti-hetu-hetu), combined with the cause of the result (phala-hetu), is generally called the measure, meaning that by relying on this reason, one can observe that which is (inferred)."
]
}
立宗義。
相有三種如前已說由彼為因於所比義。
述曰。下重釋義有二。初總釋因。次別顯果。此初文也。言相有三。釋前眾相。離重言失。故指如前。由彼為因。釋前藉字。由即因由藉待之義。于所比義。此即釋前。而觀于彼所立宗義。前照境之能因。之為觀。后約籌慮之用。號之曰比。
有正智生。
述曰。此別顯果。初明生因果。次明瞭因果。此即初也。若從他生。若自比解。俱名正智。或簡因濫。謂雖有智。藉三相因。而觀所立。猶預解起。或違智生此因失。如前決定相違之因。或可釋疑。前但略指三相如前。即有疑雲。如聲勝論因皆三相。豈緣彼智。即為正耶。遂即釋云。雖具三相。有正智生。方真比量。彼智成疑。故不為正。
了知有火或無常等。
述曰。此明瞭因果。或舉所了果。意明能了因。正顯自悟比量故。了謂了因。即前生果。然下云於二量中。即智名果者。以生因果。即體是量。一體義分。難故偏辨。不爾。此中攝因不盡。正比量智。而爲了因。火無常等。是所了果。以其因有現比不同。果亦兩種。火無常別了。火從煙量。因起了無常等。從所作等比量因生。此二望智俱為遠因。是量具故。是量境故。或緣于因。三相之智。望了宗智。猶疏於念。故說為遠。名為量具。或緣此二因之智。及緣因之念。為智近因。憶本先知所有煙處。必定有火。憶瓶所作。而是無常。故能生智了彼二果。初解遠近。理將為勝。故門論中舉二量已。后別說念。準彼即是以境並了因智俱。名現比量
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"立宗義。",
"相有三種,如前已說,由這三種相作為原因,才能成立所要證明的宗義。",
"述曰:下面重新解釋宗義,分為兩部分。首先總的解釋原因,然後分別闡明結果。這是第一部分。『言相有三』,解釋了前面的『眾相』,避免重複而產生錯誤。所以說『如前』。『由彼為因』,解釋了前面的『藉』字,『由』就是因由憑藉的意思。『于所比義』,這就是解釋前面的『而觀于彼所立宗義』。前面的『照境之能因』,指的是能觀察境界的原因,稱為『觀』。後面的『約籌慮之用』,指的是經過思考推斷的作用,稱之為『比』。",
"有正智生。",
"述曰:這是分別闡明結果。首先說明生因果(直接產生結果的原因),然後說明了因果(幫助理解結果的原因)。這是第一部分。無論是從其他地方產生,還是自己通過比較理解,都稱為『正智』。或者爲了避免原因的泛濫,即使有智慧,憑藉三種相作為原因,來觀察所要建立的宗義,仍然會產生猶豫不決的理解,或者產生錯誤的理解,這就是原因的缺失,如前面所說的『決定相違之因』。或者可以解釋疑問,前面只是簡略地指出了三種相如前所述,就會產生疑問,如聲勝論(Vaisheshika,印度古代哲學流派,主張實在論和原子論)認為所有的原因都具有三種相,難道憑藉這些相產生的智慧,就是正確的嗎?於是就解釋說,即使具備了三種相,只有產生正確的智慧,才是真正的比量(Anumana,推理)。那些產生懷疑的智慧,就不能算作正確的比量。",
"了知有火或無常等。",
"述曰:這說明了因果。或者舉出所理解的結果,意在說明能理解的原因。正是爲了彰顯自己領悟的比量。『了』指的是了因,就是前面的生果。然而下面說『於二量中』,認為智慧是結果,因為生因果的本體就是量,一體的意義難以區分,所以特別辨析。否則,這裡包含的原因就不全面了。真正的比量智,就是了因。火、無常等,是所理解的結果。因為原因有現量(Pratyaksha,現證)和比量不同,結果也有兩種。火和無常分別被理解。火是從煙來推量的,原因產生了無常等,是從所作等比量因產生的。這兩種對於智慧來說都是遠因,因為是量的工具,是量的境界。或者緣于原因,三種相的智慧,對於理解宗義的智慧來說,就像疏遠的念頭,所以說是遠因,稱為量具。或者緣于這兩種原因的智慧,以及緣于原因的念頭,是智慧的近因。回憶起先前知道的所有有煙的地方,必定有火。回憶起瓶子是所作的,所以是無常的。因此能夠產生智慧,理解這兩種結果。最初解釋遠近,道理將更為殊勝。所以正理門論(Nyaya-pravesa,因明學著作)中舉出兩種量之後,又分別說明念。按照那裡的說法,就是以境界和了因智都稱為現量和比量。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Establishing the Doctrine.",
"There are three aspects (hetu-traya) [of a valid reason], as previously stated. These aspects serve as the cause for establishing the proposition (paksha) to be proven.",
"Commentary: The following section re-explains the meaning, divided into two parts: first, a general explanation of the cause; second, a separate clarification of the result. This is the first part. 'There are three aspects' explains the preceding 'multiple aspects,' avoiding repetition and potential errors. Hence, it refers to 'as previously stated.' 'By these as the cause' explains the preceding 'by means of.' 'By' signifies the meaning of cause, reason, and dependence. 'For the proposition to be proven' explains the preceding 'and observing that which is established as the proposition.' The preceding 'the efficient cause of illuminating the object' refers to the cause that observes the object, called 'observation.' The latter 'regarding the function of deliberation' refers to the function of thought and inference, called 'inference.'",
"'The arising of correct wisdom.'",
"Commentary: This separately clarifies the result. First, it clarifies the result of the productive cause (janaka-hetu); second, it clarifies the result of the illuminative cause (jnapaka-hetu). This is the first part. Whether it arises from another or is understood through self-comparison, both are called 'correct wisdom.' Or, to avoid the proliferation of causes, even if there is wisdom, relying on the three aspects as the cause to observe the proposition to be established, doubtful understanding or incorrect understanding may still arise. This is the deficiency of the cause, such as the previously mentioned 'contradictory reason.' Or, it can resolve doubts. The previous statement only briefly pointed out the three aspects as before, which may raise doubts, such as the Vaisheshika school arguing that all causes possess three aspects. Does the wisdom arising from these aspects necessarily lead to correctness? Therefore, it is explained that even if the three aspects are present, only the arising of correct wisdom constitutes a true inference (anumana). Wisdom that generates doubt is not considered correct.",
"'Knowing that there is fire or impermanence, etc.'",
"Commentary: This clarifies the result of the illuminative cause. Or, by citing the understood result, it intends to clarify the cause that enables understanding. It precisely reveals the inference of self-realization. 'Understanding' refers to the illuminative cause, which is the preceding productive result. However, the following statement 'in the two means of cognition' considers wisdom as the result because the essence of the productive cause and result is the means of cognition. The meaning of the unity is difficult to distinguish, so it is specifically analyzed. Otherwise, the causes included here would not be comprehensive. True inferential wisdom is the illuminative cause. Fire, impermanence, etc., are the understood results. Because the causes differ in terms of perception (pratyaksha) and inference, the results are also of two types. Fire and impermanence are understood separately. Fire is inferred from smoke, and the cause gives rise to impermanence, etc., from the productive cause of being created, etc. These two are both remote causes for wisdom because they are the tools of cognition and the objects of cognition. Or, the wisdom related to the cause, the three aspects, is like a distant thought in relation to the wisdom that understands the proposition. Therefore, it is said to be a remote cause, called the tool of cognition. Or, the wisdom related to these two causes, and the thought related to the cause, are the proximate causes of wisdom. Recalling that all places with smoke necessarily have fire, and recalling that a pot is created and therefore impermanent, enables the arising of wisdom and the understanding of these two results. The initial explanation of remote and proximate will be more excellent in reasoning. Therefore, in the Nyaya-pravesa, after citing the two means of cognition, it separately explains thought. According to that, both the object and the illuminative wisdom are called perception and inference."
]
}
。故理門云。謂于所比審觀察智。從現量生。或比量生。及憶此因與所立宗。不相離念。由是成前。舉所說力。念因同品定有等故。是近及遠。比度因故。俱名比量。問現量者。為境為必。答二種俱是。境現量所緣。從心名現量。或體顯現。為心所量。名為現量。問此言比量者。為比量智。為所觀因。答即所觀因。及知此聲所作因智。此未能生比量智果。知有所作處。即與無常宗。不相離者。是念力故。能生比智。皆名比量。然比量體。正取解宗之智。故下云。於二量中。即智名果。亦名為量故。問若爾現量知因智念。俱非比量智之正體。何名比量。答此三能為比量之智。近遠生因。因從果名。故理門云。是近及遠。比量因故。俱名比量。又云。此依作具作者而說。如似伐樹。斧等為作具。人為作者。彼樹得倒。人為近因。斧為遠因。有云。斧親斷樹為近因。人持于斧疏非親因。此現比量為作具。憶因之念為作者。或復翻此。簡前二釋。故名比量。然前解正。又解。作者正了宗智。作具即是現比二因。及憶因宗不相離念。俱名比量者。依作者作具而說故。此解俱名量所以。不欲宣解能生比智近遠之因。問理門論中。現比量境及緣因念。隨其所應。俱名現比。如何此中但說于智。何理得知。彼于現境。亦名現量。比量之因亦名比量。答理門論云。問何故此中與前現量別異遠立。此問詞。為現二門。此處亦應于其比果。說為比量。彼處亦應于其現因。說為現量。俱不遮止。此答詞。即互明也。今者此中但出量體。略彼作具之與作者。略廣故爾。
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本:",
"因此,《理門論》說:『所謂對於所比較的事物進行審慎觀察的智慧,是從現量(Pratyaksha,直接感知)產生,或者從比量(Anumana,推論)產生,以及憶念此因與所要成立的宗(Paksha,論題)不相分離的念頭,由此成就前面的論證。』這是因為舉出所說的力量,憶念因與同品(Sapaksha,相似實例)必定存在等緣故,是近及遠的推比度量之因,所以都稱為比量。問:現量,是境(Vishaya,對像)還是智(Jnana,智慧)?答:兩種都是。境現量是所緣(Alambana,認識對像),從心(Citta,意識)的角度稱為現量,或者本體顯現,為心所量度,名為現量。問:這裡說的比量,是比量智,還是所觀察的因?答:就是所觀察的因,以及知道『此聲是所作』的因智,此未能產生比量智的果。知道『有所作之處,就與無常宗不相分離』,這是念的力量,能夠產生比智,都名為比量。然而比量的本體,正是取了解宗的智慧,所以下面說:『在二量(Pramana,認識方式,即現量和比量)中,即智名為果,也名為量。』問:如果這樣,現量知因智念,都不是比量智的正體,為何名為比量?答:這三者能為比量之智,提供近遠的生因,因從果得名,所以《理門論》說:『是近及遠,比量因故,都名為比量。』又說:『這是依據作具(Karana,工具)和作者(Karta,執行者)而說的。』就像砍伐樹木,斧頭等是作具,人是作者,那樹得以倒下,人是近因,斧頭是遠因。有人說,斧頭親手砍斷樹木是近因,人拿著斧頭疏遠而非親因。此現比量為作具,憶因之念為作者,或者反過來,簡化前兩種解釋,故名比量。然而前面的解釋是正確的。又解釋說,作者是正了宗智,作具即是現比二因,以及憶念因宗不相分離的念頭,都名為比量,是依據作者作具而說的緣故。此解釋都名為量的原因,是不想宣解能生比智的近遠之因。問:《理門論》中,現比量境及緣因念,隨其所應,都名為現比,如何此處只說于智,什麼道理得知,彼于現境,也名現量,比量之因也名比量?答:《理門論》說:『問:為何此處與前面的現量別異遠立?』此問詞,為現二門。此處也應于其比果,說為比量。彼處也應于其現因,說為現量,都不遮止。此答詞,即互相明瞭。現在此處只出量體,省略彼作具之與作者,省略和廣博的緣故。",
"English version:",
"Therefore, the *Hetu-dvara-tarka-shastra* (The Treatise on the Entrance to Logic) states: 'That is, the wisdom that carefully observes what is being compared, arising from *Pratyaksha* (direct perception), or arising from *Anumana* (inference), and the thought of remembering that this reason is inseparable from the *Paksha* (thesis) to be established, thereby accomplishing the preceding argument.' This is because citing the power of what is said, remembering that the reason is definitely present in the *Sapaksha* (similar instances), etc., is the cause of near and far inference and measurement, so they are all called *Anumana*. Question: Is *Pratyaksha* an object (*Vishaya*) or wisdom (*Jnana*)? Answer: Both are. The object of *Pratyaksha* is what is cognized (*Alambana*), and from the perspective of the mind (*Citta*), it is called *Pratyaksha*, or the essence manifests and is measured by the mind, and is called *Pratyaksha*. Question: What is meant by *Anumana* here, is it the wisdom of *Anumana* or the reason being observed? Answer: It is the reason being observed, and the wisdom that knows the reason 'this sound is produced', which cannot produce the result of the wisdom of *Anumana*. Knowing that 'wherever there is production, it is inseparable from the thesis of impermanence' is the power of thought, which can generate inferential wisdom, and all are called *Anumana*. However, the essence of *Anumana* is precisely taking the wisdom that understands the thesis, so it is said below: 'In the two *Pramanas* (means of knowledge, i.e., *Pratyaksha* and *Anumana*), that is, wisdom is called the result, and it is also called *Pramana*.' Question: If so, the thought of the wisdom of *Pratyaksha* knowing the reason is not the true essence of the wisdom of *Anumana*, so why is it called *Anumana*? Answer: These three can provide near and far causes for the wisdom of *Anumana*, and the cause is named after the result, so the *Hetu-dvara-tarka-shastra* states: 'It is the cause of near and far *Anumana*, so they are all called *Anumana*.' It also says: 'This is based on the *Karana* (instrument) and the *Karta* (agent) being spoken of.' Just like cutting down trees, axes, etc., are the *Karana*, and people are the *Karta*, so the tree can fall down, the person is the near cause, and the axe is the far cause. Some say that the axe personally cutting down the tree is the near cause, and the person holding the axe is distant and not the personal cause. This *Pratyaksha* and *Anumana* are the *Karana*, and the thought of remembering the reason is the *Karta*, or vice versa, simplifying the first two explanations, hence the name *Anumana*. However, the previous explanation is correct. It is also explained that the *Karta* is the wisdom that correctly understands the thesis, and the *Karana* is the two reasons of *Pratyaksha* and *Anumana*, and the thought of remembering that the reason and the thesis are inseparable, all are called *Anumana*, because it is based on the *Karta* and *Karana* being spoken of. The reason why this explanation is all called *Pramana* is that it does not want to explain the near and far causes that can generate the wisdom of *Anumana*. Question: In the *Hetu-dvara-tarka-shastra*, the object of *Pratyaksha* and *Anumana* and the thought of the causal reason, as appropriate, are all called *Pratyaksha* and *Anumana*, how is it that here only wisdom is spoken of, and what reason is there to know that there, the object of *Pratyaksha* is also called *Pratyaksha*, and the cause of *Anumana* is also called *Anumana*? Answer: The *Hetu-dvara-tarka-shastra* says: 'Question: Why is this place established differently and distantly from the previous *Pratyaksha*?' This question is for the two doors of *Pratyaksha*. Here, the result of *Anumana* should also be spoken of as *Anumana*. There, the cause of *Pratyaksha* should also be spoken of as *Pratyaksha*, and there is no prohibition. This answer clarifies each other. Now, here only the essence of *Pramana* is presented, omitting the *Karana* and the *Karta*, because of omission and extensiveness."
]
}
是名比量。
述曰。第四結名。由藉三相因比度知有火無常等故。是名比量。故是二字。如前應知。
於二量中即智名果是證相故如有作用而顯現故亦名為量。
述曰。第四明量果也。問前有正智。了知有火及無常等。以明果訖。如何此處復明量果。答前明比量智所量之果。此明瞭宗能量智果。能量所量量果別故。或前望生因果。此辨能了果。或除伏難。謂有難云。有尺秤等為能量。絹布等為所量。記數之智為量果。汝此二量。火無常等為所量。現比量智為能量。何者為量果。或薩婆多等難。我以境為所量。根為能量。彼以根見等不許識見。故根能量。依根所起心及心所。而為量果。汝大乘中。即智為能量。復何為量果。或諸外道。執境為所量。諸智為能量。神我為量果。彼計神我。為能受者。知者等故。汝佛法中既不立我。何為量果。智即能量故。論主答云。於此二量。即智名果。即者不離之義。即用此量智。還為能量果。彼復問云。何故即智複名果耶。答云。夫言量果。能知于彼。即此量智親能明證彼二境相。所以名果。彼之相境相。於心上現名。而有顯現。假說心之一分。名為能量。云如作用。既於一心。義分能所。是故量果亦名為量。或彼所量。即於心現。不離心故。亦名為量。以境亦心。依二分解。或此中意約三分明。能量見分。量果自證分。體不離用。即智名果。是能證彼見分相故。相謂行相體相。非相分名相。如有作用而顯現者。簡異正量。彼心取境。如日舒光。如鉗鉗物。親照執故。今者大乘
{
"translations": [
"是名比量。",
"述曰。第四結名。由藉三相因比度知有火無常等故。是名比量。故是二字。如前應知。",
"於二量中即智名果是證相故如有作用而顯現故亦名為量。",
"述曰。第四明量果也。問前有正智。了知有火及無常等。以明果訖。如何此處復明量果。答前明比量智所量之果。此明瞭宗能量智果。能量所量量果別故。或前望生因果。此辨能了果。或除伏難。謂有難云。有尺秤等為能量。絹布等為所量。記數之智為量果。汝此二量。火無常等為所量。現比量智為能量。何者為量果。或薩婆多等難。我以境為所量。根為能量。彼以根見等不許識見。故根能量。依根所起心及心所。而為量果。汝大乘中。即智為能量。復何為量果。或諸外道。執境為所量。諸智為能量。神我為量果。彼計神我。為能受者。知者等故。汝佛法中既不立我。何為量果。智即能量故。論主答云。於此二量。即智名果。即者不離之義。即用此量智。還為能量果。彼復問云。何故即智複名果耶。答云。夫言量果。能知于彼。即此量智親能明證彼二境相。所以名果。彼之相境相。於心上現名。而有顯現。假說心之一分。名為能量。云如作用。既於一心。義分能所。是故量果亦名為量。或彼所量。即於心現。不離心故。亦名為量。以境亦心。依二分解。或此中意約三分明。能量見分。量果自證分。體不離用。即智名果。是能證彼見分相故。相謂行相體相。非相分名相。如有作用而顯現者。簡異正量。彼心取境。如日舒光。如鉗鉗物。親照執故。今者大乘"
],
"english_translations": [
"This is called Inference (比量).",
"Explanation: This fourth section concludes the naming. Because through the three characteristics of the reason, we infer and know the existence of fire, impermanence, etc., it is called Inference (比量). The words '故是' (therefore it is) should be understood as before.",
"In the two kinds of valid cognition (量), the wisdom itself is called the result (果), because it is the characteristic of proof (證相), and because it manifests as having a function, it is also called valid cognition (量).",
"Explanation: This fourth section clarifies the result of valid cognition (量果). Question: Earlier, there was Right Knowledge (正智) that understood the existence of fire and impermanence, etc., and the result was explained. Why is the result of valid cognition (量果) being clarified again here? Answer: The previous explanation clarified the result that is measured by the wisdom of Inference (比量). This clarifies the result of the wisdom that is the agent of valid cognition (能量智果) in relation to the subject (宗). Because the agent of valid cognition (能量), the object of valid cognition (所量), and the result of valid cognition (量果) are different. Or, the previous explanation looked at the cause and effect of arising. This distinguishes the result of understanding. Or, it removes a hidden difficulty. There is a difficulty that says: 'Scales and balances are the agents of valid cognition (能量), silk and cloth are the objects of valid cognition (所量), and the wisdom of counting is the result of valid cognition (量果). In your two kinds of valid cognition (量), fire and impermanence are the objects of valid cognition (所量), and the wisdom of present and inferential valid cognition (現比量智) is the agent of valid cognition (能量). What is the result of valid cognition (量果)?' Or, there is the difficulty from the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多). 'We take the object (境) as the object of valid cognition (所量), and the sense faculties (根) as the agents of valid cognition (能量).' They do not allow consciousness (識) to see with the sense faculties (根). Therefore, the sense faculties (根) are the agents of valid cognition (能量), and the mind (心) and mental factors (心所) that arise based on the sense faculties (根) are the result of valid cognition (量果). In your Mahayana (大乘), wisdom (智) is the agent of valid cognition (能量). What then is the result of valid cognition (量果)?' Or, there are the externalists (外道) who hold the object (境) as the object of valid cognition (所量), the various wisdoms (諸智) as the agents of valid cognition (能量), and the self (神我) as the result of valid cognition (量果). They consider the self (神我) to be the receiver, the knower, etc. In your Buddha-dharma, since you do not establish a self (我), what is the result of valid cognition (量果)? Wisdom (智) is the agent of valid cognition (能量). The author of the treatise answers: 'In these two kinds of valid cognition (量), wisdom (智) itself is called the result (果).' '即' (itself) means not separate. It uses this wisdom of valid cognition (量智) as the result of the agent of valid cognition (能量果). They ask again: 'Why is wisdom (智) also called the result (果)?' The answer is: 'Speaking of the result of valid cognition (量果), it is able to know that. This wisdom of valid cognition (量智) directly and clearly proves the characteristics of those two objects (境相). Therefore, it is called the result (果).' The characteristics of those objects (境相) appear on the mind (心) and are manifested. It is figuratively said that a part of the mind (心) is the agent of valid cognition (能量), like a function. Since there is a division of agent and object in one mind (一心), therefore the result of valid cognition (量果) is also called valid cognition (量). Or, that object of valid cognition (所量) appears directly in the mind (心) and is not separate from the mind (心), so it is also called valid cognition (量). Because the object (境) is also the mind (心), based on the division of two. Or, the intention here is to clarify with three aspects: the seeing aspect (見分) is the agent of valid cognition (能量), and the self-awareness aspect (自證分) is the result of valid cognition (量果). The essence is not separate from the function. Wisdom (智) itself is called the result (果), because it is able to prove the seeing aspect (見分) of that. The characteristic refers to the characteristic of activity (行相) and the characteristic of essence (體相), not the characteristic of the object aspect (相分). 'Manifesting as having a function' distinguishes it from Right Cognition (正量). That mind (心) takes the object (境) like the sun spreading its light, like tongs gripping an object, directly illuminating and grasping. Now, in Mahayana (大乘)"
]
}
依自證分。起此見分。取境功能。及彼相分。為境生識。是緣知假。如有作用自證能起。故云而顯現故。不同彼執直實取境。此自證分。亦名為量。亦彼見分。或此相分。亦名為量。不離能量故。如言唯識等。此順陳那三分義解。故理門云。又於此中無別量果。以即此體似義生故。似有用故。假說為量。
有分別智于義異轉名似現量。
述曰。下第四大段。明二似量。真似相形。故次明也。于中有二。初似現。后似比。似現之中復分為二。初標。后釋。此即初也。標中有三。一標似現體。二標似所由。三標定似名。有分別智。謂有如前帶名種等。諸分別智。不稱實境。別妄解生。名于義異轉。名似現量。此標似名也。
謂諸有智了瓶衣等分別而生。
述曰。此下釋也。釋文亦三。即釋初也。謂諸有緣瓶衣等智。不稱實境。妄分別生。準理而言。有五種智。皆名似現。一散心緣過去。二獨頭意緣現在。三散意緣未來。四緣三世疑智。五緣現在惑亂解。謂見杌為人。睹陽炎為水。及瓶衣等。名惑亂智。皆非現量。是似現收。或諸外道及餘情類。謂現量得故。故理門云。但於此中了余境分。不名現量。由此即說憶念比度悕求疑智惑亂智等。于鹿愛等。皆非現量。隨先所愛分別轉故。五智如次配意念等智。下言等。是向內等。離此更無可外等故。于鹿愛等者。西城共呼陽炎為鹿愛。鹿以熱渴。謂之為水。而生愛故。此境言等。等彼見杌。謂之為人。病眼空華毛輪二月及瓶衣等。故彼復言。如是一切世俗有中。瓶等數等舉等
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"依靠自證分(Sva-samvedana,能認知自身狀態的部分)產生見分(Dṛṣṭi-bhāga,認知外境的部分),見分獲取外境的功能,以及作為外境的相分(Viṣaya-bhāga,被認知的外境),以外境為緣而生起識(Vijñāna,意識)。這是一種依緣而知的虛假認知。如果自證分具有作用,能夠自主生起,那麼就說『而顯現故』。這不同於那些執著于直接真實地獲取外境的觀點。這個自證分也被稱為量(Pramāṇa,正確的認知),見分或相分也可以被稱為量,因為它們不離能量(Pramāṇa,能認知的主體)。例如,『唯識』等說法就是如此。這符合陳那(Dignāga,約公元480-540年)的三分義的解釋。因此,《理門論》(Nyāyamukha)說:『又於此中無別量果,以即此體似義生故。似有用故。假說為量。』(這裡沒有獨立的量果,因為量本身就具有相似於外境的顯現,並且具有相似的作用,所以假名為量。)",
"有分別智對外境產生錯誤的理解,稱為似現量(Pratibhāsa-pratyakṣa-ābhāsa,虛假的現量)。",
"述曰:下面是第四大段,闡明兩種似量,通過真似對比來顯明。因此接著闡明似量。其中分為兩部分:首先是似現量,然後是似比量(Pratibhāsa-anumāna-ābhāsa,虛假的似比量)。似現量又分為兩部分:首先是標示,然後是解釋。這裡是標示部分。標示中有三點:一是標示似現量的本體,二是標示產生似現量的原因,三是標示確定似現量的名稱。『有分別智』,指的是像前面所說的帶有名稱、種類等分別的各種智慧。這些智慧不符合真實的境界,而產生錯誤的理解,稱為『于義異轉』,因此被稱為似現量。這是標示似現量的名稱。",
"謂諸有智了瓶衣等分別而生。",
"述曰:下面是解釋部分。解釋也分為三點,這裡是解釋第一點。『謂諸有緣瓶衣等智』,指的是那些緣于瓶子、衣服等事物的智慧,這些智慧不符合真實的境界,而產生錯誤的分別。按照道理來說,有五種智慧都可以被稱為似現量:一是散亂心緣於過去,二是獨頭意識緣于現在,三是散亂意識緣于未來,四是緣於三世的疑智,五是緣于現在的迷惑顛倒的理解,比如把樹樁看成人,把陽光下的熱氣看成水,以及瓶子、衣服等等,這些都屬於迷惑顛倒的智慧,都不是現量,而是被歸類為似現量。或者一些外道(Tīrthika,佛教以外的修行者)和其他眾生,認為這是現量所得。因此,《理門論》說:『但於此中了余境分,不名現量。』(僅僅是瞭解了外境的一部分,不能稱為現量。)因此,這裡就說了憶念、比度、希求、疑智、迷惑顛倒的智慧等等。對於鹿愛(Mṛgatṛṣṇā,海市蜃樓)等等,都不是現量,因為它們是隨著先前所愛而產生的分別。這五種智慧依次對應于意識、念頭等等智慧。下文的『等』,指的是向內等等,除了這些之外,沒有其他的向外等等。『于鹿愛等者』,在西域,人們把陽光下的熱氣稱為鹿愛,鹿因為炎熱口渴,誤以為那是水,因此產生愛戀。這裡的『境言等』,指的是像把樹樁看成人,病眼所見的空花、毛輪、二月,以及瓶子、衣服等等。因此,他們又說:『如是一切世俗有中,瓶等數等舉等。』(在一切世俗存在中,瓶子等等都是如此。)"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Based on the Sva-samvedana (self-awareness, the part that recognizes its own state), the Dṛṣṭi-bhāga (perception-part, the part that cognizes external objects) arises. The function of the Dṛṣṭi-bhāga to grasp external objects, and the Viṣaya-bhāga (object-part, the external object being cognized) as the external object, give rise to Vijñāna (consciousness) based on external objects as conditions. This is a false cognition that arises from conditions. If the Sva-samvedana has a function and can arise independently, then it is said 'and therefore manifests.' This is different from those who are attached to directly and truly grasping external objects. This Sva-samvedana is also called Pramāṇa (valid cognition), and the Dṛṣṭi-bhāga or Viṣaya-bhāga can also be called Pramāṇa because they are inseparable from the Pramāṇa (the cognizing subject). For example, the saying 'Vijñānavāda' (Consciousness-only) is like this. This is in accordance with Dignāga's (c. 480-540 CE) explanation of the three aspects. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha (Introduction to Logic) says: 'Moreover, there is no separate result of valid cognition here, because this very entity appears similar to the object. Because it appears to be useful, it is nominally called valid cognition.'",
"Conceptual intelligence that turns differently towards an object is called Pratibhāsa-pratyakṣa-ābhāsa (semblance of perception).",
"Commentary: The fourth major section below clarifies the two types of semblance, highlighting them through the contrast between truth and semblance. Therefore, semblance is clarified next. It is divided into two parts: first, semblance of perception, and then semblance of inference. Semblance of perception is further divided into two parts: first, the designation, and then the explanation. This is the designation part. There are three points in the designation: first, designating the entity of semblance of perception; second, designating the cause of the arising of semblance of perception; and third, designating the name of semblance of perception. 'Conceptual intelligence' refers to the various types of intelligence with concepts such as names and kinds mentioned earlier. These intelligences do not conform to the real object but give rise to erroneous understanding, which is called 'turning differently towards an object,' and therefore it is called semblance of perception. This is the designation of the name of semblance of perception.",
"It means that various intelligences arise with conceptualization of pots, clothes, etc.",
"Commentary: Below is the explanation part. The explanation is also divided into three points, and this is the explanation of the first point. 'It means that various intelligences arise with conceptualization of pots, clothes, etc.' refers to those intelligences that are related to objects such as pots and clothes. These intelligences do not conform to the real object but give rise to erroneous conceptualization. According to reason, there are five types of intelligence that can be called semblance of perception: first, a distracted mind related to the past; second, a solitary consciousness related to the present; third, a distracted consciousness related to the future; fourth, a doubtful intelligence related to the three times; and fifth, a confused and inverted understanding related to the present, such as seeing a tree stump as a person, seeing heat haze as water, and pots, clothes, etc. These all belong to confused and inverted intelligence, and they are not valid perception but are classified as semblance of perception. Or some Tīrthikas (non-Buddhists) and other beings consider this to be obtained through valid perception. Therefore, the Nyāyamukha says: 'But merely understanding a part of the object here is not called valid perception.' Therefore, it is said here that recollection, inference, desire, doubtful intelligence, confused and inverted intelligence, etc. are not valid perception with respect to Mṛgatṛṣṇā (mirage), etc., because they arise with conceptualization based on what was previously loved. These five types of intelligence correspond respectively to consciousness, thought, etc. The 'etc.' in the following text refers to internal etceteras; besides these, there are no other external etceteras. 'With respect to Mṛgatṛṣṇā, etc.' In the Western Regions, people call heat haze Mṛgatṛṣṇā. Because deer are hot and thirsty, they mistakenly think it is water, and therefore they develop love for it. The 'object etc.' here refers to things like seeing a tree stump as a person, seeing empty flowers, hair-circles, and a second moon with diseased eyes, and pots, clothes, etc. Therefore, they also say: 'In all worldly existences, pots, etc. are all like this.'"
]
}
有性瓶性等智。皆似現量。是假非真。名世俗有。舉瓶等取外道五唯量實句義等數。即勝論所計德句。言等取彼量合離等。舉即業句。取捨屈申行。舉即彼取。或是彼行。以等於余。有性即大有瓶性等。瓶性即同異。等取和合句等。智即緣此之智。皆似現量。此等皆於五塵實境之中。作余行相。假合余義分別轉故。問此緣瓶等智。既名似現。現比非量三中何收。答非量所攝。問如第七識緣八執我。可名非量。泛緣衣瓶。既非執心。何名非量。答應知非量不要執心。但不稱境別作余解。即名非量。以緣瓶等心雖不必執。但惑亂故。謂為實瓶。故是非量。問既有瓶衣。緣彼智起。應是稱知。何名分別。
由彼于義不以自相為境界故。
述曰。此釋所由。由彼諸智。於四塵境。不以自相為所觀境。于上增益。別實有物。而為所緣。名為異轉。此意以瓶衣等體即四塵。依四塵上。假名瓶衣。唯有共相。無其自體。此智不以本自相四塵而為所緣。但於此共相瓶衣假法而轉。謂為實有。故名分別。
名似現量。
述曰。此釋定似名。由彼瓶衣依四塵假。但意識緣共相而轉。實非眼識現量而得。自謂眼見此瓶衣等。名似現量。又但分別執為實有。謂自識現得。亦名似現。不但似眼現量而得。名似現量。此釋盡理。前解句故。
若似同智為先所起諸似義智名似比量。
述曰。此第二解似比。文亦有二。初標。后釋。此即初也。于中有三。初標所因。次標似體。后標似名。似因智者。似因及緣。似因之智為先。生后了似
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『有性』(擁有屬性)、『瓶性』(瓶子的屬性)等智,都像是現量(直接認知)。但這些是虛假的,不是真實的,被稱為『世俗有』。這裡說的『瓶』等,指的是外道五唯量(五種根本實體)中的『實句義』等概念。『實句義』是勝論派所計的『德句』(屬性範疇)。『等』字包括了勝論派的『量』(認知工具)、『合』(結合)、『離』(分離)等概念。『舉』指的是『業句』(活動範疇),如取、舍、屈、伸等行為。『舉』也指『彼取』(對那個的獲取),或者『彼行』(那個的活動),『以等』表示剩餘的。『有性』即『大有』(普遍存在),『瓶性』等,『瓶性』即『同』(相同)、『異』(不同)。『等』包括『和合句』(組合範疇)等。『智』(智慧)即緣於此的智慧。這些都像是現量。這些都在五塵(色、聲、香、味、觸)的真實境之中,作其他的行相,虛假地組合其他的意義,進行分別轉動,所以不是真實的認知。",
"問:這種緣于瓶等的智慧,既然被稱為『似現』(類似現量),那麼在現量、比量(推理認知)、非量(錯誤認知)這三者中,應該歸於哪一類?",
"答:屬於『非量』所攝。",
"問:如果說第七識緣于第八識執著的『我』,可以被稱為『非量』,但泛泛地緣于衣服、瓶子,既不是執著心,為什麼被稱為『非量』?",
"答:應當知道,『非量』不一定需要執著心。只要不符合真實的境,另外作出其他的解釋,就稱為『非量』。因為緣于瓶等的心雖然不一定有執著,但因為迷惑混亂,認為那是真實的瓶子,所以是非量。",
"問:既然有瓶子、衣服,緣於它們而生起智慧,應該是正確的認知,為什麼稱為『分別』?",
"『由彼于義不以自相為境界故。』",
"述曰:這是解釋原因。因為那些智慧,對於四塵境(地、水、火、風),不以它們的自相(自身特性)作為所觀察的境,而是在上面增益,認為有另外真實存在的物體,作為所緣,這稱為『異轉』(不同的轉變)。這個意思是說,瓶子、衣服等的本體就是四塵,依附於四塵之上,假名為瓶子、衣服,只有共相(共同特徵),沒有其自體(自身實體)。這種智慧不以原本的自相四塵作為所緣,而只是緣于這種共相瓶衣的假法而轉動,認為它們是真實存在的,所以稱為『分別』。",
"『名似現量。』",
"述曰:這是解釋確定『似』這個名稱的原因。因為瓶子、衣服依附於四塵而假立,只是意識緣于共相而轉動,實際上不是眼識現量所能得到的。自己卻認為眼睛看到了這個瓶子、衣服等,所以稱為『似現量』。又只是分別執著它們是真實存在的,認為自己通過意識現量而得到,也稱為『似現』。不僅僅是類似於眼識現量而得到,所以稱為『似現量』。這個解釋窮盡了道理。前面的解釋只是從語句的角度。",
"『若似同智為先所起諸似義智名似比量。』",
"述曰:這是第二種解釋『似比』(類似比量)。文句也有兩部分。先是標示,后是解釋。這是第一部分。其中有三點。首先標示所因(原因),其次標示似體(類似的主體),最後標示似名(類似的名稱)。『似因智』(類似原因的智慧)是指,以類似原因以及緣,以緣于類似原因的智慧為先,產生後來的了知類似...",
"English version",
"『Having-nature』 (possession of attributes), 『pot-nature』 (the nature of a pot), and other cognitions are all like direct perception (現量, *pratyakṣa*). However, these are false, not real, and are called 『conventional existence』 (世俗有, *saṃvṛti-sat*). The 『pot』 and so on mentioned here refer to concepts like 『substantial quality』 (實句義, *dravya-guṇa*) among the five categories of Vaiseṣika (外道, non-Buddhist schools) philosophy. 『Substantial quality』 is the 『quality category』 (德句, *guṇa-padārtha*) as conceived by the Vaiseṣika school (勝論). The word 『and so on』 includes the Vaiseṣika concepts of 『cognition tool』 (量, *pramāṇa*), 『combination』 (合, *saṃyoga*), 『separation』 (離, *vibhāga*), etc. 『Mentioning』 refers to the 『action category』 (業句, *karma-padārtha*), such as actions like taking, discarding, bending, and stretching. 『Mentioning』 also refers to 『taking that』 (彼取, *tat-grahaṇa*) or 『that action』 (彼行, *tat-karma*); 『with and so on』 indicates the remainder. 『Having-nature』 is 『great having』 (大有, *mahā-bhāva*), 『pot-nature』 and so on; 『pot-nature』 is 『same』 (同, *sāmānya*) and 『different』 (異, *viśeṣa*). 『And so on』 includes 『combination category』 (和合句, *samavāya-padārtha*) and so on. 『Cognition』 (智, *jñāna*) is the cognition that arises from this. All of these are like direct perception. These all operate within the real realm of the five sense objects (五塵, *pañca-viṣaya*), creating other appearances, falsely combining other meanings, and engaging in discriminatory activity; therefore, they are not true cognitions.",
"Question: Since this cognition that arises from pots and so on is called 『pseudo-direct』 (似現, *pratyakṣābhāsa*), to which of the three – direct perception, inference (比量, *anumāna*), or non-cognition (非量, *apramāṇa*) – should it be assigned?",
"Answer: It is included within 『non-cognition.』",
"Question: If the seventh consciousness (第七識, *manas*) clings to the 『self』 (我, *ātman*) that the eighth consciousness (第八識, *ālayavijñāna*) is attached to, it can be called 『non-cognition.』 But generally cognizing clothes and pots is not clinging; why is it called 『non-cognition』?",
"Answer: You should know that 『non-cognition』 does not necessarily require clinging. As long as it does not conform to the real object and makes other interpretations, it is called 『non-cognition.』 Because the mind that arises from pots and so on, although it may not have clinging, is confused and considers them to be real pots; therefore, it is non-cognition.",
"Question: Since there are pots and clothes, and cognition arises from them, it should be correct cognition; why is it called 『discrimination』 (分別, *vikalpa*)?",
"『Because it does not take the self-nature of the object as its object.』",
"Commentary: This explains the reason. Because those cognitions, regarding the realm of the four elements (四塵境, *catu-bhūta*), do not take their self-nature as the object of observation, but rather add to them, considering there to be other real existing objects as the object of cognition; this is called 『different transformation』 (異轉, *anyathā-pravṛtti*). This means that the substance of pots, clothes, etc., is the four elements. Attached to the four elements are the false names of pots and clothes, which only have common characteristics (共相, *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and no self-entity (自體, *sva-lakṣaṇa*). This cognition does not take the original self-nature of the four elements as its object, but only operates on the false phenomena of these common characteristic pots and clothes, considering them to be real; therefore, it is called 『discrimination.』",
"『Called pseudo-direct perception.』",
"Commentary: This explains the reason for determining the name 『pseudo.』 Because pots and clothes are falsely established based on the four elements, it is only consciousness that operates on the common characteristics, and it is actually not obtainable by the direct perception of the eye-consciousness (眼識, *cakṣur-vijñāna*). One mistakenly thinks that the eyes have seen these pots, clothes, etc.; therefore, it is called 『pseudo-direct perception.』 Furthermore, it is only discriminatory clinging that considers them to be real, thinking that one has obtained them through the direct perception of consciousness; it is also called 『pseudo-direct.』 It is not merely similar to the direct perception of the eye-consciousness that one obtains it; therefore, it is called 『pseudo-direct perception.』 This explanation exhausts the reasoning. The previous explanation was only from the perspective of the sentences.",
"『If the pseudo-cause cognition arises first, then all cognitions of pseudo-meaning are called pseudo-inference.』",
"Commentary: This is the second explanation of 『pseudo-inference』 (似比量, *anumānābhāsa*). The sentence also has two parts. First is the indication, then the explanation. This is the first part. There are three points within it. First, indicate the cause; second, indicate the pseudo-entity; and third, indicate the pseudo-name. 『Pseudo-cause cognition』 (似因智, *hetvābhāsa-jñāna*) refers to that which takes pseudo-cause and conditions, with the cognition of pseudo-cause as the precursor, giving rise to the subsequent understanding of the pseudo..."
]
}
宗智。名似比量。問何故似現先標似體。后標似因。此似此中先因後果。答彼之似現。由率遇境。即便取解。謂為實有。非后疇度。故先標果。此似比量。要因在先。後方推度。邪智後起。故先舉因。或復影顯。三句三文。如次配釋。
似因多種如先已說用彼為因。
述曰。下釋。如先所說。宗之九過。因十四過。及其似喻。皆生智因。併名似因。前已廣明。恐繁故指。準標有智及因。今釋亦有所知之因。及能知智。皆不正故。俱名似因。然釋文無。即舉因顯。用彼因智以為先因。準理標中亦合云。若似因智及耶憶彼所立宗因不相離念。為先文略故爾。釋文隨標。亦略不說。
于似所比諸有智生。
述曰。釋前所起諸似義智。起之與生。義同文異。如於霧等。妄謂為煙。言于似所比。耶證有火。于中智起。言有智生。
不能正解名似比量。
述曰。此釋名也。由彼耶因。妄起耶智。不能正解彼火有無等。是真之流。而非真故。名似比量。
複次若正顯示能立過失說名能破。
述曰。下第五大段解真能破。文段分三。初總標能破。次辨能破境。后兼顯悟他。結能破號。或分為四。初二如前。第三齣能破體。第四結能破名。或初標。后釋。標中有三。若正顯示標能破體。能立過失。標能破境。說名能破。標能破名。后釋中先境。次體。后名。且依初科。此即初也。他立有失。如實能知。顯令他悟名。若正顯示能立過失。其失者何。
謂初能立缺減過性立宗過性不成因性不定因性相違因
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"宗智(關於宗的智慧)。名似比量(一種推理形式)。問:為什麼似現量(一種錯誤的直覺)先標出似體(錯誤的實體),后標出似因(錯誤的原因),而此似比量中卻是先因後果?答:那似現量,是由於感官直接遇到外境,立即產生理解,認為那是真實存在的,並非後來的推測。所以先標出果。而此似比量,要因在先,然後才能推測。邪智(錯誤的智慧)後起,所以先舉出因。或者,影顯,三句三文,依次配合解釋。",
"似因(錯誤的原因)多種,如先前已經說過,用那些作為因。",
"述曰:下面解釋。如先前所說,宗的九種過失,因的十四種過失,以及似喻(錯誤的例子),都是產生邪智的原因,都叫做似因。前面已經詳細說明,恐怕繁瑣所以省略。準照標有智及因,現在解釋也有所知的原因,以及能知的智慧,都不正確,所以都叫做似因。然而釋文中沒有,就舉出因來顯示。用那些因智作為先因。準照道理,標中也應該說:『如果似因智以及邪憶,對於他所立的宗因不相離的念頭』,因為文字簡略所以這樣。釋文隨著標文,也省略不說。",
"對於似所比(錯誤的比較)的諸有智(各種智慧)產生。",
"述曰:解釋先前所產生的各種相似意義的智慧。起和生,意義相同,只是用詞不同。例如對於霧等,錯誤地認為是煙。說『對於似所比』,錯誤地證明有火,于其中產生智慧,說『有智生』。",
"不能正確理解,叫做似比量(錯誤的推理)。",
"述曰:這是解釋名稱。由於那些錯誤的因,錯誤地產生錯誤的智慧,不能正確理解那火的有無等,是真實的流派,但不是真實的,所以叫做似比量。",
"再次,如果正確顯示能立(論證者)的過失,就叫做能破(反駁者)。",
"述曰:下面第五大段解釋真能破。文段分為三部分。首先總標能破,其次辨別能破的境界,然後兼顯示悟他,總結能破的名稱。或者分為四部分。前兩部分如前。第三部分說明能破的本體,第四部分總結能破的名稱。或者先標,后釋。標中有三部分。『如果正確顯示』,標出能破的本體。『能立過失』,標出能破的境界。『說名能破』,標出能破的名稱。後面解釋中先說境界,其次說本體,最後說名稱。且按照第一種分類,這就是第一部分。他人立論有失誤,如實能夠知道,顯示讓他人明白,叫做『如果正確顯示能立過失』。那些失誤是什麼?",
"所謂初能立(最初的論證)的缺減過性(缺少必要的條件),立宗過性(宗的過失),不成因性(因不能成立),不定因性(因不確定),相違因(因相違背)"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Zongzhi (Wisdom concerning the thesis). Named 'Similarto-Inference'. Question: Why does 'Similar-to-Perception' first state the 'similar entity' and then the 'similar reason', while in this 'Similar-to-Inference', the reason comes first and then the result? Answer: That 'Similar-to-Perception' arises because the senses directly encounter an object, immediately generating an understanding and considering it to be real, not a later deduction. Therefore, it first states the result. But in this 'Similar-to-Inference', the reason must come first before inference can occur. Erroneous wisdom arises later, so the reason is stated first. Alternatively, 'shadowy manifestation', three phrases, three texts, are matched and explained in order.",
"There are many kinds of 'similar reasons', as previously stated. These are used as reasons.",
"Commentary: Explaining below. As previously stated, the nine faults of the thesis, the fourteen faults of the reason, and the 'similar examples' are all causes for generating erroneous wisdom and are called 'similar reasons'. This has been explained in detail before, so it is omitted to avoid repetition. According to the standard of 'having wisdom and reason', the explanation now also includes the cause of what is known and the wisdom that knows, both of which are incorrect, so they are both called 'similar reasons'. However, the explanatory text does not include this, so it is shown by citing the reason. Using those 'reason-wisdoms' as the prior reason. According to the principle, the statement should also say: 'If the 'similar reason-wisdom' and the erroneous recollection, the thought that the thesis and reason established by him are inseparable', but it is abbreviated for brevity. The explanatory text follows the statement and also omits it.",
"Regarding the arising of various wisdoms from 'similar comparisons'.",
"Commentary: Explaining the various wisdoms of similar meanings that arise previously. 'Arising' and 'generating' have the same meaning but different wording. For example, mistakenly considering fog to be smoke. Saying 'regarding similar comparisons', erroneously proving that there is fire, from which wisdom arises, saying 'wisdom is generated'.",
"Not being able to understand correctly is called 'Similar-to-Inference'.",
"Commentary: This explains the name. Because of those erroneous reasons, erroneous wisdom arises erroneously, unable to correctly understand the existence or non-existence of that fire, etc., which is a true lineage but not true, so it is called 'Similar-to-Inference'.",
"Furthermore, if one correctly points out the faults of the proponent, it is called 'Refutation'.",
"Commentary: The fifth major section below explains 'True Refutation'. The section is divided into three parts. First, a general statement of refutation; second, distinguishing the realm of refutation; and third, also showing the enlightenment of others, concluding the name of refutation. Or it can be divided into four parts. The first two parts are as before. The third part explains the substance of refutation, and the fourth part concludes the name of refutation. Or first state, then explain. There are three parts in the statement. 'If one correctly points out', stating the substance of refutation. 'Faults of the proponent', stating the realm of refutation. 'It is called refutation', stating the name of refutation. In the later explanation, first the realm, then the substance, and finally the name are discussed. Following the first classification, this is the first part. If another's argument has faults, and one can truly know them and show them to others, it is called 'If one correctly points out the faults of the proponent'. What are those faults?",
"So-called initial proponent's lack of completeness, faults of the thesis, the reason not being established, the reason being uncertain, the reason being contradictory."
]
}
性及喻過性。
述曰。此辨能破境。則他立失分二。初辨𨷂支。次明前失。言初能立缺減過性。此即初辨𨷂支。或總無言。或言無義。過重先明。故云初也。此之缺減。古師約宗因喻。或七六句。陳那已后。約因三相。亦或六七。並如前辨。或且約陳那因三相。為七句者。𨷂一有三者。如數論師對聲論。立聲是無常。眼所見故。聲無常宗。瓶色盆等為同品。虛空等為異品。此但𨷂初而有後二。聲論對薩婆多。立聲為常宗。所聞性故。虛空為共同品。瓶盆等為異。𨷂第二相。所量性因。𨷂第三相。𨷂二有三者。如立聲非勤發鼻取故。虛空等為同。瓶盆等為異。𨷂初二相。如立我常對佛法者。因云。非勤勇發。虛空為同。電等為異。因𨷂所依。故無初相。電等上有。𨷂第三相。四相違因。即𨷂后二相。如立聲常眼所見故。虛空為同。色等為異。三相俱𨷂。立宗過性等下。別明支過。此等或於能破。立所破名。故理門云。此中能破𨷂減等言者。謂前所說。𨷂減言詞諸分過失。彼一一言。皆名能破。或於所破。立能破名。理門又云。云何同法相似能破。于所作中。說能作故。傳生起故。作如是說。問云何能立缺減等。名為能破。能破理在出彼過言故。答此于能破。說所破名。據實能破。在於言也。或於所作說能作名。能立缺減等為因。能起此能破言。名為能作。即能破言從彼似起。名為所作。起及生作。名殊義一。破實在言。言缺減能破等。是于所作立能作名。亦如於果立彼因號。或可此唯約境。以下更云顯示此言。若前是言。何須后說。
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"性及喻過性。",
"述曰:此辨能破境,則他立失分二。初辨𨷂支,次明前失。言初能立缺減過性,此即初辨𨷂支。或總無言,或言無義,過重先明,故云初也。此之缺減,古師約宗因喻,或七六句。陳那(Dignāga,約480-540)已后,約因三相,亦或六七,並如前辨。或且約陳那因三相,為七句者,𨷂一有三者,如數論師(Samkhya)對聲論,立聲是無常,眼所見故。聲無常宗,瓶色盆等為同品,虛空等為異品。此但𨷂初而有後二。聲論對薩婆多(Sarvāstivāda),立聲為常宗,所聞性故,虛空為共同品,瓶盆等為異。𨷂第二相,所量性因。𨷂第三相。𨷂二有三者,如立聲非勤發鼻取故,虛空等為同,瓶盆等為異。𨷂初二相,如立我常對佛法者,因云:非勤勇發,虛空為同,電等為異。因𨷂所依,故無初相,電等上有。𨷂第三相。四相違因,即𨷂后二相,如立聲常眼所見故,虛空為同,色等為異。三相俱𨷂。立宗過性等下,別明支過。此等或於能破,立所破名,故理門云:此中能破𨷂減等言者,謂前所說,𨷂減言詞諸分過失,彼一一言,皆名能破。或於所破,立能破名。理門又云:云何同法相似能破?于所作中,說能作故,傳生起故,作如是說。問云何能立缺減等,名為能破?能破理在出彼過言故。答此于能破,說所破名。據實能破,在於言也。或於所作說能作名,能立缺減等為因,能起此能破言,名為能作。即能破言從彼似起,名為所作。起及生作,名殊義一。破實在言,言缺減能破等,是于所作立能作名,亦如於果立彼因號。或可此唯約境,以下更云顯示此言。若前是言,何須后說。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"Nature and the fault of the example.",
"Explanation: This distinguishes the realm of what can be refuted, and thus the opponent's position loses in two ways. First, it distinguishes the deficient members (𨷂支), then it clarifies the previous faults. Saying that the initial proposition lacks the nature of being a valid proof, this is the initial distinction of the deficient members. Either there is no statement at all, or the statement is meaningless; the serious faults are clarified first, hence it is called 'initial.' These deficiencies, ancient teachers discussed in terms of the thesis, reason, and example, sometimes in seven or six phrases. After Dignāga (陳那,約480-540), it is discussed in terms of the three aspects of the reason, also sometimes in six or seven, all as previously distinguished. Or, considering only Dignāga's three aspects of the reason, there are seven phrases. '𨷂 one has three' refers to cases such as the Samkhya (數論師) school arguing against the school of sound, establishing that sound is impermanent because it is seen by the eye. The thesis is that sound is impermanent, the similar examples are pots, colors, and basins, and the dissimilar examples are space, etc. This only lacks the first aspect while having the latter two. The school of sound argues against the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多), establishing that sound is permanent because it is audible. Space is the common example, and pots, basins, etc., are dissimilar. Lacking the second aspect is the reason of being measurable. Lacking the third aspect.",
"'𨷂 two has three' refers to cases such as establishing that sound is not produced by effort and perceived by the nose; space, etc., are similar, and pots, basins, etc., are dissimilar. Lacking the first two aspects is like establishing that the self is permanent against Buddhists, with the reason being 'not produced by effort,' space being similar, and lightning, etc., being dissimilar. Because the reason lacks a basis, it lacks the first aspect; lightning, etc., have it. Lacking the third aspect. The four contradictory reasons lack the latter two aspects, such as establishing that sound is permanent because it is seen by the eye; space is similar, and colors, etc., are dissimilar. All three aspects are lacking. Below, 'establishing the fault of the thesis, etc.,' separately clarifies the faults of the members. These are sometimes called the names of what is refuted in what can be refuted, hence the *Hetuvidyā-dvāra-tarka-śāstra* (理門) says: 'Here, the words 'refutation by deficiency, etc.' refer to the previously mentioned faults of the deficient words and parts; each of those words is called a refutation.' Or, the name of what can be refuted is established in what is refuted. The *Hetuvidyā-dvāra-tarka-śāstra* (理門) also says: 'How is the similar refutation of the same dharma? In what is made, it is said to be able to make, because it is transmitted and arises, thus it is said.' Question: How are the deficiencies, etc., of the proposition called refutations? The principle of refutation lies in expressing those faulty words. Answer: Here, the name of what is refuted is spoken in what can be refuted. The actual refutation lies in the words. Or, the name of what can be made is spoken in what is made; the deficiencies, etc., of the proposition are the cause, and the words of refutation that arise from them are called what can be made. That is, the words of refutation seem to arise from them and are called what is made. Arising, generating, and making have different names but the same meaning. The refutation truly lies in the words; the words 'deficient refutation,' etc., are establishing the name of what can be made in what is made, just as the cause is named after its effect. Or perhaps this only refers to the realm; below it further says 'to show these words.' If the former is words, why is the latter needed?"
]
}
顯示此言開曉問者故名能破。
述曰。兼顯悟他結能破號。立者過生。敵責汝失。立證俱問其失者。何名為問者。敵能正顯缺減等。非明之在言名顯示。此由能破言。曉悟彼問。令知其失。舍妄趣真。此即悟他名為能破。此即兼明悟他。以釋能破名。簡雖破他。不令他悟。亦非能破。亦有立量破他名為能破。此中且約出過破他。名為能破。或由彼立量有過故。方立量破。即亦顯彼。故此攝盡。若他無過。量破即似。非正能破。
若不實顯能立過言名似能破。
述曰。此大段第六明似能破。文分為三。初標似能破。次出似破體。后結似破名。並釋所以。此初也。
謂于圓滿能立至有過喻言。
述曰。此出喻能破體。初明妄言𨷂。后辨正言。即敵者量圓。妄言有缺。宗因喻正。虛謂為耶。不了彼真。興言自負。由對真立。名似能破。準真能破。思之可悉。
如是言說名似能破。
述曰。下結似能破名。並釋所以。于中分二。即結及釋。此即初也。如是者指前之詞。言說者。即圓滿能立缺減言等。如此等言。名為似破。問何故於圓滿能立。顯示缺減性言等。為似能破。
以不能顯他宗過故彼無過故。
述曰。釋所以。夫能破者。彼立有過。如實出之。顯示立證。令知其失。能生彼智。此有悟他之能。可名能破。彼實無犯。妄起言非。以不能顯他宗之過。何不能顯彼無過故。又他過量。不如實知。于非過支。妄生彈詰。亦是不能顯他過失。以無過故。設立量非。不如其非正能顯示。
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"『顯示此言開曉問者故名能破』。",
"述曰:兼顯悟他結能破號。立者過生。敵責汝失。立證俱問其失者。何名為問者。敵能正顯缺減等。非明之在言名顯示。此由能破言。曉悟彼問。令知其失。舍妄趣真。此即悟他名為能破。此即兼明悟他。以釋能破名。簡雖破他。不令他悟。亦非能破。亦有立量破他名為能破。此中且約出過破他。名為能破。或由彼立量有過故。方立量破。即亦顯彼。故此攝盡。若他無過。量破即似。非正能破。",
"『若不實顯能立過言名似能破』。",
"述曰:此大段第六明似能破。文分為三。初標似能破。次出似破體。后結似破名。並釋所以。此初也。",
"『謂于圓滿能立至有過喻言』。",
"述曰:此出喻能破體。初明妄言𨷂。后辨正言。即敵者量圓。妄言有缺。宗因喻正。虛謂為耶。不了彼真。興言自負。由對真立。名似能破。準真能破。思之可悉。",
"『如是言說名似能破』。",
"述曰:下結似能破名。並釋所以。于中分二。即結及釋。此即初也。如是者指前之詞。言說者。即圓滿能立缺減言等。如此等言。名為似破。問何故於圓滿能立。顯示缺減性言等。為似能破。",
"『以不能顯他宗過故彼無過故』。",
"述曰:釋所以。夫能破者。彼立有過。如實出之。顯示立證。令知其失。能生彼智。此有悟他之能。可名能破。彼實無犯。妄起言非。以不能顯他宗之過。何不能顯彼無過故。又他過量。不如實知。于非過支。妄生彈詰。亦是不能顯他過失。以無過故。設立量非。不如其非正能顯示。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"『Showing this statement opens and clarifies for the questioner, hence it is named 'able to refute'.』",
"Explanation: It also reveals that understanding others' faults is the characteristic of 'able to refute'. The establisher has faults. The opponent points out your errors. Both the establisher and the proof are questioned about their faults. What is called a questioner? The opponent can correctly point out deficiencies, etc. It is not the clarity that lies in the words that is called 'showing'. This is because the statement 'able to refute' clarifies the question for the other party, making them aware of their errors, abandoning falsehood and pursuing truth. This is understanding others, which is called 'able to refute'. This also clarifies understanding others, explaining the name 'able to refute'. Simply refuting others without making them understand is not 'able to refute'. There is also establishing a proposition to refute others, which is called 'able to refute'. Here, it is about pointing out the faults of others to refute them, which is called 'able to refute'. Or because the other party's proposition has faults, then a proposition is established to refute it, which also reveals those faults. Therefore, this encompasses everything. If the other party has no faults, the refutation is only apparent, not a genuine 'able to refute'.",
"『If one does not truly reveal the faults of the established proposition, the statement is called 'similar to able to refute'.』",
"Explanation: This sixth major section explains 'similar to able to refute'. The text is divided into three parts: first, it labels 'similar to able to refute'; second, it presents the substance of 'similar to refute'; and third, it concludes the name 'similar to refute' and explains the reason. This is the first part.",
"『It refers to the complete established proposition up to the statement of faulty analogy.』",
"Explanation: This presents the substance of 'similar to refute'. First, it clarifies false statements; then, it distinguishes correct statements. That is, the opponent's proposition is complete, but the false statement has deficiencies. The subject, reason, and analogy are correct. One falsely claims it is not so. Not understanding the truth, one makes statements boastfully. Because it is directed against a true establishment, it is called 'similar to able to refute'. Based on the true 'able to refute', one can understand it thoroughly.",
"『Such a statement is called 'similar to able to refute'.』",
"Explanation: The following concludes the name 'similar to able to refute' and explains the reason. It is divided into two parts: conclusion and explanation. This is the first part. 'Such' refers to the preceding words. 'Statement' refers to the complete established proposition, deficient statements, etc. Such statements are called 'similar to refute'. Question: Why is it that in the complete established proposition, showing deficient statements, etc., is called 'similar to able to refute'?",
"『Because it cannot reveal the faults of the other's doctrine, because they have no faults.』",
"Explanation: This explains the reason. The 'able to refute' is one who points out the faults of the other's establishment as they truly are, showing the establishment and proof, making them aware of their errors, and generating that knowledge. This has the ability to make others understand and can be called 'able to refute'. If they have not actually committed any offense, but one falsely raises objections, it is because one cannot reveal the faults of the other's doctrine. Why can't one reveal it? Because they have no faults. Also, if one does not truly know the other's faulty proposition and falsely raises objections to a non-faulty part, it is also not being able to reveal the other's faults, because there are no faults. Establishing a proposition that is incorrect is not a true 'able to show'."
]
}
亦似能破。今據決定。舉真能立。
且止斯事。
述曰。大文第三方隅略示。顯息煩文。論斯八義。真似寔繁。略辨為八。廣之由具顯。恐無進之漸。故今略說云且止斯事。
已宣少句義為始立方隅其間理非理妙辨于余處。
述曰。一部之中。文分為二。此即第二顯略指廣。上二句顯略。下二句指廣。略宣如前少句文義。欲為始學。立其方隅。八義之中。理與非理。如彼理門因門集量。具廣妙辨。
沼雖廁法莚。朽情難飾。濫因承乏。無以減言。于師曾獲半殊。緣𨷂未蒙全寶。因訓之次。舉螢而助曦光。其中文理是非。有智幸為詳定。
因明論疏卷下
No. 852-A
保元二年。專寺長講會。談因明大疏。至於能立不成已下疏文。諸本不同。或文上加文。取捨致謬。或字下止字。是非多過。然今且依唐和論家。且以末學愚案。[邪/心]奉講疏。有兩本之由。一慈恩制。如明詮導疏。二淄州續。如今所寫疏。本疏文略而理狹。末疏詞廣而義豐。續加之文。本無末有。半珠雖獲。全寶莫窺。但有一文。本具末𨷂。如以量所攝言。簡不定過也。詞異師資。勿輒添削。疏分本末。不偏是非矣。
於時同三年春三月七日大法師藏俊記之
No. 852-B
今勘唐和諸記。能立不成已下。有基疏。有沼續。明詮導疏基撰也。今所寫疏沼續也。要義抄云。基疏初量不言極成比所有。直言非現比所有。一分不極成。治續云。極成比所有。后量有法。基疏沼續同云。極成現
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"亦似可以被駁倒。現在依據決定的原則,提出真正的能成立的理由。",
"姑且停止討論這件事。",
"講述:大段文章的第三方隅只是略微顯示,爲了減少煩瑣的文字。討論這八個義理,真實與相似確實繁雜。略微辨析為八個方面。如果全部詳細地顯現,恐怕就沒有進步的途徑了。所以現在略微地說,姑且停止討論這件事。",
"已經宣說了少量語句的義理,作為開始確立方向。其中道理與非道理,在其他地方有精妙的辨析。",
"講述:一部論著之中,文字分為兩個部分。這裡是第二部分,顯示簡略而指向廣博。上面兩句顯示簡略,下面兩句指向廣博。簡略地宣說如前面少量語句的文義,想要作為開始學習,確立它的方向。八個義理之中,道理與非道理,如同理門、因門、集量那樣,有詳細廣博精妙的辨析。",
"我的見解雖然混雜了一些法莚(可能是指不純熟的佛法),但難以掩飾我的淺薄。濫竽充數地承擔責任,沒有什麼可以減少我的不足。在老師那裡曾經獲得一半的殊勝之處,因為淺陋未能完全領悟全部的珍寶。在訓導之後,如同舉著螢火蟲來幫助太陽的光芒。其中的文理是非,希望有智慧的人能夠詳細地審定。",
"《因明論疏》卷下",
"保元二年(1074年),專寺長講會,談論《因明大疏》。至於『能立不成』以下的疏文,各個版本不同。有的在原文上增加文字,取捨導致謬誤。有的在字下停止,是非錯誤很多。然而現在姑且依據唐和論家的說法,姑且以末學者的愚見,恭敬地講解疏文。有兩種版本的原因:一是慈恩大師(窺基)所著,如《明詮導疏》;二是淄州(可能是指淄州地區的學者)續寫,如現在所寫的疏。原本的疏文簡略而義理狹窄,後來的疏文詞語廣博而義理豐富。續加的文字,原本沒有而後來才有。雖然獲得一半的珠玉,卻未能窺見全部的珍寶。但有一種情況,原本具備而後來淺陋了。如以量所攝的言語,簡化了不定的過失。詞語不同於師長的教誨,不要隨意增刪。疏文分為原本和後來的續寫,不偏袒是非。",
"於時同三年春三月七日大法師藏俊記之",
"現在勘查唐和的各種記錄,『能立不成』以下,有基疏(窺基的疏),有沼續(沼的續寫)。《明詮導疏》是窺基撰寫的。現在所寫的疏是沼續寫的。《要義抄》說,基疏最初的量沒有說『極成比所有』,直接說『非現比所有』,一部分不極成。治續說,『極成比所有』,後來的量有法。基疏和沼續都說『極成現』。"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"It also seems possible to refute. Now, based on the principle of determination, present the truly valid reason.",
"Let's stop discussing this matter for now.",
"Explanation: The third corner of the extensive text is only slightly indicated to reduce verbose writing. Discussing these eight meanings, truth and similarity are indeed complex. Briefly distinguishing them into eight aspects. If all were fully and clearly shown, there might be no path for progress. Therefore, now I briefly say, let's stop discussing this matter for now.",
"The meaning of a few sentences has been explained as a starting point for establishing direction. The principles of reason and unreason within it are subtly distinguished elsewhere.",
"Explanation: Within a treatise, the text is divided into two parts. This is the second part, showing brevity while pointing to breadth. The above two sentences show brevity, and the below two sentences point to breadth. Briefly explaining the meaning of the few sentences as a starting point for learning, to establish its direction. Among the eight meanings, reason and unreason, like the Reason Gate, Cause Gate, and Collection of Measures, have detailed, extensive, and subtle distinctions.",
"Although my understanding is mixed with some *fa yan* (法莚, possibly referring to immature Buddhist teachings), it is difficult to conceal my shallowness. Presumptuously undertaking responsibility, there is nothing to reduce my inadequacy. I once obtained half of the excellence from the teacher, but due to my shallowness, I failed to fully comprehend all the treasures. After the instruction, it is like holding a firefly to aid the light of the sun. Regarding the principles of the text, I hope that wise people can carefully examine and determine them.",
"*Hetuvidyā-śāstra-ṭīkā* (因明論疏) Scroll Down",
"In the second year of *Hoan* (保元二年, 1074), the head of the *Senji* (專寺) held a lecture meeting, discussing the *Hetuvidyā-mahā-ṭīkā* (因明大疏). As for the commentary text from 'The Probandum is Not Established' onwards, the versions differ. Some add text to the original, leading to errors in selection. Some stop at a word, resulting in many errors of right and wrong. However, now, let's follow the sayings of the *Tanghe* (唐和) scholars, and with the foolish view of a junior scholar, respectfully explain the commentary text. There are two reasons for the existence of two versions: one is written by *Ci'en* (慈恩, Kuiji), such as the *Mingquan Daoshu* (明詮導疏); the other is a continuation by *Zizhou* (淄州, possibly referring to scholars from the Zizhou region), such as the commentary text being written now. The original commentary text is brief and the meaning is narrow, while the later commentary text is extensive in wording and rich in meaning. The added text did not exist in the original but exists later. Although half of the jewel is obtained, the entire treasure is not seen. But there is one situation where the original possessed it but later became shallow. For example, the language encompassed by the measure simplifies the fault of uncertainty. The wording differs from the teacher's teachings, so do not add or subtract arbitrarily. The commentary text is divided into the original and the later continuation, without bias towards right or wrong.",
"Recorded by Dharma Master Zangjun on the seventh day of the third month of spring in the third year of *Hoan* (同三年)",
"Now, examining the various records of *Tanghe* (唐和), from 'The Probandum is Not Established' onwards, there is *Ji Shu* (基疏, Kuiji's commentary) and *Zhao Xu* (沼續, Zhao's continuation). *Mingquan Daoshu* (明詮導疏) was written by *Kuiji* (窺基). The commentary text being written now is *Zhao Xu* (沼續). *Yōgishō* (要義抄) says that *Ji Shu* (基疏) does not mention 'extremely established compared to all' in the initial measure, but directly says 'not present compared to all,' and a portion is not extremely established. *Chi Xu* (治續) says, 'extremely established compared to all,' the later measure has the *dharma*. Both *Ji Shu* (基疏) and *Zhao Xu* (沼續) say 'extremely established present.'"
]
}
所有。一分不極成量也(已上)。明詮云。言將彼貿礙屬著無常者。沼法師云。將彼無常屬者貿礙(云云)。余文同也(已上)。明燈抄云。文可通彼難主離合釋難者。此沼師新續注加文也(已上)。週記[咒-幾+巴]記明詮。上下其意同也。然有人見註文云。后𨷂未獲。且獲半珠。謂無基疏者。違上諸文。不可依信。但明燈抄云。文論能立法。至慧沼續者。注云。后𨷂未得且獲半珠者。或有疏本無此文。準此卷末沼法師語。故彼文云。于師曾獲半珠。緣𨷂未蒙全寶。由此準知。沼師自注。今觀三卷。已專伏膺。兩卷余半。既是過半。豈是半珠。非全名半。何必等分名半焉。如華嚴序云。然一部之典。才獲三萬余言。唯啟半珠。未窺全寶。言此經下本有十萬偈。而晉朝諍才三萬六千偈。所獲尚少。來及半分。而猶為半珠。今此亦爾。不全名半耳(云云)。下文云。于師曾獲半珠。緣𨷂未蒙全寶者。有唐本疏。能立不成。終注云后𨷂未得且獲半珠(已上)。重修序云。既逼半珠之情。遂有獲麟之望。今意如彼。言緣𨷂者。為師為資乎。未詳何也(云云)。此文似無基疏。然無續加文。故作此言。同疏注也。
元歷乙巳之歲。暮春上旬之候。為充當年維摩會講師。學因明疏之次。以祖師權別當權少僧都之正本。而摸畢。
大法師信憲
{
"translations": [
"現代漢語譯本",
"所有。『一分不極成量也』(以上)。《明詮》云:『言將彼貿礙屬著無常者。』沼法師云:『將彼無常屬者貿礙(云云)。』其餘文字相同(以上)。《明燈抄》云:『文可通彼難主離合釋難者。』此乃沼師新續注加之文(以上)。週記、[咒-幾+巴]記、《明詮》,上下其意相同。然而有人見註文云:『后𨷂未獲,且獲半珠。』謂無基疏者,違背上述諸文,不可依信。但《明燈抄》云:『文論能立法,至慧沼續者。』注云:『后𨷂未得,且獲半珠者。』或有疏本無此文。準此卷末沼法師語,故彼文云:『于師曾獲半珠,緣𨷂未蒙全寶。』由此準知,沼師自注。今觀三卷,已專心伏膺,兩卷余半,既是過半,豈是半珠?非全名半,何必等分名半焉。如《華嚴經》序云:『然一部之典,才獲三萬余言,唯啟半珠,未窺全寶。』言此經下本有十萬偈,而晉朝諍才三萬六千偈,所獲尚少,來及半分,而猶為半珠。今此亦爾,不全名半耳(云云)。下文云:『于師曾獲半珠,緣𨷂未蒙全寶者。』有唐本疏,能立不成,終注云:『后𨷂未得,且獲半珠(以上)。』重修序云:『既逼半珠之情,遂有獲麟之望。』今意如彼。言緣𨷂者,為師為資乎?未詳何也(云云)。此文似無基疏,然無續加文,故作此言,同疏注也。",
"元歷乙巳之歲(1185)。暮春上旬之候,為充當年維摩會講師,學因明疏之次,以祖師權別當權少僧都之正本,而摸畢。",
"大法師信憲"
],
"english_translations": [
"English version",
"All. 'A fraction does not constitute a complete measure' (above). The *Ming Quan* (Clarifying Explanations) says: 'It speaks of exchanging what is impermanent, attached, and obstructive.' Dharma Master Zhao says: 'Exchanging what is impermanent and attached for obstruction (etc.).' The remaining text is the same (above). The *Ming Deng Chao* (Record of the Bright Lamp) says: 'The text can be understood as the difficult master separating and combining to explain the difficulty.' This is the text newly added and annotated by Master Zhao (above). Zhou's Record, [咒-幾+巴]'s Record, and *Ming Quan* have the same meaning from beginning to end. However, some people see the annotation saying: 'The latter *𨷂* has not been obtained, and only half a pearl has been obtained.' Those who say there is no original commentary contradict the above texts and cannot be relied upon. But the *Ming Deng Chao* says: 'The text argues that it can establish the law, continued by Hui Zhao.' The annotation says: 'The latter *𨷂* has not been obtained, and only half a pearl has been obtained.' Perhaps some commentary versions do not have this text. According to Dharma Master Zhao's words at the end of this volume, the text says: 'I once obtained half a pearl from the teacher, but I have not received the complete treasure due to *𨷂*.' From this, we can infer that it is Master Zhao's own annotation. Now, looking at the three volumes, I have wholeheartedly devoted myself to them. Two and a half volumes, being more than half, how can it be just half a pearl? It is called half because it is not complete. Why must it be equally divided to be called half? For example, the preface to the *Avatamsaka Sutra* (Flower Garland Sutra) says: 'However, of the entire scripture, only over 30,000 words have been obtained, only opening half a pearl, not yet glimpsing the complete treasure.' It is said that the lower part of this scripture has 100,000 *gathas* (verses), but the Jin Dynasty (266-420) only translated 36,000 *gathas*, which is still a small amount, reaching only half, and yet it is called half a pearl. This is also the case now, it is called half because it is not complete (etc.). The following text says: 'I once obtained half a pearl from the teacher, but I have not received the complete treasure due to *𨷂*.' There is a Tang Dynasty (618-907) commentary that cannot establish the law, and the final annotation says: 'The latter *𨷂* has not been obtained, and only half a pearl has been obtained (above).' The revised preface says: 'Having approached the feeling of half a pearl, there is a hope of obtaining a *lin* (mythical creature, auspicious omen).' The current meaning is like that. Speaking of *𨷂*, is it the teacher or the resources? It is not clear what it is (etc.). This text seems to have no original commentary, but there is no continued added text, so this statement is made, the same as the commentary annotation.",
"In the year of Yuanli Yisi (1185), in the early ten days of late spring, to serve as the lecturer for the annual Vimalakirti Assembly, while studying the *Hetuvidya* (Logic) commentary, I copied it from the original of the ancestral teacher Quanbetsu, who was then the Junior Abbot.",
"Great Dharma Master Xinxian"
]
}
同部經論
與本文同名或相近的其他版本、科判、譯文與註疏。